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Since its proposal in 1970, Fama's "Three Form" model of stockmarket
efficiency has become widely accepted as the framework for examining
stockmarket behavior. Using this framework, researchers have carried
out many intensive studies of the Western stockmarkets. From these
studies, the great majority of workers in this field have concluded
that the major Western markets (principally the US and the British)
are efficient in the semi-strong form. However, this general picture
of efficiency masks two disturbing features. Firstly, it is apparent
that not all semi-strong information are treated with the same speed
and understanding. Secondly, it appears that in a supposedly
semi-strongly efficient market, some weak form information are not
efficiently treated. It is therefore doubtful whether the Fama model
can be applied in its entirity.
Concurrently, there are indications that many less developed markets
do not match the US and British markets' efficiency. Nor do all
markets possess the complete set of ' ideal conditions which are
assumed to be given in efficiency debate. It would seem to be even
more difficult to apply the Fama model to these markets. Based on
these realisations, this dissertation begins by hypothesising that:
(1) Stockmarket efficiency is dependent on the nature of each market
and that there is no universal form of market efficiency; and (2) The
Fama model is over-rigid in its partitioning of information into
three "concentric" sets. A new model for the stockmarket information
system is therefore proposed - the Mosaic Model. In brief, the Mosaic
Model proposes that different markets produce different amount of
different types of information and that each market deals with the
information produced with different degree of efficiency. Such
differences arise because of the differences which exist in the
sophistication and inclination of the markets.
This dissertation begins with an extensive literature review to
provide support for the Mosaic Model within the context of the
Western Markets. It then proposes to validate the Mosaic Model
further by testing it in the less mature Malaysian market which is
very different from the US or the British market. The efficiency
with which this market treats seven different types of information is
tested by using direct replicate of tests previously performed on the
Western markets or close facsimiles of them. These tests reveal that
there are considerable differences in the way the Malaysian market
deals with these seven types of information compared with the Western
markets. In all cases, the Malaysian market appears to be less
efficient. The validity of the Mosaic Model is therefore deemed to be
upheld.
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Chapter One of this dissertation is divided into the following
sections:-
1.2 - INTRODUCTION
1.3 - PROBLEMS OF EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS (EMH) RESEARCH
1.4 - OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY AND PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MODEL FOR
DESCRIBING STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY
1.2 — Introduction
The field of stockmarket efficiency and its related field of capital
asset pricing constitute two of the most intensely researched areas
in the sphere of economic research. In the thirty years since modern
research started in this area, enormous contributions have been made
to the understanding of the behavior of securities. A majority of the
researchers in this field are now in general agreement regarding the
validity of the hypothesis that has been made in respect of the
efficiency of the securities market. Indeed, findings and jargons of
this field of research have even become common knowledge among
professional and lay practitioners of the art of investment. However,
wide acceptance among academics and wide dissemination of its
findings have not led to any consensus as to the validity of its
central hypothesis- the Efficient Market Hypothesis ( EMH). Until
today, the central theme of EMH is still rejected by most
practitioners and disputed by many academics as well. Admittedly, it
is true to say that in science consensus cannot be taken as a
hallmark of the correctness of a theoretical model as shown by the
long acceptance of the Ptolemaic view of the universe. However, it is
significant to note that there appeared to have been no slow-down in
the number of papers revealing anomalies which cannot be explained by
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EMH. Furthermore, a significant number of wellknown researchers and
commentators in the field appear to have moved back by a lesser or
greater extent from their earlier strong support of EMH. It would
thus appear that this field can still provide useful ground for
research in spite of the intensity of previous and ongoing work.
The idea that a stockmarket can be "efficient" was first propounded
by Fama in his landmark article of 1970. In it, he defined an
efficient stockmarket as follows:-
"The primary role of the capital market is the allocation
of the ownership of the economy's capital stock. In general
terms, the ideal is a market in which prices provide
accurate signals for resource allocation: that is, a market
in which firms can make production/investment decisions,
and investors can choose among the securities that
represent ownership of the firms' activities under the
assumption that security prices at any time "fully
reflect" all the available information. A market in which
prices always " fully reflect " available information is
efficient."
In such a market, the price of every security would adjust instantly
to the arrival of any new information regarding the value of the
security and the market price would instantly reflect the content of
that piece of new information. In this market, it would not be
possible for an individual to have the ex-ante expectation of being
able to make a profit from investing in any security that is greater
than the return given by the market as a whole after an allowance has
been made for the riskiness of the investment undertaken.
However, given the fact that the universe of relevant information is
extremely vast, students of stockmarkets obviously would differ as to
how much of the available information the price of a security
reflects. To allow for this difference of opinion, in the same paper
Fama also laid down the concept of defining market efficiency in
three increasingly efficient forms; namely the Weak, the Semi-Strong
and the Strong. Under this concept, the successive form of the
efficient market would " fully reflect" a bigger subset of the
information universe. In the Weak Form Efficient Market, the
information subset the security prices are said to " fully reflect"
is that which is related to the historical market data on the
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securities. Under the Semi-Strong Efficient Market, the information
subset which is reflected in the prices would be that which is
"publicly available". While under the Strong Form Efficient Market,
the information subset that is reflected in the prices would be that
which is available only to " investors and groups (that) have
monopolistic access to any information ( that is) relevant to price
formation ". Although, it is not explicitly stated, it is
generally accepted that the subset of information which is reflected
by a weak form market would constitute part of the subset of
information reflected by the semi-strong form. In turn, the subset of
information reflected by the semi-strong market constitutes part of
the subset of information reflected by the strong form market. Thus
a market that is efficient in the semi-strong form must ipso facto be
efficient in the weak form and a market which is efficient in the
strong form must also be efficient in the other two forms. However,
real life social phenonmena are seldom so clearcut. As will be shown
later, this unstated implication gives rise to considerable problems
for proponents of EMH.
Fama's schema of market efficiency quickly gained wide acceptance
since its publication and has been adopted by almost all workers in
the field. Since 1970, research papers have ranged widely over the
whole universe of the stockmarket information system, seeking to
determine the boundary of market efficiency. In the 15 years since
the paper was published, the main area of contention between the
proponents and opponents of EMH has narrowed considerably ( at the
very least this applies to researchers in the US, Britain and
Australia). It is now generally accepted by most workers in this
field that the market, insofar as it is possible to design workable
tests, is probably reasonably efficient in the weak form. It has also
been accepted that the market is most probably not efficient in the
strong form. (Evidence in support of these statements will be quoted
in Chapters Three and Four.) The main area of contention between the
opposing sides of the EMH debate is therefore now concentrated in the
semi-strong area. However, even within this much narrower area of
informational efficiency, there is still a great deal of
disagreement.
Perhaps it is not surprising that the vast majority of professional
investors, financial analysts, portfolio managers and stockbrokers
find the idea of EMH unacceptable. (For the rest of the dissertation
the short form "EMH" is taken to mean the semi-strong from of
4
efficient market hypothesis, unless otherwise stated.) Apart from
anything else, the EM1I, in its current form, assigns no role for
professional investment managers and analysts. If one were to accept
the main tenet of EMH in this form, one would be compelled to admit
that the profession of investment management is largely superfluous.
The logical way for non-insiders to invest in a semi-strong efficient
market would be to invest in a wide portfolio of stocks and totally
refrain from trading. One's return would then be determined by the
market according to the level of risk one is willing to undertake.
However, if one were to accept that not all professional objections
to EMH need arise as a result of self-interest, the general consensus
that is found among the over 15,000 financial analysts (this is for
the US alone) and probably an even greater number of portfolio
manangers and brokers is very compelling. While it is not
scientific, these professional investors are generally in agreement
that in their professional capacity, they continually come across
evidence of inefficiencies such that they find EMH go against what
their senses tell them.
The surprising thing is that many academics are not convinced either
by the arguments and evidence mustered by the EMH proponents. They
continue to unearth evidence indicating that there exists certain
inefficiencies within what many believe to be an efficient market.
Until today therefore, a neutral observer may be driven to come to the
same conclusion as Kuehner and Renwick (1980) that " the jury
must render the identical verdict for both sides: 'SCOTCH VERDICT -
NOT PROVED'."
At present, the stockmarket can still be said to be something of an
enigma in terms of informational efficiency. While there is a huge
body of evidence providing proof that the stockmarket is efficient in
the semi-strong form, there is also another body of evidence showing
that it may not be that efficient after all. An intending worker in
this field faces the difficult task of bringing the two sides of the
debate together and trying to make some sense of it all, mindful of
the enormous amount of effort that has been put in before him. It
would be unrealistic to hope that a single worker can do that much
to resolve the Great Debate. But it is hoped that the fresh approach
which is proposed may bring some unexpected insights to the problem.
This thesis will attempt to show that there is possibly a middle
ground where both sides of the EMH debate can claim to be right in
their own ways.
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In the next section, an attempt will be made to examine some of the
more important characteristics of the current state of EMH research
in all three forms and how these characteristics can and do give
rise to severe problems for the intending researchers in this field.
It is also hoped that some lights will be thrown on why the
proponents of EMH have met many difficulties in gaining acceptance
for their idea.
1.3 — Important Characteristics of
Stockmarket Research
Stockmarket research is unique in that it has a combination of
characteristics which creates many problems for the workers in this
area. These important characteristics are :-
(1) The lack of a strong theoretical foundation on how informational
efficiency is achieved;
(2) The lack of a clearly defined set of conditions and parameters for
efficiency; and
(3) The untestability of EMH in terms of its environment and methods.
Each of these characteristics and the problems which can arise will
be examined in this section.
1.3.1 - THE LACK OF A STRONG THEORETICAL
FOUNDATION IN STOCKMARKET RESEARCH
In the world of science, there is no rigid rule as to the necessity
of having a pre-existing theoretical model before tests on a
hypothesis governing the behavior of a certain phenomenon can be
carried out. A hypothesis governing a certain behavior can be laid
down even before the theoretical model governing the behavior has
been postulated. The EMH can be said to belong to this class of
hypotheses, for until now, there is no rigorous theoretical model
which can explain such efficiency in the stockmarket.
The non-existence of a firm theoretical foundation does not
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necessarily mean that a particular hypothesis is unprovable. What it
does mean is that the tests which have been carried out todate to
prove the validity of EMH are empirical tests. Such tests are likely
to be regarded with much greater scepticism by workers in the field
than tests which are based on a widely accepted theoretical
foundation. What it also means is that the testers of that hypothesis
have to be very much more rigorous in their tests. In addition, if any
unexplained anomalies are uncovered when the phenomemon is being
tested, it would mean that the hypothesis would be on very weak
ground.
How then does the lack of a firm theoretical foundation give rise to
problems for testers who are seeking to uphold the main tenets of EMH?
The Lack of a Model on How Informational Efficiency is Attained
The first problem relates to the lack of a model which can explain the
mechanism of achieving informational efficiency in the face of a
great diversity in the amount of information generated by each type
of shares and the lack of symmetry in the possession and
understanding of information by market participants. As will be shown
later, it is generally accepted that the stockmarkets of the West are
probably not hyperefficient. This being the case, the semi-strong
form of efficient market is usually the one that is hypothesised. If
this form of EMH is valid, what it means is that there exists a
mechanism by which all relevant information regarding all the stocks
in the market which is in the "public domain" is fully digested by
the " market" and an equilibrium price which represents the best
possible estimate of the future price of each and every stock in the
market is arrived at. In order to do so, the market will have to act
as if it is omniscient. However, until now, the question of how the
market achieves such omniscience has not been answered. Furthermore,
to achieve omniscience in the face of the great diversities in term
of participants and stocks is even more difficult to explain. The
next subsection will examine these diversities in greater detail
First, the range of participants in the market varies enormously from
the professionals who do nothing else but immerse themselves totally
in stockmarket research to the proverbial " little old lady from
Kalamazoo (or Pontypridd)". The cost of access and understanding the
available public information is manifestly not the same for the two
groups of investors given above.
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It could well be argued by some people that, in the West,
particularly in the US, because there are a great many financial
analysts whose works are well publicised, a great many journals and
newspapers on sale on the subject of investment as well as a long
history of share investment, the difference in the cost of access may
be too small to make a difference. However, in a very different
market like the Malaysian's, one can probably hypothesise that the
gulf between the professionals and the "small timers" is very much
larger. ( As an example of the general ignorance of the small timers
in Malaysia, it is the belief of this writer (and other professionals
in the field) that most of them do not realise there is a big
difference between overall earnings growth of a firm and its per
share earnings growth. As a result, firms engaging in takeover
"games" are as highly valued as firms with true, high internally
generated growth rate.)
If we were to leave aside the problem of definition of "public
information" for the moment; an efficient market, wherever it is,
would require the low cost producers of information to act in exactly
the same way as the high cost producers or there must exist a
mechanism for "telegraphing" the intentions of the low cost producers
to the high cost producers. As will be shown later on, it is doubtful
that the low cost producers would not act on their advantage or that
the telegraphing mechanism can act with instantaneous effect.
Secondly, the stocks which make up the market are not homogeneous. In
a market as complex as that of NYSE or LSE, there are a great number
of stocks which differ greatly in the amount of information each
generates and the amount of information which is taken in and fully
understood by the market participants. The amount of effort expended
by the market participants to collect and understand the information
generated would be dependent on the amount of perceived utility that
the participants can expect to gain. Given that nowadays, most of the
particpants are institutions and professionals, it can be expected
that they would be much more interested in the larger of the listed
firms as well as firms which are currently in vogue or those which
are making a new issue of one kind or another. If the price of a
stock should reflect the current level of understanding of the
available information on it, this would imply that it is the stocks
which are more "popular" with the market participants that are likely
to be more efficiently priced (unless it can be argued that the
threshold of informational knowledge required for efficient pricing
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is very low, so low that all listed companies do cross that
threshold). Again, it would probably be rash to so postulate.
Even if the threshold of efficiency in terms of public information is
very low, there is still the problem of the professional investors
being able to glean additional information from the vast pool of
information in a way that is not feasible for the small investors.
This is the socalled "mosaic effect" whereby a person having an
overall view of the information would be able to gather additional
information not available to those who only have the smaller segments
of the information.
The Lack of a Model of the Stockmarket System The second problem
relates to the nature of the stockmarket. Is it a truely free market
in the economic sense or is it controlled by a limited number of
participants oligopolistically or is it somewhere between the two
extremes ? Or it could be that certain sectors of the market
approaches the ideal free market form while parts of it are
oligopolistically controlled (oligopolist \ cal\y controlled not in
the active sense but in the sense that there are only a limited
number of investors actually taking part in this sector of the
market). If, as it is likely, the market resembles the latter case to
some extent, then the pricing of the stocks in some sectors is less
likely to be efficient. As will be shown later, two of the most
difficult to comprehend anomalies in the stockmarket are : (1) The
Small Firm Effect; and (2) The Closed End Investment Trust Paradox
(as they are known by the popular financial press). It is possible
that these two anomalies are the result of limited participation in
these sectors of the market and that those who have access to these
sectors may be disinclined to trade or may even be taking advantage
of their position.
Given such a complex situation, although it is not necessary to have
a theoretical model which explains the working of an efficient
market, it would help the case of EMH enormously if there exists a
model which could provide the theoretical underpinning as well as
explaining some of the anomalies that have been unearthed. In the
recent past, several attempts have been made to design models that
can explain market efficiency in the face of such diversity in
corporate disclosure and wide asymmetry in terms of the economic cost
of being fully informed. As will be shown in Chapter Four, none of
these models are particularly convincing. Furthermore, these models
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cannot explain all of these anomalies; anomalies which seem to
indicate that the market cannot be totally efficient. By contrast,
those models which allow for some degree of inefficiency appear to
have greater explanatory power.
1.3.2 - THE LACK OF A CLEARLY DEFINED SET OF
CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR MARKET EFFICIENCY
For obvious reasons, it is very risky to hypothesise that all
securities markets are efficient. Security markets do differ a great
deal in their make up. It has been long accepted that in order for a
market to be efficient, it must meet certain basic requirements.
Black, Fama, Lorie and Francis, among others, have set forth the
various requirements for an efficient market. Kuehner (1975)
summarised these requirements into the following five conditions:-
(1) Effective flow of (public) information;
(2) Fully rational investors;
(3) Rapid price change to new information;
(4) Low transaction cost; and
(5) Continuous trading.
However, the exact definition of the above conditions for an
efficient market has not been clearly stated, nor has it been made
clear in what ways the efficiency of a market would be affected if it
does not fully meet these requirements. As with other aspects of the
efficiency debate, situations tended to be seen in a black-or-white
manner. There had been few attempts made to allow for deviations
from the theoretical ideal. This has led to a situation whereby the
researchers have to interpret the wording of the hypothesis in their
own ways. Tests of market efficiency would be carried out based on
the testers' own definition of the various parameters tested as well
as their own choice of conditions under which the tests are carried
out. Some researchers then proceed to offer the results of such
tests as evidence of universal market efficiency or inefficiency. A
passage taken from the book of Granger and Morgenstern (1970) quoted
below is illustrative of such deterministic writing:-
"It is convenient to list the principal common beliefs (of
non-believers of EMH) and to state our subsequent findings
as far as they relate to these beliefs:-
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(1) There are cyclical and non-cyclical stocks: disproved
(Chapter Four)
(2) There are seasonal variations in stock prices e.g.
there is "summer rise", yearend rise" etc.: disproved
(Chapter Three and Four)
(3) Certain stock movements lead to other stock movements:
disproved (Chapter Nine)
(4) Stock market price cycles lead general economic
developments :disproved in general (Section 5.3)
(5) Stock prices can be predicted from "technical analysis"
of price charts: disproved as far as all currently used
(linear) techniques are concerned"
As will be shown in later chapters of this dissertation, many of the
recent papers seem to indicate that a great deal of the socalled
"conclusive evidence" of market efficiency turn out to be nothing of
the sort. It is hardly surprising that given the above approach,
different groups of researchers are continually in disagreement with
others.
The next subsection will take a closer look at the first three of
the above stated basic requirements for market efficiency and how
they can lead to interpretational problems for tests of efficiency.
It will also take a look at the problem of extending the efficient
market concept to markets which do not fully meet these
preconditions.
(A) Definitional Problems of the Conditions for Efficiency
(a) Definition of " Effective Flow of Public Information" is
Ambiguous The EMH requires all public information on the stock
market to be rapidly disseminated and understood by all the market
participants. By "public information", this is generally taken to
mean information that is available to any member of the public or is
published in a widely distributed source; that is, information that
is in the "public domain". In the US, this is usually taken to mean
information that is published in, for example, the Wall Street
Journal. There is little doubt that this information is available to
the investment professionals at very low cost. But what about the
small time investors? Can they get access to this information with
the same cost and at the same time?
Furthermore, there are sources of public information other than the
newspapers, for example the information produced by investment
research houses and broker firms. It is not clear whether this
type of information can be considered public information or not.
Since this type of information is available to any one who asks for
it or can pay a small price for, it can be regarded as public
information. Can one seriously postulate that this type of
information is truly available to all participants at the same cost
in terms of effort and time?
If the answer to the above two questions is both "no", then it must
be admitted that socalled public information is not always equally
available to all market participants. Would unequal access, hence
dissimilar cost of information, lead to inefficiency in the market? We
can draw some conclusion from the work carried out in testing for the
strong form of market efficiency.
The work of Pratt and DeVere (1968) and Jaffe (1974) have shown that
non-public information can have considerable utilities for those who
have access to it. It would seem that unequal access to public
information by different market participants is, in essence, the same
as some of the participants having access to non-public information.
If there is unequal access, it would seem that the market cannot be
completely efficient with regard to public information unless it can
be conclusively shown that access to information per se is not
essential to attaining market efficiency. But there is more to the
problem of public information than that. The work of Joy,
Litzenberger and McEnally (1972) (unanticipated earnings changes),
Chant (1980) (money supply figures as price forecaster) and Brown
and Rozeff (1976) (Value Line earnings forecast) have shown that even
what many would regard as common public information can provide
opportunities for obtaining abnormal profit.
Evidence so far seems to indicate that "public information" may not be
a black-or-white issue. That is, information need not be either
public or non-public but they can be more or less public. It would
not be possible to define exactly the concept of "public information"
and the speed of its dissemination. Two pieces of information, both
equally "public" by traditional standards may provide different
utility in the hand of different participants. It would seem to be
unduly deterministic if one were to infer overall public information
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efficiency based on the results of a test on a single type of
information.
(b) Universal Rationality Of the Market Participants Is In Doubt
Francis (1972) defines rational investors as investors who " are able
to recognise efficient assets so that they will want to invest their
money where it is needed most- that is assets with relatively high
return.". The required level of rationality that is embodied in that
statement is far greater than what it seems at first glance because
the determination of return from stocks is not straightforward. The
return one can expect from stock investments has to to modified to
allow for risk, different timing of return and the effect of
inflation on different stocks as well as alternative investment
vehicles. These modifications are obviously extremely difficult to
carry out and it would not be surprising if different classes of
market participants were to come to different conclusions as what
constitutes the rational action to be taken in a given situation. If,
for some reason, the bulk of the market participants were to be
collectively bias in their judgement of what constitutes the rational
action to take, it would be possible for the rest of the market
participants to take advantage of such irrationality.
There appears to be some evidence that such irrationality does exists
and that the market as a whole may even go through periods of
inefficiency when it could vastly under or over value a class of
stocks. This has been remarked upon by wellknown writers such as
Baumol and Malkiel as well as numerous popular fundamentalist
writers. Among possible evidence of lack of rationality is the poor
performance of the stockmarket during periods of inflation
(Modigliani and Cohn 1979); and the small firm effect (Reinganum 1982
and others). These anomalies will be examined in detail in Chapters
Three and Four and the next subsection will only briefly discuss how
the first of these anomalies could perhaps be explained by the
existence of less than perfect rationality on the part of the market.
If one were to examine the efficiency of the stockmarket in terms of
its valuation of stocks relative to their earning capacity, one would
find that over the very long run, say, 20 years or more, the
stockmarket is efficient ( for example, the S & P study quoted by
Lorie and Hamilton (1973)) for it is unlikely that a security can be
raispriced for such a long period of time. On the other hand, the
picture for the short and medium term is far from clear. Many papers
have been published to show that the earnings series of firms are
probably best described as being to close to submartingale processes
(e.g. work of Lintner and Glauber (1967)). However, several tests of
market efficiency do show that there is good correlation between
price and earnings over 1- 2 years ( e.g. the work Beaver and Morse
(1978)). This seems to imply that even if the earnings follow a random
process, this does not necessarily make it impossible to be
predicted. However, such ability to predict does not lead to abnormal
profit because lead time provided is short or even negative ( that is
the price move downward in anticipation of an earnings decline). Thus
the market can be said to be efficient because the information is
reflected in the price before or shortly after the earnings figures
become public information.
The picture of efficiency is less clear over the longer term. Can the
market be considered as efficient in the face of counter evidence of
the existence of superior professional investors as evidenced by the
superiority of the Value Line ranking (Black (1971)) as a
predictive tool? Could it be that the Value Line Corporation and
other superior investors have very different time horizons compared
with that of the typical market participants? It is a well known
fact that most investment analysts and other well publicised
investment professionals have a short time .horizon. There are seldom
any published earnings forecasts for beyond two years and the typical
professional investors are said by many well known writers to be much
more concerned with the short term ( e.g. Dreraan (1977)). This being
so, it is possible that the poor correlation between medium and long
term prices and current PER is due not so much to the
non-predictability of long term earnings figures (hence the future
market prices) but more due to the inability and/or the
disinclination of a majority of the professional investors to look
beyond the short term. It is notable that all four superior
investors mentioned in Seligman's article (1983) (Buffet, Munger,
Ruane and Schloss) as well as the Value Line Corporation are
self-professed followers of the investment philosophy of Graham which
stresses, among other things, the necessity to hold purchases for a
long period. While the success of the investors mentioned in
Seligmen's article cannot be taken as rigorous evidence of market
inefficiency, the recent direct test carried out by Oppenheimer and
Schlarbaum (1981) on Graham's investment strategy seems to indicate
that there is probably some truth in this assertion. It is possible
that they are all exploiting the irrational preoccupation of the
vast majority of the market participants with the short term.
(c) The Definition of "Rapid Price Change" is Uncertain In order
for the market to be efficient, the price change on the receipt of a
piece of new information has to be very rapid such that the more
knowledgeable investors cannot take advantage of their proximity to
the market. There is little doubt that in terms of large wellknown
companies, such adjustments can be very rapid indeed. As an example
of such rapid price changes, the shares of both Texas Instruments
and Digital Equipment dropped by over one third in value within three
days of their respective announcements of bad news in June and
October 1983. However, when the information released is about smaller
companies and/or dealing with lesser aspects of the corporate
performance, would the adjustment be just as rapid? The work of
Kaplan and Roll (1973) and Brown (1978) seem to indicate that the
rate of adjustment is low enough for abnormal profit to be made. Thus
the traditional assumption that prices adjust rapidly to new
information may be conditional on the type of information received.
(B) The Applicability Of EMH At Different Time And Place
The EMH is largely a product of the US investment environment of the
Seventies. There is little doubt that it has been an extremely useful
tool for understanding the overall behavior of the US stockmarket and
that many of its basic assumptions are probably correct. The US
market of the Seventies can be characterised by being mature, large,
complex, very well researched, with excellent corporate disclosure
and is at the same time well controlled and policed. There are many
well informed and sophisticated investors and many highly intelligent
and astute commentators. It is likely that it is very close to the
ideal conditions for an efficient market laid down earlier. It is
probable that these characteristics have some effect on it being as
efficient as it is. However, we have seen that even in the US, the
market can differ from the ideal conditions for efficiency. What
about markets with conditions which differ considerably more from
this ideal picture?
There are many other stockmarkets in the world that are very
different from the US market in term of meeting these requirements.
Indeed, judging by the writing of Galbraith(1954) the US market fifty
to sixty years ago was very different from what it is now. If meeting
these requirements results in a market being more efficient, how
would deviations from these requirements affect the efficiency of the
market? As will be elaborated in Chapter Four, work carried out in
less developed markets ( including the European and Canadian markets)
shows that there are greater signs of inefficiency. While there has
not been much work in the English language on markets which are even
less well developed than the European markets, those published so far
show that this area is likely to be fruitful ground for further
intensive research.
The Malaysian market, being just twenty five years old, is obviously
not as well developed as the US market. If it fits into the pattern
of the other less developed markets, it would be very useful ground
for research. A comparative study against the best developed markets
could yield interesting results in terms of the necessary conditions
for achieving efficiency and could perhaps throw some light on the
reasons for the existence of inefficiency in an otherwise fairly
efficient market. (Chapter Two provides a short descriptive
history of the Malaysian stockmarket as well as a contrasting study
of certain of its characteristics with those of the US and UK
markets).
From this short discussion we have seen that there are a considerable
number of ambiguities surrounding the conditions generally specified
for an efficient market. Even the most advanced market can fail to
meet some of these conditions in some parts let alone the less
developed market. While failure to meet all the preconditions does not
necessarily mean the existence of exploitable inefficiencies as Fama
rightly pointed out in his paper of 1970, it does mean that once
again, researchers have to be very much more careful in making
assertions about overall market efficiency in the light of such
evidence.
1.3.3 - THE "UNTESTABILITY" OF EMH IN TERMS OF A CONTROLLED
ENVIRONMENT AND OF CERTAIN PRACTITIONERS' METHODS
(A)The Impossibility Of Having A Controlled Environment For EMH Tests
If a stockmarket is efficient, it means that the current price of a
security is the best possible estimate of the risk adjusted present
value of its future price based on the current available information.
This means that the ex-post price should come from the same
probability distribution as the ex-ante price. However, this is very
difficult to test for two reasons. First, unlike some other social
phenomena, it is impossible to carry out controlled experiments on
market efficiency, however small scaled the experiment may be.
The second problem is that it is generally argued that the
distribution of stock prices does not conform to a distribution for
which the characteristics are well defined. This being so, it would
be difficult (if not impossible) to prove that any extreme movements
of stock prices that there are were caused by abnormal factors.
There is therefore is no way, after the event, to determine whether
big variations in stock prices are caused by market inefficiency or
not. It is possible for the big variations to be caused by the
ex-post prices being located at the extreme end of the probability
distribution.
Hitherto, tests on market efficiency therefore have relied on indirect
tests. These tests seek to infer inefficiency or otherwise by such
methods as observing the stock price series surrounding a critical
event (e.g. stock split) or the comparison of the expected return on
the stockmarket with the return derived from a particular stock
investment method (e.g. quarterly earnings used for the prediction of
annual earnings). In either case, efficiency or inefficiency is then
inferred based on the deviation from the expected after the
appropriate adjustment for risk has been made. Such inferences are
obviously very risky since they are very much dependent on the
assumptions made about what is expected, the risk adjustment made as
well as assumptions regarding the validity of the methodology of the
tests. A good example of how wrong inferences can lead to wrong
conclusions regarding market efficiency is the test originally carried
out to prove the strong form of market efficiency by Jensen (1968).
Jensen's conclusion depended on the poor risk adjusted performance
shown by mutual funds as proof that the market is highly efficient.
His test was based on the assumption that the mutual funds with all
their expertise and wealth of research ought be able to show better
than average return if the market is in any way inefficient. However,
as pointed out by later writers (e.g. Malkiel (1975) and Dreman
(1977)), there is substantial evidence that the mutual funds may well
be collectively bias in their stock selection and that they could also
be too big a factor in the market to be able to trade profitably
without telegraphing their intention to the rest of the market. In
this case therefore, poorer than expected return is no indication of
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efficiency or inefficiency.
Furthermore, such indirect tests have to be based on the statistical
concept of significance. In cases where the significance is
marginal, the conclusion reached would to some extent depend on the
personal bias of the tester. As Jones Tweedie and Whittington pointed
out in a "Reply" to a comment to their paper (1976), statistical
tests are not symmetrical tests. The fact that a test fails to uphold
the null hypothesis cannot be taken to imply that the opposite
hypothesis would be supported.
It is also notable that many of the tests so far carried out have
used the same source of data, that is, the CRSP tapes in Chicago.
The data held there are of very long duration and most researchers
have relied on tests carried out over long period of time in order to
secure the highest level of statistical significance. Given the fact
that a sociological phenomenon is being observed, it is questionable
whether it is necessary or even advisable to run tests on data
covering long periods of time. If the market's behavior is not static
but slowly evolving, its characteristics may have changed a great deal
over the duration of the test. These types of changes may produce
very "fuzzy" results in statistical tests such that either different
or no conclusion can be drawn. As an example of this, Allvine and
O'Neill (1980) arrived at a very different conclusion regarding the
existence of long term cycles compared with Granger and Morgenstern
(1970) in carrying out spectral analysis on the prices of NYSE
stocks. Their different conclusion can be partly attributable to the
incorporation of a phase shift in 1960 and extending the test to
1980.
(B)The "Intestability" Of EMH In Terms Of Some Practitioners' Methods
The nature of statistical testing is such that they have to be simple
with few variables. As the number of variables increases, the tests
have to be replicated an ever greater number of times. While in the US
or the UK it is possible to obtain enough data to replicate the test
many times, such abundance of data is not obtainable in all markets.
In certain markets, the researcher has to work with a fairly small
number of stocks. However, it is very difficult to make simple
straightforward tests to resemble exactly methods (even very simple
methods) commonly used by investors. This statement applies to
methods commonly employed by both technicians and fundamentalists,
although it is more so for the technicians' methods.
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In addition to the problem of keeping the test simple, there is also
the problem that some of the practitioners' methods are not amenable
to being tested. One of the most important percepts of the art of
technical analysis is the "trend channel" in which medium term
prices are supposed to confine their movements ( This is in
accordance with the concept of secondary movements under the Dow
Theory (see Edwards and Magee (1966 )). EMH proponents have tried to
use serial correlation, run tests and filter rules to show that the
trend channel is only a figment of the technicians' imagination.
However, each of these tests can only test one particular feature of
a trend channel and each of them can only emulate the real life
situation in a very crude manner. This is because the
characteristics of the secondary cycles under the Dow theory are not
specifically defined. The secondary price cycles have no fixed cycle
length (they are supposed to vary between 6 weeks and 6 months). The
slope of the secondary trend channel is also not constant nor is the
width of the trend channel known. Lastly, the number of cycles per
uptrend or downtrend is not known in advance either. It is difficult
to conceive of a statistical test that can make allowance for all
these features. It is not surprising that even a strong supporter of
EMH as Fama was moved to remark, " The simple linear relationships
that underlie serial correlation models are much too unsophisticated
to identify the complicated 'patterns' that 'chartists' see in stock
prices. Similarly run tests are far too rigid in determining the
duration of the upward and downward movements." ( Fama and Blume
(1966)).
Not only are the technicians' methods difficult to replicate, the
methods commonly employed by fundamentalists are also difficult to
test. The fundamentalist approach to investment as espoused by
Graham and his supporters holds in essence that all stocks have an
"intrinsic value" at any one time and that the market price wanders
randomly about the intrinsic value. If a person can derive the
intrinsic value of a stock, he should purchase it whenever its market
price falls considerably below its intrinsic value and hold it until
its market price is considerably above its intrinsic value ( as it
must eventually do since the price movements are random and bounded).
If one willing to wait long enough, the price will get above the
intrinsic value at which time he can dispose of it at a profit.
Again, it is probably impossible to test this theory. The
determination of intrinsic value is very much a subjective event
since it is derived from several measures rather than a unified
approach. The determination of the correct purchase and sales points
is similarly highly subjective. The length of time for which the
stocks have to be held was never clearly stated by Graham, although a
period of several years was frequently mentioned as a possibility.
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that few attempts had
been made to test this long standing theory in spite of the fact that
both Graham himself and a number of his followers have achieved well
documented success with his method. The one better known test on
Graham's method (Oppenheimer and Schlarbaum (1981)) is based on the
simplified method as described in Graham (1973) rather than that in
Graham, Dodd and Cottle (1962).
1.3.4 - CONCLUDING REMARKS ON SECTION 1.3
The EMH controversy, inspite of thirty years of intense research is
still far from resolved. An attempt has been made in this section of
the dissertation to show some of the reasons which are believed to
have created such difficulties for researchers seeking to prove this
hypothesis. We have seen that given the lack of a strong theoretical
foundation, the lack of unanimity concerning the exact definition of
the conditions for efficiency and the difficulty of designing
workable tests, the proponents and opponents of EMH are still very
far apart. It is likely that so long as these conditions persist, the
controversy will remain. This thesis holds the opinion that to a
large extent, the controversy is due to the strongly held views and
position of many researchers on both sides of the debate. It is
possible that the phenomenon may not be one which is resolvable on a
black-oi—white basis. It is also possible that an approach which
tries to adopt a middle ground between the two sides of the
controversy may yield better result. In the next section of this
chapter, an attempt will be made to lay down the objectives of this
study and how this writer plans to achieve them.
1-4 — Objectives o -f tbe Research
As shown in the last section, EMH research is fraught with enormous
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difficulties, especially for the proponents of efficiency given the
"one black swan is sufficient to falsify the hypothesis that all swans
are white" principle. Some of the proponents of efficiency seek to
strengthen their position by further research hoping that more
complex research methodologies, bigger bodies of data or the
discovery of risk misspecifications would demolish the arguments
mustered by their opponents. However, each of these research
directions can give rise to further problems. More and more complex
research methodologies have a tendency to further divorce the
academics from the real world of investment. Bigger bodies of data do
not necessarily lead to more clearcut results. Besides, the vast
majority of research carried out in the US rely on two sets of tapes
(CRSP and Compustats); it is doubtful if there is that much untested
data left. Nor can all anomalies be explained by reason of risk
misspecification ( for example, the Monday Effect and the Yearend
Rally) and some of the risk factors proposed are arguably not risks
but are inbuilt bias (for example, unexpected inflation can be
regarded as a risk factor and if included would remove the mispricing
of stocks during period of high inflation but some fundamentalists
could well argue that this "risk" is more the result of incompetence
among the financial analysts).
However, exhaustive and meticulous research over the last ten years
or so does not appear to have moved forward the position of the
efficient market proponents by any great extent. Based on the
reasonable assumption that a market should become more efficient as
it develops, if it has been so difficult to show conclusively that
the US market is efficient, it must be considerably more difficult to
do so for a less developed market like Malaysia's. This has led this
writer to the conclusion that it is possible that the original
assumptions underlying the EMH may be fragile assumptions and the
efficient market model as proposed by Fama may prove to be far too
simplistic for the real world situation, especially if one were to
take into consideration the existence of markets at different stages
of development. What is required may be a model (a new one or a
development of the Fama model) which takes into account all the
findings of the research since Fama made his original proposal and
one which has wider application to all types of markets. A study can
then be carried out to examine the predictive power of this model to
a real life situation. However, given the fact that the model would
have been developed using the research findings from the US, there is
hardly any point in testing it further in the US. The logical place
21
to test it would be in a market which has not yet been studied and
one which is also very different from the US in order to test the
wider applicability of the proposed model.
The Malaysian market fits the above description. In addition, it is
reasonably small in size and have a fairly short history. It is
therefore ideal in the context of a doctoral thesis.
The main objective of this research, stated very broadly, is to
propose an adaptation of the traditional model of the information/
security pricing system so that it can be used as the basis for
attempting to throw some light, to the extent possible, on the current
controversy surrounding the EMH issue. This model will then be tested
on a new body of data from a very different market. Given the
complexity and the ambiguity surrounding this issue, this may seem to
be an overambitious objective at first glance. However, it must be
pointed out that this objective represents the final rather than the
sole objective of the study. Before an attempt can be made to tackle
this objective, the study first requires the attainment of three
subsidiary objectives. The objectives to be attained in this study
can be considered to be each on a different level in term of
abstraction and difficulty. The study therefore proceeds from the
attainment of one objective to the next, each step building upon the
successful accomplishment of the previous step. The four objectives
are: -
(1) To carry out an analysis of the characteristics of the Malaysian
stockmarket;
(2) To carry out an analysis of the efficiency of the Malaysian stock
market in respect of a wide range of information;
(3) To compare the efficiency of the Malaysian stockmarket vis a vis
the American and British stockmarkets; and
(4) To examine the applicability of the traditional model of market
efficiency in the light of the above findings and to suggest
possible modifications/extensions to the traditional model of
informational efficiency.
The rest of this section will discuss the reasons for pursuing each
of these objectives as well as providing a detailed description of
each objective.
1.4.1 - AN ANALYSIS OF THE MALAYSIAN STOCKMARKET
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In the traditional model of an efficient market, the environment and
the participants of a market are assigned no specific role and their
contribution to market efficiency is not stated. However, this thesis
takes the position that the nature of the market and its
participants could possibly have important parts to play in the
attainment of its efficiency. The traditional model of EMH assumes
that the market is efficient because of the effective flow of
information to the fully rational investors who will instantly bid
up or down the prices to the optimum level. In what way this
efficiency is achieved is not stated. Nor does this model allow for
the existence of less than ideal market conditions and state what
would happen in that eventuality.
The modification/extension to the model of market efficiency that
will be proposed in this thesis rests on the not unreasonable
assumption that efficiency depends on various variables connected
with information availability and the correct interpretation of such
information. Markets in the world therefore differ in their
individual efficiency because they differ in terms of these
variables. While no prior research has been carried out to
specifically link any of these variables directly to a certain type
of informational efficiency, it is possible to develop some idea of
the factors which can lead to greater efficiency by examining the
characteristics of the US market in the context of the wide spectrum
of efficiency tests that had been carried out.
Take for instance, the situation in which the US stockmarket treats
the news of stock splits efficiently (Fama et al (1969)) but not the
news of earnings forecast error (Joy et al (1977)). We can probably
say with some confidence that it is efficient in the former case
because the vast majority of the investors and market professionals
understand the meaning of a stock split. But in the latter case, it
is not unreasonable to conclude that it is not so efficient because
fewer people take the trouble of either computing or compliling the
expected earnings figures and then compare them with the published
results. This situation is not at all surprising because it does not
take a very high level of investor literacy to understand that stock
splits in themselves do not creat value but it requires a far higher
level of sophistication to make sense of earnings forecasts and to
speedily take action as soon as the actual earnings figures are
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released.
In the US and the UK, hundreds of tests had been carried out to study
the efficiency of the markets in their treatment of a huge range of
information. Combining our knowledge of the characteristics of these
markets in term of its information system, particpants and the
financial literacy of the participants with an analysis of the
markets' behavior in those tests, we can develop some a priori
conclusions regarding what are the factors which are likely to lead
to greater efficiency. The following is a non-exhaustive list of
these factors, most of which are concerned with the degree of
sophistication of the investors and/or the availability of
information:-
-The proportions of professional versus private investors;
-The quantity and quality of investment publications;
-The average financial literacy of the market participants;
-The degree of control of equity by corporate insiders;
-The level of disclosure and the quality of the corporate annual
reports; and
-The number of traders and the level of trading activity in the market
If our prior analysis is correct, the more developed or sophisticated
a market is along each of these dimensions, the more efficient we
would expect it to be. It is true to say that most of these factors
do not lend themselves very well to being measured. Some of them would
be difficult to quantify (for example, financial literacy). While it
is not possible to provide a quantitative measure of each of these
factors, it should be possible to give a qualitative statement on
each and/or to measure some of them through the use of surrogates. It
is realised that qualitative statements may not be satisfactory in
the context of a dissertation. However, it is perhaps important to
note that it is not so much that such statements are in any way
usable in themselves but that they allow us to compare two different
markets and note the differences between them along each dimension.
The first major task of this thesis is then to produce a description
of the Malaysian stockmarket along each of the above stated
dimensions. This is provided in Chapter Two of the thesis together
with some other information on the market. If our hypothesis is
correct, it is likely that the Malaysian market would be less
efficient than the Western markets. The next step would then be to
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attempt to measure the degree of efficiency of the Malaysian market.
1.4.2 - ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MALAYSIAN STOCKMARKET
The main task required under this objective is to analyse the
behavior of the Malaysian stockmarket in terms of its efficiency.
More specifically, this will involve the analysis of the market's
response to certain types of information to discover whether it
"reads" these types of information efficiently or not. In the first
place, this would involve arriving at a definition of the term
"informational efficiency" which is testable. As will be shown in the
Chapters Three and Four, the workers in this field of research are
gradually moving away from the more rigid definition of informational
efficiency as originally laid down by Fama in 1970 towards an
approach which was first formally suggested by Beaver in 1981b. This
approach is better suited to the type of efficiency to be tested in
the thesis. In fact, the model of market efficiency proposed in this
thesis is a modification and extention of the Beaverian model.
In brief, Beaver proposed that a market/information system could be
said to be efficient in two ways. Either the whole
market/information system is efficient, in which case all the
information emanating from such a market are correctly "read" and
reflected in the price of stocks of that market. Or, only certain
'signals' from this market/information system are correctly read, in
which case, the market cannot be said to be efficient overall. Two
important features of this model have to be noted here. First, the
same market could react to different information in different ways
depending on how "difficult" (i.e. difficult in terms of the effort
required to uncover and comprehend the information) it is to read
each signal. Second, different markets could, conceivably, react to
the same information in different ways. The objective of this part
of the study is to discover how the Malaysian market reacts to
certain types of information (signals).
The choice of signals to be tested is obviously very critical to the
results that are likely to be obtained. If the signals to be tested
are restricted to very "difficult" signals, the market will give the
appearance of being very inefficient and vice versa. Fortunately, the
main purpose of this investigation is to afford a comparison with the
US and UK markets which have been very well investigated. We can
choose from the results of studies on the reaction of the market to
an enormous range of signals which cover a wide spectrum of
"difficultness" in terms of dissemination and comprehension.
There are several criteria used for selecting the number and type of
signals to be used in the comparison. It is decided to select seven
signals, the number being a compromise between comprehensiveness and
available resources. The selection of the actual signals is a
compromise between making full use of the data which can feasibly be
collected and the desire to have a wide range of different types of
signals. These seven signals are chosen because, to the degreee it
is possible to be definite, they are treated efficiently or very
efficiently by the US market. The reaction of the Malaysian market
to these seven different signals would give a good impression of the
overall efficiency of the market as compared with the US market.
This work will be described in the next subsection.
1.4.3 - COMPARISON BETWEEN THE US, UK AND MALAYSIAN MARKETS
As has been mentioned earlier, stockmarket efficiency is thought not
to be a black or white issue as commonly implied by many published
works. If we wish to compare two different markets in term of their
efficiency, there is no existing framework for doing so on a
graduated basis. In the first place therefore, this study has to
organise the concept of efficiency in such a way that some sort of
statement can be made in terms of comparative efficiency. As
mentioned in the last subsection, stockmarket efficiency can be
considered in terms of signal efficiency or overall market efficiency.
Since market efficiency is such a complex and nebulous issue under
the Beaverian model, it would be logical to compare different
markets based on their respective treatment of certain signals.
This study proposes that signal efficiency be thought of in terms of
the utility that can be derived by a person who can obtain, correctly
interpret and act upon a signal irrespective of the actual market
situation (the knowledgeable investor). The smaller the potential for
obtaining abnormal gain from that signal in the hand of that
knowledgeable investor, the more efficiently is that piece of signal
being treated by the market as a whole. In order to have an idea of
how much utility a piece of information may have, we must first
consider how a piece of information is processed by the market to
derive an efficient price for a stock.
It is possible to think of the process of attaining pricing
efficiency as a three staged one. Firstly, the market must produce a
piece of information which is of potential benefit to stock valuation
and disseminate it throughout the market. Secondly, the market, after
having obtained that piece of information, must correctly interpret
the meaning of its content. Lastly, after the correct
interpretation, the market still has to react speedily to bring the
price of the security to the correct level. If the market fails at
any of these stages, it would give the appearance of being
inefficient in terms of a particular signal. It must be emphasised
that this schema is developed as an aid to comparing the efficiency
of different markets and it is not meant to be definitive. As can be
expected the boundary between any of two adjoinning stages is likely
to be ambiguous and for certain types of signals, the three stages
can be compressed into two. The announcement by a firm that it is
filing for Chapter 11 protection under the Bankruptcy Act would be em
example of the latter case since the meaning of this piece of news
is instantly obvious. The diagram below (Figure 1.1) illustrates the
proposed schema.










FIGURE 1.1 - DIAGRAM OF PROPOSED SCHEMA FOR SIGNAL EFFICIENCY
Although failure at any of the above three stages would result in the
market being regarded as inefficient in terms of a particular signal,
there is a qualitatively difference in terms of which stage the
information-efficient price process fails. Obviously, if a market
does not even produce a certain type of information ( for example,
the non-availability of dividend forecasts for Malaysian companies),
it can be said to be very inefficient in terms of that particular
signal (compared with the US situation where the IBES consensus
forecasts for the larger corporations are widely available). In this
case, only those who have private access to that information can
profit from it; this means that the utility of that piece of
information ( if it exists at all) would be enormous.
At the next level, if the market does produce that signal (Stage I
Efficiency) but the market as a whole either does not get hold of it
or does not appear to interpret it correctly (for example, the
meaning of bonus issues may not be fully understood by the market
which regards it as a piece of good news). Those who are able to
interpret it correctly (i.e. that bonus issues in themselves are of
no benefit), would be able to benefit from it. Since presumably, only
a small number of people are privy to its true meaning (otherwise the
market would have the appearance of being efficient), the signal
would still have some utility.
At the next level, if the market is inefficient only in so far as it
is tardy in acting after its correct interpretation of that signal
(Stage II Efficiency), the faster acting investors will be able to
benefit from that signal. In this case, the utility of that piece of
information is likely to be smaller. Finally, if the market reacts
correctly and speedily to a signal, the utility of that piece of
information to anybody would be zero (Stage III Efficiency).
This study will therefore critically examine the Malaysian market's
response to each of the selected seven types of signals compared with
the US and the UK markets. At the end of the study, it would be
possible to give a general statement on the relative efficiency of
the Malaysian market. At the same time, it is hoped that with the
successful attainment of these three objectives, there is sufficient
ground to proceed to the next objective.
1.4.4 - A PROPOSAL TO MODIFY THE FAMA MODEL OF MARKET
EFFICIENCY TO SUIT A WIDER RANGE OF MARKETS
This section will introduce a new model of informational efficiency
for stockmarkets adapted from the Fama model based on the previous
discussions in this chapter awl on analysis of existing literature
which is described in Chapters Three and Four. The new model differs
from the existing, commonly accepted Fama model in its description of
the information system and the process of attaining pricing
efficiency. The description of the new model will be carried out by
contrasting it with the existing model.
1.4.4.1 - DESCRIPTION OF STOCKMARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM
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The Fama model of stock market information system is best illustrated








FIG 1.2 :FAMA 'S MODEL OF
INFORMATION SYSTEM
INFORMATION UNIVERSE
EACH SQUARE REPRESENTS A SIGNAL
FIG 1.3 : PROPOSED MODEL OF
INFORMATION SYSTEM
Under Fama's model, the information that is deemed to contribute to
market efficiency is thought of as three "concentric" sets of
information. A market is deemed to be respectively weakly,
semi-strongly or strongly efficient depending on which set of
information the security prices fully reflect. This model gives rise
to the following problems when tests are carried out to study market
efficiency:-
(1) The division of the information into three sets and the name
given to each is largely arbitrary. There is no real evidence that
all historical data are easier to obtain or treated with greater
efficiency than other types of public information;
(2) The definition of each type of information is inexact hence the
boundary between two adjoining sets of information is unclear;
(3) The market can be efficient with regard to what many would think
is non-public information and at the same time be inefficient with
regard to certain public information; and
(4) The division of the information universe into three subsets gives
rise to the tendency for researchers to think of the market's
reaction to a particular type of information as representative of its
reaction to the whole class of information.
In order to overcome these difficulties, a new model of the market
information system is proposed. The general concept of this model is
illustrated graphically in Figure 1.3.
This model which may be called the Mosaic Model does away with the
somewhat artificial division of the information into three
categories. Instead the model views the information universe within a
particular market system as being made up of numerous pieces of
information in a mosaic tile pattern. Each of the pieces of
information that is available in a particular market would have more
or less influence on the price of one or more securities.
The amount of information that is available is different from market
to market. There are two major factors determining the amount of
information that is available. Firstly, the amount of socalled
"public" information is dependent on the legal and institutional
environment of corporate disclosure. In a country like the US, the
amount of information that is disclosed to the shareholders and
authorities like SEC is truly prodigious while the amount disclosed
in Malaysia is very much smaller. Secondly, the amount of information
available is dependent on the number and quality of financial
journalists, research houses, broker firms and the like. The amount
and type of information produced by these sources can be very
different from that which is disclosed by the listed companies
themselves. Again, the availability of this type of information
differs greatly from country to country.
However, the available information can be thought of as being hidden
to some extent from the investors ( even what is thought of as public
information). In order to make use of the information, efforts must
be made and certain costs incurred. Some of the information is very
easy to gather; for example, quarterly corporate earnings figures.
Some can be more difficult, for example, inflation adjusted earnings
figures. While it may be useful to further classify the information
in terms of the cost and difficulty of gathering it, it is doubtful
if this is really feasible. Given the enormous number of information
pieces available in a market and their diversity, it would be
difficult to design a schema wherein all information pieces can be
described on the same scale. Secondly, it seems that a particular
market does not always behave in the same way. At times, it would
work very diligently in a particular area and uncover a lot of
information while at the other times, it may ignore this part of the
market. Thus in 1983 and 1984, the personal computer industry was in
vogue and the market did produce an enormous amount of data on this
industry while at the same time, there was a lot less information on
"blue chips" favourites like Polaroid, MMM and Walt Disney. Thus
information which requires a lot of effort to obtain is not
necessarily less accessible to the investing public.
The cost and accessibility of a particular type of information is
probably more a function of the amount of useful information there
is in the first place and the effort put in by the various market
participants to accummulate it rather than the actual "difficulty"
involved in gathering it. The next section will discuss the part
played by the market participants in creating, gathering and
understanding information.
1.4.4.2 - THE PART PLAYED BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS
The process leading up to the final decision making regarding the
sales or purchase of shares is very complex. There are not many
investors who do their buying or selling in accordance to the method
an adherent of EMH would prescribe. For the vast majority of
buyers and sellers, they trade because they believe that the current
market price is higher (for the sellers) or lower (for the buyers)
than the expected risk adjusted future price. This being so, the
enormous amount of information that is available on any one stock
has to be digested and distilled into a single piece of information
— the expected future price. This complex process can be broken down
into three steps as shown graphically in the diagram below following




















FIGURE 1.4 :PARTICIPANTS AND THE PROCESS OF
ACHIEVING INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY IN INVESTMENT
As can be seen above, the process can be thought of as one of three
parts — Information Creation, Information Gathering and
Interpretation and Investment Decision Making. Subsection 1.5.1 will
discuss the concept of information creation and this subsection
will deal only with the last two stages. These two steps however are
not straight forward in that the process can be direct or convoluted,
fast or slow depending on the participants involved. The three steps
in this process can be undertaken by a single market participant
(e.g. a large mutual funds) in which case it would be direct and
possibly fast or can be undertaken by a different market participant
for each step ( e.g. S&P, a broker and a small investor) and hence
conceivably slow. For a market to be efficient for one type of
signal, there must be a sufficient number of participants who can
complete all three steps quickly and correctly. As explained in
Section 1.4.3, inefficiency can arise if there is a failure in any of
these steps.
Under the model proposed by Fama, no specific role has been assigned
to the various market participants in the attainment of efficiency by
a particular market. This thesis however, postulates that the
informational environment and the participants who make up a market
have important influence on the efficiency of the market. For a stock
to be efficiently priced, all the knowable information on it must be
disseminated to - and be correctly interpreted by - a sufficiently
large number of investors or their agents. The US market with its
well developed legal and institutional environment and the large
number of information "gatherers" and "interpreters" is likely to be
very efficient. However this study takes the position that given the
large number of signals available in any securities market and the
very large number of disparate participants involved, it is extremely
unlikely that every single signal generated by the market can be
correctly interpreted and speedily acted upon. For most investors in
the US, it is likely that the market will have the appearance of
efficiency because they are situated at the tail end of a long chain
of events. The typical small investors, relying upon second or third
hand information relayed by their brokers, are most unlikely to be
able to discover any inefficiency. This does not necessarily mean
that the large well endowed mutual funds can perform a lot better.
The process of information interpretation under the typical mutual
fund environment could lead to group bias (Dreman (1977)) and the
typical institutional environment of large mutual funds probably lead
to slow decision making as well.
Under this scenario, the participants who are most likely to discover
and exploit inefficiencies are the smaller investment trusts or
companies run by individuals who can make accurate interpretations
of less well popularised information they have unearthed and then
act fast on such interpretations.
The Malaysian market however, lacking the institutional and legal
setup of the US, has a far smaller number of gatherers and
interpreters of the information. If, as hypothesised, they do play
an important part in the information efficiency process, the
Malaysian market is likely to demonstrate more signs of
inefficiency. This hypothesis will be tested in Chapters Seven and
Eight of this thesis.
1.4.4.3 - THE MODEL OF STOCKMARKET EFFICIENCY DESCRIBED
The Mosaic Model of market efficiency that is proposed in this study
is best described by drawing an analogy with the lithographic
printing process. In lithographic printing, colour and tonal
variations are achieved by the imprinting of coloured dots of
different sizes on the same surface. The overall impression of colour
and tones is controlled by the mixture of different coloured dots of
different sizes. Thus the impression of grayness can be achieved
either by imprinting an overall gray coloured dots or by an admixture
of black and white dots. The tone of gray colour can be achieved
either by using a gray ink of the desired tone or by the correct
proportion of black to white dots. Market efficiency can be thought
of as the overall impression of efficiency of a market as given by
the proportion of efficiently treated signals against the
inefficiently treated signals.
Thus we can think of black dots on a piece of paper as representing
inefficiently treated signals while white dots represent efficiently
treated signals. In the most simplistic case, the market can be
thought of as either totally efficient or totally inefficient. In the
former case, it would be white overall while in the latter case, it
would black overall. However, there are unlikely to be any totally
efficient or inefficient markets. The stockmarkets which are found in
the real world are likely to form a continuum across the range
between the two extremes. The problem of how to describe the relative
efficiency of each market arises.
The problem is that the signals are not themselves treated totally
efficiently or inefficiently (as explained in Section 1.4.3). That is,
the dots themselves need not be black or white but could be different
shades of gray. This means in effect that all stockmarkets are likely
to give the appearance of grayness of differing shades. In a highly
efficient market like the US, the overall impression would be one of
very light shades of gray since most of the dots would be white in
colour with a scatterring of gray and black dots. In contrast, the
Malaysian market, if it corresponds with the hypothesis in this
study, would give the impression of a darker shade of gray since many
of the dots would be black or gray with a scattering of white dots.
Thus when we speak of market efficiency, it is not possible to talk
of a market as being "efficient" overall. Its efficiency is one of
degree and parts rather than overall. Comparison between different
markets can only be carried out qualitatively, and even so such
comparisons can only be tentative. Therefore, there can be no
universal form of market efficiency. Each market differs in its make
up in terms of its legal and institutional environment and the
variety, number and quality of the participants. Such qualitative




A SHORT HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF
THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
MALAYSIAN AND SINCAFOREAN MARKETS
2.1 — Introduction
In Chapter One of this thesis, it has been pointed out that stock
markets of the world can and do differ greatly in their make up and
characteristics. It hypothesises that stockmarket efficiency is not
an automatic event. It is more likely, so it is hypothesised, that
stockmarket efficiency is dependent on the nature of the market and
that certain factors are likely to influence the degree of efficiency
attained by a particular market. This chapter will attempt to
describe some of those characteristics which are thought to be
important in affecting the degree of efficiency of the market and
will make some conjectures regarding the ex ante expectation of the
efficiency of the Malaysian stockmarket. The chapter begins by
providing a short descriptive history of the Malaysian stockmarket.
It is felt that an understanding of the history of this market will
lead to a better understanding of its present characteristics which
are likely to be strongly influenced by the past events.
A study of the history of the Malaysian stockmarket cannot avoid
mentioning the role played by Singapore, especially in the early
years of its development. Until 1957 when the then Malaya achieved
its political independence, the social and political administration
of the two countries was very much linked. During the time of the
British colonial administration, Singapore was regarded as the
adminstrative and commercial hub of the British colonies in the
region. Trading and other commercial activities therefore tended to
be started in Singapore and then proceeded to spread gradually to the
rest of the region. Malaya (as it was then known) was very much
regarded as the productive hinterland which existed to support the
port and commercial activities of Singapore. It was inevitable that
the securities industry started in Singapore, although with time its
institutions were to diffuse throughout Malaya as well.
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Given the longer history and greater sophistication of the
stockmarket participants in Singapore, it is inevitable that almost
all the writings that had appeared on the stockmarket were produced
by Singaporeans. Hitherto, there had been almost no writings by
Malaysians or foreigners specifically on the Malaysian stock market.
A study of the characteristics of the local stockmarket would need
to rely to a large extent on extrapolating what have been written on
the Singapore stockmarket. Even so, much of the writings that had
appeared cannot be regarded as being of a serious academic nature. A
large part of what is to be reported in this chapter can only be
regarded as being more anecdotal in nature.
This chapter is divided into various major sections. The first and
the longest is a descriptive history of the nature and organisation
of the stockmarket in the two countries. The rest of the chapter
will be divided into eight sections, each describing one important
characteristic of the market which together are believed to exert
some influence on the efficiency of the local stockmarket. The rest
of this chapter is therefore divided as follows
2.2 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKETS
2.3 - THE GROWTH OF THE MARKETS IN TERMS OF MARKET VALUE
2.4 - THE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL PATTERNS
2.5 - THE TRADING VOLUME AND THE VARIABILITY OF VOLUME
2.6 - THE NUMBER AND QUALITY OF INVESTMENT PUBLICATIONS, ADVISORY
SERVICES AND BROKER FIRMS
2.7 - THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
2.8 - SOME COMMENTS ON THE LOCAL MARKET FROM THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC
REVIEW
2.9 - CONCLUSION
2.2 — The Development. Of The
Local Securities Industry
The history of the local securities industry can be conveniently
divided into three parts, the first being its development up to the
eve of the Second World War when it was still largely Singapore based
dealing in British shares. The second is the period from the end of
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the Second World War to June 1973 when the Stock Exchange split into
its two component parts. The third is the post June 1973 period to
the present time with the separate development of the Malaysian
market being a highlight of this period.
2.2.1 - THE EARLY YEARS
The history of the earliest years of securities trading in Singapore
is very much the history of one single securities firm - Fraser & Co.
(Fraser & Co. still exists and is one of the largest broker firms in
the Republic today.) This firm was established in 1873 and until the
first establishment of a central meeting place by the brokers
themselves in 1908 (?), the premises of Fraser & Co. was the meeting
place of the local brokers. During these early years, Fraser & Co.
dominated the trading to such an extent that it made the market for
the rest of the brokers.
The nature of the securities trading which developed was very much
influenced by the dominance exerted by the British enterprises in the
colony at the time. The shares that were traded werethose of British
plantations and tin companies operating in South East Asia. The
sharebroking business therefore was very much an appendage of the
London Exchange. Shares were bought and sold only through the
intermediation of brokers in London and the local brokers had to
split the commission with them. (Parenthetically, it is is interesting
to note that until today, those longer established among the local
brokers still have amazingly close ties with London brokers through
this historical connection). Trading activities were largely
restricted to the morning period based on the overnight London
quotations received during the night. Orders for purchases and sales
were similarly made by the use of telegrams to London brokers. There
was a lapse of a minimum of six weeks for the delivery of shares to
arrive from London. Trading activities were leisurely and very
"gentlemanly" to say the least. Much of the local buying were for
investment purposes. However, then as now, the local market was not
immune to bouts of speculative mania.
The first instance of local share speculative fever took place in
1910. This was shortly after the brokers themselves had rented a
small room on the ground floor of a local shopping "complex" known as
the Arcade. The speculative fever was triggered by the rubber boom of
1910 caused by the automobile boom of the USA. The Straits Times
(then as now, the leading newspaper of Singapore) was moved to remark
that " ....the market had become a financial machine engrossing
the attention and resources of half the town!" The boom created the
impetus (as in 1981/83) for many people to move into the stockbroking
business. Again the Straits Times remarked, " Half the town seems to
have turned broker, jobber, or whatever you best call it "
However, many of the speculators and new brokers created by this boom
were wiped out in the "bust" which followed in 1912.
The development in the subsequent 20 years was relatively slow,
hampered as it was by the Great War and shortly thereafter the
collapse of the rubber market and the implementation of the Stevenson
Scheme to restrict rubber production. The 1929 Wall Street Crash and
the London Crash which preceded it brought further hardship and
ruthless price cutting competition to the local brokers. In June
1930, 15 local brokers decided it was better to cooperate than to
engage in cutthroat competition and the Singapore Stockbrokers
Association was established.
During the Thirties, share trading slowly became a much more pan-
Malayan than purely Singaporean activity such that in 1938, the
Singapore Stockbrokers Association was re-registered as the Malayan
Stockbrokers Association. On the eve of the Second World War, the
local stockmarket scene was not much different from that of 60 years
earlier apart from the greater number of brokers. The trading was
still largely restricted to shares of British plantations and tin
companies.
2.2.2 - THE MIDDLE YEARS
The Fifties was a period of very significant development for the
local stockmarket. The postwar prosperity, partly brought on by the
Korean War commodity boom and the beginning of local
industrialisation enabled a greater number of people to invest in
shares. The gradual emergence of large locally resident companies in
fields of finance and manufacturing industries created a counter
weight to the predominance of British companies. It has proved
impossible to locate any writings on the trading system in use during
the Fifties. That there must have been a fairly sophisticated system
is not in doubt since the first issue of the new Stock Exchange
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Gazette (1961) listed 76 locally domiciled companies on its trading
list. Many of these must have been publicly traded before the
existence of the official Exchange. The Association continued its
existence throughout the Fifties, with its activities at a high level
according to contemporary reports. The industrial developments of the
time, the achievement of Independence by Malaya in 1957 and the
increasing sophistication of the financial market made the need for a
proper stock exchange increasingly pressing.
In March 1960, 21 stockbrokers throughout Malaya and Singapore
reconstituted the Association into the Malayan Stock Exchange (It was
to be renamed the Stock Exchange of Malaysia when Singapore achieved
Independence in 1963 and became part of the Federation of Malaysia).
The service of the then Chairman of the Sydney Stock Exchange was
retained to design and implement a trading system. In November of the
same year, a Big Board system similar to the one in use in Sydney was
adopted and official trading started. Two trading rooms, connected by
direct telephone lines were established, one in Singapore and one in
Kuala Lumpur. The two "exchanges" in fact worked more or less as one.
The Early Sixties saw continuous improvement in the organisation and
completeness of the Exchange. The first issue of its official
publication - The Malayan Stock Exchange Gazette- was published in
June 1961. In 1962, Malaysian branch registers of British companies
which shares were traded in Malaysia were made possible with the
promulgation of the Enabling Order by the British government. With
this move, the Malaysian Stock Exchange began to slowly move away
from its previous very close tie to the London Exchange. Shares of
British Companies could then be traded locally as if they were
Malaysian shares. This development was to have very important
implications for the transfer of domicile of many British plantations
and tin companies from Britain to Malaysia during the Seventies. The
creation of the Malaysian branch registers together with the
disinvestment of overseas assets by British nationals throughout the
late Sixties and early Seventies (partly due to continual weakness of
the pounds and the very high Dollar Premium) eventually led to the
majority of the outstanding shares in many of these companies being
owned by Malaysians or Singaporeans. Since their assets had always
been in Malaysia in the first place, once the majority ownership
shifted to this region, it was inevitable that the official residence
of these companies shifted to Malaysia as well.
There were several other important developments which took place
during the Sixties whose effects were to become much greater than
anyone had originally expected. The first was the adoption of a
proper set of Rules and Bye-laws as well as Listing Requirments drawn
up with the help of the Sydney Stock Exchange (1965). Although these
rules and requirements were still very lax by current Western
standards, they represented the first attempt at regulation of
trading activities and some control over companies seeking to achieve
listing on the Exchange. The second was the promulgation of the
Malaysian Companies Act in 1965. The Companies Act required, for the
first time, certain standards of information disclosure by the public
companies as well as established certain rules governing the conduct
of directors and insiders of public companies. The standards for
disclosure represented considerable improvement on the previously
accepted standards and permitted some meaningful financial analysis
although they could still be said to be extremely lax standards (
when compared with SEC requirements). The last major development was
the creation of a Capital Issues Committee (CIC) under the
chairmanship of the Governor of the Central Bank in 1968 whose
function was to '...consider the draft prospectus or announcement of
any company intending to make a new issue or to seek listing on the
Exchange....'. This last development was destined to become a
powerful force in moulding the share market in accordance with
certain political aims of the government although the original aims
of its creation were similar to those of the SEC in the US.
Another development which was not directly connected with the Stock
Exchange was the separation of Singapore from Malaysia as a sovereign
nation in 1965. The decision was taken at that time to maintain the
Exchange as a single entity in spite of the political situation. In
view of this, the Exchange's name was changed to the Stock Exchange of
Malaysia and Singapore (SEMS) and its new identity was to continue
for another eight years. In retrospect, it does seem that the
decision was a futile one given the very different aspirations of the
leaders of the two countries. Singapore, right from the start, saw
itself very much the potential Switzerland of the East. It wanted to
creat a political and commercial climate that would lead to its
becoming a great financial centre. To this end, since the separation
it has increasingly tightened listing requirements and disclosure
standards through successive Companies Acts. The Malaysian leaders
however saw the Stock Exchange as one of the vehicles through which
the indigenous people ( i.e. the Malays) could be enriched and a
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larger share of the corporate ownership transferred to them. Stock
exchange listing has been, and still is, used as the "bait" to compel
foreign and non-Malay owned companies to transfer some of their
shares to the Malay community. As such, listing became very
restrictive and post 1975, only a small number of companies is
granted listing annually. (Chapter 6 will provide the detailed figures
on listed companies.) It was therefore inevitable that the two
countries would eventually split the Exchange. This took place in May
1973 at the same time as the interchangeability of the currencies of
the two countries was ended and each allowed to float separately. The
name of the Exchange was once again modified, this time to the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) and it had remained so since that time.
It is interesting to note that the local stockmarket had continued
to be very volatile during the Sixties. There were sharp upward
movements in 1962 and 1963. The Central Bank was moved to remark in
its 1963 Annual Report thus, "....(we have seen) excessive
speculation in the share market, concern over which was expressed
last year Recent share issues appeared to have encouraged the
gambling instincts of certain sections of the public aided and
abetted by the failure of some of the broking firms to observe the
rules of the Malayan Stock Exchange...." The market was to collapse
three years later when first Singapore separated from the Federation
and later Indonesia started its armed 'Confrontation' against
Malaysia. However, by 1968, there were again sharp movements of the
stockmarket upward. The Capital Issues Committee was created in that
year partly to curb speculative activities fuelled by unscrupulous
insiders. Just a year later, in the aftermath of the 1969 Race Riot,
the market collapsed again. This sharp gyrations of the market took
place throughout the Sixties and Seventies. It is not possible to
make any definite comment about the relationship between high market
volatility and efficiency at this stage. However, rapid and large
swings in the market would present opportunities for profit if such
swings could be predicted. Many local and foreign writers tend to
point to such rapid swings in prices as evidence of the emotional
rather than rational approach which Malaysians tend to bring to
investment. The magnitude of the worst of these gyrations will be
discussed in Section 2.3.
2.2.3 - POST SEPARATION IN 1973
Since the separation from the Singapore Stock Exchange, the most
important development had been the increasing part played by the
Malaysian government in the activities of the stockmarket. The
Malaysian Government, both directly and working through the normally
pliant KLSE Committee had increasingly used the stockmarket as a
mean of achieving some of the aims of the New Economic Policy (NEP)
which has the stated objective of increasing the indigenous people's
share of corporate ownership to 30% (from 2% in 1970) by 1990. The
Government had sought to achieve this by many different means vising
the stockmarket as one of the more crucial avenues through a
multipronged action plan.
Firstly, it has been directly intervening in the stockmarket to make
large scale purchases and carried out "dawn raids" on British owned
but Malaysian based companies. The success of this policy can be seen
from the fact that the largest of the previously British owned mining
and plantations companies such as Malayan Tin Dredging (now known as
Malaysian Mining Corporation), Guthrie Plantations, Sime Darby and
Harrisons and Crosfields Plantations are now all largely owned by
Malaysian statutory bodies or public corporations.
Secondly, it has made listing on the Exchange and the issual of new
equity conditional upon satisfactory compliance with the New Economic
Policy. This means that firms seeking public listing have to sell at
least thirty percent of their stocks to Malay individuals or
corporations at a price determined by the Capital Issues Committee.
This has led to a slowing of the stream of non-Malay owned companies
achieving listing on the KLSE to a handful a year. There is now
thought to be a great shortage of investment opportunities for the
newly prosperous non-Malays. This has probably partly contributed to
the very high valuation of listed companies since 1980. At the same
time, this policy of subsidy and encouragement has created a new
shareowning class who hitherto had little experience of securities
investment. Again, it is probably logical to conjecture that these
new investors are probably more prone to irrational behavior than
otherwise.
Thirdly, it had completely stopped the issual of new stockbroking
licences to non-Malay firms while at the same time strongly
encouraging Malays to enter stockbroking business in an industry that
had hitherto been dominated by the Chinese. Given that the vast
majority of the stock buying public are non-Malays and they would
prefer to take their business to Chinese firms, the existing
stockbroker firms have no shortage of business. Add to that the
existence of a fixed commission structure, there is even less
incentive to provide better service to attract customers. At the same
time, the newer Malay firms have neither the expertise nor the
wherewithals to do any better. The standard of research carried out
(if any at all) and the advisory service provided is therefore
extremely low. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that in
Singapore where a much freer market exists, the standard of research
and advisory service appears to have been improving quickly over the
last several years.
The history of the Malaysian stockmarket since its separation from
Singapore had been one of sharp contrasts. The second half of the
Seventies and the early Eighties was a period of incredible growth in
the nominal GNP of Malaysia through rapid industrialisation,
discovery of petroleum fields and enormous government deficit
financing (The nominal national income quintupled to $57 billion in
the space of five years). However, the structure of the stockbroking
profession and the Exchange itself had remained stagnant partly due
to strong governmental interventions. At the same time, the number of
listed companies has not kept pace with the growth of the disposable
income of the population ( see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). The enormous
increase in the disposable income of the population of the country
has also created a new class of investors with little previous
experience or knowledge of investment. In short,this market displays
many of the characteristics of the US market of the Twenties as
described by Galbraith (1954). It is possible that such a market
would lead to certain inefficiencies owing to the greater number of
first time investors, the lack of a good advisory network and the
shortage of shares. The inefficiencies, if any, will be examined
later in this thesis.
2.3 — The G srowh.h Of The Economy
And "the Stockmarket
2.3.1 -REASONS FOR THE RAPID GROWTH OF THE MARKET
In the years since the Malayan Stock Exchange was first officially
established, it has grown explosively. The total market value of
companies which are listed on it has increased from $ 573 million at
the end of May 1961 to $ 79,799 million by December 1983. Such a big
increase was only possible because of an unique combination of three
local factors.
(1) Transfer of domicile of many British companies to Malaysia;
(2) A rapid increase in the number of local listed companies; and
(3) Rapid growth in the GNP of the country.
Tables 2.1 gives the various figures connected with the growth of the
Malaysian stockmarket. The table provides the figures on a four
yearly basis to reduce the year to year fluctuation. The figures
provided are for beginning of the year except for the first and last
years. The cumulative compounded annual rate of growth for each
figure is also provided.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the Malaysian market had very close ties
with the London Exchange right up to the early Seventies. Many of the
British plantations and tin companies which were not listed
officially on the Malaysian Exchange were actually traded (in pounds
sterling) almost as if they were Malaysian" companies. Their daily
price and volume data were reported by the local newspapers and many
brokers made a market in them. However, with the establishement of
the Malayan branch registers and the gradual transfer of the domicile
of British companies to Malaysia, the importance of these companies
declined such that by 1983 none was left in this category. The second
major column in Table 2.1 shows clearly this decline. The indicated
explosive growth of the Malaysian listed companies is therefore to a
certain extent misleading. As can be seen from the third major column
of Table 2.1, the combined value of these two categories of listed
companies only increased at slightly above the pre-1976 GNP growth
rate (Table 2.2). Post 1976, there was an apparent spurt in the
growth rate of the market value of the listed companies over and
above the growth of the nominal GNP. This spurt can be attributed to
the higher valuation given to shares during this period. This higher
valuation can be seen from the average dividend yield of the stocks
in the database given in the fourth major column of Table 2.1.
Table 2.2 provides further information on the growth of the Malaysian
stockmarket by showing two of the better known stockmarket indices,
the GNP of Malaysia at current prices and the private sector
liquidity. The two better known Malaysian indices provided are the
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TABLE 2.1
CHANGES IN THE MARKET VALUATIONS OF STOCKS TRADED LOCALLY
FOR THE PERIOD 1961 TO 1983
YEAR LOCAL COHAPHIES LISTED FOREIGN RESIDENT CO'S BOTH MEDIAN
ON THE MALAYSIAN TRADED IN THE MALAYSIAN CATEGORIES DIV. YIELD
/SINGAPOREAN EXCHANGE /SINGAPORE MARKET
NO. MKT VALUE Z* NO. MKT.VALUE X» NO MKT.VALUE X*
$ M $ M $ M
1961 79 573 88 1975 - 167 2548 - NA
1964 107 1867 40.1 96 2059 1.2 203 3926 13.2 NA
1968 141 4165 30.3 66 1583 -2.9 207 5748 7.3 0.0327
1972 224 18267 35.1 31 844 -7.1 255 19111 13.9 0.0350
1976 254 12537 22.0 10 150 -5.7 264 12439 10.9 0.0384
249 42930 24.8 1 107 -14.0 255 43037 20.0 0.0333
1983 271 79799
. 24.5 0 NH 0 271 79799 16.5 0.0265
TABLE 2.2
GROWTH IN MALAYSIAN STOCKMARKET INDICES AND GNP
FOR THE PERIOD 1961 TO 1983
YEAR KLSE INDEX CUM.I NST INDEX CUM. Z MALAYSIAN CUM.Z PRIVATE CUM. X
1.1.70:100 ANNUAL 1.1.67:100 ANNUAL GNP AT MKT ANNUAL SECTOR ANNUAL
GAIN GAIN PRICES $M GAIN LIQUIDITY $B GAIN
1961 NA - NA - 5891 - NA -
1964 NA NA 8021 10.S3 NA
1968 NA - 168.53 29.82 10071 7.96 3.3
1972 433.76 63.09 432.73 27.65 12163 6.81 5.8 15.1
1976 229.79 16.42 279.92 10.84 26983 10.68 12.8 18.5
1980 532.79 16.42 834.37 16.66 50018 11.92 27.7 19.3
1983 644.22 14.23 1404.17 20.77 63802 11.44 41.2 18.3
NOTES:
X* : Cumulative annual compounded rate of growth from the first available datum.
NA : Not Available
NM : Not Meaningful
/
blue chips New Straits Times (NST) and the KLSE Industrial Indices.
As can be seen from this table, there was a most rapid growth in the
indices during this period. However, the rapid rate of increase shown
may be overstated by the indices as they tend to bias the growth rate
upward, albeit in different ways. The NST Index is a non-weighted
index which means that it is bias towards the smaller of the sample
companies. The KLSE Index is based on the total market value of the
sample companies. It therefore tends to bias the growth rate of the
market upward because the overall increase in market value includes
new shares created as a result of takeovers of previously non-listed
companies.
The growth of the indices does not show up the very large scale
transfer of stocks from the founders of firms to the general public
through new listings. Each time a company is listed, a large
percentage of its shares is transferred to the smaller investors. It
is possible that the characteristics of the individual investors
might have changed during this period. With very rapidly rising
income and a traditionally high saving community (throughout this
period, the national savings rate stayed above 25%), there might have
been a large emergent investment class. It is not possible to obtain
figures on the amount of private savings outstanding but an
indication of the amount of funds available can be obtained by
examining the figures for private sector liquidity. As can be seen in
the last major column of Table 2.2, this had been increasing
considerably faster than the GNP or the indices. Owing to the lack of
"paper" investment avenues other than stocks (there being no active
bonds market), it is very possible for this large number of newly
rich savers to turn to the stockmarket. It is admitted that there
are no figures to confirm this statement. (An analysis of share
ownership patterns will be shown in the next section). We have here a
situation that is reminiscent of the situation in the US during the
Twenties. There was a rapidly expanding economy, rise of new
industries and the creation of a new prosperous middle class with
adequate savings for making investments - A situation which has been
attributed by Galbraith, among others, to have fuelled the
stockmarket boom of the late Twenties leading to the Great Crash. It
is not possible to be as deterministic about the Malaysian investors
as writers on the Great Crash without further indepth research. But it
is possible that the influx of so many new investors during the late
Sixties and throughout the Seventies in Malaysia could lead to the
development of a "market" that is dichotomised, a market with a strong
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representation of inexperienced investors who are perhaps less
rational in their expectation and who are also possibly more prone to
fall prey to manipulators and market rumours. Such a situation and the
resultant behavior pattern would be more likely to lead to market
inefficiencies.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note the very large variability
of the Malaysian stockmarket, as can be partly seen from the figures
in Table 2.2 above. In fact the swings undergone by the market had
been much worse than the figures may first suggest. For example, the
KLSE Index has its base date as 1.1.70 but at the peak of the 1973
"bull market", the index stood at close to 600. The Index was to
collapse to 160 by the end of 1974, a mere 22 months later. The same
thing was repeated in the 1981 "bull market" when the index rose from
220 in early 1978 to a peak of over 820 by June 1981 and was to
decline by over 50% within 12 months. The fluctuations among
"non-blue chips" are of course even greater. It is not unknown for
these companies to lose 90% of their value within a 18 month period.
It would be overly deterministic to state that this variability is a
result of an inefficient market but again such wild swings are
possibly indicative of the less than perfectly rational approach of
some of the local investors.
2.4 — Patterns Of Share Ownership
A survey of the ownership patterns of Malaysian shareholders is
handicapped by the dearth of publications on the subject. The only
article of significance that this writer could find is Ooi (1979).
Some information could also be gleaned from corporate annual reports
which had recently started to provide a list of the significant
shareholders. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 are summarised from results of the
survey carried out by Ooi (1979). This survey was based on
questionaires mailed to the listed companies domiciled in Singapore
(1975-1976) and Malaysia (1977). The basis of the survey is the
number of owners in each company and the number of shares owned by
each owner in each company. No attempt was made to classify the
ownership in accordance with the market value of shares owned.
According to the author, about 50% of the companies responded to the
questionaires. The two tables below give the ownership pattern
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according to the number of shares owned by each class of owners.
TABLE 2 . 3
OWNERSHIP PATTERN OF SINGAPORE INCORPORATED COMPANIES
CLASS OF OWNERS NO.IN NO. OF SHARES PERCENT
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Table 2.5 below is based on a survey carried out by the writer from
information published in the 1983 KLSE Annual Companies Handbook. In
the last three years, it has become widely accepted that listed
companies should disclose its largest shareholders. This disclosure
policy has now been accepted by a big majority of listed companies
although there is no force of law or other institutional compulsion
behind it. This table shows the percentage of the outstanding shares
of the 30 largest companies (at the financial yearend closest to the
publishing date of the KLSE Handbook) owned by the three and five
largest owners. In addition, the table also gives the name of the
zaibatsu type corporate group with which each company is generally
associated ( unless it is not associated with any). It must be stated
beforehand that this survey tends to give an understated picture of
the degree of control of listed companies by individuals and holding
companies since companies of a group tend to be linked with each
other through cross holdings. Moreover, the shareholdings of the
controlling share holders are often held through nominees and
trustees. A study of the list of directors can nevertheless provide
an indication of the persons/groups in control.
TABLE 2 . 5
OWNERSHIP OF THE THIRTY LARGEST LISTED COMPANIES ON THE
ELSE BY THE THREE LARGEST AND FIVE LARGEST SHAREHOLDERS
MKT.VALUE PART OF: LARGEST 3 LARGEST 5
$'000 X O/so
COLD STORAGE 542,640 OCBC 56.57 63.34
F & N 638,400 OCBC 24.63 29.36
GENTING 786,974 LGT NA
HL INDUSTRIES 478,897 HL NA
M.BREWERIES 1,234,716 OCBC 78.42 84.44
MTC 783,000 56.72 60.10
MULTI PURPOSE 883,192 MCA 53.29 53.67
PERLIS 513,623 KB >50 >50
PROMET 615,681 48.66 60.25
SIME DARBY* 1,575,219 SDB MAL. GOV'T CONTROLLED
S.STEAMSHIP* 465,863 67.71 72.93
S.TRADING 1,053,000 OCBC NA
TASEK 514,372 25.66 32.71
TMB* 520,560 SDB 76.38 79.36
DBS* 1,945,071 59.78 64.53
HL FINANCE 1,251,000 HL 39.3 52.39
MBB* 1,251,000 ASN 50.91 64.91
OCBC 3,911,787 OCBC NA
UOB 1,633,197 NA
OUE 917,138 52.68 62.48
SHANGRI-LA 477,000 KB 50.15 67.89
BANDARAYA 491,231 MCA 46.77 54.36
CITY DEVEL. 485,390 HL 64.50 78.35
SEL.PROPERTIES 473,757 NA
SINGAPORE LAND 705,407 HL 73.12 77.65
HIGH & LOWLANDS* 812,832 KLK/ASN 48.61 58.19
KLK 686,752 KLK 45.65 48.89
CON.PLANTATIONS* 947,878 SDB 62.69 65.16
UTD.PLANTATIONS* 517,400 FIMA 69.94 76.51
MMC* 922,275 ASN 65.76 73.39
* These are companies in which either the Malaysian or Singaporean
Government has a controlling or large interest.
From these two surveys, it is possible to develop some prima facie
idea of the pattern of share ownership in Malaysia. The picture which
emerges is one which is very different from that of the Western
markets. There are several significant differences. Firstly, there is
only a minor representation from institutions, Secondly, corporate
insiders appear to control a very large proportion of the outstanding
shares. Each of these characteristics will be further examined and
the reasons for them will be discussed in the next subsection.
THE LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERS - In the West, institutions such
as pension funds, insurance companies and investment trusts hold a
very large and increasingly larger share of the total number of
outstanding shares. As can be seen from Tables 2.3 and 2.4, their
share in Malaysia/Singapore is very small. There are several reasons
for this situation. Firstly, there are very few privately run pension
schemes because of compulsory contribution by both employers and
employees to state run pension scheme ( in the form of provident
funds). There are only a handful of privately run pension schemes
which mostly predate the establishment of the state run scheme. The
state run provident funds organisation largely invests its money in
Treasury Bills and Bonds. It was only in the recent years that this
organisation started to consider the stockmarket. Second, almost all
insurance companies are foreign controlled and as a result their
investment strategy tended to be decided on a global basis. What
funds the local insurance companies have to invest are again invested
largely in Treasury Bonds and Bills. Thirdly, unit trusts, other than
state run unit trusts specifically for the Malays, are very
insignificant. Although the rate of saving is very high in
Malaysia/Singapore (>20%), few people are willing to invest in unit
trusts which suffer from the "chicken or egg" problem in terms of
size. That is, until they are large enough, they could not spend
enough on research and marketing to attract the clientele. Unless
they can attact a large enough customer base, they cannot afford to do
marketing or research of a high enough calibre.
CORPORATE INSIDERS CONTROL A VERY LARGE PROPORTION OF THE
OUTSTANDING SHARES - Unlike the West, where there is a very large
degree of separation between ownership and management control of
public corporations, most of the listed companies in
Malaysia/Singapore are still controlled either by the original
pioneering entrepreneurs and/or their immediate descendents and state
owned corporations. To a certain extent, the outside shareholders
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are at the mercy of the, insiders in terms of disclosure of relevant
information and the speedy release of crucial news.
The Malaysian market also has the feature of little trading for a
large proportion of the holdings of many listed companies. The reason
is that most of the insiders need to hold on to their shares very
tightly since they they would have already sold at least 30% of the
shares to Malay interests as one of the original conditions for being
listed in the first place or as a condition for their continued
listing. The Malay interests are almost always outside the
controlling group and at same time often monolithicly controlled the
possibility of losing control is always present if additional blocks
are sold. The Malay corporations, being mostly state owned, are
usually prevented from selling by their articles. A very large part
of the outstanding shares therefore are not freely available for
trading in the market under the normal circumstances.
It. is possible to make certain conjectures on the behavioral results
of this pattern of ownership. Firstly, the lack of institutional
demand and the tight control of insiders leads to a situation whereby
much of the trading in shares are carried out by individuals. The
lack of stabilising purchases or sales by institutions tends to
further exaggerate the normal swings in trading volume that is
present in any share market.
Secondly, it is very possible that the individuals, especially first
time investors, not having any concrete strategy to go by (this
aspect of the market will be examined in Sections 2.6 and 2.8), tend
to base their purchases more on the state of market. That is, news of
a strongly rising market would attract new investors who tend to rely
more on rumours and hearsays than on any economic principle. When
the economy of the country is prospering (concurrently, the
stockmarket is likely to be "booming" as well), a great number of
individuals would enter the market, leading to a tight supply
situation and wild price increases. The reverse would take place
when the economy goes into a recession. While at this stage, there
is little documentary evidence for this conjecture, there certainly
have been numerous comments by local and foreign writers on this
feature of the market (Section 2.8 will quote some of the comments on
the local market by a respected regional publication). If these
conjectures are correct, the existence of a large number of
"floating" non-knowledgeable investors can perhaps lead to their
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being exploited by the more knowledgeable investors and hence may
lead to inefficiencies.
The existence of conditions which can lead to inefficiencies does not
necessarily mean that there are testable signs of such. There are
several reasons for this. Firstly, a totally inefficient market (if
there exists a totally inefficienct market), is likely to show many
of the outward appearances of a totally efficient market. Secondly,
the need to go beyond reasonable doubt in testing for inefficiency
increases the possibility of the tester committing Type I errors. A
researcher needs to demonstrate better than 95% significance if he is
to be sure of his finding. But from a practical viewpoint, an
investor would probably be quite satisfied if his strategy proves
right, say, 75% of the time. Thirdly, the market participants could be
collectively bias such that they do not exploit the opportunities for
abnormal gain although such opportunities exist. Fourthly, even if
there are exploitable inefficiencies, it may not be possible to
design tests to uncover them, especially since the tests to be
carried out are largely replicates of tests already carried out in
the West.
2.5 — Trading VoXume
Whilst there have been no well known papers specifically commenting
on the cause of variability in trading volumes and there are no
theories specifically linking trading volumes to the efficiency of a
market, the variability of trading volume in the Malaysian market
could possibly provide a further pointer to the basically immature
characteristics of the market which have been remarked upon earlier.
It is normal for any securities market to have dull periods and active
periods, usually coinciding with periods of falling and rising
prices. In a mature market, with a large share of institutional
trading, there is usually a "basal" volume of transactions. Thus it
can be said that the variability of its trading volume is not too
great. We can draw some conclusions by observing volume charts on the
NYSE. On a day to day basis, the volume on its heaviest trading day
in any one year is no more than five times that of another normal
day. On a month to month basis, it is rare to find the ratio of the
heaviest trading month in a year exceeding that of the lightest month
by more than 2. In the Malaysian market, this ratio is far greater.
The ratio of the heaviest trading day volume to the lightest day in
any one year has exceeded 20 while 10 is regularly breached. On a
month to month basis, the ratio regularly exceeds four. The one
exception is the post 1973 peak period. For some unexplained reason,
the trading volume of the two individual markets after they have been
split approximately equalled that of the pre-split market.
The transaction volume patterns of NYSE and KLSE are compared in the
following tables. Table 2.6A is constructed from commercially
available volume charts of the transaction volume of the NYSE for
months surrounding the 1973, 1981 and 1983 peaks. Table 2.6B shows
the monthly volume surrounding the past three price peaks
experienced by the local market - 1969, 1973 and 1981. The trading
volume for the peak month and that for the second, fourth, sixth,
twelveth and eighteen months before and after the peak are provided.
These months are chosen without any special attempt being made to
include the months with the highest and lowest volumes.
The ratios have varied from 3.3 to 2.5 to over 4 (the differences in
the ratios in terms of value of shares traded are even more
pronounced). This seems to bear out the earlier conjecture that with
rising prosperity, a great number of individuals have adequate
savings for stockmarket investment. As first time investors, their
investment strategy (if it can be called that) is probably a lot less
rational and tended to be swayed by the immediate past performance of
the market. There is hence probably a large number of "floating"
investors who move in and out of the market. Their volume is such
that at times, they dominate the trading activities.
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TABLE 2 - 6A


















-18 12.7 56 60 82
-12 18.3 35 90 85
- 6 14.0 57 78 90
- 4 12.0 50 82 82
- 2 20.3 55 87 105
PEAK 18.6 45 115 100
+ 2 15.7 42 85 84
+ 4 15.0 48 88 88
+ 6 13.5 48 82 84
+ 12 18.0 50 120 104
+ 18 12.3 90 NA 133
TABLE 2 . SB


















-18 35.49 54.66 57.54 85
-12 43.05 62.14 136.19 115
- 6 34.17 107.95 107.17 131
- 4 44.56 83.30 186.41 142
- 2 62.06 63.39 206.50 149
PEAK 35.49 48.40 144.82 100
+ 2 46.18 34.75 84.81 87
+ 4 57.59 87.43 50.92 92
+ 6 53.83 65.82 117.76 123
+12 30.61 58.72 86.54 89
+18 18.67 95.87 73.91 101
2 - (3 — Sophistication and ttxe
Availability o ST Pub 1 ±cat ions
and Adv i so r~y Seirvioes
As mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis, in the West the availability
of the great number of brokers' research departments and other
advisory services as well as the numerous publications on the subject
is very much taken for granted. Most theorists on the EMH do not
actively consider the part played by them in the attainment of market
efficiency. In the West, just about any investor can obtain a great
deal of information on most of the listed companies. This together
with the long history of investment by the public most probably has
contributed to the efficiency of the market. The Malaysian situation
is very different. The typical individual investor has very little
knowledge of accounting and economics, cannot obtain advice easily
and does not know how to get information on any company. In sharp
contrast, there are knowledgeable investors and well informed
insiders operating in the very same market. It is difficult to
believe that the cost of information search is the same for the two
classes of investors. In economic terms, if a market is such that the
cost of information search is, on average, very high but is not the
same for all participants ( which is manifestly possible or even
likely), there would be opportunities which can be exploited by those
with the lowest cost of search. It would be difficult for a Westerner
to conceptualise the degree of unsophistication of the Malaysian
stockmarket in terms of availability and quality of information on
investment. It would be instructive to look at two particular aspects
of this problem:-
(1) The availablity and quality of investment publications;and
(2) The availability of advisory services.
THE AVAILABILITY AND QUALITY OF INVESTMENT PUBLICATIONS. There
are in total a population of 17 million ( in 1984) in Malaysia and
Singapore with an average level of income a fraction of that of the
United States (under US$ 2,000 per capita in 1984). Given such a
small consumption base, it is unlikely that there can be much in the
way of specialised investment publications. In fact, there are none.
The closest one could get to the likes of Barron's or Investors
Chronicle would be some specialised columns in several of the local
newspapers. Needless to say, there is nothing of the quality or even
the form of Fortune, the Economist or Business Week. The Far Eastern
Economic Review (a regional publication that is similar to the
Economist) has occasional articles on the Malaysian economy and
individual Malaysian/Singaporean companies. However, the circulation
of this newspaper is very small (35,000 worldwide in 1984). The
typical investor has to either rely upon the business section of his
daily paper, or to obtain the required information himself. The second
avenue is obviously not open to the typical small investors.
It is not possible to state categorically what the quality of the
journalistic writings on investment in the local newspapers is.
Section 2.8 will include comments from the Far Eastern Economic
Review on this aspect of the market. However, it would be true to say
that the standard of writing is well below that of the rest of the
English speaking world. Much of the writings consist of verbatim
reporting of company annual reports or news releases without
comments. Most of the socalled investment journalists have no prior
training on financial analysis or accounting. The standard is no
better whether the publication is supposed to be a "business"
publication or not.
THE LACK OF ADVISORY SERVICES FOR INVESTORS- It is normal for an
investor in the West to get advice from his stockbrokers regarding
the wisdom of his intended purchase or sales. Similarly, he could
subscribe to (or his broker would supply him) published opinion on
his intended investment from commercial advisory firms such as the
Standard & Poor or Valueline. One may argue about the accuracy and
quality of advice provided but it would be difficult to argue about
the overall high standard of research and workmanship which go into
their preparation. Even such a person as Graham was quoted by Beaver
(1981a) as saying that the quality of research had improved to such
an extent that it had become very difficult to find undervalued
companies. What is more important than their accuracy is their
overall impact on the literacy of the investment public. After the
experience of the Great Crash and that of the "Nifty Fifties Mania"
of the late Sixties, most advisory services do caution their
advisees to be prudent and rational. It is inevitable that there
would still be pockets of inefficiency today but it is rare to read
of advice of the genre, " Given the prospect of the company, the
current Price Earnings Ratio of 50 is fully justified" as can often
be found in Malaysia. It would seem likely that the long history and
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weight of such advice has some effect on the thinking and action of
the average investors.
It is notable that in the whole of Malaysia, until 1982, there was
not a single broker firm which published a newsletter on a regular
basis while there were only three which did so by the end of
1984. In Singapore, there were eight which were doing so by the end
of 1984. There was only one firm which provided an investment
newsletter subscription service throughout Malaysia and Singapore but
it closed down sometime in the early Eighties. The local Extel card
service only became generally available from 1983. But given the cost
of these services, their reach must have been very limited. There were
only four registered investment advisors at the end of 1982 (all
investment advisors have to registered with the Registrar of
Companies who supplied this information) in Malaysia (private
communication from the Registrar of Companies). The typical advice
one gets from the brokers in Malaysia and Singapore is based on
hearsays and rumours rather than facts and analysis. For, until very
recently, it does not require any qualification to be either a broker
or a broker's representative (for. the Malays, there is still no
definite requirement). It is generally accepted that the best advice
on investment comes not from local firms but from British based firms
such as Lawrence Prust or Vickers Da Costa.
2 - 7 — Amount o:f" Corporate Disclosure
The amount of information disclosed by the listed companies in their
annual reports, their various offer documents and their availability
to the investors at large have an obvious effect on the cost of
information search for the investors. In the US and Britain, the
amount and quality of information disclosed is determined by such
institutions as the Accounting Standards Board and the SEC as well as
the relevant laws of the land. In Malaysia, their equivalents would
by the Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants (MACPA),
the Capital Issues Committee (CIC) and the 1965 Companies Act. In
Singapore, their equivalent would be the Singapore Society of
Accountants, the Securities Industry Council and the Companies Act.
In Malaysia, and to a lesser extent in Singapore, there are several
institutional barriers to having adequate disclosure by the listed
companies. Firstly, given the fact that most listed companies are
still controlled by their founders or their descendents, the concept
of the public right to know has not yet taken very deep root. The
General Manager of the Singapore Stock Exchange, Mr. Lim Hua Min, was
quoted as saying (in Luchangco 1973), ' (companies
generally) comply only with the minimum in accordance to
statutory requirements and treat the annual report as an unnecessary
chore ' Luchangco in the same article spoke of the ' need
to improve on the current methods of corporate disclosure and
financial reporting And in Singapore, the statutory requirements
are even below those existing in such countries as United States
(Sic) and the Philipines.' The statutory disclosure requirements of
Malaysia are even lower than those of Singapore's.
As has been mentioned earlier, the original functions of the CIC
have been largely supplanted by its new function of enforcing the
implementation of the New Economic Policy. For the CIC, good
disclosure by the listed companies is a far less pressing objective
than the need to achieve 30% Malay ownership in the corporate sector
by 1990.
The MACPA as yet lacks the prestige and power of the ASB. It is only
recently that the MACPA has begun to enforce disclosure standards on
local listed companies. Prior to the enforcement of these standards,
the companies merely had to conform to the requirements laid down
under the 1965 Companies Act. Under the Act, the amount of
information that had to be disclosed was minimal. It centred around
unimportant issues such as the allocation of the profit into various
classes of reserves which is of no consequence from a financial
viewpoint. Table 2.7 is a list of the International Accounting
Standards (IAS) which have been adopted by the MACPA for enforcement
on local listed companies. It is most notable that a piece of
information as basic as the dollar value of sales was not required
to be disclosed until after the enforcement of IAS No. 5 on 1.1.78.
It was not until 1.1.83 before the enforcement of IAS No. 14 required
the listed companies to disclose very superficial segment
information. Until today, the listed companies are not required to
disclose trading accounts which makes prediction of future earnings
almost impossible. Judging by the standard of annual reports of
Singapore incorporated companies, the required standards of
disclosure there cannot be very much higher.
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TABLE 2 . V
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS- NO., TITLE AND ENFORCEMENT DATE
1.DISCLOSURE OF ACCOUNTING POLICY .1.78
2.VALUATION OF INVENTORIES (Cost Concept) .1.78
3.CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT POLICY .1.78
4.DEPRECIATION POLICY .1.78
5.DISCLOSURE OF RELEVANT INFORMATION (Incl. SALES) .1.78
6.PRICE LEVEL ACCOUNTING (Not Mandatory) .1.78
7.STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL POSITION .1.79
8.UNUSUAL, PRIOR PERIOD ITEMS AND CHANGES IN ACCTG. POLICY .1.79
9.ACCOUNTING FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT .1.80
10.CONTINGENT AND OTHER EVENTS AFTER BALANCE SHEET DATE .1.80
11.ACCOUNTING FOR CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT .1.80
12 ACCOUNTING FOR DIFFERED TAX .1.81
13.PRESENTATION OF CURRENT ASSETS AND CRT. LIABILITIES .1.82
14.REPORTING FINANCIAL INFORMATION BY SEGMENTS .1.83
It is important to note that the MACPA has no force of law behind its
power to enforce certain accounting standards. If a listed company
refuses (as many do on occasions) to uphold the standards, the most
that MACPA can do is to ask the auditors concerned to qualify the
offending company's annual report. In Malaysia where the standard of
journalistic reporting and the general level of investment literacy
is so low, qualification of an annual report would pass almost totally
unnoticed.
It ought to be mentioned also that public companies in
Malaysia/Singapore do not normally welcome requests for current or
back issues of their annual reports. Nor are there public libraries
where one can obtain this type of information. It is this writer's
belief that the cost of search for the typical small investor must be
extremely high compared with the small number of larger investors and
insiders.
2 _ 8 — E nxjr Eas t ei irn Economic Rev i cw :
Comments on the Loca 1 Menl<e t
A person not. familiar with the nature of the Malaysian/Singaporean
market is likely to be skeptical of some of the assertions made
regarding the lack of sophistication of the market. In order to
provide a neutral view of the market, the foremost economic newspaper
of the South East Asian region will be quoted extensively in this
section. The quotations are taken from a special feature on the
Malaysian/Singaporean stockmarket published on 12th April, 1984.
Although the comments are more applicable to the market during the
last several years of the research period, they do provide a glimpse
into the workings of the stockmarket in general. It is notable also
that the comments on the excessively high valuation of stocks in the
local market are only applicable during the "bull market" phases and
also during the last few years of the research period, while during
other times, stocks can be very lowly valued. The comments will be
divided into various subsections in line with the organisation of
this chapter.
2.8.1 - COMMENTS ON THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKET
"With more than 70% of their shares co-listed, the stock exchanges
of Singapore and Malaysia are as tightly linked as runners in a
three-legged race Singapore and Malaysia are, in effect, a
single market with a split personality. "
"The SES and the KLSE share with Tokyo some of the world's highest P/E
ratios. But, besides being far from world economic powers, Singapore
and Malaysia also differ from Japan in their lack of assured
continuity of industrial management and ownership. Higher political
risk and Malaysia's enforced transfer of wealth into Bumiputra (Malay)
hands present the predominantly Chinese movers-and-shakers of
industry and the equity markets with the incentives to seek
short-term rather than long-term gains.
"As a result, the markets are geared more to redistributing than to
creating wealth. Traditional equity-holders rush to flog off their
assets to the SES/KLSE market-makers — middle class Chinese punters,
bumiputra and foreign institutions. In the process, the assets often
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get handsomely revalued upwards by the market through a panoply of
excitement generating equity restructuring 'events' such as rights and
bonus issues, share splits, new listings and takeovers."
On Malaysia:
"The urgency of transfering equity into bumiputra hands accelerates
with the approach of the policy's 1990 deadline. The emergence of
bumiputra entrepreneurs such as and to take up the
slack (in government funding for stock investment for the Malays)
(also) provides new personalities to stoke up the rumour engine.
" Such overhanging questions (regarding the exact nature of the
NEP) only magnify the policy's menace in the eyes of traditional
Chinese wealth-holders.
"But they do get two messages loud and clear: their businesses face
forced equity restructuring and their days of unchallenged economic
sway are numbered. That adds to a deteriorating situation from which
many would just as soon flee. Equity restructuring, since it is
mandated anyway, can be turned to account as an avenue of escape."
" And if enough excitement can be generated, a lively secondary
market in a counter offers opportunities to insiders Syndicates
of big investors can readily ramp up prices Once an appetite
is built up, market players become attuned to capital-restructuring
ploys to the exclusion of fundamentals
" The resulting 'market culture' prizes dizzying
over-subscriptions, reward equity dilution ...."
On Singapore
"Singapore, with its higher liquidity, offers a livelier trading
arena
"Last year, for instance, brokers and punters in Singapore's budding
financial centre had access to a reservoir of banking liquidity 10%
larger than Malaysia's without any official restraint on banks
lending to stockmarket players.
"As to the amounts available to punters, a very rough idea may be had
62
by looking at the sums raised in application monies for new-shares
issues. Singapore's record breaking L&M issue mobilised S$2 billion,
and S$1.5 billionworth of application monies are the general rule for
SES newcomers. If stags can pull together that much money on a sudden
one-shot basis, brokers conjecture, they must have at least as much
for on-going speculation."
2.8.2 - COMMENTS ON THE BROKERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES
"A glimpse of the typical brokerage office in each country sums up
the contrast between the stock-exchange communities of Singapore and
Malaysia. A SES member firm is likely to occupy a suite in a downtown
skyscraper. Banks of remisiers and order takers track prices on their
desk-top computer screens, More screens and telephones
cluster on a central trading desk The research staff has its own
precinct.
"One spin-off (of the computerised database provided by SES) is the
relative advanced standard of research in Singapore's brokerage
community
"While still short of Wall Street standards, most of these
publications now feature a balance of market overview and company
focus, plus both technical and fundamental analysis
"Yet behind Singapore's facade of Anglophone, numerate efficiency, the
local market remains manipulation prone and rumour driven — what
brokers call "situational"
"Partners in Malaysian firms, by contrast, are just as likely to be
found alongside the remisiers and order clerks manning the telephones
on a raised dais facing the wall-to-wall chalk board. Clerks rush to
scrawl updated quotations as the punters crowd the back of the
dealing room, swapping gossip and intermittently buttonholing a
broker to pass an order. Research consists of a looseleaf binder of
hand-transcribed accounting data from the counter's reported results.
The scene might be set in a shop-front or a hotel arcade — this
correspondent found one brokerage in the back room of a Chinese
temple.
"'We simply do not need research,' explained one Malaysian broker
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whose outstation firm has got by for nearly 30 years without any."
2.8.3 - COMMENTS ON STOCKMARKET VALUATION
"Yet even as economic growth has slowed down the stockmarket
indices have more than quadrupled over the past five years But
how long can this share-price levitation go on? Does the market's
current long-term uptrend represent the economies' innate bouyancy,
or a large-ditch speculative sprint before prices implode and the
towkays (the big Chinese businessmen) bail out?
"One broker likens the lofty P/E ratios of Singapore and Malaysian
stocks to the aroma of durian, For investors who can overcome
their initial squeamishness, he pointed out that the fruits of these
stockmarkets, (i.e. capital gains) are tax-free. But non-initiates
might be excused for suspecting that some local equity may prove in
the end to be just what it smells like — unsustainably overvalued.
"Not that the responsible government agencies are over-generous in
their valuation of newly capitalised assets. A CIC source told the
REVIEW: "We see it as our stewardship to keep valuations wedded to
economic reality." That may be true as far as the stock exchange
door, but once inside, the divorce is effected. 'It is perverse,'
commented one analyst. 'It almost seems as though the more
conservatively the regulators assess an issue on its introduction to
the market, the racier will be the secondary market speculation.'
"The malady is even more strikingly demonstrated by the market's
unflappability in the face of such capital expanding ploys as rights
and bonus issues, stock dividends and stock splits. Seldom is the
earnings-per-share dilution fully reflected in the stock price, even
at the listing date. And the counter's rate of appreciation often
gets enough of a boost from the excitement thus generated to carry
it back to its predilution absolute price level in short order.
"The stockmarket landscape is littered with corporate shells — spent
tin mines or plantations, played-out industrials — whose most viable
asset is their stock exchange listing. From such beginnings sprang
such sometime stockmarket darlings as Malayan United Industries, a
M$1.9 billion combine that (was) parlayed out of a long
dormant rice company during the last speculative heyday prior to the
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1981 crash.
"Some of these high-flyers will emerge as market mainstays. Some will
go to ground in the next crash and will never get up
again While it is impossible to firmly pin anything on
anybody, there is the feeling that some syndicates of big players and
their broker friends jigged prices up to where they had to fail."
2.9 — CONCLUSION
In this short survey, it is hoped that it is possible to develop a
prima facie idea of the nature of the market we are dealing with. It
is a market which is very different from the present day markets of
the West. This market with its great disparity in the cost of search
for different market participants, the tight control of insiders, the
poor disclosure of financial information, the lack of institutional
investors and the poor standard of publication and advisory services
probably resembles the Western markets of 50 or 60 years ago. It is
therefore hypothesised that the EMH, which was developed for the
Western markets of the Seventies, is perhaps not fully applicable to
this market. This being so, it would be necessary to develop an
alternate model of stockmarket behavior which can take into account
differences in the nature of stockmarkets. Such a model has been
previously developed in Chapter One and this thesis will examine the
apllicability of this model in Chapter Seven and Eight.
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CHAPTER THREE
LITERATURE REVIEW — PART I
EFFICIENT MARKET RESEARCH URTO 1970
3.1 — Introduction "to Chapters 3—5
Chapters Three to Five of this thesis deal with the literature
connected with research on the subject of stockmarket efficiency.
Given that this field is one of the most intensely researched areas of
economics, the number of publications which has to be reviewed is
very large. As a result, it is felt that the thesis would be more
manageable and readable if the literature review is divided into
three separate chapters. Chapter Three deals with the research
directly connected with stockmarket efficiency published upto 1970;
Chapter Four deals with the same type of articles published from 1971
to the present date; and Chapter Five deals with articles which are
less directly concerned with stockmarket efficiency but which are
important to the unfolding of this thesis nevertheless. Even using
this subdivision, each chapter would still be very long. They are
therefore further divided into subsections.
3.1.1 - Organisation of Chapter Three
Unlike research in other fields of economics, intensive research on
market efficiency is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Intensive
research only became possible with the advent of large high speed
computers. Apart from a few notable exceptions, most of the more
important research papers on the subject were only published after
1959. In effect, this chapter will be dealing with articles which
were, in the main, published in a twelve year period. However, even
for such a short time span, one can note several important changes in
the nature and direction of the research carried out, such that by
the end of the Sixties, the emphasis of the main bulk of research
carried out had become very different from the emphasis pursued at the
beginning of that decade. The year 1965 could be taken as the
watershed between these two subperiods of research.
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During the first subperiod, much of the research was of a statistical
or "technical" (in the stockmarket sense) in nature. In those years,
academics were still inclined to think of the stock price series as
randomly generated processes and the Efficient Market Hypothesis was
still known under its previous name of Random Walk Hypothesis (RWH).
The main efforts were therefore directed at trying to prove that this
was indeed so. The paper by Fama (1965) is typical of the research of
the period. However, after 1966, with the gradual acceptance of the
information based model of stock price behavior, there was a rapid
increase in the number of papers that were published examining the
efficiency of the market in terms of its strong or semi-strong form.
And for various reasons which will be examined later in this paper,
there was a gradual decline in the number of papers examining the
technical aspect of market behavior (or the weak form tests as they
came to be known later) such that by the end of the decade, only
several papers of note were published yearly.
The papers which were published in the Sixties (with a few outside
this decade but included nevertheless) therefore could be divided
into three main categories. Firstly, there were the papers which were
concerned with the overall aspect of the market, each laying down its
author's hypothesis on the behavior of stock prices. Secondly there
were the papers concerned with the statistical and/or technical tests
on market beahvior which reached their peak in the early Sixties.
Finally, there were the papers concerned with the informational
efficiency of the market in the strong or semi-strong form which
started to appear in the second half of the decade. This is the way
by which the materials to be discussed in this chapter are arranged.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows
3.2 - Important Papers on the Overall Aspects of the Market;
3.3 - Articles on Statistical and/or Technical Tests:
3.3.1 - A Discussion on the Basic Principles of Technical
Analysis
3.3.2 - Efficiency Tests using Approximations to Trend
Analysis
3.3.3 - Efficiency Tests using Approximations to Structural
Analysis
3.4 - Publication on Semi-Strong and Strong Form Tests:
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3.4.1 - Research Related to the Semi-Strong Form of EMH
3.4.2 - Research Related to the Strong Form of EMH
3.2 — Important I"'nj:> e; xr £5 On The
Overal X Aspects of*
Stock 3P:r-±ce Behavior
There were not that many papers of this category published. The six
papers chosen demonstrate quite clearly the development of thinking
in this field during the decade.
MANDELBROT(1963) The early work of Kendall, Osborne and Moore
showed clearly that there was little serial dependence in the first
difference of price series for various commodities, including stocks.
However, it also became clear that the distribution of the logarithm
of first difference of prices did net closely conform to that of a
normal distribution. Since at that time, academics were still
thinking of stock prices as being generated by a random process, it
was obviously quite disturbing that in reality the first difference
of stock price series did not conform to the shape of a normal
distribution as expected. Attempts were therefore made to find an
explanation for this failure and such attempts fell into two
categories. Some, as exemplified by Cootner (1962), accepted that
there was no reason why it should do so. The distribution of stock
prices may not be generated by a random process and thus they would
not conform to a normal or any other type of probability
distribution. Others, led by Mandelbrot and Fama, sought to uncover
another probability distribution which would fit more closely to that
which is exhibited by stock prices.
The problem with the distributions of stock prices is that they are
leptokurtic compared with normal distributions. They are so
leptokurtic that it is very unlikely that they can be normal
distributions (as shown by Fama in his article of 1965). Mandelbrot
postulated that the distributions were Stable Paretian rather than
normal. Stable Paretian distributions belong to a family of
probability distributions of which the normal distribution may be
regarded as the extreme case. One of the characteristic exponents of
Stable Paretian distribution is known as ' a' which measures the
height of the distribution in the tails of the density function. A
normal distribution has an a of 2 while the stable Paretian family
has an a of between 0 and 2. The most important characteristic of a
distribution with an a of less than 2 is that it has an infinite
variance. Using the time series of cotton spot prices, Mandelbrot
-demonstrated graphically that their distributions closely conformed
to that of a theoretical Stable Paretian distribution with an a of
1.7. Mandelbrot therefore came to the conclusion the distribution was
indeed Stable Paretian.. He therefore deemed that the Random Walk
Hypothesis be upheld although the distribution of successive stock
price changes did not conform to a normal distribution.
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FAMA (1963) In this companion article to Mandelbrot's, Fama gave
strong support to the hypothesis that commodity price distributions
were Stable Paretian. In addition, Fama discussed the important
properties of Stable Paretian distributions and their implication to
investors. This work is also notable becaue he was the first person
to offer an explanation for the random behavior of stock prices. He
postulated that the changes in prices were caused by the arrival of
new information regarding the value of the underlying stock. The
distribution of the stock price changes would be in close conformance
to the arrival pattern and the effect of the information received. If
the arrival of such information were Stable Paretian, the distribution
of stock price changes would also be Stable Paretian. This hypothesis
was to be the first appearance of* the concept of the information
based model of stock price behavior. This will be discussed in detail
in a later section of this chapter.
If stockmarket research were to be diverted to the direction taken by
Famaand Mandelbrot, it could be said to be heading towards a dead end.
However, not all academics at the time were persuaded by their line
of reasoning. Cootner strongly criticised Mandelbrot in his
"Comments" on the Mandelbrot's paper published in 1964. He felt that
Mandelbrot's work was over casual and graphical and thus not
adequately rigorous. Secondly, he pointed out that daily spot cotton
prices were used rather than futures prices. Cootner contended that
it was a well known fact that spot prices were notoriously volatile
especially around harvest time because of the low level of physical
stocks in hand. Spot prices therefore are not a good representation
of stock prices. Mandelbrot's paper also failed to address the
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question of the change in the leptokurtosis of stock prices as the
differencing interval is changed from one week to longer periods
brought out in Cootner's earlier paper (1962).
FAMA (1965) This monumental article can be divided into three
major parts:-
(1) A description of the meaning, the necessary conditions for, and
the implications, of random walk;
(2) A careful examination of the theoretical and empirical evidence
for a probable shape of the distribution of stock prices; and
(3) An extensive series of tests to show the validity of the of random
walk Hypothesis.
The third part of the article appears to be the main purpose of the
article and will be examined in detail in the next section. The
first two parts of the article constituted a strong support for the
hypothesis that distribution of stock price changes conform with the
Stable Paretian distribution, hence the random walk hypothesis can be
upheld. This strong support for the random walk model was at the end
of an era. It demonstrated the thinking of the majority of the
researchers at the end of the first phase of the development of the
EMH. Fama's next well known article, published a mere five years
later would have shown his moving away from a pure random walk model
towards an information based model.
In this article, Fama foreshadowed the movement away from a dogmatic
random walk model to a more practical information based model. Early
in the article, he made the distinction between statistical
independence of successive price changes and practical independence.
He admitted it was most unlikely that perfect statistical
independence existed. He accepted that the fundamentalist's concept
of the existence of an intrinsic value around which the market price
of a stock would fluctuate may be valid. However, the important
question to be asked was whether anyone could benefit from such
random movements around the intrinsic value. In the real world, it
was possible for the intrinsic value model to co-exist with the
random walk hypothesis. In fact, it was even possible or even likely
that there were superior chartists who could detect the existence of
any dependency in stock prices.
But in a world of uncertainty, it would be difficult to know the
exact intrinsic value of any one share ( that is, the intrinsic value
could be masked by a big noise item). Besides, the intrinsic value of
the share would change with time. It would take a very superior
analyst to know what the exact intrinsic value of a share was at a
given time. However, it was very unlikely that the superior analyst
could take advantage of his knowledge (if he existed at all) for a
long period. For his very action would be largely self-defeating
because his action would creat dependencies in the price series which
would be detectable by other superior chartists. The implication of
the random walk hypothesis was that for the vast majority of the
market participants, it would be quite pointless to do any analysis.
Given the conclusion of the first part of the article, it is strange
that Fama should proceed with the second part. If the successive
price changes are indeed practically independent, it would seem to
be immaterial what type of probability distribution the time series
conform to. The clue may lie in a statement about one property of the
Stable Paretian distribution in his article of 1963 which was
repeated in the present article. Fama pointed out that if the
distribution was indeed Stable Paretian, the distribution would have
infinite variance. This meant that the risk faced by the investors
would be much greater than if the distribution was Gaussian and it is
possible that Fama wanted to emphasise this risk. In the remainder
of the second part of the article (Section III and IV) Fama attempted
to demonstrate the validity of the Mandelbrot hypothesis. As
discussed previously, the debate as to whether the distribution of
successive price changes conforms with the normal or Stable Paretian
distribution would lead into a blind alley and there is therefore
little point in discussing it here.
BAUMOL (1965) Although this short book was more concerned with
economic efficiency in terms of perfect capital allocation by correct
pricing in the stockmarket, it still made several important points
regarding stockmarket behavior which were in the same direction as
the hypothesis postulated earlier in this thesis.
Firstly, the book strongly denied that the stockmarket could ever be a
perfect market in the Walrasian sense with the supply and demand
perfectly matched through an auction type mechanism to arrive at the
equilibrium price. The book pointed out that apart from anything else,
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the supply of stocks at any one time was inelastic while the demand
could vary greatly. Over the short run, there must be another
mechanism for bringing about the equilibrium. The book offered strong
evidence that the specialists played the role of the market makers in
the short run and from this process did earn considerable profits from
their unique knowledge. Baumol made the point that the fact that the
specialists could make a profit must mean that, to a small extent at
least, prices were not free to move in a completely random manner.
It is interesting to note that Cootner (1962) and later Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) extended this line of reasoning to cover, in
addition, the situation of the knowledgeable investors who could
extract an 'economic rent' from the market through their superior
knowledge and lower cost of search for information.
Secondly, the book pointed out that the market could also be
inefficient in the longer run, contrary to the then available
evidence. Although the book could offer no rigorous proof of such
assertion, again its line of reasoning has been echoed by other
writers of the field. Baumol was of the opinion that the majority of
the market participants were prone to highly emotional response to
news. He suggested that the universe of available stockmarket
information was so vast that the process of correct price
determination would be very difficult for most of the market
participants. The market therefore tended to "clutch at straws" and
to respond emotionally to the appearance of news. The market,
contrary to what one's commonsense may suggest, may actually produce
a unified response to the appearance of a piece of news even though
the response may not be economically rational. In support of this,
Baumol suggested that Schelling's "focal point" theory may have
application here. Many people, though not in communication or acting
in concert, could produce the same response to a given stimulus. Such
collective reponse could often be wrong and would provide
opportunities for knowledgeable investors. This is in line with the
fundamentalists' approach to investment and is also close to the
Keynesian "what the average opinion believes the average opinion to
be" model of stockmarket behavior. In support of this, Baumol cited
the case of the severe price drop at the news of President Eisenhower
having suffered a heart attack. This collapse, according to Baumol,
was caused not so much by the fact that the market collectively
thought that his heart attack would result in the diminution of stock
value but by the fact that the participants thought that the market
would collapse at the news; the collective action produced the self
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fulfilling effect.
Baumol also suggested that the diffusion of information throughout
the market could not possibly be instantaneous. It would thus be
possible for professional investors to reap abnormal profit from
having first access to the news. This hypothesis (in the first part
certainly) was to be proved right many times by later researchers
examining the speed of stock price adjustment to news.
SAMUELSON (1965) Samuelson addressed the theoretical problem of
the behavior of commodity futures prices. Since stock prices closely
resemble commodity futures prices, his work is applicable to the
study of stock price behavior as well. In this writer's opinion,
/samuelson's article was the most significant in this era. It probably
had very powerful influence on the thinking of the researchers of the
time; shifting the direction toward the information based model.
Samuelson set out to prove that it was unimportant that commodity
prices should fluctuate in accordance with some probability function.
It was perhaps a lucky accident that prices should conform so closely
to one theoretical distribution or another. There was also very
little reason why there should be so little serial correlation in
price series, again probably another lucky accident. Nor did it
matter that the price movements should resemble that of a random
walk. In fact, from an economic viewpoint, there was every reason to
think that they should not since the prices of commodities were
unlikely to be completely unbounded in their movements.
Samuelson believed that the movements of commodity futures prices
should resemble a martingale, or the socalled 'fair game' model. (At
this point in the development of his hypothesis, he ignored the
question of futures premium.). This meant that the present price of a
commodity was the best possible forecast of its future price and it
would therefore be impossible to reap a profit from the knowledge of
the past prices alone. He started with two basic assumptions:-
(1) The expected value of a spot price sometime in the future (i.e.
the terminal spot price) is the sum of all the probabilities of such
spot prices in the future upto that time; and that these
probabilities are independent of the past prices; and
(2) The market value of a commodity futures price is the result of
the competitive bidding process of the market arising from the
market's collective judgement of the expected value of the terminal
spot price as defined by the first assumption.
Given these two assumptions, Samuelson then showed that the best
possible estimate of the terminal spot price of a commodity was the
current price of the futures of that commodity. And the expected
deviation of the terminal spot price from that best current estimate
would be zero.
After proving the validity of his model for the specific case,
Samuelson went on to apply his model to the general case where an
allowance has to be made for the opportunity cost of the money tied
up in the commodity futures. He called this cost "safe interest" and
this can be thought of as its more modern equivalent of "risk
premium". By adding a multiplier (1 + R )**T ( where "R" is the "safe
interest rate", "T" is the time period into the future and "**" stands
for "raised to the power"), he allowed for the computation of the
necessary premium which commodity futures price would command above
the spot price. With the multiplier included, his model of commodity
price can no longer be regarded as a martingale since prices were
expected to rise into the future. The correct name of the model would
be a submartingale with a drift.
The importance of Samuelson's work has been previously mentioned. In
the late Sixties researchers in the field increasingly realised that
it was not very important what shape the ex post price distribution
took. What was important from the economic viewpoint was whether, ex
ante, anybody could make a superior return from the stockmarket.
Although Samuelson's model is concerned only with the expected value
of a commodity's price sometime in the future given the knowledge of
its past prices, it is a natural step to extend this model to include
knowledge of other information sets as well. From this beginning,
the model of the information based EMH model developed such that
Fama's third well known article published in 1970 would present the
EMH in its fully fledged form.
FAMA (1970) This lengthy article may be taken as marking the
watershed of EMH research. Fama's article is important not because of
any major discovery, but because it drew together much of the
previous work carried out and produced a unified theoretical basis
for future research, a common set of terminology and a fairly
standardised set of methods. It is in essence a review article which
re-examined both the empirical and theoretical evidence in support of
EMU. The article may be divided into two major parts, the first being
a review of the theoretical basis for EMH and the second being a
review of the evidence in support of EMH. Only the first part will be
discussed here since the rest of this chapter will be doing almost,
the same as the second half of his article, except that the former
will be on a much bigger scale.
In his review of the various models of stock price behavior, Fama
gave his support to what may call the "information" based model of
price behavior. This model is in fact a class of models which share
the description provided by the expression below:-
E(fj.(t.u l^pjt
In words, this expression states that the expected future price of a
security given the set of information, 4>, which it is assumed to
reflect, is equal to the current price multiplied by the expected
equilibrium return that can be expected given the current available
information. The information set, $ which the security price is
assumed to reflect is left undefined in the first instance for Fama
realised that not everyone would agree on the degree of omniscience
of the market.
Thus EMH proponents may not all agree as to what is the information
set which is fully reflected in the price, but they can agree on the
above expression. In the same article Fama also defined the different
information sets which could be thought of as being reflected in
security prices as the Weak Form Information, the Semi-Strong
Information and the Strong Form Information. The exact definition for
each of these sets had been given earlier in this thesis and will not
be repeated here. The information sets (either mutually exclusive or
non-mutually exclusive) that can be reflected in the price are of
course not limited to these three sets. The random walk model which
was previously widely accepted can be thought of as belonging to this
class of model. In this case, the information set which was thought
to be reflected in the price of a security is the type of information
which has a random arrival pattern. This part of Fama's proposal had
been given much less prominence by workers in the field than his
definition of the 'three forms' of information set. The researchers
have largely stayed with this categorisation of information set until
today. As will be shown later in this thesis, this form of thinking
is believed to be over rigid. Not all weak form information would
entail the same degree of difficulty in uncovering. A market could
thus reflect a certain type of weak form information but not another
and so on.
The inadequacy of this aspect of Fama's model would become more clear
as the Seventies progressed. However, at the time of it publication,
it seemed to be on the whole very adequate although there were a few
dissenters; the atmosphere was generally favourable as will be seen
in the next two sections.
3.3 — Art ±c Xe ss on Statistical
and/or Technical Tests
3.3.1 - BASIC "PRINCIPLES" OF TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
The technical approach to stockmarket analysis and security valuation
is the oldest method practised by market participants. Essentially it
is based on the belief that the price of a given security is
dependent on supply and demand and has very little to do with its
intrinsic value. Pinches (1970) summarised the technical analyst's
view of the market into the following three statements:-
(1) Market price depends on supply and demand which at any one time
reflects hundreds of rational and irrational considerations: facts,
opinions, moods, and guesses about the future.
(2) (However,) Disregarding minor fluctuations, market prices move in
trends which persist over an appreciable length of time.
(3) Changes in trend represent a shift in the balance between supply
and demand. However caused, these changes are detectable "sooner or
later in the action of the market itself".
Thus technicians believe that stock price changes are dependent in
complete contradiction to the belief of the supporters of the Random
Walk Hypothesis. It is not surprising therefore that the first papers
published in defense of RWH were articles seeking to overthrow the
ideas of technicians. As had been previously pointed out in Section
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1.2.3, it is by no means easy to disprove the ideas of technicians
because many of the technicians' methods are not readily testable.
Many of the tests which were purportedly tests of technicians'
methods were not good approximation of the real methods.
Technical analysis methods cam be divided into two major categories -
Trend Analysis and Structural Analysis. Trend analysis seeks to
determine the future direction of a security's price (or the market
as a whole) by analysing its past movements based on the belief that
trends are persistent and such persistence can be predicted from past
prices. Structural analysis seeks to determine the future direction of
a security's price by analysing the sentiment of the market
participants and the balance between the optimists (the bulls) and
the pessimists (the bears) based on the belief that the sentiment and
balance of power in the market place leaves detectable traces in the
form of unusual changes in other market variables. However, to a
certain degree the boundary between these two types of analysis is
blurred and most technicians tend to use both types of methods in
combination. This section separates them in order to facilitate the
discussion of this complex subject matter.
(A) Trend Analysis
Nearly all the methods of trend analysis currently in use are based
on the Dow Theory first proposed by Dow in 1921 and then re¬
presented by Rhea in 1932 in a more complete form. Although the Dow
Theory, as it was originally presented, was meant for the analysis of
stockmarket indices, it is now generally applied to individual
security prices as well. The Dow Theory has two important features
(1) The market (or security prices) has three movements
(a) Primary Movements - These last from One to Three Years on
the upward trend and slightly shorter period on the downward
trend;
(b) Secondary Movements - These last from Six Weeks to Six Months
for a complete cycle; and
(c) Minor Movements - These last from a few hours to several days
and cannot be predicted. They are unimportant from the point of
view of the technician.
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(2) The price patterns determine the trend:-
Upward trend is indicated if the secondary movements result in
successively higher peaks and troughs. The converse applies if
successive peaks and troughs are lower.
Based on these two major ideas of the Dow Theory as well as several
other minor concepts, technicians have, over the years, developed a
large number of methods for predicting future price trends. They can
be grouped into
(1) Primary Trend Determination - By the use of medium term moving
averages of varying lengths and long term price cycles.
(2) Secondary Trend Determination - By the use of various chart
patterns such as Channel, Rectangle, Triangle and other trend
patterns as well as specific Price Patterns ( Head and Shoulder,
Double Top and Bottom, Saucer etc.)
(B) Structural Analysis
In structural analysis, technicians attempt to decipher the sentiment
and the balance of power between the optimists and the pessimists by
studying market variables other than price. For example, it is
believed by technicians that if volume of shares transacted were to
rise each time the market declines for several cycles ( this is the
socalled accumulation pattern) followed by a decisive breach of the
previous peaks, the market would rise sharply shortly afterward. Of
the methods practised, volume is probably the most important.
However, not only are there myriads of methods involving volume data,
they are also seldom used by themselves. They are usually used in
combination with price and/or other data. As such this is not the
place to describe them. However, the other methods are relatively
straightforward and they are known under the following names
(1) Breadth - This method depends on the belief that market advance
or retreat tends to take place over a broad front. If an advance is
not broadly based, its progress would be shortlived. The converse also
applies to market retreat.
(2) Momentum - This method is based on the belief that the market in
its movements is like a train. It takes time to build up speed and
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similarly it takes time to slow down.
(3) Relative Strength - This methods applies to individual stocks or
group of stocks. It is based on the belief that if the price of a
stock is increasing faster than the rest of the market, it will
continue to rise faster until such trend is broken.
For the remainder of this section, we shall be examining the various
articles published during the Sixties on various tests carried out on
the validity of technical analysis as an approach to investment. We
shall both examine how closely the methods tested duplicate actual
practitioners' methods and the validity of the conclusion reached.
One important point that ought to be made in the first place is that
most professed technicians claim that they do not work from a single
method but rather their decision to buy or sell is usually arrived
at after considering the results of several tests.
3.3.2 - EFFICIENCY TESTS USING APPROXIMATIONS TO TREND ANALYSIS
Although early work was carried out by Bachelier and Cowles
respectively in 1900 and 1937 on the behavior of securities prices,
they were largely ignored until the Fifties when a resurgence in
research in this field took place. During the Fifties and early
Sixties, the research that was carried out can be characterised as
being largely experimental in nature in the absence of an accepted
theoretical description of security price behavior.
The first group of articles to be discussed in this section are
articles largely concerned with statistical tests for independence in
successive price changes and as such they cannot be regarded as
direct tests on the technicians' methods. However, they laid the
groundwork for the emergence of the RWH which was to contradict the
long held ideas of the technicians.
(A) Serial Correlations and Similar Statistical Tests
KENDALL (1953) This was the first work to show empirically that the
first difference in the time series of prices was serially
independent. Kendall's original purpose was to discoverthe presence
of trends in price series. In all, the statistical analysis of 22
different time series was carried out. The time series were made up
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of 19 weekly stock indices (1928-1938), weekly and monthly wheat
prices (1883-1934) and monthly cotton prices (1816-1934). The main
conclusions reached were:-
(1) The first difference in wheat prices appeared to follow a normal
distribution;
(2) Stock indices had similar serial behavior as commodity prices;
(3) The random changes of these series from one period to the next
were so large as to swamp the systematic effect;
(4) It was difficult to distinguish between a random walk and one with
a weak systematic effect; and
(5) Aggregative stock indices had greater serial correlation than
their components.
Apart from being the first modern worker in the field, Kendall was
also notable in that he was the first person to introduce the concept
of "Random Walk" into stockmarket research.
OSBORNE (1959 AND 1962) He was the first person to postulate a
model for stock price behavior, equating it with the movements of
very small particles in fluid while being acted upon by random small
forces. He was also the first person to use the logarithm of the
first difference rather than the absolute difference itself. This
crucial change led to the obtaining of a distribution of differences
which was more or less symmetrical about the mean. This naturally
led him to compare the distribution with the normal distribution.
Osborne showed that the logarithm of the first difference when
graphed onto normal probability paper closely resembled that of a
normal distribution. This led him to conclude that the stock price
movements were probably random in nature. He was also the first
person to study the semi-quartile range of the first difference of
successively longer differencing periods for individual stocks. This
work showed that the size of the variance increased at a rate that
was proportional to the square root of the time difference. These two
characteristics led him (as a physicist) to speculate that the
movement of stock prices may have the same characteristics as the
movements of samll particles in a fluid while being acted upon by
small forces ( Brownian Motion). Since the two types of motion showed
such close similarities, he concluded that the movements of stock
prices must be random as well.
Osborne was also the first person to study the relationship between
individual stock price movements and those of the market as a whole.
He noted that although the "rate of diffusion" (i.e. the rate of
increase in the variance over time) differed from stock to stock, all
of them were proportional to the square root of the time, thus
foreshadowing the work of Sharpe and others on the systematic aspect
of stock price movements.
In his second paper however, Osborne retreated somewhat from his
previous position. In it, he expressed some doubts about the random
nature of stock price movements. He noted after a more comprehensive
study that the stock price movements acted as if the Brownian motions
were constrained by some reflecting barriers. In addition, he noted
evidence of "clustered" activities. He therefore concluded thus, "In
general, the picture of price motion as simple random walks is
supported quantitatively; qualitatively there are substantial
departures from this simple picture".
MOORE (1962) This was the first systematic statistical analysis
of weekly serial independence of stocks on the NYSE. Moore conducted
tests on the S&P Index as well as 30 randomly selected stocks. He
found that while there was a slight positive serial correlation for
S8cP 500, 22 of the 30 stocks showed negative serial correlation.
Although in both instances, the amount of correlation was not
significant, the number of stocks having negative serial correlation
itself was significant. One of the explanations he offered for the
existence of negative serial correlation was that the market could
correct itself after the occurence of a large random "error" item in
the next period. While it is difficult to pinpoint any significance
in this, his reasoning is very close to that offered by Weintraub
(1963) in that there were floor traders ever ready to take advantage
of "inefficiencies".
WEINTRAUB (1963) He applied Kendall's method with a slight
modification to take into account the real world situation. He had
noted that professional floor traders made large profit speculating
on short term price changes. They made enough profit for their seats
to be worth thousands of dollars on transfer. He therefore sought to
use a test close to their method. Instead of using the closing price
of the next period for computing the first difference, he used the
next period's highest (for uptrend) and the period's lowest for
downtrend reasoning that the professionals would act close to this
manner. He found significant serial correlation both betting with the
trend (0.69) as well as against the trend (-0.61).
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FAMA (1965) Apart from its discussion on the possible shape of
the distribution of stock price, this article contains three tests of
price dependencies. They are, serial correlation, runs tests and
distribution of successors to large values. The serial correlation
tests produced much the same results as the previous tests carried
out. It is notable that the serial correlations examined covered the
periods of 1 to 16 days.
The runs tests were designed to look for persistence of stock price
movements in the same direction. Again, the tests carried out were
for runs covering periods of between 1 to 16 days. Fama found a very
slight tendency for the one day runs to persist. But as the test was
extended for successive runs of 4,9, or 16 days, the persistence
disappeared, and on average, the actual total number of runs
conformed precisely with what one would expect from a random
distribution.
The distribution of successors to large value tests showed the result
that large changes tended to be followed by large changes, but of
random sign. There also seemed to be more more bunching of large
values than a random distribution. This result upheld the contention
that the distribution of price changes seemed to exhibit very long
tails as had been previously noted.
COMMENTS ON TESTS IN GROUP (A) Apart from the fact that the early
researchers made the mistake of assuming price distribution as being
normal, two things stand out from the papers discussed above. Firstly,
the tests on serial correlation carried out were based on
differencing interval of less than one month. This interval of
differencing ignore the typical secondary cycle of 6-26 weeks where
technicians are supposed to operate.
Secondly, even for the differencing intervals during which one would
expect the greatest degree of independence, the picture of
independence is by no mean as clearcut as some of the workers seemed
to imply.
(B) FILTER AND MOVING AVERAGE TESTS
ALEXANDER (1961 AND 1964) Alexander pioneered the use of filter
rules to uncover weak form inefficiency, if any. Filter rules may be
regarded as crude approximations of the most fundamental trading rule
of technicians who believe that prices move in cycles. If this is
true, one could make abnormal profit by buying just after the price
of a stock has moved off the bottom of a cycle and selling soon
after it has reached the peak of the cycle. Filter rules are supposed
to mimic the action of a technician watching price charts to determine
the bottom and top of price cycles. Under Alexandrian filter rules,
the selling (or buying) of a stock is triggered off if and when the
stock's price moves X% from the top (or bottom) previously reached.
When this test is applied, X is usually set at various values such as
1, 5, 10 etc.
In his first article, Alexander came to the conclusion that it was
possible to make abnormal profit even after allowing for commissions
by using filter rules. However, he included two serious errors in his
methodology and these were later pointed out by Fama. Firstly, he used
the closing price rather than the highest or lowest price reached
during the trading period to determine whether the trigger point had
been reached. Had the maximum or minimum period price been used,
there would have been a lot more trading and would result in lower
profit. Second, he used stockmarket indices rather than individual
stocks and dividend payments were left out of the computation of
total return. In his second article, he corrected the first bias but
not the second and concluded that it was still possible to achieve
abnormal profit before commission.
However, in a very comprehensive paper, FAMA and BLUME (1966)
showed that after correcting the second bias, the probability of
making abnormal profit even before commission was small. After
commission was included, the probability of making such gain was very
small indeed. There is now little doubt that the straight forward
Alexandrian filter rules cannot produce abnormal profit once
commission is taken into account.
COOTNER (1962) Cootner's well known "random walk with reflecting
barriers" model of market behavior was proposed in this paper.
Although this model is now over 20 years old, it is still often cited
by researchers in the field. Through this model Cootner offered an
explanation for the fundamentalist's and even chartist's view of
market behavior wherein the price movements of stocks are constrained
(within a channel in the technicians' case). According to the
fundamentalist's view, this constraint is the result of the
limitation imposed by the existence of an intrinsic value around
which the market price must move. From the technical viewpoint, the
constraint is the result of the stock prices' tendency to move within
trend channels. In Cootner's model, the participants in the market
are divided into the informed and the uninformed. The informed have a
much lower cost of search because they know what to look for and
where. They also have a much better idea of what the future return is
likely to be than the uninformed because of their superior knowledge.
But their cost of search is not zero and they can only expect to
profit from a search if their expected return is higher than the
"market" expected return by their cost of search. Since the market is
being assaulted by random arrival of news as well as being subjected
to the buying and selling of the uninformed investors at all times,
the price of securities would tend to drift randomly. The informed
investors would "sit on the side line" as it were and would not take
any action until the price has drifted far enough away from their
expected future price either in an upward or downward direction. At
this point, they would spring into action and buy or sell according
to their own expectation. Their action would cause an increase in
demand or supply and would alert other informed investors who would
also move into action. Their concerted action would cause the price
to "bounce" back from the low or high reached. Once the price has
moved away from its low or high sufficiently, the professionals would
withdraw and wait for further random drifts to place the price again
being in a beneficial position. Cootner stressed that the "barriers"
were elastic because not all professionals had the same expected
future price. Nor does the model imply one fixed trend channel. As
Cootner pointed out, there was little reason to expect that "the
changes in the price expectation of the professionals should occur
other than in a random manner". Over time therefore, the price would
be composed of a number of trends each bracketed by relecting
barriers within which the price would drift randomly.
The nett statistical result of such a model would be a price series
which exhibits autocorrelation over the medium term as the price
moves within a trend, excessive shorter term reversal as it nears the
barriers and within the trend but away from the barriers, the price
would be free to move about randomly. As Cootner himself admitted, it
would be very difficult to conclusively demonstrate that this model
is correct. This is partly due to the fact that the width of the
trend channel is not constant and the lengths of successive trends are
not the same. However, in spite of these difficulties, Cootner
believed he could provide evidence that the real world would be close
to his model. In his paper, he described several series of tests, two
of which are summarised below.
Autocorrelation If stock prices move within a trend, there should
be a degree of autocorrelation. So long as it stays within the
trend, the positive correlation would increase as the differencing
interval is increased. Cootner's work appears to show that this was
indeed so. At two week differencing interval, only one out of his
sample of 45 stocks shows significant autocorrelation ( at the 5%
confidence limit) while 10 others show some degree of
autocorrelation. At 14 week differencing interval, the number of
stocks showing significant autocorrelation had increased to 9 while
26 others showed some tendency to autocorrelate.
Modified Alexander's Filter Rule Cootner reasoned that
Alexander's filter rule did not work because they did not mimic
closely enough the real method. Technicians do not consider the
absolute difference between the current price and the previous high
or low. They normally compare current price with the overall market
situation by comparing it implicitly or explicitly with the trend.
Cootner therefore modified Alexander's method by comparing the
current price with the 200 day moving average. He compared the gain
from five different trading rules using "buy-and- hold" as well as 0
and 5% trigger points for the two different trading strategies -
"long only" and "long and short". His results show that the "long
only" strategy at 5% trigger point had a very high probability of
making abnormal gain even after taking into account commission-
Furthermore, the risk of the "long only" strategy as measured by
variance of the return was approximately 30% lower because during the
time when the price of a stock fell below its moving average, the
stock would be sold and the proceeds held in an alternative
investment (T-bills?).
VAN HORNE AND PARKER (1967) They tested Cootner's moving average
trading method and came to a very different conclusion. They applied
the method to a random sample of thirty companies over a six year
period from 1960 to 1966. (Cootner's sample were mostly for five years
1956-1960) They used three different moving average intervals; 100,
150 and 200 days and five threshold percentages; 0,2,5,10 and 15.
Thus it can be said that their method was much more comprehensive.
The results showed that none of the trading strategies was any better
than the "buy-and-hold" strategy even before commission was included.
Without another researcher replicating their work, it is not possible
to offer an explanation as to how such different results were
obtained. It is possible that the market behavior could have changed
between the two periods. Another possible explanation is that the
sample selection was bias in either of the tests conducted. As things
now stand, the moving average method is an enigma.
(C) CYCLICAL PATTERNS
GRANGER AND MORGENSTERN (1963) This work is notable because it was
the first to bring a highly sophisticated statistical method from a
non related field to stock price analysis. The use of spectral
analysis appeared at that time to have settled once and for all the
debate as to whether stock prices demonstrated any regular cycle.
Granger and Morgenstern applied spectral analysis to the S&P common
stock index from 1875 to 1952 and the DJIA from 1915 to 1958 (both
series on a monthly basis).
The main conclusion which arose from this analysis was that over a
short run (i.e. less than 24 months), stock indices did not seem to
exhibit regular cyclical patterns. However, there, were several peaks
in the power spectra of these indices over the longer runs. There were
indications of a 40 month cycle coinciding with the well known 40
month business cycles as well as annual cycles and their attendant
harmonics at the 90% confidence limit. But the authors did not
believe that they were significant.
This conclusion would be in conflict with the conclusion reached by
Allvine and O'neill (1980). The explanation for this conflict will be
discussed together with this later paper in the next chapter.
3.3.3 - TESTS BASED ON APPROXIMATIONS TO STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
There is a great dearth of articles on structural analysis compared
with articles on trend analysis. A possible explanation for this is
the great difficulty involved in approximating the various
practitioners' methods in this area. Most of the methods do not lend
themselves to be tested in a scientifically rigorous manner. The best
tested method is the relative strength trading strategy from which it
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appears that one ought to draw a conclusion which is in favour of
market efficiency.
LEVY (1967) Levy was the first to test the relative strength
strategy. This trading method depends on the wellknown Wall Street
adage that a stock that is moving up well relative to the rest of the
market will continue to do so until the momentum is somehow broken.
The converse also applies. Levy's method depends on isolating those
stocks that have performed well and track their subsequent
performance after selection. His method consists of computing the 26
week moving average of all stocks in the portfolio and selecting
those which have exceeded this moving average by X% for purchase and
casting out those previously selected whose relative performance rank
have fallen below a certain number, K.
Levy tested this method with X set at 5% and 10% and K set at 20 to
195 with a total of 200 stocks in the portfolio. Levy showed that his
method would result in the trading portfolios providing a return of
as much as 29.1% (X=5% and K=140 with high volatility stocks) nett of
transaction cost compared with a return of 10.6% using a random
selection method.
Jensen, in his "Comment" on the above article criticised Levy on four
counts:-
(1) The definition of return for the "Random Selection Policy";
(2) The data and sample used may have built-in biases;
(3) There was no proper treatment of risk;
(4) There was an erroneous pricing method under the trading strategy
used (cf Fama's criticism of Alexander).
In his reply to the above comment, Levy recalculated his previous
results to take into account the last two criticisms and used another
body of data to allow for the second bias. He claimed that his
strategy would still yield supranormal return after these
modifications. However, the next paper by Jensen and Bennington
strongly refuted his contentions.
JENSEN AND BENNINGTON (1970) They replicated Levy's method and
produced very different results. A very much larger body of data was
used (29 portfolios of 200 stocks each) covering a very much longer
period of time (1931-1965 divided into 7 non overlapping periods).
They showed that after the appropriate allowance for risk using CAPM,
the relative strength strategy consistently produced a result which
was worse than a buy-and-hold strategy. It would seem that this method
when applied to very large body of stocks over a long period of time
has very doubtful use.
Jen in his "Discussion" on this paper expressed some sympathy for
Levy's method. He felt that this method with its small number of
stocks in the portfolio was probably much more useful when practised
by the typical small independent traders with small portfolios. The
large mutual funds, should they try to practise this method with a
small number of stocks would find themselves too large a factor in the
market. For them, Jensen and Bennington's method would be a close
approximation of their situation. With regards to tests on market
efficiency as a whole, he had this to say, " Both kinds of tests
(i.e. statistical and empirical tests) can be criticized on the
ground that the statistical procedure used cannot disprove the
hypothesis that, for a limited period of time, price changes are not
random for certain stocks or even a significant part of the market in
response to some new information. Nor can they disprove the
hypothesis that (even if) price changes are random for a long period
but actually (is caused by) either mean or variance, or both, having
shifted within that period in response to new information.".
GODFREY, GRANGER AND MORGENSTERN (1964) This was a follow-up
article to Granger and Morgenstern (1963) on the use of spectral
analysis for testing cyclicalities in stock prices. In it is the only
well known reference to a test on the correlation between volume and
price of stocks. The authors found that the correlation between price
and volume series was rarely greater than 0.1 while the typical value
was 0.02. The authors also remarked that, " As a matter of passing
interest they are the lowest estimates of coherence from actual
observations of economic processes known to any of the authors". This
was a truly surprising result in view of the long held belief on Wall
Street that price and volume are closely related. Most observers of
the stockmarket scene, even casual observers, would have noticed
that volume and price do seem to move and down together during bull
and bear markets. Without further collaborative testing, it would not
be possible to comment on this one single test. However, one thing is
quite clear - the relationship between price and volume is neither
simple nor positive according to the belief of technicians. It would
be very difficult to design direct tests which approximate
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practitioners' methods. This is probably the main reason why there
have been so few tests on this relationship.
3-4 — Publications on Strong and
Seomo.—stnong: Forms Tests
The second half of the Sixties was a most fruitful period for
efficiency research. There was almost what one may call a flowering
of articles on research on the information based model of EMH. Many
of these articles are still cited regularly today and many of them
could be regarded as most significant because they established the now
accepted methodology of efficiency testing in their respective area.
The articles to be discussed are divided into those dealing with the
semi-strong form information and the strong form information although
they were not known as such until after this era was over.
3.4.1 - RESEARCH RELATED TO THE SEMI-STRONG FORM OF EMH
It is well accepted by most students of the stockmarket that the
value of a stock is dependent on its expected stream of future
earnings or dividends. The record of earnings previously obtained or
dividends paid and the latest earnings (or dividend) of a firm can be
reasonably assumed to convey a certain amount of information to the
market about its future expected earnings (or dividend). If this
assumption is correct, a new earnings figure must constitute sin
important piece of information processed by the market to evaluate
the worth of a stock. As a result of this line of thinking both the
predictability of a firm's earnings and the effect of its earnings
announcements on the price of its stock have been subjected to close
scrutiny by researchers.
Many researchers had carried out work examining the predictability of
future earnings streams. The work of Little (196A), Lintner and
Glauber (1967) and Ball and Watt (1972) (to be discussed in Chapter
4) appeared to have shown that the annual earnings series of firms
follow a pattern that was close to a random walk or random walk with
a drift. Later studies by Beaver (1968) and Beaver, Clarke and Wright
(1979) seemed to indicate that the change in the price of a stock is
fairly closely related to the change of the EPS although the
relationship may not be one-to-one. These findings lead one quite
logically to the speculation that if one were to act fast on the
receipt of abnormal earnings announcements, one could perhaps profit
from it. The work of Ball and Brown, to be discussed next, which is
arguably the best known in this field, seemed to strongly refute this
speculation.
BALL AND BROWN (1968) It is highly significant because it
established two "firsts"
(1) It was the first study on the informational content of unexpected
earnings changes and their effect on subsequent stock prices; and
(2) It pioneered the used of the Abnormal Performance Index (API) to
study the "pure" abnormal behavior of stock prices after the public
receipt of such information by removing the market effect from the
stock prices.
Ball and Brown (BB) reasoned that since historically about half of
the variability of a firm's EPS was associated with economy wide
factor, the market thus could have an expectation of a firm's next
EPS based on its knowledge of the current economic performance of the
country. If the actual EPS turned out to be very different from the
market's expectation, there would likely to be an effect on the
firm's stock's price (hence on the computed return on an investment
in the company's stock). The relationship between a firm's EPS and
the economy could be first established by using the OLS method. The
results from the regression can then be used to establish the level
of the expected EPS. (It is important to note here that the expected
EPS so computed may or may not be the same as the real market
expectation). A firm that had reported an EPS which was lower than the
level established could be said to have suffered a Negative Earnings
Forecast Error (or NFE) and one that had a higher than expected EPS
would have suffered a Positive Earnings Forecast Error (or PFE).
Logically, one would expect that the information content of an NFE or
PFE would have some value for forecasting the stock's future price.
That is, one could reasonably expect that a firm which has
experienced a NFE to suffer a decline in its stock's price.
However, over the same period as the one during which the earnings
information is received, the total movement experienced by a stock
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cannot be wholly attributed to the earnings information since the
movement of the overall market would have an effect on the stock's
price as well. As King (1966) had previously shown, about 30-50% of
the movements of a stock's price could be explained by the movements
in the market. It is therefore necessary to remove the market's
effect from a stock's price if one wishes to study the "pure" effect
of the news of NFE or PFE. BB therefore adjusted the price of the
stocks investigated by applying Sharpe's market model. The residual
(i.e. pure) return which included both dividend and price changes was
defined as V^which is given by the following expression:-
V. = h . ■+ b,.[L -1 ] - [PR -1 3
jm lj 2j m m
Where : bm ^Market Performance Index as defined by Fisher for the
month of 'm'.
'jm
PR*- =Price Relative for the 'jth' stock for the month 'm'
(Price Relative = [Closing price + Dividend]/Opening
Price)
From this, BB defined API as
1 N M
api = ± y n (1 + V )
m N L. . . nm
n=l m=-ll
Where: N = Total number of stocks in portfolio of sampled stocks.
API computes the change in the value of one dollar equally divided as
investment in the sampled stocks j (where j = 1,2,3 j) from the
end of month -11 (i.e. 12 months before the earnings announcement) to
the time M months afterwards.
Contrary to what one would have expected, the results of BB's study
showed that at the point of the earnings announcement ( i.e. m = 0),
the market appeared to have already incorporated much of the
information associated with a NFE or PFE into the price of the stocks
concerned. In other words, this study appeared to show that if a
person were to act on the basis of public earnings announcements, he
would not be able to make any abnormal profit. BB's study seemed to
show that a stock's price would start to move in the direction of the
forecast error apto 12 months before; the public announcement.
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However BB's study contained several major deficiencies which caused
later workers to question the validity of its conclusion. They are:-
(1) Annual earnings were used and the information content of the
subsequent interim announcements was ignored;
(2) The magnitude of the forecast errors was not considered, only
their direction; and
(3) Monthly prices were used for the study which could have masked
shorter term movements.
Later workers, after correcting for these deficiencies, were able to
show that the market was neither totally prescient nor was its
reaction to forecast errors instantaneous. These studies will be
discussed in the next chapter.
The next paper, although superficially appearing to be deal with the
question of stock split, is actually more concerned with the effect
of dividend announcements on stock prices.
FAMA, FISHER, JENSEN AND ROLL (1969) (FFJR) This is arguably the
best known and most cited article in the field of stockmarket
efficiency. The original purpose of the authors appears to be to test
the long held Wall Street adage that stock splits increase the
overall value of the firm. If this is true, it would be a sign of
gross inefficiency. More specifically, they set out to discover the
answer to the following questions:-
(1) Was there any "abnormal" behavior surrounding stock splits ( that
is, did the price of a stock move up around the time of the stock
split announcement) ?
(2) If there was abnormal behavior, could this be accounted for by the
relationship between the split and some other fundamental variables
rather than the split itself.
FFJR used the data surrounding a total of 940 splits of greater than
25% during the years 1927 to 1959. In order to isolate the effect of
the split (if any) from the market effect, FFJR used an adjustment
method that is slightly different from the API method previously
described. They named their adjustment method Cumulative Average
Residual ( or CAR). The main difference between CAR and API is that
the former uses the logarithm of the price relative rather than the
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arithmatic ratio. FFJR defined the return residual, U. , for thejm
jth security for the month of m, as follows:-
U. = Log R. - a. - (3. Log L
jm e jm j J em
Where: =Market performance index as previously defined,
=Actual return for the jth security for the month of
m.
The Average Residual,u and the Cumulative Average Residual U could
m m
then be defined as follows:-
N
m
u = E U. /N U = Z u
m .
j jm m m ^=-29 k
The CAR for the sample is computed for the 30 months before and after
the stock splits. The securities undergoing split are divided into
three data sets - all stocks undergoing split; stocks undergoing
split with concurrent dividend increase; and stocks undergoing split
with concurrent dividend decrease. Their results could be summarised
as follows:-
(1) For all splits, the CAR started to move upward well before the
split announcement, as much as 30 months before. The upward movement
was the strongest in the several months just before the announcement.
The upward trend was stronger for stocks with a concurrent dividend
increase than one without dividend increase.
(2) After the announcement, those stocks with dividend increase would
show a CAR which was flattish for the rest of the observation period.
Those stocks with concurrent dividend decrease would experience a
declining CAR for about 12 months before the CAR flattened out and
stayed that way till the end of the observation period.
FFJR therefore concluded thus. Firstly, stock splits per se did not
seem to increase the market's valuation of the stock concerned.
Secondly, prices had tended to move up well ahead of the split
announcements which must imply that the latter could not be the reason
for the upward movement. The more likely explanation was that the
management of the firms concerned had tended to decide on splitting
after a period of superior corporate performance which had already
been reflected in better price performance of its stocks. Lastly they
concluded that part of the superior performance of the stocks could
be attributed to the market expectation of increased dividend which
usually accompanied stock splits. If the dividend increase did not
materialise, the disappointed market would retrace some of the gain
previously attained. It would thus seem that dividend increase or
decrease could have informational value for stock pricing.
From these conclusions, as well as those based on Ball and Brown's
work previously discussed, supporters of EMH strongly argued that the
market was efficient in the semi-strong form because public
announcements could not be used to gain abnormal profit. In
hindsight, such a conclusion would seem to be over sweeping and
premature. The deficiencies of BB's work have been discussed earlier.
As to FFJR's work, to conclude that the market was efficient in the
semi-strong form based on the evidence that it did not react to
announcements of stock split would seem to be overly deterministic.
It is hard to believe that a market as sophisticated as the American
one would react positively to stock splits in the first place since
they are manifestly not events of any advantage to the shareholders.
It seems to this writer that in this study, the most important result
is the market's reaction to the presence or absence of a dividend
increase. Since dividend increase or decrease is a "stronger" form of
information, the degree of efficiency of the US market is greater
than what the test superficially shows. Owing to the fact that the
first post stock-split dividend announcements do not occur at the
same time, it is not possible to determine the speed of the stock
market's reaction to the dividend information. Later researchers would
carry out extensive work in this specific area. These work will be
discussed in the next chapter. As we shall see, these studies were to
show that in the case of several different types of semi-strong
information, the market's reaction was quite slow.
GREEN AND SEGALL (1967) One of the more serious deficiencies of
BB's work that has been pointed out was that annual earnings figures
were used instead of quarterly ones. It would seem logical to
conclude that the three interim announcements in between would have
"given away" the coming news about the annual earnings figure. It
would therefore not be surprising if the market did not react to the
subsequent annual earnings announcement. However, Green and Segall's
work seemed to contradict this commonsensical conclusion. Their
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result revealed that the annual earnings figures appeared to be the
more accurate forecast for the next annual figures than the interim
earnings figures. Even the authors agreed that this result seemed
"nonsensical". If their work is an accurate representation of the
actual situation, it would seem that BB's work would be partially-
vindicated.
BROWN AND NIEDERHOFFER (1968) In a follow up article to the
above, Brown and Niederhoffer came to the opposite conclusion. Using
a much larger sample than Green and Segall, they concluded their
study with this remark, " the best of the interim predictors was
consistently better than the best of the annual (predictors) ......
interim reports, as currently prepared are useful in predicting
annual earnings.".
Green and Segall, in two subsequent replies (1968 and 1970), failed
to demonstrate convincingly that Brown and Niederhoffer's conclusion
was in anyway inappropriate. It thus appears that interim results can
be used as a better predictor of current year's earnings than the
previous year's. This discovery was to lead to work by Joy,
Litzenberger and McEnally, among others, which were to show that the
market was not that efficient when dealing with earnings
announcements (to be discussed in the next chapter).
3.4.2 - RESEARCH RELATED TO THE STRONG FORM OF EMH
During the late Sixties, the idea that stock prices were reflections
of the degree of understanding the market had of the available
information gradually took hold among the academics. They then
proceeded to explore the limit of such understanding. One of the
earlier ideas to take hold was the possibility that market
professionals, having a much better knowledge of the market, should
obviously outperform the market as a whole. This section will examine
three papers on this subject as well as their conclusions for
appropriateness.
SHARPE (1966) This was the earliest paper to appear on the
subject. As a matter of passing interest, it is perhaps revealing to
note the lack of sophistication and the small size of the sample
employed in this study compared with the next (Jensen's ) which
appeared a mere two years later. Sharpe examined the performance of
34 open end mutual funds during the years 1954 to 1963. He found
that after making the appropriate adjustment for the riskiness of the
mutual funds, the probability of the average mutual fund
outperforming the market as represented by the DJIA, for the whole of
the study period was about 0.01. He adjusted for the riskiness of
each mutual fund by dividing the average annual return by the
variability of such return (he called this the Reward-to-Variability
Ratio or R/V Ratio). The R/V Ratio was then used as the standard of
comparison between different funds and between them and the market.
Nor was the performance of the mutual funds consistent from year to
year. He found that the rank correlation from year to year was only
0.36. Based on these results it would seem logical to conclude that
mutual funds, in spite of their supposedly superior access to
information, could not perform better than a broad market average.
This was taken by the researchers at the time to mean that the market
must have been very efficient in its ability to digest available
information. This conclusion was given further credence by the next
piece of research work.
JENSEN (1968) Jensen's follow up work in this area was much more
comprehensive and it also introduced CAPM as a means of adjusting for
riskiness of each mutual fund's portfolio. One of the stated purposes
of this work was to measure return on an absolute rather than relative
basis as was done by Sharpe using the R/V ratio.
Jensen's method was based on the computation of the residual item in
the return of mutual funds after the market effect had been removed
by using CAPM. He found that the residual item (which he called
alpha) for his sample of 115 mutual funds for the period 1955 to 1964
had a range from -0.0805 to 0.0582 distributed almost symmetrically
about zero. The mean residual return was -0.011 ( i.e. about 1% worse
than the market average) and the median -0.009. He also carried out
the same computation for certain subsets of the sample and these gave
similar result. He therefore concluded that it was most unlikely that
mutual funds could perform significantly better than the market even
gross of management expenses.
CRAGG AND MALKIEL (1968) This paper examined a different aspect
of the professionals' ability to "beat the market". The stated
purpose of this paper was to examine whether professionals in the
field of investment could do a better job of earnings forecasting
than mere extrapolation. The authors also sought to discover the
degree of consensus among the professionals working in the same area.
Their study was based on the earnings estimates for 185 firms
produced by 4 and 5 finance houses for the years 1962 and 1963
respectively. Their result showed that whilst there was a very high
degree of consensus among the experts' forecasts, their accuracy was
only slightly better that what could be achieved using simple
extrapolation based on past earnings. They also discovered that PER
were not good guides to the future performance of a firm. That is,
firms whose stocks were selling for a high PER (because the market
expected them to do well) did not seem to do significantly better
than firms with low PER.
These studies and others like them, led to the general realisation
that mutual funds, finance houses and other professionals in the
field of investment did not have the ability to provide better
forecasts or perform better in investment than the market as a whole.
Many of the academics of the time therefore concluded that the market
could even be efficient in the strong form. But the prima facie
evidence available at the time was misleading. The fact that
professionals could not outperform the market does not necessarily
mean that it is impossible for anyone to outperform the market, a
conclusion which would be warranted if one accepts the validity of
EMH in the strong form. Later work on insider trading wets to show
conclusively that it was possible to make abnormal profit using
specialised knowledge. The early methods used by the pioneers of
market efficiency discussed in this chapter were to be further
refined and tested throughout the Seventies. In many cases, it was
found that the earlier conclusion was erroneous for one reason or




LITERATURE REVIEW — PART II
EFFICIENT MARKET RESEARCH UPTO 1984
4.1. — Organisation oT Chapter- Four
This chapter of the thesis will look at the research work carried out
during a 14 year period from 1971 to 1984 (with a few outside these
bounds) connected with market efficiency. As has been previously
pointed out, a major shift in the research emphasis in this area
took place during the early Seventies. With the wide acceptance of
the information based model of market behavior, research - largely of
an empirical nature - had become more focussed on how and at what
speed the market would react to receipt of various types of
information as well as on the limit of informational effciency
exhibited by the market. There were therefore relatively fewer papers
of a theoretical nature published on the overall aspect of the
market. There was also a shift away from research on the weak form
efficiency of the market as most researchers appearred to be of the
opinion that this aspect of the market is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The papers which will be reviewed in this chapters therefore
will be largely connected with either explaining how the market
attain informational efficiency or how efficiently a piece of
information is treated by the market.
This chapter is therefore divided in several sections in order to
simplify the organisation of a very large number of papers on the
subject. Each section will deal with one particular type of papers in
the following order:-
4.2 : Papers on the overall, theoretical treatment of market
efficiency;
4.3 : Papers on the market's reaction to the CONTENTS of
information received;
4.4 : Papers on the SPEED and RANGE of reaction of the market to
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of information;
4.5 : Papers on other aspects of information processed by the
market and papers on efficiency tests carried out in
countries other than the US and UK;
4.6 : General views of several noted academics on market
efficiency.
The above division is of course largely artificial. Its main purpose
is to make more manageable a very large body of research for
discussion. To a certain extent, the boundaries between the various
categories of papers are blurred and certain papers could as well
appear in one category as another.
4.2 — IMPORTANT PAPERS 03NT THE
OVERALL ASPECT OE THE MARKET
The acceptance of the information model of stockmarket behavior
naturally enough leads to questions being asked on how the market
could correctly interpret the informational content of any piece of
news arid produce the best possible estimate of its effect on the
future price of a security. While it is not necessary for the EMH to
have a theoretical foundation, it would obviously strengthen the case
of its proponents if there is a widely acceptable theoretical model
behind it. Since the mid Seventies, there had been many papers
postulating various models which either attempt to explain the
attainment of stockmarket informational efficiency or refute such a
possibility. Models which support the EMH would have to explain how
is it possible for the market to attain efficiency in spite of the
wide asymmetry in the knowledge of the market participants and the
manifest impossibility of instantaneous dissemination of news
throughtout the market. As pointed out in Section 1.2, there have
been many attempts to resolve the first of these two difficulties
while the second problem is, up to now, still largely unanswered.
This section will consider five papers concerned with the development
of different models of stockmarket informational system. Two of
these models are in support of the EMH while two are against with the
fifth being taken from a related economic area. This section will
attempt to examine the merit of each model and consider how they
compare with the model which is being proposed in this thesis.
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VERRECCHIA (1979) This paper attempted to develop mathematically
a model of informational efficiency in the face of the seemingly
natural conclusion that the informed investors ought to be able to
take advantage of their position and reap abnormal profit at the
expense of the less informed. Verrecchia's model is based on the
following assumptions about the investors' assessment of the
dispersion of the return on share investment relative to the
. dispersion of the true return:-
(a) Their assessments should be collectively unbiased;
(b) Their assessments should be pairwise independent; and
(c) Their assessments should have finite mean square.
Provided that these conditions hold true, the model would not require
the existence of any informed investors for the market to be
efficient. As the paper stated, "The dispersion in the prices (of the
securities) will converge to the true underlying dispersion as the
number of individuals who actively participate in the market becomes
large.". It is to be noted that the assumptions made concerning the
stockmarket are very gross assumptions (which Verrecchia himself
admitted). Firstly, it is not inconceivable that a large proportion
of the market participants could be collectively biased in their
assessment of the true return achievable from stockmarket investment
(this is the position held by most fundamentalist writers). For
example, during the technology "craze" of the late Sixties, such
stocks were priced at a very high level. Secondly, even if the market
is collectively unbiased, in order for the market's assessment to
converge on the true price, the number of active participants has to
be large. This situation may not be attainable in all sectors of the
market. In those sectors with limited participants, the prices may
not be a good estimate of the future prices. It is important to note
that the concept of "participation in a sector" need not be limited
to participation in a physical sector of the market, for example,
closed end investment trusts sector. Limited participation can also
occur in the case of, say, investing for the longer run. If the
bulk of the market participants are interested in very short time
frame, the available information on the superior return of certain
long term investments may well be ignored by the majority of the
market participants. In this case, the informed investors who are
interested in the long run would be able to buy securities with long
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term growth potential at a "discount". This is the position long held
by many fundamentalists and the paper by Oppenheimer and Schlarbaum
(1981) (to be discussed later in this chapter) seems to uphold this
belief. This thesis therefore is inclined to take the position that
Verrecchia's model, while applicable over a part (maybe even a large
part) of the market, may not be applicable to all parts ofa market (
or all markets). It would seem that it is precisely in those sectors
of the market which this model is not. applicable that inefficiencies
can occur.
BEAVER (1981a) Verrechia's model was later expanded by Beaver to
include the situation wherein there was a wide asymmetry of posession
of knowledge among the participants. Beaver's model's basic postulate
is that the universe of investment information is so vast and complex
that each market participant could only possess a small piece of the
the total available information. So, it could be said that there is
no such thing as an "expert" on the stock market, who is in
possession of such a large slice of information that he could make a
better forecast of the future price of a security than the market as
a whole. Furthermore, not only does each participant possesse' a small
/
piece of the information available, he is also not completely
rational in the action he takes after coming into possession of that
piece of information (presumably because he does not have enough
information to make a rational decision). Thus the market could be
characterised as one which is populated by a very large number of
people who each receives a small signal which is in addition garbled
by a large noise item. The action taken by each participant
subsequent to the receipt of that signal is idiosyncratically
determined. Since by definition, the actions taken by the
participants are collectively unbiased and independent, the
idiosyncratic part of their actions is self cancelling. The end
result of such collective action is that the "pure signal" on each
security generated by the market comes through. Thus the market acts
as an aggregator of all the information individually possessed and
idiosyncratically acted upon to produce an efficient end result.
In support of this model of market efficiency, Beaver cited the case
of the inability of the individual sportswriters of the Chicago Daily
News in the years 1966-1968 to consistently produce better football
result forecasts than their own consensus forecasts. Beaver's model
is an obvious improvement on Verrecchia's but neither the assumptions
made nor the parallel drawn between sportwriters' forecasts and
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security price forecasts are very valid. Firstly, it must, be pointed
out that because the sportwriters are all supposed to be experts in
their field, it is perhaps not surprising that none of them could do
better than the others on a consistent basis. In the stock market, we
have the overall situation of experts competing with non-experts.
While it is true that for some sectors of the market, there are
enough experts in competition to make the market efficient, this may
not be true for all sectors. Secondly, whilst it is true that the
overall universe of stockroarket information is vast ( certainly a lot
more vast than the universe of football information), it is not always
true to assert that an investment decision requires the calling upon
of the whole universe. Occasionally, an investment decision entails
the weighing of a fairly simple piece or set of data, for example,
the occurence of a large earnings forecast error for a particular
stock. In such instances, it is not the information processing
ability that is of importance but the speed with which such
information is received and that of decision making.
GROSSMAN AND STIGLITZ (1980) This is a follow-up paper from
GROSSMAN (1976) and its conclusion is very much stronger than the
first paper. This paper is concerned with demonstrating that it is
"impossible" to have an informationally efficient capital market. The
paper begins by presenting certain conjectures concerning the model
of equilibrium in a competitive market where the cost of search for
information is not zero. Under this model, the informed and
uninformed investors coexist in the market. An investor is said to be
free to choose between staying uninformed or becoming informed. In
the equilibrium situation, the cost an investor incurs to become
informed is fully offset by the extra utility he would gain by
becoming informed. At the equilibrium, he would be indifferent as to
one or the other.
This paper shows that for the specific case of investors having
constant absolute risk-aversion, it would not be possible to achieve
an equilibrium if the the market is fully efficient. If the market is
fully efficient, the price would convey all the information regarding
security return. If that is the case, there would be no incentive to
purchase information and everyone would desire to become uninformed.
On the other hand, if everyone is uninformed, the price would convey
nothing. Hence everyone would desire to become informed. Under either
situation, the market would break down completely with zero trading.
The market can only achieve competitive equilibrium if there is noise
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in the system and there is utility to be gained from doing research.
Only when traders in the market hold different beliefs and are
willing to act on those beliefs, is there a possible market. But the
intriguing question that needs to be asked is : "Do all participants
in the market incur the same cost in information search?". Cootner,
in his paper of 1962, obviously did not think so. While the case
could be made for the US that given the long history of the
stockmarket and the high level of investor literacy and the
widespread availability of investment information, there may not be
that much difference in the cost of search. But in a less immature
market, there would be greater possibility that the cost of
information search would not be the same for all participants. If the
cost of information is not uniform for all participants, then at the
equilibrium point of this model, there would be some traders who
could obtain abnormal profit.
AKERLOF (1970) This paper proposes a model which was originally
developed for use in economic situations other than the stockmarket
but which appears to have interesting possibilities when used to
explain the market information system. Akerlof's socalled "Market For
Lemons" model was developed to provide an explanation for the
process of price formation in a market where there is an unequal
possession of knowledge between the buyer and the seller regarding the
quality of the goods being offered for sale, as the case of the used
cars market. In such a situation, the seller of the car possesses far
more knowledge regarding the car than the intending buyer. Since
there is a risk that the buyer could be buying a "lemon", he would
only offer a price which would protect him in the event that he
really does get a lemon. Thus the price of the used cars as a whole
would be driven down to a level which can be upheld by the average
quality of the car on offer. An extreme development of this situation
can take place if the sellers of non-lemons are not satisfied with
the price offered and withdraw from the market all together. The
withdrawal of the non-lemon sellers would imply a drop in the
average quality of cars left on the market and this would cause the
buyers to lower their offered price even further for fear of getting
the lemon among the lemons. This process can lead to the eventual
disappearance of the market.
This process of pricing in a situation of non-symmetrical possession
of knowledge could be applied to the stockmarket with a
modification. The stockmarket is not made up of only knowledgeable
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sellers and non-knowledgeable buyers. Instead, it is made up of both
knowlegeable buyers and sellers as well as non-knowledgeable buyers
and sellers. In such a situation, the less well informed would always
be in a disadvantaged position. They could conceivably be always
trj'ing to sell higher or buy lower than what is justifiable by the
true expected return. Compared with the informed investors, it is
possible that they would need to wait for more confirmatory signals
before making up their minds. If we assume that the knowledgeability
of the market participants follows a continuum rather than two
distinct classes and that the action of the most knowlegeable
participants can be thought of as the confirmatory signal required by
the next most knowledgeable, it is possible to propose the following
adaptation of Akerlof's model.
At the equilibrium situation, a new piece of information concerning a
stock is received. This piece of information is so small that only
the most knowledgeable realises its meaning for improving (or
deteriorating) future stock return; he therefore moves in and makes
his trade. His buying together with additional information which
■would be trickling in would alert the next most knowledgeable
investors and they would in turn follow. This would trigger more
action down the line of less knowledgeable investors until eventually
even the most ignorant will have participated in the buying. The more
knowledgeable are therefore in position to take advantage of the
less knowledgeable by buying or selling before the latter. If it
could be shown that the price of stocks responds slowly rather than
instantaneously to the input of a new piece of information, this
model would have some validity and the market could not be considered
ultra efficient. As will be shown later in this chapter, even the US
market does not always react instantaneously to new information. It
would thus seem that such a model of market behavior has greater
explanatory power than the earlier Beaverian model.
BEAVER (1981b) It is interesting to note that in a paper that was
published in the same year as his book (1981a), Beaver proposed a
model of market behavior that appears to have much greater
explanatory power of the real market situation and which moves away
considerably from the efficient market position earlier held (the
book was probably written somewhat earlier). The first part of this
article is a review of the theoretical basis of EMH first proposed by
Faraa in 1970 taking note of the subsequent research since then.
Beaver pointed out the ambiguities and the difficulties associated
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with this model as has been discussed in some detail in Chapter One
of this thesis. He therefore proposed a new model of EMH to overcome
these difficulties. Beaver's paper postulates that the informational
efficiency of a security market should be regarded as of a
"two-stage" process. In this schema, these two stages are referred to
as "Signal Efficiency" and "Informational System Efficiency". Signal
efficiency refers to the correct equilibrium pricing of a security in
respect of a particular signal from an information system. One cannot
generalise on the overall informational system efficiency of a market
from tests relating to a particular signal or class of signals. Thus
one cannot cite the case of the efficient market reaction to
disclosure under ASR 190 (i.e. the rule for disclosing inflation
adjusted earnings) as proof for overall market efficiency of the
semi-strong form. Informational system efficiency refers to the
efficient pricing of all securities in respect of every signal which
may arise from a particular information system. Care must obviously
be taken in trying to justify the latter since it implies a far
higher level of efficiency.
In the last part of this article, Beaver appears to indicate that his
support is for a position of market efficiency that is considerably
weaker than pure efficiency. He gave support to the models which
allow for this, for example, Grossman & Stiglitz's described earlier.
4.3 — Ifesearch on Efficiency when
Dealing with Earnings and
Dividend Information
In this section, we shall be examining papers which attempt to
demonstrate either that the market responds efficiently or
inefficiently to the release of public information related to
corporate earnings and dividends. Since this is an extremely
complicated and intensely researched area, the publications concerned
will be divided into various subsections for discussions. Section 4.3
will therefore be divided into the following parts:-
4.3.1 - The Information Content of Earnings Announcement
4.3.1.1 - Short Term Earnings
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(A) Predictability of Short Term Earnings
(B) Market Reaction to Unexpected Earnings
Announcements
4.3.1.2 - Long Term Earnings
(A) Predictability of Long Term Earnings
(B) Relationship between Long Term Price and
Earnings
4.3.1.3 - Concluding Remarks on Section 4.3.1
4.3.2 - The Information Content of Dividend Announcements
4.3.2.1 - Dividend Yield and Stock Return
4.3.2.2 - Dividend Changes, its Predictability and its
Place in the Pricing of Stocks
4.3.2.3 - Concluding Remarks on Section 4.3.2
4.3.1 - THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS
Since Williams (1938), it is generally accepted by students of the
stockmarket. that the value of a stock is dependent on the discounted
stream of its future earnings (or dividend, which is derived from
earnings in any case). If we were to accept that current and past
earnings records convey a certain amount of information about the
expected future earnings, the earnings figures which are periodically
released must constitute an important piece of information processed
by the market to place a valuation on stocks. As a result, the
ability of the market to make use of current earnings announcements
has been subjected to close scrutiny by many researchers.
The usefulness of current earnings announcements as tools for price
forecasting would depend on its predictability as well as its past
behavior relative to price. If the past earnings series are either
totally predictable or unpredictable and/or their behavior has no
connection at all with that of the price series, then the utility of
this information would be zero. Only if there is a strong
relationship between price and earnings and if the earnings figures
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themselves are to a certain extent unpredictable (that is, the cost
of search is non-zero), would the unanticipated earnings
announcements attract any responces. Therefore much of the work in
this area is related to these two questions.
This subsection will examine short term (i.e. less than 12 months)
and long term earnings separately because the utility,
predictability and the efficiency with which the market treats short
term and long term earnings are quite different.
4.3.1.1 - Short Term Earnings
(A) The Predictability of Short Term Earnings
The early work of Little(1962) and its later imitators gave the
impression that future earnings were not predictable and that the
value of earnings information is therefore zero. However, later
research was to that show there was considerable departure from this
picture when the shorter term is considered. When dealing with the
short term situation, such a conclusion would seem to be overstated
or perhaps even in error. Several important papers were later
published which demonstrated that the short term changes in earnings
of firms were not that random, and that some analysts were able to
make more accurate earnings forecasts than by merely extrapolating
from past data. (It is also demonstratable that deviations from
expected earnings could lead to price reactions which deviate from
pure randomness as will be shown in the next subsection). It would
seem that the informational content of earnings announcements is
greater than originally thought. Of the many studies carried out in
this area, two will be briefly discussed next.
BROWN AND ROZEFF (1978) The authors set out to test that under
the hypothesis of rational expectation, the long run survival of
financial analysts must imply that their forecasts must be better
than that of martigales or submartingales. They were of the opinion
that past, comparisons which yielded the conclusion that analysts
could do no better than martingales were invalid because of sample
selection bias. They used a forecasting horizon of five quarters and
compared the results from four different methods of forecasting
seasonal martingale, seasonal submartingale, Box-Jenkins and
Valueline Corporation forecasts. The research utilised 50 firms for
1972-1975. Their results seem to show that the Valueline forecast to
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be overwhelmingly superior to the other three methods and the
Box-Jenkins method to be superior to the other two time series
models. This strongly suggests that Valueline Corporation used
information other than earnings time series and was able to achieve
superior forecasts.
In a similar vein, CHANT (1980) tested the accuracy of other
forecast tools against time series models and found that it was
possible to do better than pure random walk. He used six different
stock price forecast variables - money supply, stock indices, bank
loan, average growth, exponentially smoothed and random walk. His
results showed that the money supply model was significantly better
than random walk although surprisingly, none of the others was any
better.
The second paper has shown that even very simple procedure could
produce surprisingly good predictions of future earnings. Taken
together with the first paper, it is quite clear that good analysts
can and do produce reasonable earnings predictions. Given this
conclusion and provided that there is strong correlation between
earnings changes and price changes, it would be possible to predict
stock prices as well. Several papers have been published which showed
that the price of a stock is fairly closely correlated with the
change of its earnings. Among them are BEAVER (1968), NIEDERHOFFER
AND REGAN (1972) and BEAVER, CLARKE AND WRIGHT (1979), the last of
which will be examined below in greater detail.
BEAVER, CLARKE AND WRIGHT (1979) (BCW) This was a most extensive
piece of work which set out to show that, " a positive ordinal
association exists between unsystematic returns and the magnitude of
earnings forecast errors." BCW tested two different earnings forecast
models and two different methods of measuring forecast errors. The
two different earnings forecast models are: (A) Martingale with a
Drift and (B) A model based on the postulate that the change in EPS
is a linear function of the change in market index.
The four sets of tests were run using data on 276 firms for the ten
years from 1965-1974. All four tests yielded very similar results. The
unsystematic return was measured for the 12 months upto the point of
earnings announcement ( assumed to be three months after the end of
the fiscal year). BCW was able to show very high correlation between
high earnings forecast error and high unsystematic return the mean
109
Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient being 0.72 for Model (A)
and 0.68 for Model (B). It would thus seem that the US market has
very good foreknowledge of future earnings.
Given the validity of the above findings, if one can predict the
earnings on a stock accurately and early enough, one should be able
to make abnormal profit. (Niederhoffer and Regan made this point in
their paper as well). However, in the US, earnings forecasts (from
many sources) for the great majority of the listed stocks are
available "off the shelf". Thus the price of a stock at any one time
may already incorporate the market's expectation of its future
earnings. There may therefore be little point trying to make use of
earnings forecasts for predicting future price level unless such
forecasts are only available monopolistically.
In general, researchers do indeed accept that this could well be the
case. Another way to examine how the market would respond to
announced earnings figures would have to be found. If the price of a
stock already incorporates the market's expectation of its future
earnings, would not its price show some reactions if the actual
earnings turns out to be much lower or higher than expected. This is
the direction of much of the research which attempted to study the
market's reaction to new earnings information. Two of the more
important papers will be discussed next.
(B) Market Reaction to Unexpected Earnings Announcements
The work of Ball and Brown (1968) has been discussed in some detail
in Chapter Three together with its defects. During the Seventies,
several well known pieces of work were carried out to correct these
defects. (The earlier mentioned work of Niederhoffer & Regan ought to
be considered as of the same class of work as those described here).
BROWN AND KENNELLY (1972) They used both quarterly earnings
figures as well as the annual earnings figures as the basis of
comparing the actual performance of the sampled companies with that
of the expected based on GNP (i.e. using Ball and Brown's method for
making earnings forecasts). They found that using methodology that
was similar to that of Ball & Brown, they could obtain API's that
were 30-40% higher with quarterly earnings figures compared with
annual earnings figures. Apart from this, they also found that the
API of the companies which had suffered forecast errors started
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moving up from about 11 months before the announcement date and
continued to do so up till the end of the recorded period ( 6 months
after the announcement date). Although the slow speed of adjustment
after the announcement of earnings is clear evidence of
inefficiency, they did not draw any conclusion regarding the
efficiency or inefficiency of the market.
JOY, LITZENBERGER AND McENALLY (1977) (JIM) They made further
improvements to the methodology of Ball & Brown. Firstly, weekly
prices were used instead of monthly prices in order to obtain a finer
picture of the market's reaction. Secondly, the market's response to
forecast errors between the actual and expected earnings was divided
into three categories - 0-20%, 20-40% and above 40%. The reason for
doing so is that they felt that small forecast errors may be ignored
by the market. Their results seem to indicate that they were right in
thinking so. At 26 weeks after the announcement of earnings, those
firms with positive earnings forecast error of greater than 20% had
an API which was 15% greater than firms which have incurred a
negative forecast error of similar magnitude. The API of firms with
greater than 40% forecast error showed similar abnormality. As the
authors pointed out, even after incorporating transaction costs, such
difference in API would still result in a handsome profit. Again, the
API was found to have starfed moving up well before the announcement
date.
Based on the two above papers, we can come to some important
conclusions about market behavior in the US in respect of earnings
announcements:-
(1) The market seems to have a prior expectation of what the
forthcoming earnings figure for each listed firm ought to be:
(2) In addition to having a prior expectation of what a firm's
earnings ought to be, the market seems to "know" in advance if the
firm is going to experience an increase or decrease in earnings and
the price of a stock would have moved considerably in the direction
of the eventual earnings change well before the announcement ;
(3) A good facsimile of the market's earnings expectations can be
developed from fairly simple method/s;
(4) If the actual figure differs considerably from what had been
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expected, there is a further price reaction in the direction of the
forecast error in addition to the previous movement; and
(5) The reaction is not instantaneous, taking up to 26 weeks to take
full effect.
Using the schema developed in Section 1.4.3, the implication is that
the US market, in so far as earnings forecast error is concerned,
attains Stage II efficiency but not Stage III. There is therefore a
potential for making abnormal profit. In addition, it is possible
that there may exist earnings forecast methods which are more
accurate than those used hitherto which could more accurately predict
future earnings and hence prices with even greater potential for
making abnormal gains. So far, there is no well known paper on any
direct test on the possibility of obtaining abnormal gains by
accurate earnings forecasts.
The findings of JLM would seem, at first glance, to conflict with the
first of the two major findings of the next paper. However, closer
examination would reveal that such conflict is more apparent than
real. A reconciliation between the two would be offered after the
discussion of the next paper.
BEAVER, LAMBERT AND MORSE (1980) (BLM) BLM turned the traditional
relationship inferred between price and earnings upside down by
looking at the relationship in the opposite direction. Their study
covered 19 years of records on the Compustat tape with a sample size
of between 363 to 748 firms. The contemporaneous relationship
between the two with the price as the dependent variable was first
examined. Their result showed that the average regression coefficient
was 0.12 and the mean coefficient of determination was only 0.07.
The mean regression coefficient of 0.12 seems to imply that earnings
series is not a random walk in which case it would have been (or
close to) 0. The coefficient of determination was so low that it
would warrant the conclusion that it was most unlikely that the
observed changes in prices be the result of earnings changes.
However, when the regression was performed in the other direction
using the current year's price changes and the following year's
earnings changes, the coefficient of determination was considerably
higher at 0.26. This implies that to an extent, it is possible to
anticipate future earnings change from observation of price behavior.
112
Further simple tests conducted by BLM seemed to indicate that price
based forecasting models were more accurate than models based on
random walk with a drift.
This led BLM to propose that the process for the generation of
earnings of a firm was a compound process. The earnings were generated
by a mixture of two elements. The first, element was generated by
events which were related to stock price and which appeared to
exhibit a lagged response to the information contained in the price.
The second element was generated by those events which were
independent of the stock price.
The second important implication of BLM's work is its explanation for
the "peculiar' long term behavior of price earnings ratios (which will
be examined in the next subsection) for "mean reversion". The
explanation being that current earnings (which is used for the
computation of PER) contains both a transitory as well as a permanent
component. Only the permanent component of earnings ought to be
reflected in the price since over the long term, the transitory
component would be self-cancelling. This being the case, when the
transitory component is large and positive, the PER would be low and
vice versa. Given that the transitory component is self cancelling,
it is not surprising that PER has a strong tendency to "mean
reversion".
Reconciliation between Joy, Litzenberger and McEnally and Beaver,
Lambert and Morse It is quite simple to explain the first finding
of BLM. BLM used annual earnings figures in an aggregative study
hence it committed all the faults of Ball and Brown. It is not at all
surprising that the coefficienct of determination on a regression
using price against earnings is so low.
It is also possible to offer an explanation for the second finding in
a way which does not overturn the validity of JLM's finding. In a
way, this finding of BLM is not at all surprising since the
stockmarket. is well known as a leading indicator of the economy. As
Cohen, Zinbarg and Zeikel (1973) showed in their book, the
stockmarket price cycle apparently led the economic cycle by
between 3-9 months over the post war period. The US Department of
Labour (USDL) uses stockmarket returns as one of the components of
its leading indicator index. Since national income is the most
powerful determinant of corporate earnings, it is not surprising that
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price leads earnings.
There is no denying that on an aggregative basis, the market is
highly efficient in that it can look some way into the future.
However, such evidence of prescience has to be tempered by two
considerations. Firstly, the announced as opposed to actual annual
corporate earnings figures lag the national income by a considerable
margin. The annual earnings figures are only released about 7-8
months after half the annual income has been earned. Secondly, in
addition to the month by month release of national income figures by
the USDL, there are a large number of public and private forecasts of
next year's GNP. The market, as a complete entity, therefore has a
very good idea of following year's aggregate corporate earnings.
The market is also capable of discerning the future of the individual
stocks. This statement is supported by evidence from JIM's work as
well. This does not mean that the market can be said to be fully
efficient with regard to all earnings signals. While it could look
into the future and adjust stock prices according to its expectation,
this adjustment does not appear to be fully completed at the time of
the announcement or even shortly after. This then is the most
important implication of JLM's work; that is, the market does not
work instantaneously in accordance with the EMH model.
BLM's postulation that earnings is generated by a two component
process is fully compatible with JLM's finding. It is possible that
the delayed response of the market to earnings forecast errors
revealed in JLM's work was more due to the effect of the second
component (i.e. the idiosyncratic element of earnings formation).
BLM's finding was more the probable result of the first component
(the one which was thought to show a lagged response to price).
However, it would seem more logical to say that the earnings are not
generated by the price but by a factor which appears to have a
contemporaneous response in price and a lagged response in earnings.
A.s was pointed out earlier, this factor is probably the national
income. Using Beaver's own schema, there is little doubt that the
market is highly efficient in terms of the signal on overall
corporate earnings but it is less efficient when it is dealing with
signals on individual corporate earnings.
4.3.1.2 - Long Term Earnings
(A) Predictability of Long Term Earnings
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Important work dealing with this topic will be discussed in detail in
Chapter Five and they will hence be dealt with briefly here. The best
known work dealing with the predictability of earnings is arguably
that by LITTLE (1962). The other early works of note are papers
by LITTLE AND RAYNER (1966), LINTNER AND GLAUBER (1967) and BALL AND
WATTS (1972). The general conclusion which one can draw from these
papers is that the annual earnings series appear to follow something
that is either close to a random walk or random walk with a drift. If
the long run earnings series of firms are true random walks, this
would imply that it would take a very superior analyst indeed to be
able to produce accurate forecasts. Much of the time, earnings
forecasts would therefore be useless. Following this line of
reasoning, it would be logical to conclude that if the market is
rational, it would not bother to do any research on earnings
forecasting and if any research is carried out, it would most
probably ignore them. These early papers therefore seem to support
the main tenets of the EMH.
The picture of the long term relationship between earnings and price
as revealed by published work is somewhat confused. There have been
many papers studying the relationship between earnings and price over
the long term, many of them focusing on the usefulness of price
earnings ratio as a predictive tool for long term earnings growth.
Most of these papers fall into two categories - one examining the
usefulness of PER as a predictor of future earnings growth and the
second examining the possibility of abnormal gain by using low PER as
a selection strategy. As will be shown in Section 4.4.2, the second
category of papers has turned out to be victims of model
misspecification. Owing to the tendency of researchers to use massive
sample without stratification, the test for low PER effect turned
out to be largely a test for the small firm effect. As a result,
their conclusion regarding the ineffciency with regard to low PER has
been invalidated. Further research work in this area with stratified
samples is probably required before any conclusion can be made in
terms of this aspect of market inefficiency.
Initial studies of the first category led to the conclusion that the
market was not capable of predicting future earnings growth because
the PER of stocks at any one time had little correlation with
subsequent earnings growth. The works of MURPHY AND STEVENSON
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(1967) and GRAGG AND MALKIEL (1968) are often cited in support of
this. However, such studies contained one basic defect - they failed
to take into account the fact that the market could differentiate
between the transitory and permanent elements of earnings growth as
pointed out by BLM. The two elements together would tend to give a
garbled picture of the predictive power of PER. The very
comprehensive work by Beaver and Morse to be described next shows
very clearly that upto two years, PER has very good predictive power.
However, the picture for periods longer than two years is still
unclear.
BEAVER AND MORSE (1978) This study made use of the data contained
on the Compustat tape for a period of 19 years from 1956 to 1974 with
the number of stocks in the sample increasing from 270 to 600. The
stocks in each year's sample were first ranked into 25 portfolios by
PER and the behavior of the PER of each portfolio subsequent to its
formation was studied. The study made several important discoveries
which are summarised below:-
(a) The rank correlation of portfolios over time subsequent to their
formation was very good. The median correlation declined slowly over
time - from 0.96 in the first year after formation to 0.44 after 14
years. Beaver and Morse interpreted this as indication of very long
term persistence of the PER characteristic.
(b) The tendency for portfolio PER to converge was very strong in the
first three years. The PER of the highest ranked portfolio was 8.6
times higher than the 25th portfolio in the year of formation, in the
second year, the ratio had shrunk to 3.3 and by the third year it was
only 2.1. But subsequent to the third year, the ratio was very
persistent, shrinking only from 1.8 times to 1.2 in the 12t.h year.
Beaver and Morse took this to mean that while certain factor(s)
determining the PER at the time of portfolio formation had dissipated
greatly after the third year, certain other factor(s) which explained
PER persisted for a very long time.
(c) The rank correlation between PER and EPS growth in years
subsequent to portfolio formation demonstrated a pattern which
supported the contention that the market was adept at picking out the
transitory component of the earnings. This was first, reported by
WHITBECK AND KISOR as early as 1963. The median correlation
between the two was -0.28 in the first year, 0.53 in the second and
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0.25 in the third year. The reason why the correlation was negative in
the first year was that the market could see through the transitory
part of the earnings and ignored it in its pricing of the stocks by
rewarding stocks with temporary low EPS with a higher PER and vice
versa. The good correlation in the first three years after formation
clearly demonstrated the market's ability to predict earnings beyond
one year. The tapering off of the correlation coefficient after the
third year indicated the lack of ability or interest of the market in
looking at the long term. However, the long term persistence of the
correlation coefficient is very puzzling in view of the earlier
finding regarding the random nature of earnings series.
(d) The persistence of the portfolio PER could only be partially
explained by the riskiness of the stocks. This was difficult to
demonstrate because the relationship between the two can either be
positive or negative depending on whether the market was up or down
in the period. However, the computation of the average beta of each
portfolio grouped into "up" and "down" years demonstrated little
difference between the highest and lowest ranking PER portfolios.
However, with the addition of earnings growth rate, the two together
had much better predictive power on PER; the coefficient of
determination being 0.51.
Based on these findings, the authors concluded that, none of the
traditional factors appeared to offer strong explanatory power of the
long term persistence of PER. They therefore offered accounting
method as an explanation. However, they left this hypothesis
untested.
4.3.1.3 - CONCLUDING REMARKS FOR SECTION 4.3.1
Based on the foregoing discussions, it is possible to make the
following statements about how efficiently the Western markets deal
with information on earnings which has been well tested and the
academics are in general agreement over the findings
(1) The earnings streams of companies appear to be made up of two
components — a short term one and a long term one. The market
appears to be well aware of this.
(2) The market appears to have a good foreknowledge of the future
earnings of companies. Such foreknowledge leads to the movements of
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price of stocks in the direction of the expected earnings change
prior to earnings announcements.
(3) There is in addition further price movements after the earnings
announcement. Such movements appear to take some time to complete.
(4) The US market can therefore be said to have reached Stage II
efficiency; being inefficient only to the extent that the reactions
are slow to complete.
4.3.2 - THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF DIVIDENDS
Dividend is another area of finance which has been and still is being
intensely researched. However, a very large percentage of the work is
put into trying to prove or disprove the validity of Miller and
Modigliani's assertion that "dividend does not matter". The
relationship between this hypothesis and this dissertation is only
peripheral and as a result, we shall only be examining this topic
superficially in Chapter Five. In this dissertation, we are much more
interested in how the market deals with various types of dividend
information in its pricing of stocks. There are many types of
dividend information and this dissertation will concentrate on two
only — Dividend Yield and Dividend Change information.
4.3.2.1 - Dividend Yield and Stock Return
The return an investor can expect from an investment in stocks is
usually in two parts — dividend and capital appreciation. Typically,
dividend forms a much smaller part of the total return than capital
appreciation. Theoretically, all investors should ignore the split
between dividend and capital gain and concentrate on the total
expected return. However, the thinking of the practitioners and many
fundamentalist writers (to be discussed in Chapter Five) is in
contradiction to this principle. They consistently uphold the view
that investors should concentrate on high yielding stocks, other
things being equal.
It would seem that it is possible to test this assertion. However,
the relationship between dividend yield and return is not an easy
matter to test. Dividend yield is computed from two highly dynamic
factors — stock price and dividend rate. As with earnings, there
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are probably two components in the dividend series as well. Given the
sophistication of the Western market, when an investor is considering
the dividend yield level at which to buy a stock, he would compute
the yield based on some "normalised dividend rate" (In fact, a broker
firm which the writer is familiar with uses precisely this concept).
To use the published dividend yield figures directly is likely to
lead to the sort of pitfalls described by Brealey (1971) when
discussing the work of Robinson.
Robinson studied the relationship between dividend payout ratios and
PER for the years 1945-1949. His result seemed to show that in each
of these years, there was a strong relationship between dividend
payout and PER. The result therefore appeared to lend strong support
to the fundamentalists. But, as Brealey pointed out, Robinson's study
included several unintentional biases. One possible bias was
introduced by firms which had suffered temporary misfortunes (e.g.
strike) which led to sharp earnings decline. As the management
realised that such earnings decline was only temporary, the same
dividend would be maintained. The market also realised this and as a
result the price would not fall much. These events would lead to a
high PER and high payout ratio. Another possible bias could be
introduced by non-consideration of factors which had an effect on
both the firm's dividend policy and market valuation. Thus, a firm
with high leverage would be given a low PER by the market. At the
same time, for reasons of safety, the company would adopt a low
payout policy. Again the combination of events lead to a positive
relationship between PER and payout.
Brealey went on to discuss in some detail the problems with other
approaches for drawing a valid relationship between dividend yield
and return. He found none of the tests he examined ( among them :
Arditti (1967) and Donaldson (1961) ) truly satisfactory for drawing
an overall conclusion. However, he did state that there is
considerable evidence for the assertion that investors were aware of
the tax effect and that the hypothesis for the existence of a
"clientele effect" was probably valid. If the clinetele effect exists
then there can be no logical reason to believe that there is a
correlation between dividend yield and return. The next paper to be
discussed used a novel method and its findings seems to support this
assertion.
BLACK AND SCHOLES (1974) The authors reasoned that the more
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traditional method of using cross sectional tests was less reliable
because of the difficulty of controlling factors other than dividend
yield. They therefore used an adaptation of the two parameter CAPM
based on the supposition that increasing the dividend of a firm will
decrease its future return. The relationship postulated is given by
the following equation:-
E (R.) = y + $[E(.R 1 - y ] + y (6. - 6 )/6
l o m o oi mm
A
Where: R. =Expected return on security i
r =Expected return on the market
pin ,
=Rividend yield on security i
6 -Dividend yield on the market
m
The cross sectional regressions were carried out with the stocks
divided into 25 intermediate portfolios according to their betas. The
regressions were performed on the monthly data on dividend yield,
price and return for every common stock listed on the NYSE from 1926
to 1966.
The results of the study appeared to confirm the well accepted view
that the return of a stock depended on its beta. The regressions also
showed that the coefficient for dividend yield was close to zero.
This seemed to imply that the market is efficient to the degree that
it recognises that dividend per se is of no importance. However, the
next test, using very similar methodology, came to the opposite
conclusion regarding the importance of dividend yield.
BLUME (1980) He applied Black and Scholes' method to a slightly
different regression model :-
r. = a + b8. + c6. + e.
it t t it t it xt
Where : =Return on the ith security for the tth period
6 -Beta of the ith security in the tth period
it
Y. ^Dividend yield on the ith security for the tth period
it
The one major difference was that Blume used a different definition
for "Dividend Yield". He defined Dividend Yield on an "anticipated"
basis rather than on an "as is" basis. The former being defined as the
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dividend paid in the previous twelve months divided by the price at
the BEGINNING of the twelve months adjusted for the overall market
movement for the twelve months. The latter being defined as the same
amount of dividend divided by the end of period price (this would be
the normal definition of dividend yield).
Blume carried out quarterly regressions from the data taken from the
Compustat tapes for the period January 1936 to December 1976, divided
into five subperiods. His result showed positive correlation between
dividend yield (as defined) and return throughout the whole period,
although only two of the five sets of correlations for each of the
subperiods were significant.
Concluding Remarks on Dividend Yield Effect At this stage it is
not possible to offer more than a very tentative explanation on why
Blume's test should produce such a diametrically opposite result to
Black and Scholes'. The explanation possibly lies in the former's
definition of dividend yield. Given the foreknowledge of earnings the
market has, it is likely that dividend yield as computed by Black and
Scholes would have discounted the expected future change in dividend
and the stock price would have adjusted accordingly. Dividend yield
computed at that point would therefore bear little relationship with
the future return on the stock.
If Blume's conclusion is correct and there is indeed a linear
relationship between dividend yield and return, it should not
automatically lead one to conclude that the US market is inefficient.
In view of the otherwise highly efficient nature of the market, there
may be other explanations for this anomaly. A possible explanation
could be that the investors do adhere to "a bird in hand is
preferable to two in the bush" principle. That is, they put a higher
premium on dividend return as against capital appreciation. This
being so, the traditional model would fall foul of model
misspecification since the riskiness of the two types of return would
not be the same in the eyes of the investors. The existence of a
linear relationship between dividend yield and return could just as
well be regarded as a sign of efficiency as inefficiency since the
investors take dividend yield information into account for pricing of
stocks.
While it is not possible to state categorically whether dividend
yield information is efficiently utilised, it is important to note
that one way or another, dividend yield information appears to
influence investment decision making and in that sense, the market is
at least Stage I efficient. It would be interesting to replicate
Blume's test on another, less sophisticated, market to uncover if any
difference exists.
4.3.2.2 - DIVIDEND CHANGES, THEIR PREDICTABILITY AND THEIR
PLACE IN THE DETERMINATION OF STOCK PRICES
It is arguable that dividend yield information is among the most
readily available of investment information. It is perhaps not
surprising that a sophisticated market like the US treats this piece
of information efficiently. Dividend change information requires
greater sophistication on the part of the investor to correctly
interpret the significance of the information. Firstly, the investors
would need to have a record of the previous payments or have some
idea of the dividend trend from which they have developed a prior
expectation of what the dividend ought to be. Secondly, they would
need to be able to compare what the dividend "ought to be" and what
it is and re-evaluate the stock in the light of this difference. The
next two papers to be examined investigated the ability of the market
to efficiently interpret dividend change announcements. The prima
facie evidence seems to indicate that the market is efficient in
terms of this particular type of information.
PETTIT (1972) Pettit used the API method to study the monthly
price performance of 625 NYSE stocks which had undergone dividend
changes during the period 1964-1968. He also carried out a parallel
study using daily prices for the period 1967-1969. The API for seven
different dividend change categories were separately computed -
Omission, Reduction, No Change, Increase of 10% or less, Increase of
10-25% and Increase Exceeding 25%.
His study showed that the API of stocks of all categories became
fully adjusted either by the end of the announcement month (for the
monthly prices) or within a few days ( for the daily prices). It is
important to note that the amount of adjustment undergone by the API
correlated very well with the amount of dividend change.
WATTS (1973) He examined the informational content of dividend
changes from a different angle. He reasoned that the management of
firms had a much better idea of the future earnings prospects of the
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firm than the market. Since traditionally the management of firms are
thought to hold the view that the quantum of dividend payment is
sacrosant in the downward direction, they would therefore only
change the dividend rate if they were very sure of the future
earnings prospect of the firms. If this were the case, there would be
positive correlation between dividend changes and future earnings. If
this relationship existed, a knowledgeable investor would be able to
make abnormal gain if the market as a whole was not aware of this
relationship. Watts used the API method to examine the data on 310
firms for the period 1945-1968 and he concluded thus
(a) Although there is a positive correlation between dividend changes
and future earnings changes, the correlation is so small that it
would have little informational value; and
(b) The API of firms which were expected to have earnings changes due
to dividend changes tended to stay close to 1.00 for the tweleve
months before and after the abnormal dividend changes. Thus it would
seem impossible to make abnormal gain from this piece of information.
While the above two papers seem to show conclusively that the market
appears to attain Stage III efficiency in terms of dividend
announcements, there are two points to consider. Firstly, it could be
argued that although the dividend change information has been
incorporated in the price at the time of dividend announcement, this
does not necessarily imply prescience on the part of the market. It
could mean that the dividend information could be a function of a
third as yet unknown variable which itself has an effect on price.
Secondly, it could also be argued that such lack of reaction to
dividend changes could be due to the lack of significance accorded to
dividend information by the market and as a result it is not used in
the process of price formation to any large extent. It could be
argued that the quantum of dividend paid out by each firm is an
artificial quantity affected by the inclination, economic reality,
tradition and a host of other factors. This being so, the real
significance of dividend changes is very much garbled by external
noise; to the extent that its informational value may be close to
zero. The next paper to be discussed leads support to this view.
FAMA AND BABIAK (1968) The authors set out to test Lint.ner"s
"partial adjustment model" for dividend payments. According to this
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model, each firm usually has a long run target dividend payout ratio.
However, it would not be possible under normal circumstances to stick
to this rate rigidly because of the usual variability in earnings.
The firm therefore makes an effort to adjust the dividend to this
rate only partially in response to a change in earnings. Unless and
until the new earnings trend is confirmed by several years of
earnings at the new level, a firm would not move back completely to
the long run payout rate.
They utilised multiple regression of the current dividend against
prior years' earnings and were able to show positive correlation. This
implies that current dividend rate is very much a product of previous
years' earnings for which the market has full knowledge. It is
therefore not surprising that neither Pettit nor Watts were able to
show much informational value for dividend announcements.
The foregoing paragraph of course does not imply that dividend
announcements always have zero informational value. The next two
papers were to show that under certain circumstances, dividend
announcements have value and the market does react to them.
AHARONY AND SWARY (1980) This study is less concerned with the
question of EMH but more with the question of whether "dividend does
not matter". However, its finding is of interest in connection with
the current discussion of whether the market deals efficiently with
dividend information. The authors reasoned that it had been difficult
to isolate the "pure" effect of dividend announcements because its
effect cannot be separated from the effect of the usually concurrent
earnings announcement. They therefore examined the effect of dividend
announcements made either before or after the earnings announcements.
They used the CAR method pioneered by FFJR to isolate the abnormal
return associated with such announcements. They were able to show
considerable movements in the CAR in the same direction as the changes
of dividend announced (except in the case of no dividend change where
the effect was positive) after the date of the announcements. This
finding seems to uphold the the finding of JLM and the contention
that the market does react to "unusual" dividend announcements,
albeit more slowly than EMH model would suggest.
ASQUITH AND MULLINS (1983) The authors of this paper used another
method of studying the effect of "unusual" dividend announcements.
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They studied the market reaction to firms which initiated or resumed
(after a long break) dividend payments. Again they used FFJR's CAR
method. The sample consisted of 168 such announcements. They found
that the CAR showed excess return of upto 4.3% after such
announcements.
4.3.2.3 - CONCLUDING REMARKS ON SECTION 4.3.2
It is possible to come to some conclusions after this long and
complex survey of the research work in the area of informational
value of dividend:-
(1) the situation surrounding the dividend yield information is
complex and cannot be readily summarised. It is perhaps more
important to note that this type of information is very well used by
the market than how efficiently it is being utilised.
(2) While there is strong evidence that dividend change information
appears to be very efficiently utilised by the US market, there is
also strong evidence that the quantum of dividend in itself is an
artificial quantity. Apart from abnormal situations such as drastic
dividend cuts and resumptions of dividend payment, dividend
information does not appear to be a very important piece of
information.
(3) Given that dividend data in itself is not very important, a
different approach will be considered when testing the Malaysian
market for informational efficiency surrounding dividend data.
4-4 — OTHER ASPECTS OF SEMI-STRONG
FORM INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY
In this section, we shall be examining further the informational
efficiency of the market with regard to other types of semi-strong
information. Here we shall be beginning to examine the margin of the
market's efficiency by looking at information which appears to be
inefficiently treated by the market while previously we were
considering information which was either very efficiently or
reasonably efficiently treated by the market.
4.4.1 - THE SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT TO NEW INFORMATION
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In efficiency debate, the condition of speedy adjustment to new
information is usually assumed as given. For unless the speed of
adjustment is rapid, it would present opportunity to traders who are
closer to the market place (both physically and informationwise) to
act first and reap abnormal profit. In the previous section we have
seen that there are indications of less than rapid adjustment of the
market in the cases of earnings forecast errors and unexpected
dividend changes. Here we shall look at several more instances of
less than rapid adjustment of the market to new information.
In the earlier years of efficient market research, it was typically
assumed that the market reacts speedily to new information. The
studies there were cited in support of this are those by BEAVER
(1968) AND FOSTER (1976). In both papers, the conclusion reached
regarding the speed of adjustment of the market to new earnings
information was similar. Both authors concluded that the market was
efficient because the prices appeared to fully reflect the
information content of the new earnings announcements within one or
two days (Forster's paper) or weeks (Beaver's paper). However, both
studies contain the same defect as the studies on earnings forecast
errors examined earlier in this chapter. That is, the effect of the
information studied is that of the aggregative information. If
modifications to the methodology is introduced to consider only the
more severe cases of earnings increase or decrease, a very mixed
picture emerges as can be seen from the next paper.
BROWN (1978) He reasoned that the market's reaction as studied by
the two previous authors was the average reaction which masked the
reaction of the more extreme cases of earnings changes. He therefore
only took into account the extreme cases by examining the price
reactions of companies which have experienced an earnings changes of
greater than 20% either in the positive or negative direction. Using
three different abnormal performance indices, API; CAR; and PPI ( the
last developed by Pettit), Brown was able to show that the market's
reaction was very slow (confirmed by all three indices). The market
took as long as 60 days to fully adjust to the new earnings
announcements. The difference in prices between firms that had
suffered an earnings decline as compared with firms which had
experienced an earnings increase was in the order of 16-17%. The
author therefore concluded thus : " Examination of Figure 1 (i.e.
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figure of the CAR for 0-60 days for firms with PFE and NFE) reveals
that the adjustment of stock prices to EPS information apparently
takes some time. The CAR trends strongly until about day 45 after the
earnings announcement in the Wall Street Journal.".
KAPLAN AND ROLL (1973) Confirmation of the slow reaction of the
market can be obtained from a most unexpected source. The purpose of
this study was to examine the ability of the market to see through
the accounting earnings presented by the firm which had been
enhanced by "creative accounting" as against firms whose earnings
increase was "real". The authors examined firms that had adopted two
accounting sleights-of-hand to improve their earnings figures ( the
use of immediate flow-through of investment tax credit and the use of
depreciation switchback). According to their definition of
efficiency, the market ought to be able to see through such
techniques and the earnings figures would be discounted by the market
as if there had been no increase in earnings. The prima facie
evidence seems to indicate that the market indeed was efficient with
regard to this particular information. However, what is surprising is
the length of time required for the price to adjust fully relative to
the control groups. In both types of accounting changes, the market
took as long as 60 weeks to adjust fully. While the amount of
adjustment is not very much ( in the order of 8% in both cases), the
slowness of the reaction appears to confirm the earlier contention
that the market is not efficient in this respect.
The above papers have demonstrated that one of the prime assumptions
behind market efficiency does not appear to hold true in all
instances. Parenthetically, it may be useful to note another paper
which calls to question two other major assumptions behind the EMH -
zero transaction cost and perfectly rational investors. A well
researched anomaly of the stockmarket is the "seasoning" required
for old bonds to adjust to the yield of new bonds. An example of
these would be the paper by LINDVALL (1977). From the EMH's point
of view, it just does not make sense that the old and new bonds of
the same risk class should be selling at different yield levels.
Admittedly, the differences in yield are not great but their
existence is still troubling nevertheless. Lindvall offered several
explanations for the low level of trading in old bonds which resulted
in their slow seasoning. All these explanations could be linked to the
fact that in the US, bonds are largely held by institutions or trust
departments of institutions. Firstly, the nature of the liquidity
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requirement of institutions had meant that the bonds were traded more
to meet the funds requirements rather than to maximise the yield
obtainable. Secondly, the explicit and implicit cost of trading
argued against trading. Thirdly, there was a "lock-in" effect as the
old bonds were carried on the balance sheets of the institutions at
much higher price than the current market value (this study was
conducted during a time of fast rising interest rate). Even if from
the cashflow point of view it was advantageous to trade, the desire
not to suffer too much accounting loss would argue against it. Given
this institutional bias against trading and thinness of trading in
this sector otherwise, the old bonds would therefore only adjust
slowly to the new bonds' yield.
This evidence of the inability of the institutions to act rationally
is supported by the oft remarked "incompetence" of institutions by
fundamentalist writers such as DREMAN in (1977) and "ADAM SMITH"
(1964 and 1968). This lack of economic rationality and the
possibility of thinness of trading in certain sectors of the market
is very disturbing in view of the basic assumptions of EMH
supporters.
4.4.2 - SMALL FIRM AND OTHER "THIN TRADING" EFFECTS
(A) The Small Firm Effect
The "small firm effect" alludes to the wellknown fact that investment
in the stocks of smaller firms could provide much higher return than
investment in larger firms even after the appropriate adjustment for
risk has been made. This effect was initially thought to be the "low
PER effect" since it was first noticed that investment in low PER
stocks could generate much higher returns than investment in high
PER stocks, a manifestly inefficient state of the market. This was
demonstrated by BASU (1977) among others.
Later BANZ (1981) and REINGANUM (1981a) were able to show
convincingly that the low PER effect was in fact a surrogate of the
small firm effect because smaller firms have much lower PER than
larger firms. This anomaly is obviously extremely disturbing to
proponents of EMH since it does not seem possible that such a simple
mechanical trading rule could yield higher returns. Since its initial
discovery, EMH proponents had been trying to uncover possibilities of
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risk misspecification to account for the much higher return. As an
example of this, ROLL (1981) postulated that the low trading that
was prevalent among smaller firms' stocks could result in their
computed betas being considerably lower than they actually were. In
1982, REINGANUM demonstrated that after using the adjustment for
low trading proposed by DIMSON (1979), the stocks of small firms
still yielded much higher return.
These publications started a big chain of research on the subject. As
an example of the intensity of the current research, in Volume 12
(1983) of the Journal of Financial Economics, there are seven papers
on this one topic. As indicated by the tone of the paper by Reinganum
(1981a), proponents of EMH were convinced that there may be some as
yet undiscovered risk factors which could explain the higher return.
Most of the papers in the 1983 issue of Journal of Finanical
Economics are of this genre. It is worthwhile quoting in full the
conclusion of SCHWERT (1983) which is the introductory and in a
sense, the concluding paper for the other six.
"The search for an explanation of this anomaly (size effect)
has been unsuccessful. Almost all authors of papers on the
'size effect' agree that it is evidence of misspecification
of the capital asset pricing model, rather than evidence of
inefficient capital markets. On the other hand, none of the
attempts to modify the CAPM to account for taxation,
transaction costs, skewness of preference and so forth has
been successful at discovering the 'missing factor' for
which size is a proxy."
As stated by BROWN, KLEIDON AND MARSH (1983), the idea of
misspecification of CAPM is a "catchall" which can provide an
explanation for any anomaly. However, as additional evidence appears
(as in JAMES AND EDMINSTER (1983)); other, more neutral observers
are of the view that this could well be a clear case of inefficiency.
This writer concurs with the latter view and would like to add that
this case of inefficiency seems to be a fairly clear indication that
the cost of information search to the investors is probably far from
similar for the large and small firms. This and the thinness of the
market owing to lack of participation by both the institutional
investors (the small number of shares available, the relatively high
cost of information and possibly an inbuilt bias against small firms)
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and the individual investors (lack of knowledge) lead to the
knowledgeable investors being able to reap abnormal gain from their
investment.
This view of the writer is given some support by the recent paper of
BARRY AND BROWN (1984). Barry and Brown tested for relationship
between available information (using period of listing as a proxy)
and return and concluded:-
We show that period of listing, a crude measure of
differential information is associated with the well known
'size effect' anomaly. However, this information argument
does by no means fully explain the firm size anomaly, and it
is an open question as to whether a more satisfactory
measure of information would more completely explain the
observed size effect. It is interesting to note that at
least one popular explanation of the small firm effect, an
explanation in terms of a turn-of-the-year phenomenon,
does not in anyway diminish the period of listing effect seen
in the data."
As has been pointed out in Section 4.2 and the previous paragraph,
the presence of a large number of participants in a particular
sector is an important prerequisite for efficiency. Such lack of
participation, as in the case of the small firms, can lead to
inefficiencies. The following two papers offer additional evidence of
such inefficiency.
(B) The Effect of Thin Trading
This writer coined this "effect" in order to group together the
evidence of inefficiency related to less popularly traded securities.
The earlier quoted paper by Lindvall (1977) shows that even in fairly
straight-forward cases, there can be evidence of inefficiency when the
trading volume is low. Several papers have demonstrated that similar
type of inefficiency exists in other sectors of the market, two of
which will be examined here. In addition, a collection of papers
which demonstrates efficiency with respect to one particular class of
information which was of wide public concern will be examined as a
case of, "the exception which proves the rule". While there could
perhaps be lather reason(s) for the inefficiency of this type, to this
writer at least, available evidence seems to indicate that the stated
reason may well be the more cogent one.
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MARSH (1979) Marsh's paper is concerned with the efficiency
demonstrated by stocks at the time of rights issues which are very
common in Britain but much less common in the US. The stated purpose
of the study was to examine the informational efficiency of the market
with regards to rights issues and to test the two conflicting
theories regarding the pricing of stocks at the time of new issues -
Price Pressure Hypothesis versus Substitution Hypothesis. Briefly
stated, the Price Pressure Hypothesis asserts that the demand curve
for a firm's securities is downward sloping which implies that a
rights issue would depress the price of a stock. The Substitution
Hypothesis asserts that all stocks are perfect substitutes for one
another because they are all efficiently priced in terms of each
stock's expected return. Hence a rights issue should have no effect
on price. Marsh was, in effect, attempting to test two aspects of the
market. Firstly, he was interested to see if the market could absorb
new issues without price drops. Secondly, he was interested in
discovering any longer term abnormal behavior ( cf the test by Fama
et al.). His results were mixed in terms of efficiency.
The results of the first test seems to indicate a degree of
efficiency. Irrespective of the size of the individual issues, there
was only a small temporary drop in prices ( in the region of 1%).
This evidence indeed appears to uphold the contention that stocks are
near perfect substitutes for one another. But tests of the second type
appear to indicate considerable inefficiency. His results shows that
the stocks of small firms issuing rights ( as opposed to firms making
small rights issues) appeared to enjoy abnormally good performance
for the six months after the rights issues. This appears to be in
blatant contradiction to EMH. It would therefore appear that the
market can be schizophrenic. It could be very efficient with regard
to one particular type of information (the value of rights vis a vis
the other securities) and yet at the same time be inefficient in
respect of another type of information (expected return of small firms
following rights).
MALKIEL (1977) Malkiel was able to show similar type of
inefficiency by examining the returns on closed end investment
companies. It is a common belief among investment professionals that
closed end investment companies ( or trusts) in both the US and Great
Britain usually sell at a considerable discount to their underlying
131
market value. Malkiel showed that in the US at least, this belief
was well founded. He attempted to find a possible explanation for
this anomaly but failed. He found that the discount could not be
explained by the riskiness of these stocks ( about the same or even
lower), the management fee exacted ( usually below 1% only) or
excessive trading ( shown to be untrue). He believed that the
explanation lay with the fact that the stockbrokers were not keen to
"push" these type of securities as their commission would be lower
than in the case of selling open end mutual funds and of course the
institutions themselves would have little interest in purchasing this
type of securities.
It is perhaps important point out that in recent years, the discount
on closed end investment companies has been shrinking (as pointed out
in an article in the Business Week of 16th April 1984). It may be
overly deterministic to attribute this increasing pricing efficiency
to the influence of wide spread coverage by popular press of the
work by Malkiel and other writers on this aspect of the market, but
it is difficult to think of another possible explanation of this
sudden reversion to efficiency after many years of inefficiency.
The great complexity of the process of information creation and
utilisation in the process of securities price formation which is
continously alluded to throughout this chapter can be further
demonstrated by examining another collection of papers dealing of
inflation adjusted earnings information. In the same issue of Journal
of Accounting and Economics (Volume 2 No. 2), there are three papers
on this subject together with a review article by WATTS AND
ZIMMERMAN. (The mere fact that there should be four articles on the
same topic in the same issue of one single journal shows the intense
interest of academics (if not the investing world as a whole) on the
question of inflation adjusted earnings.) All three papers ( by
BEAVER, CHRISTIE AND GRIFFIN, CHEYARA AND BOATSMAN and RO)show
that the accounting information which was first released to the
public following the promulgation of the SEC ASR 190 Regulation
appeared to have very little effect on stock prices. Watts and
Zimmerman argued that this was a clear indication of market
efficiency since the market behaved as if it had already incorporated
this information in the price. Given the fact that inflation
adjustment of earnings in not a simple piece of information to
derive, the ability of the market to reflect this information prior
to it being publicised seems to uphold the case of market efficiency.
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However, taking into consideration the other papers examined in this
chapter, it would perhaps be more logical to conclude that the
market and the public was so preoccupied with with the severe
inflationary situation that it was highly sensitive to information on
the real earnings capability of the listed firms. Indeed, even prior
to the publication of mandatory inflation adjusted earnings figures,
some firms were already doing it voluntarily. In addition, most large
stockbrokers were already making available to their clients their own
estimates of the effect of inflation on earnings. In this sense
therefore, the newly released information may already be well known
to the public and hence did not result in any price reactions.
From the above four papers, it would seem that the investment
professionals have a very important part to play in the process of
achieving market efficiency. The simple model of efficiency as put
forward by Verrecchia (1979) or Beaver (1981a) is inadequate when
tested in the real life circumstances. The creation, dissemination
and comprehension of information leading to the investment decision
making process is not a simple or direct one. The simplistic
division of information into three forms in accordance with Fama's
model does not take into adequate consideration the nature of the
information transferral process. The model of market/information
system as proposed in Chapter One of this thesis would appear to have
greater validity even in the US situation. In a country with far
lower level of sophistication, it would seem that the assumptions of
instantaneous dissemination of all public information would be even
harder to uphold.
4.5 — OTHER ASPECTS OF
INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY
In this section, we shall be examining a mixture of papers on various
aspects of market efficiency.
4.5.1 - INEFFICIENCY RELATED TO INFLATION AND LONG TERM OUTLOOK
Earlier in this chapter, the point is made that limited participation
in a market sector could theoretically lead to inefficient pricing and
that participation is not limited to physical sectors alone. Most
fundamentalist writers, and some academics as well ( for example
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Baumol), have long believed that the market is very often
inefficient because the participants tend to be governed by emotion
and fads rather than economic rationality in their behavior. One
manifestation of this irrationality is the market's preoccupation
with the short term. One aspect of this preoccupation, in the form
of the analysts' seeming general disinclination to predict earnings
beyond one year, has been pointed out earlier. In this section, we
shall examine two more aspects of this irrationality.
Many writers have remarked on the market's inability to correctly
interpret the effect of inflation on stock value (including LINTNER
(1975)). Theoretically, stocks, being a claim against real assets,
should keep pace with the rate of inflation in terms of improvement
in value. HAJIM (1982) showed in a non-academic article that
stocks had traditionally performed very badly during time of
inflation. However, once the inflationary pressures eased, the price
of stocks would rise very steeply to catch up, as it were. Thus he
quoted the evidence of stocks rising by 500% in the wake of the
inflation brought on by World War I; stocks rose by similar
magnitude after the inflation of World War II and the Korean War. He
therefore predicted that there would be a huge rise in stock prices
in the Eighties as a result of depressed prices during the
Seventies. The very large increase in stockmarket prices in the
years since 1981 appears to show that his contention has been right
so far. While Hajim is not an academic and his article could not be
taken as providing more than anecdotal evidence, the next paper is of
a different mould.
MODIGLIANI AND COHN (1979) The authors attempted to provide an
explanation for this irrational behavior. They postulated that the
incorrect pricing of stocks was caused by two major errors of the
investors. Firstly, they had always capitalised the future earnings
stream at the nominal rate rather than the economically correct real
rate (the short term return on money market instruments, during a
period of high inflation, would look very attractive compared with
the nominal dividend yield of stocks). For, during a period of
inflation, one should not compare the cash return on money market
instruments (which are not real assets) with the expected cash
return on stocks. One should compare the real return on stocks with
the real return on bonds. Secondly, investors had never made
allowance for the diminution in the value of corporate liabilities.
They went on to show that had the profit of all the S & P 500 stocks
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been discounted on this erroneous basis, their computed value would
be very close to the actual price. They concluded that owing to this
irrationality, the stocks on the NYSE were undervalued by about 50%.
This conclusion is very similar to that of Hajim's.
One can only conjecture as to why the market should behave in this
manner in the absence of any general agreement among the researchers
and writers. Many supporters of the EMH would probably attribute this
to an unspecified risk associated with unexpected inflation.
Others have attributed this to the myopic outlook of the typical
market participants. The next paper to be discussed also deals with
the seemingly short term outlook of the market.
OPPENHEIMER AND SCHLARBAUM (1981) Benjamin Graham was probably the
most respected non-academic writer on the stockmarket who had ever
lived. Much of -the current fundamentalist investment philosophy could
be said to have stemmed from his writing on the subject, both
serious (i.e.Graham and Dodd (1934) and its subsequent reissues) and
for the laymen (Graham (1973)). Through the five different editions
of the second book, "The Intelligent Investor", the recommendation
was to invest in a relatively small portfolio (10-30) of good quality
defensive stocks and avoid other more fashionable offerings of the
market. His stock selection procedure relied heavily upon choosing
stocks with a large capitalization relative to their industries,
selling at low multiples of asset value and low multiple of earnings
with a longish history of earnings and dividend payments. Such stocks
should then be held for long term appreciation and would only be
rejected if they failed to provide positive return after several
years (Graham suggested three as a guide). This set of investment
philosophy has become the guideline for a large number of investors
in the US and some of them have been very successful.
Oppenheimer and Schlarbaum tested Graham's selection method (using
yearly rebalancing) on the companies listed in the Moody's Handbook
of Common Stocks and S & P's Security Owner's Stock Guide for the
period 1956 through 1975. Their conclusions are quoted partially
below : —
"The results presented in this paper indicate that positive
risk-adjusted rate of return were available to investors
who used the common stock selection method that Ben Graham
suggested for the period 1956 through 1975. Rates of
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return were 3 to 3 1/2% per year higher than those
achievable by holding a market portfolio when
frictionless market situation was approximated The
frictions taken into account in the typical investor's
situation did reduce the comparative
advantage Nonetheless, a "typical investor" could have
still earned rates of return which were higher "
"Creation and maintenance of a portfolio in accordance with
Graham's suggestion is an easy task which consumed very
little time. Our experience indicated that one hour per
year should be enough...."
As the authors suggested, there might be other explanations for the
results of this study but they were inclined to think that it
demonstrated an instance of inefficiency of the semi-strong form.
4.5.2 - EVIDENCE OF INEFFCIENCY FROM OTHER MARKETS
So far, we have looked at only papers concerning the US and the UK
markets. In recent years, an increasing number of papers on the other
markets of the world has started appearing. While some of the papers
which have appeared on the smaller and less developed market of the
world (e.g. Singapore and Kuwait) are not academically rigorous
enough* there are several papers written on the European markets
which merit discussing. It is to be admitted that most of these
papers still used very simple research methodology compared with the
latest crop of papers from the US. However, even with very simple
methods, methods which are generally thought to be inadequate for
uncovering inefficiencies in the US, indications of non-randomness
were revealed. Four papers will be briefly discussed next.
THEIL AND LEENDERS (1965) This was produced in response to the
wellknown article by Fama called "Tomorrow on the New York Stock
Exchange" and is hence called "Tomorrow on the Amsterdam Stock
Exchange". Fama was not able to uncover any sign of non-randomness.
The method consists of examining the predictability of the different
fractions of stocks on the market which increases, decreases or
remains the same. The authors found considerable positive dependence
in the successive values of the proportions of stocks in each
category. In essence, they found that if the market rose yesterday,
^ See •footnote at "the e_r\<i. clr\ap"Ve^
it had a strong tendency to rise today and vice versa.
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CONRAD AND JUTTNER (1973) They carried out two series of tests
for randomness on the German stock market:-
(1) Total Number of Runs, Runs Up and Down, Different Signs
(2) Serial Correlation.
Based on their findings, they rejected the Random Walk Hypothesis
(the EMH did not appear to have yet made an impact there in 1973).
WEISS (1975) re-examined the validity of Conrad and Juttner's
paper and supported their conclusion.
SOLNIK (1973) This is a very comprehensive piece of work in terms
of the number of European markets studied. The author used simple
serial correlations to examine the dependence in daily and longer
period stock prices for eight Europenan countries — France, the UK,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Sweden. The
results showed the apart from the UK and Netherlands, there was a very
large degree of non-randomness in all markets for the daily prices,
much greater than that of the US market.
There has been limited amount of research of high academic standard
from the Far Eastern markets which are even less developed than the
those of Europe. On would conjecture that these markets are likely to
show some signs of inefficiency as well. Dawson has produced several
papers on the subject and his conclusions are in general agreement
with the hypothesis of this dissertation. In DAWSON (1982), he
was able to show that there are some signs of inefficiency in the
form of abnormal return to be gained from following a stock broker
firm's reccomendation. In a later paper, DAWSON (1984) he further
showed that such inefficiency appeared to be lessensing over time.
4.5.3 - OTHER STATISTICAL AND TECHNICAL EVIDENCE
In this section we shall look at papers concerned with the
statistical and technical aspects of stock prices published during
the Seventies and Eighties. There are fewer of them than during the
first period. In the first part we shall look at some papers
concerned with cyclicalities in stock prices and in the second part,
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we shall look two papers which provide very interesting twists to
similar tests carried out in the earlier years of EMU research which
had been generally accepted as proof of market efficiency.
(A) The "Turn-of-the-Year", "Monday" and "Presidential Cycle"
Effects
ROZEFF AND KINNEY (1976) This is a highly significant paper which
led to a burst of research activity in this area. Rozeff and Kinney
were able to show that although the classical autocorrelation test
was not able to reveal any cyclicality, non-parametric tests
revealed statis tically significant higher January returns compared
with the other months of the yeai. OFFICER (1975) was able to
demonstrate similar "turn-of-the-year" effect for Australian stock
prices although there was a similar and more significant higher
return for July.
These findings seemingly contradict the whole basis of EMH and as a
result, EMH supporters have tried to provide some explanation for
this effect. Among the best accepted possible explanations are the
"Tax Loss Selling" explanation argued by ROLL (1983) and the
"Small Firm" explanation argued by KEIM (1983). However a large
number of research findings published during the last two years
seemed to have overturned these explantions.
As there are many papers on the topic, only a small number will be
mentioned here. BROWN, KEIM, KLEIDON AND MARSH (1983) conducted a
test for both these effects. They strongly question the tax-loss
selling hypothesis and found that although there was a consistent
premium on return on small firms, this cannot be used to explain the
turn-on-the-year effect. The authors concluded that they were at a
loss to explain these effects.
GULTEKIN AND GULTEKIN (1983) tested for the turn-of-the-year
effect over a dozen countries. They were able to show strong evidence
for this effect in most countries tested. The effect did not appear
to be linked to firm size. In a similar fashion, BERGES, McCONNEL
AND SCHLARBAUM (1984) found strong evidence for this effect in
Canada. Again, the authors refuted the tax-loss selling hypothesis
(in part because Canada did not institute capital gains tax until
after 1974).
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As things now stand, it would seem that the turn-of-the-year effect
is one of the most serious anomalies to emerge questioning the
validity of EMH. In addition to the turn-of-the-year effect,
researchers in the recent years had uncovered the "Monday" effect
which is .just as difficult to explain under the umbrella of EMH.
CROSS(1973) was the first person to uncover the seemingly
impossible fact that stock prices had a strong tendency to rise on
Fridays and a similar tendency to fall on Monday. KEIM AND
STAMBAUGH (1984) conducted a large scaled long term test
(1928-1982) and were able to show that the last trading day of the
week, irrespecitive of whetherh it was Saturday or Friday, provided
higher return. Again, EMH supporters have not been able to provide a
satisfactory explanation.
ALLVINE AND O'NEILL (1980) Granger and Morgenstern's tests based
on spectral analysis are the sources of evidence often quoted in
support of efficient market hypothesis. In their study of 1963, they
found a long term cycle in stock prices which followed the jiness
cycle though they denied its significance. For a long time, it held
been assumed by most workers in this field that Granger & Morgenstern
were correct until the recent paper by Allvine and O'neill. Their
paper reported on both the results of their spectral analysis on the
stock price series as well as a direct test of a trading strategy
based on the cyclicality discovered. The spectral analysis of the
price series from 1948 to 1978 showed a pronounced peak at 208 weeks
as well as at the harmonics of this period. The direct test was based
on a comparison of a "trading and T-bills" strategy against a
"buy-and-hold" strategy. Their results seem to indicate that there
existed a fairly clearcut four year cycle which coincided with the
presidential election cycle. (It is perhaps worth pointing out that
Wall Street wisdom also believes in the existence of just such a
cycle). They gave two reasons why their results turned out different
from those of Granger and Morgenstern. Firstly, they had incorporated
a phase shift in 1960. Secondly the Fourier transform carried out
was based on a much longer correlogram (416 weeks) because a shorter
correlogram can mask a long term cycle.
(B) Other Papers of Interest
ROSENBERG AND RUDD (1982) The evidence most commonly used as
"proof" of market efficiency during the earlier years was the fact
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that serial correlation studies had shown that there was little
serial correlation between successive price changes. But it is
conceivable that the total return may be made up of more than one
component each with positive or negative serial correlation, which
together, nearly offset one another, resulting in near zero serial
correlation. Rosenberg and Rudd used a sophisticated multiple
regression technique to study this residual item. They decomposed the
total monthly return of just under 1000 stocks for 92 months into
both factor specific return (based on 55 descriptors) and firm
specific return. The results of the study uncovered a hitherto
unrealised fact. While the total return may not be serially
correlated, its two components do not necessarily show likewise. The
authors concluded thus For total return, its(the return)
distribution is indistinguishable from pure randomness. For factor
related return, there is substantial positive serial dependence which
is nevertheless not quite statistically significant. Finally for firm
specific return, there is negative serial correlation which is stable
over time and highly significant.".
The authors went on to state that while the predictive power of a
model based on the results of the study was not big (in the order of
1.2% of the monthly variance), the amount of pricing error was not
the same for all stocks. Nor was the amount of pricing error a
constant factor of price. They pointed out that by choosing those
stocks with high specific variance, it would be possible to make
abnormal profit. This conclusion appears to be in line with the
evidence presented so far. That is, some securities are more
efficiently priced than others.
SHILLER (1981a and 1981a) Qie characteristic that is common among
all stock markets is the great volatility of stock prices. Thus on
the NYSE, the long term annual return had been about 9% while the
annual standard deviation had been over 20% during the same period.
The volatility at difference place and time can be considerably
higher than this. If the stockmarket is efficient, the variations in
prices have to be explained by the random arrival of new information
having a bearing on price formation. In order to explain such big
movement in prices, the new information "bits" which are being
received have to be very large as well. It is difficult to conceive
of pieces of information which can cause a 50% increase in price over
a two months' period as happened in August/September 1982. However,
it is impossible to prove that the ex post price distribution is the
direct result of certain information received.
In spite of the long standing theoretical models of stock price
determinants by WILLIAMS (1938) or MILLER AND MODIGLIANI (1961),
it has been impossible to prove that in the real world, stock prices
are indeed determined by either of these variables. However, if one
were to accept the validity of these models, then it is possible to
draw some conclusions regarding the relationship between the
fluctuations in interest rate or dividend and the fluctuation of
stock prices (as the dependent variable). Shiller's work showed
convincingly that the ex post fluctuations in stock prices could not
possibly be explained by the fluctuations in these two independent
variables. Shiller concluded that this was a clear indication that
the market could not be efficient and he attributed this pattern of
fluctuations to the market's tendency to follow fads or to act
irrationally. This is probably an over deterministic conclusion as
commented upon by both Lintner and Long in the post-article
"Comments". However, Lintner did point out that the result indicated
that a hyper ratione1 and efficient market could not be supported.
But if one were to accept that the information sets do change over
time and that market participants exhibit learning behavior, then the
result of Shiller's study could be used to support such a weaker form
of efficient market.
4.6 — GENERAL VIEWS OF SEVERAL
ACADEM ICS AJSTD WRITERS
There are few areas of academic research in which the view of the
workers in it had been so different from the view of the
professionals in the same area. This dichotomy was especially marked
in the early years of EMH. Fortunately for the writer of this thesis,
there are increasing signs that the two sides are moving closer
together. More and more researchers are beginning to accept the view
expressed by financial writers such as Seligman of the Fortune that
the EMH is not a true description of the real life situation. At the
same time, the views of the academics have found a degree of
acceptance among the professionals who (like Seligman although to a
lesser extent) find that the EMH is a useful starting point for
understanding the stockmarket. The emergence of index funds in
recent years is certainly a pointer to this change of mind. In the
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last section of this chapter, the views of several noted academics in
this field will be quoted. Most of these quotations are taken from
business magazines rather than learned journals since the latter do
not usually print interviews.
Sharpe, in an interview with E.H. Ehbar published in Fortune of
the 26th Febuary 1979, had this to say, " I have second thoughts
about the efficiency of the market I still think it is highly
efficient, but I can no longer adhere to the view that it is
hyperefficient and never process its information wrongly there
has to be an incentive for people to do research, and in the
equilibrium, there have to be some managers who can earn large
returns so as to cover the cost of their research."
Beaver, in the concluding remark of the chapter on market
efficiency in book (1981a ppl80) says, " In closing, this chapter
takes no position as to the efficiency of the market with regards to
any specific information system. The nature of the empirical evidence
and the interpretation is likely to change over time and is subject
to continuing debate and controversy.".
Kuehner & Renwick, in the conclusion to an extensive review of
available evidence for and against EMH published in LEVINE (1980
ppl59), declare that " the jury must render the identical
verdict for both sides: 'SCOTCH VERDICT - NOT PROVED'.".
Malkiel, in an interview in the Forbes Magazine of the 26th of
March, 1984 declared that " the stockmarket resembles more Random
Walk with a crutch rather than pure Random Walk". While this
statement is a little cryptic, this writer takes it to imply that
since a drunk with a crutch cannot move very far, such a model of EMH
probably resemble something like Cootner's "random walk with
reflecting barriers", a model which is close to what is hypothesied
in this work.
Perhaps the last quotation should be from Graham. In an interview
with Financial Analysts Journal shortly before his death after 50
years of observing the stockmarket (Sept./Oct. 1976) he said (among
other things) : " ....Most of the time common stocks are subjected to
irrational and excessive price fluctuations in both directions, as
the consequence of the ingrained tendency of most people to speculate
or gamble - i.e. to give way to hope, fear and greed
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I am no longer an advocate of elaborate techniques of security
analysis This Has a rewarding activity, say, 40 years
ago but the situation has changed a good deal since then. To that
very limited extent, I'm on the side of the "efficient market" school
of thought
He are just finishing a performance study of these approaches (i.e.
investment methods based on the philosophy suggested in his book)
over the past half-century - 1925~1975. They consistently show results
of 15% or better per annum, or twice the record of the DJIA for this
long period At the bottom it is a technique by which the
investors can exploit the recurrent excessive optimism and excessive
apprehension of the speculative public. ".
FOOTNOTE
Although it is true to say that much of the work which have emerged
from the less developed countries are not of a very high academic
standard, some of the work are interesting nevertheless as they
provide some insights into these markets. The following two papers
from Singapore are typical of the papers in terms of coverage and
academic rigour.
HAI HONG Review of Economics and Statisitics, November, 1978 <pp
619-621). This short paper reported on the results of serial
correlation and run tests conducted on the stockmarket indices of
four Far Eastern markets - Australia, Hong Kong, Japan and
Singapore. These tests were based on the daily and weekly indices
for the period of September 1973 to March 1976. No mention was made
of the lag over which the serial correlation tests were run but it
can be assumed to be one period in each instant. The serial
correlation of the daily indices varied from 0.093 (Japan) to 0.233
(Australia). These translates respectively to 2.4 times the standard
error and 6.0 times. The daily runs tests showed that the Australian
index had significant departures from normality. Neither the weekly
serial correlation nor runs tests revealed any significant departure
from independence.
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The author concluded that it was probably not possible to beat the
market in these countries over the short run.
K K LEONG Securities Industry Review, Volume 9, No 1 ( pp 6-15).
The author examined the efficiency of the Singapore stockmarket by
carrying out serial correlation and runs tests on the monthly
stockmarket indices and the prices of 20 different stocks from the
period of January 1973 to December 1980 (96 observations). The serial
correlation tests on the indices were carried out for the lags of 1
to 5 periods. Apart from the Finance Index at the lag of 1 period,
none of the indices revealed any significant correlation. Of the 20
stock price series only 3 showed any significant departure from
independence.
The runs tests indicated that none of the indices showed any
significant departure from independence. Of the stock price series
tested, only four of them showed similar significant departure.




LITERATURE REVIEW — PART III
RESEARCH AMD PUBLICATIONS PERI¬
PHERAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMH
5-1 — Organ±satxon of Chapter Five
In the last two chapters, the history of the development of EMH has
been traced. Such development, however, was perhaps only possible
because of two important environmental reasons. Firstly, during the
last quarter of a century, large computerised databases were set up.
Through these databases, researchers were able to carry out extensive
statistical and economic analysis of the stockmarket on a scale and
in such detail which had been till then impossible. Such research
gave rise to a far better understanding of the nature of the stock
market.Subsequently such understanding became well propagated among
the investors at large such that they now have a much better
expectation with regard to the risk and return involved.
Concommitently, there were a great deal of parallel developments in
the fields of microeconomics and finance, in particular the areas of
risk/return and the pricing of capital assets. It is arguable that
EMH would not have been developed in the absence of these
developments.
These developments in the academia were paralleled by similar large
improvement in the knowlegeability of the investors as a whole. By all
accounts, the investors' knowledge and perception of the market has
improved vastly since the Twenties. It is obvious that the investors
of the earlier era could not be as sophisticated. Investment
approaches which are currently out of favour among the academics were
widely believed to have been useful in providing abnormal return from
the stockmarket.
Since one of the purposes of this thesis is to analyse the abnormal
return obtainable using different investment methods, it is important
to develop an understanding of the philosophy and methods of the two
alternative schools of investment. It is also worth considering that
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it is possible that these schools might have reflected the market
conditions existing during the earlier years of this century. If
there are similarities between the present Malaysian market and the
then American situation, it is possible that these alternative
investment methods may be applicable locally.
Publications connected with the theoretical development of EMH have
been extensively discussed in the two previous chapters. This chapter
will therefore start with two important, publications which laid down
respectively the "theories" of technical analysis and fundamentalism.
In addition, two other papers which, in a sense, lend further support
to the fundamentalist school will also be examined. In its second
part, this chapter will examine publications on the "environment" of
investment which provided workers in this area a better understanding
of the nature of the stockmarket. In the last part, this chapter will
examine publications in connection with the development of Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), its companion Market Model, the Arbitrage
Pricing Theory and CAPM's validity when using it to adjust security
returns. The rest of this chapter is therefore divided into the
following sections
5.2 : Publications on alternative schools of thought regarding
stockmarket behavior;
5.3 : Publications on the "environment" of investment. That is,
publications examining the various variables connected with the
stockmarket investment;
5.4 : Publications connected with the development and critical
examination of CAPM.
5.2 — Publications connected with
Alternative Schools o f Thoxj. tr.
Regarding Mar-ket Behavior
RHEA (1932) This is generally acknowledged to be the first book
which properly laid down the principles of technical analysis
originally stated informally by Dow. Rhea himself admitted that his
book was largely a distillation of the earlier writings of
Nelson(1902), Hamilton(1929) and various editorials from the Wall
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Street Journal written by Hamilton during his time as editor of the
newspaper (1903-1929).
Thus technical approach can be said to be the oldest approach to
stock investment. While it still has many followers today, its
period of greatest following was probably in the first few decades of
this century, before the emergence of fundamentalism. For thirty
years or more, it was the only "rational" approach to stock
investment. Although it is largely discredited today, in its days it
must have been viewed as a great improvement on no method at all. In
today's environment, it is easy for students of the stockmarket to
dismiss technical analysis as mere sorcery. It is perhaps difficult
for a present day researcher to fathom what the stockmarket was like
in the early part of this century. Given the calibre of people like
Dow himself and Hamilton who laid down these basic principles, it may
be premature to conclude that even then technical analysis had not
been of any use in obtaining abnormal profit.
In one aspect, Dow Theory reflects exactly the thinking of present
day supporters of EMH as voiced by Dow himself : "The Averages
(stock market indices) discount everything". The idea that the market
as a whole has far superior knowledge than the individuals and that
the price of the stocks reflects all that the market knows about it
has as much acceptance today. The major difference in the two
approaches is that technicians believe that the future could be
foretold by the past. Technicians base this belief on the "fact" that
market operators are creatures of habit such that in similar
situations, they tend to behave in the same predictable manner. It is
perhaps useful to speculate on just, how "investors" would behave in
a highly unsophisticated market. In the absence of any "good"
publication or a strong theory of stockmarket behavior compounded by
the lack of understanding of financial reports and continuously
assailed by rumours and hearsays, how would a typical investor in
such a situation behave? Would it not be possible that he would tend
to revert to a more visceral reaction to various market movements? A
reaction which would probably be far more predictable than one which
is based on a more "rational" basis.
It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to proceed further along
this line of thinking apart from saying that it would be interesting
to test technical analysis under conditions closer to those under
which it was formulated. As has been shown in Chapter two the
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Malaysian market, at present appears to resemble to some extent the US
market of the period when Dow Theory was formulated and tested. It is
possible that some of the important principles may still be
applicable today or perhaps, even more likely, in the recent past.
GRAHAM & DODD (1934) (GD) This book could be said to have created
a new discipline as well as a a new industry. It had been through
three major revisions as well as the addition of one more co-author
(Cottle) since its first publication. Its central "philosophy" has
however remained largely unchanged. The idea of "intrinsic value" for
stocks has been previously examined at length in this thesis and it
will not be elaborated here. The method reccommended by GD and the
circumstances which could lead to this method being applicable will
be examined instead.
GD's method relies on the belief that it is possible to determine the
relative cheapness of a share by studying its earnings(or dividend)
multiple. Investors should buy a share when its multiple has fallen to
a low enough level if, in addition, the company meets certain criteria
for financial soundness. Each edition of the book uses slightly
different rate but we can use as illustration the rate proposed in in
the latest (1962) edition. In this GD suggested that the purchase
price should be between 7 and 20 times the average of the next seven
years' earnings with a mid point of 13. Appropriate adjustments to
these multiples have to be made to take into account the growth rate
of the company (for example, they recommended that one should not pay
a greater premium than 50% for growth stocks). There are several major
shortcomings in these selection criteria in the light of later-
market conditions and economic thinking. Firstly, the method does not
take into account the possiblity of changes in the inflation rate.
Secondly, the growth rate of the firm is not explicitly taken into
account in the valuation. Thirdly, there is no explicit allowance
for risks.
However, even with these inherent shortcomings, it is conceivable
that there are circumstances in which such a stock selection method
could have worked. This method is implicitly based on several
important assumptions about the market and if these assumptions are
correct then the method may be workable. Firstly, the method assumes
that the vast majority of the market participants are not rational.
Their expectations and assumptions are uncertain and varying. As a
result, the price of shares tend to fluctuate randomly but such
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fluctuations are bounded and the stock price will eventually return
to its intrinsic value. Secondly, the method assumes, with the proviso
that one buys only the shares of dominant and financially sound
companies, their future earnings are predictable. Thirdly, the method
assumes that there would not be large changes in the future inflation
rate such that the basis of valuation would become totally
meaningless ( as it did during the early Seventies). Lastly, the
method implicitly assumes that the economy would continue to grow
steadily in all sectors and that if there were to be any structural
adjustment, such adjustment would be slow enough for the companies
affected to be able to "escape" to another sector. It is notable
that these assumptions were largely correct during the Thirties and
to a similar extent during the Fifties and Sixties.
Since then of course, the economic situation has changed enormously
in the developed world. There are few companies which can take future
earnings for granted. There have been periods of severe inflation and
recession. There have been also major structural changes in the
economy and many blue chips had performed very badly. The work of
Oppenheimer and Schlarbaum (1981) no1 withstanding (the work used data
from 1956-1975), it is likely that GD's method would not have worked
well in the past ten years. As with the Dow Theory, if it is possible
to locate stockmarket conditions close to those assumed by the
originators of fundamentalism, it would be worthwhile to test GD's
method, perhaps with some modifications to allow for changed
circumstances.
WILLIAMS (1938) This is a highly significant publication which
laid down many of the basic principles of the rational approach to
stock valuation. It would not be possible to summarise the whole book
within the limitations of this thesis given that this book had the
following stated objective " To outline a new subscience that shall
be known as the Theory of Investment Value and shall comprise a
coherent body of principles " . This book may be divided into two
parts - the first being a description of the principles being
postulated and the second being case studies examining how these
principles may be applied to real cases in the investment world.
The first part is made up of several chapters examining various
topics, viz the theory of speculation; the pure theory of investment
value; and the economics of interest and dividend. Of these, Chapter
Five, "Evaluation By The Rule Of Present Value" can be said to be of
the greatest importance to the world of finance. The other chapters in
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the first half of the book were largely concerned with applying
modern scientific modifications to GD's method. The two most
important being the use of dividend instead of earnings as the basis
of valuation and the use of discounting for future sums.
The work of Williams has enormous influence on the thinking of
fundamentalists until today. All commonly used "intrinsic value" type
methods of stock evaluation are based on his method (i.e. the
discounting of a future stream of dividends). The somewhat surprising
adoption of dividend as the basis of valuation is perhaps not that
unexpected considering the market condition of the time. The
stockmarket of the Twenties, and to a lesser extent, the .Thirties can
be said to contain many traps for the less knowledgeable investors.
There were too many instances of dubious earnings and firms of
dubious design. In the light of present knowledge, dividend is no
longer of importance in the valuation of firm. This will be examined
in detail in the next subsection.
In his book, Williams also preempted the much later work of Markowitz
in suggesting that the discount rate used in the evaluation of stocks
should contain a risk premium to take into account the degree of risk
involved in the investment. While there was no further discusssion on
the appropriate size of risk premium to use in each case, it is still
a revolutionary suggestion nevertheless. However, one of its main
tenets did not stand the test of time very well. The use of dividend
as the basis of valuation was to be overturned by the next paper.
MILLER & MODIGLIANI (1961) (MM) When this paper first appeared,
it was considered highly revolutionary and caused much furore in the
academic world and was much derided in the business world. However, a
scant twenty years later, its basic idea that "dividend does not
matter" has become almost fully accepted by the academia and by many
practising managers. There are highly valued companies in existence
today which have never paid a cent of dividend (e.g. DEC and Intel),
a situation which would have been inconceivable twenty years ago.
In its initial form MM postulated that given perfect market, rational
behavior and perfect certainty, the value of a stock is the
discounted present value of what one may call the nett cashflow
after capital investment ( or in MM's parlance (X[t] - 111]}). MM
showed that all other approaches to stock valuation - cashflow,
dividend, earnings and earnings plus investment opportunities - are
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economically the same.
Later in the paper, MM were to relax the initial stringent
assumptions and were still able to show that dividend per se is
irrelevant to stock value. Later work on the relationship between
dividend yield and stock return (which have been previously
discussed) were to show that MM were probably correct in their
theorising.
It is interesting to speculate if there exists or ever existed a
stockmarket which is so unsophisticated that it would rely purely on
dividend yield as the investment criterion. If such a market exists,
the demand for low dividend shares would fall such that its dividend
yield would equilibriate at the required level. Hence at equilibrium
in such a market, all shares of the same risk class would sell at the
same dividend yield. It is doubtful if such an unsophisticated market
could exist since it is a well known fact that dividend yield does
vary cross-sectionally and longitudinally. If there is any degree of
unsophistication regarding dividend, one would expect it to exist in
a less obvious manner. A straight forward dividend yield test is not
likely to uncover such inefficiency.
5.3 — Publications on the
Investment Environment
5.3.1 - PUBLICATIONS ON EARNINGS STABILITY
If dividend information is not relevant in investment decision making,
earnings information is the obvious alternative. In order for
historical earnings figures to be useful for stock valuation, they
must be useable for the forecasting of future earnings. This would
imply a high degree of longitudinal consistency in corporate
earnings. The papers to be discussed in this section show that, on
the whole, corporate earnings, whether in Britain or the US, do not
appear to be very consistent.
LITTLE (1962) AND LITTLE & RAYNER (1966) These two publications
may be taken together since the second publication was an expanded
version of the first. Much of the materials contained in the first was
duplicated in the first half of the second. Little (1962) must be one
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of the most cited papers in the field of finance and has spawned many
"me-too" copies since its first appearance. The main objective of
these two publications was to survey the stability of earnings growth
rate in the UK. The main findings of the research were as follows:-
(a) There was virtually no growth consistency in the short run; and
(b) There appeared to be little more consistency over the long run.
The main conclusion arrived at by the authors was that the work of
financial analysts was logically worthless. There is little doubt
that these works gave a great deal of irapetous to the development of
the random walk hypothesis. This conclusion may be over strong,
especially if it were to be applied on a global basis. As shown in
the last chapter, it appears possible to make reasonably accurate
short term forecasts based on interim results and that some analysts
are capable making of reasonably accurate forecasts. The next paper
was to provide, at best, lukewarm support for these findings.
LINTNER & GLAUBER (1969) This study examined the long run
earnings consistency in the US using Little's method. The main
difference was that a longer period of study was carried out and the
earnings growth was stated in logarithmic rather than arithmetical
term. Their conclusion was much more cautious than that, reached by
Little. They concluded that whilst there was a lot of randomness in
the data examined, it would be premature to conclude on " the
irrelevance of good management, superior product market position, the
insights and judgement of good financial analysts...."
This difference in conclusions reached could, in part, be due to the
different samples studied. The performance of the US companies in the
Fifties and the Sixties was superior and more consistent than that of
the British. In addition, there was no lack of innovative, high growth
firms which produced consistent year after year good results, even
among the larger companies (firms like GE, DEC, HP IBM and the like).
BALL & WATTS (1972) This later work gave support to the idea that
the time series of agrregated corporate earnings are best described
by a submartingale. This paper however, used the averaged earnings of
the S & P firms rather than the earnings series of individual
companies. This action obviously masked the existence of any
individual earnings consistency.
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If the conclusion of a number of workers in this area is accepted,
the earnings series of firms in the West would appear to be generated
by something close to a submartingle. However, the evidence in
support of this contention is not that strong in the US.
5.3.2 - PUBLICATIONS ON RETURN AND RETURN STABILITY
FISHER & LORIE (FL) (1964), (1968) AND (1970) It is difficult to
estimate the influence and contribution of this pair of wellknown
researchers. These three papers are but a small part of their vast
contribution, both singly, together and in combination with others.
The first two publications can be taken togeher and will to be known
as FL(64/68) and the third will be known as FL(70). Even before the
findings of FL(64/68) are considered, these workers are highly
significant for several important reasons. Firstly, they established
the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and created the
CRSP tapes from which a whole stream of research papers has emerged.
Secondly, they created a standardised algorithm for the adjustment of
dividend and capitalisation changes. This project, like almost every
other in the same area, depends on their algorithm. Thirdly, they
established the standard method for the computation of the
period-to-period security return which, again, has been adopted by
most workers in the field.
It is obviously impossible to even summarise the quantitative
findings of these papers and besides, they are too wellknown to
require repetition. However, there are several qualitative findings
which can be considered important. Firstly, they showed that over the
long run, stocks provided a much higher return than any other
securities thus providing evidence that investors are indeed risk
averse and that, common stocks are priced to compensate investors for
this aversion. Secondly the papers showed that the period-to-period
variability in return was considerable. The findings from these
papers also have an important bearing on the direction of this
project. A comparison of the yeai—to-year return between the earlier
part of the research period ( the Twenties) and the later part
provides evidence in support of one of the assertions of this thesis.
That is, the characteristic of the US stockmarket had changed
considerably between the earlier part of this century and the present
time. The year-to-year variablity of return and the average rate of
return have become very much smaller. There is therefore some
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evidence to support the contention that during the immature phrase of
a securities market, there is a greater tendency to greater
volatility.
FISHER & LORIE (1970) This paper has a slightly different emphasis
compared with FL(64/68). It examined the variability of the returns
in addition to the returns themselves. This paper presented three
separate sets of findings
(1) A study of the frequency distribution of the return on individual
stocks for periods ranging from one to 45 years;
(2) A study on the distribution of the aggregated return from
individual stocks; and
(3) A study on the distribution of return from portfolios containing
different number of stocks.
5-4 — Research Work Connected With
Capital Assets F'ricing Model
5.4.1 -INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 5.4
The EMH is a model for describing the performance of a security on a
relative basis. That is, the return on a stock or a portfolio of
stocks should not be significantly different than what can be
expected from the market as a whole after suitable adjustment for
risk has been made. This hypothesis is only testable in respect of a
particular stock selection method if one has an expectation of what
a portfolio based on this method ought to return given a certain
return on the market. Only then can one compare the actual ex post
return with what is the expected return and then come to some
conclusion as to whether the difference between the two is
statistically significant or not.
Another model is therefore required to specify what is the expected
relationship between the behavior of the market and that of the
stocks selected. The most commonly used conceptual model for
specifying the relationship is the Capital Asset Pricing Model
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(CAPM) or its precursor, the Market Model (MM).
The rest of this subsection is divided into three subsections in the
following manner:-
5.4.2 - The Theoretical Basis of CAPM/MM
5.4.3 - The Shortcomings of CAPM/MM
5.4.4 - Recent Developments of CAPM
5.4.2 - THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF CAPM/MM
CAPM/MM has its origin in the Portfolio Theory. According to Lorie and
Brealey (1972), the Portfolio Theory is probably the second most
important development in the field of investment after the EMH.
According to them, the publication of Markowitz's paper in 1952 :
" radically changed the thinking, not only about portfolio
management but also about the entire field of investment as well.".
It is therefore appropriate to start this discussion with his paper.
MARKOWTIZ (1952) This paper started with the simple assumption
that the vast majority of investors are not pure profit maximisers
and that they take into consideration the variability of return as
well as the return itself when they were considering what asset to
purchase. Markowitz called this the Expected Return-Variance of
Expected Return Principle ( or E-V for short). He then demonstrated
that provided the returns of asset were normally distributed, a
portfolio of stocks would always generate a more efficient return
than a single stock. By "a more efficient return", he meant, either a
higher return at the same degree of risk or the same return for a
lower degree of risk.
Markowitz pointed out that the covariance between different pairs of
stocks would be different from pair to pair. In order to maximise the
benefit of diversification, the investors ought to select stocks on
the basis of lowest pairwise covariation. He did realise however,
that it would not be possible to achieve perfect diversification
since there would always be some degree of covariation between
stocks.
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At this point, Markowitz's theory was only largely of theoretical
interest, owing to the impracticalit.y of computing the covarianee
between every pair of stocks. Even the largest computer of today
would be hard put to compute this. Further development iri this theory
was not possible until the appearance of the next paper.
SHARPE (1963) Sharpe proposed that the computation of the
covariance between individual pairs of stocks could be considerably
simplified if their relationship could be linked through the market
as a whole. He called this the Diagonal Model ( later to be known as
the Market Model (MM)). Under the MM, the return on any stock is
assumed to be dependent on a single outside factor and a random
variable. Using Sharpe's original notation, the MM is given the
following expression:-
R. = A. + B.I + C.
111 1
However, the MM is now more commonly given in the following form:-
r. = a. + 6.R + y.
it l l mt it
where: ?. = Expected return on security i for period t
R = General market factor for period t
„mt
it = re*-urn specific to security i for period t
which has expected value of zero
This simple model depends on the usual assumptions of no transaction
cost and no tax as well as one more assumption. The additional
assumption is that the investors are risk averse, single period
oriented, expected-utility-of-terminal-wealth maxiinisers who select
their portfolio on the basis of the mean and variance of the
distribution of return on the stocks. It is important to note that in
Sharpe's original model, the single factor to which all stock returns
were assumed to be related referred to the overall market, and economy
factor which was deemed to have an effect on all stock returns. Later,
in actual application of CAPM and MM, this factor was to become
simplified to become merely a proxy of its original form. Market
return ( usually based on Fisher's "Lm") is used as the proxy. The
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inadequacy of CAPM which is to become so prominent in the current
investment debate could perhaps be regarded as having partly stemmed
from this simplification. The market return alone cannot account for
all facets of stock return.
The MM, though very useful from the practical research viewpoint, is
not very satisfactory from a theoretical angle. It does not seek to
explain the relationship between the risk an investor bears and the
extra expected return he can derive from bearing that risk. Nor can
this model be modified to include other forms of investment apart from
stocks. Sharpe overcame these two difficulty by proposing a second
model which was to become generally known as the
Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM.
SHARPE (1964) In this model, Sharpe extended the applicability of
CAPM by making two further assumptions;_
(1) Investors can borrow or lend unlimited amount at the same
riskfree rate of interest: and
(2) Investors have homogeneous expectations.
Sharpe showed that at equilibrium, it was possible to obtain an
efficient combination of a risky portfolio and .a single riskfree asset
which will provide all investors with the desired optimal combination
of risk and return. The relationship between risk and return could
then be shown to be a linear one.
Sharpe also demonstrated that the riskiness of a stock could be
broken into two parts - systematic and non-systematic. The
non-systematic part of the risk would be uncorrelated with the
non-systematic risk of other stocks in the portfolio. This risk
could be reduced to zero (or nearly zero) by diversifying the
portfolio. The systematic part of the risk could not be reduced by
diversification and investors would have to be compensated for
bearing this risk. The higher the sensitivity of a stock to the
market effect, the higher would be the return on that stock. From a
portfolio viewpoint, provided that portfolios are efficiently
diversified, there will be perfect correlation between those
similarly diversified portfolios.
LINTNER (1965) Lintner concurrently developed the same model as
Sharpe and the CAPM is generally regarded as their joint product
156
(Sharpe-Lintner or S-L CAPM). His treatment of the subject was more
extensive and vigorous and he also included a section on the use of
CAPM in capital budgeting. The S-L CAPM is usually represented by the
following expression:-
Cov(r , r )
E(r. ) = r + [E(r ) - r ] —
it ft mt ft
o (r )
mt
where: = Return on security i for the period t
r„ = Return on the riskfree asset for the period t
ft
£ = Return on the market for the period t
mt
5.4.3 - THE PRACTICAL SHORTCOMINGS OF CAPM
It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss
comprehensively the shortcomings of CAPM/MM as a model of stock
return. For the purpose of the present study, it is more important to
concentrate instead on the shortcomings of CAPM/MM when it is being
used as a mean of adjusting stock returns to remove the market
effect. This subsection will look at three major shortcomings of
CAPM/MM.
(A) Accuracy of CAPM/MM as a Predictive Tool
Ideally CAPM/MM should be able to predict a substantial portion of
the systematic movement of a portfolio and it ought to be able to do
so consistently. However, much of the research work carried out in
Ihis area had not produced encouraging results.
KING (1966) This was the first paper testing the applicability of
CAPM and it revealed two shortcomings of CAPM as a predictive tool.
The study was based on data for 63 firms grouped into six industrial
classifications for the years 1927-1960, divided into four subperiods.
The first, shortcoming of the model is .that the proportion of the
total variation of stock return which was explained by the market
effect did not. appear to be stable over time. The average coefficient,
of correlation declined from 0.58 in the first subperiod to only 0.31
in the last. Furthermore, there was considerable variation from stock
to stock. For example, in the first subperiod, the range of the
coefficient of correlation was from 0.16 to 0.84 and for the whole
period from 0.14 to 0.76. The second shortcoming uncovered by King
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was that there appeared to be a large "industry" factor which
accounted for about 10% of the total variation. This finding
anticipated the suggestion of some of the present workers that CAPM
should be replaced by APT.
King also found that there was very good correlation between the S&P
index and the market factor. This finding is of interest for two
reasons Firstly it seems to imply that to the investors at large,
capital gains assume a far greater importance than total return.
Secondly, i1 appears that a good representative index can be used as
a proxy for the market factor without having to carry out complex
computation to obtain the latter.
BLUME AND FRIEND (1973) The authors took a "new" look at CAPM and
came to the conclusion that it must be rejected. They examined the ex
post return on 12 portfolios of 82 stocks each for the period
1955-1968 divided into three subperiods. They appplied the MM but
nevertheless assume that the y-intercept was equivalent to the
riskfree return. Using both equal weighted and value weighted
portfolios, they found that the market factor was a very poor
predictor of monthly return. The coefficient of determination ranged
from 0.0 to 0.55 except in one instance when it was 0.98 (equal
weighted porfolio from 1/65 to 6/66). In three cases, the computed
beta was negative which is manifestly impossible (unless a majority
of the 82 stocks in the portfolios are countercyclical type of
stocks). They also found that the y-intercept was significantly
different from the then riskfree rate in all subperiods. This
foreshadowed later findings in the same area.
As a summary to this subsection, it has to be said that beta, as
obtained by OLS regression of individual stock returns against market
returns appears to be a poor predictor of the expected return on
individual portfolio. On an individual stock basis, its predictive
power would be even worse. Its value for adjusting stock returns to
reflect market effect is therefore is some doubt.
(B) Stationarity of Beta
The CAPM was originally developed as a single period model. However,
it is now usually used in the study of longitudinal price series.
Such usage assumes that the computed beta is constant over the whole
period of the study. Several pieces of work have shown that this
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assumption is now open to question.
SHARPE & COOPER (1972) They carried out a comprehensive study on
the stability of the beta ranking of a large sample of stocks (the
author called this the "risk-return classes') They concluded that,
" there is substantial stability over time, even at the level of
individual securities." This conclusion appears to depend a great
deal upon one's definition of the the word "substantial". A more
stringent interpretation of the research findings would result in a
very different conclusion. The following extract from their findings
does not appear to support their conclusion.
RISK-RETURN PROP. IN SAME CLASS AFTER PROP.WITHIN 1 CLASS AFTER
CLASSES* ONE YEAR FIVE YEARS ONE YEAR FIVE YEARS
10 0.74 0.35 0.91 0.69
9 0.50 0.18 0.88 0.54
8 0.41 0.18 0.83 0.45
7 0.36 0.13 0.78 0.41
6 0.35 0.14 0.78 0.39
*The highest, ranking class has the highest beta
BLUME (1975) This paper found that the beta of portfolios with
extreme market sensitivity had a strong tendency to regress toward the
grand mean of all the stocks. He divided stocks into portfolios
according to their beta (four classes in the first subperiod of the
research period and eight in the last). He found that the beta of the
extreme portfolios had a strong tendency to converge toward 1. The
























(C) (I) Assumption of the Existence of a Riskfree Asset
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The S-L CAPM assumes that there is in existence a riskfree asset
which can be purchased by the investors and hold in conjunction with
a risky portfolio such that they would each own a personally optimum
portfolio. From this assumption, the actual riskfree rate is used for
the computation of the expected portfolio return. From a theoretical
viewpoint, the S-L CAPM is sounder than the MM. However, from the
viewpoint of this study, it is not feasible to use the S-L CAPM. The
reason being that there does not exist a riskfree asset (other than
cash) which can be purchased by the general public. The Malaysian
Treasury only sells its financial instruments to financial
institutions. Nor is there is secondary market for Treasury bills or
bonds. However, as it serendipitously turns out, the basic assumption
of the existence of a riskfree asset the return of which affects the
return on all other assets has been repeatedly shown to be far from
robust as the two following papers will show.
BLACK, JENSEN & SCHOLES (1972) In this comprehensive study of
the applicability of CAPM, the authors came to the conclusion that
the CAPM failed to adequately explain security return. Their
results showed that the return obtainable on low beta stocks to be
higher than expected and the return on high beta stocks to be lower
than expected. They also found that the return on riskfree asset as
obtained by regression was far too high when compared with the actual
riskfree rate of the period.
BLACK (1972) This paper attempted to show that even without a
riskfree asset, the central provision of CAPM would still hold. Black
showed that it was possible to contrive an efficient portfolio from a
linear combination of the market portfolio and a single
minimum-variance portfolio of risky assets. The relationship between
return and portfolio beta would still be a linear one. In this case,
however, the slope of the efficiency set would be smaller than in the
case where there is a risky asset. This smaller slope would perhaps
explain why is it that the previous paper had found that the returns
on low beta stocks were too high and vice versa.
(CMII) The Testability of CAPM
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The two above papers came under strong critism by Roll (1977) who
maintained that the rejection of the SL-CAPM by Black, Jensen and
Scholes (among others) arose out of the misspecification of the
market proxy. It Has this misspecification Hhich created the bias and
nonstationarity discovered by the latter. Roll asserted that the CAPM
in its present form Has untestable. His assertion arose out of several
conclusions Hhich he arrived at after a lengthy discussion. First, he
concluded that it Has impossible to test for the linear relationship
betneen beta and expected return. Second, he concluded that it Has
possible to generate an infinite number of "market" portfolios all of
Hhich could be made to produce a sample beta Hhich Hould give rise to
a linear relationship betHeen asset return and the beta so derived.
Third, he concluded that EMH Has only testable if all individual
assets are included in the "market" portfolio.
Hhile this paper superficially seems to be a critique of of the
earliers tests on the validity of CAPM, its major implication seems
to be that EMH is not a norkable moci^j. under our present state of
knonledge and method.
5- 4. 4 - SUMMARY COMMENTS ON SUBSECTION 5. 4. 3
In conducting tests to prove or disprove the validity of EMH, it is
inevitable that on occasions, CAPM/MM has to be used to normalise
stock return. However, the use of CAPM/MM has a major difficulty.
The problem being that a test for the validity of EMH is essentially
a two staged test. In the first place, the researcher has to be sure
that CAPM/MM does indeed correctly specify the relationship between a
stock's return and the market return. As things noH stand, the
researcher has to perform the test on the validity of EMH without
being very sure that this relationship is indeed correct. Usually
tests on the validity of EMH rely on being able to show that it is
not possible to obtain abnormal return with any stock selection
method. In the event that one test does indeed show such
"inefficiency", the researcher could not really be sure that the test
shows conclusively that EMH is not valid in this instance. An example
would illustrate this. It is a well known fact that in the US, the
stocks of small firms usually provide much higher return than those
of large firms. But could this fact be used as evidence of
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ineffciency? It could be said instead that that there is an
unspecified risk premium involved in the investment in small firms.
Even if He ignore the problem posed by the possible existence of risk
factors not specified by SL-CAPM, the use of this model for
normalising stock returns creats other practical and theoretical
difficulties as have been shown in the previous section. Since some
method of normalisation of returns has to be used and given the fact
that APT (to be discussed in the next section) is as yet not generally
acceptable, the choice is now one of between the SL-CAPM and the MM.
At this point it is perhaps worth reiterating the purpose of
normalisation of returns in efficiency tests. This can be said to be
for the the removal of non-stock specific return components from the
total return experienced by the stocks. Under the present state of
knowledge, it is very possible that there are other return components
over and above the market component which have to be removed but
there is no acceptable method for doing so. He should therefore
concentrate on the removal of the market return component which is
what CAPM/MM is designed to do. From a theoretical view point, the
removal of the market return component alone is not too great an
oversimplification. Subjectively, it would seem that most investors
in the stockmarket are much more interested in the "relative" return
of various stocks rather than the relative return between various
assets. This is especially true in Malaysia where there is paucity of
investment avenues open to the ordinary investors. If we want to
merely remove the market effect, it would seem that MM is the better
model for the normalisation of stock return.
Most studies on the validity of EMH had used MM for return
adjustment. Black, Jensen 8. Scholes in fact found that MM appeared
to have greater predictive power than CAPM. For this reason and the
reason of the non-existence of riskfree asset locally, whenever it is
required to adjust the return on stocks, the MM will be used.
Thus it would seem that the use of CAPM/MM for adjusting stock return
is fraught with difficulties. As will be shown in Chapter Six, the
coefficients of determination of the OLS model used for computing
betas are even lower in Malaysia than that of the US. Given such a
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state of affair, it is probably better that the use of CAPM/MM be
minimised in this project. There are several acceptable nays of doing
so. Firstly, the test can be so designed such that the returns under
the stock selection method being tested (e.g. moving average
method)are compared against the "buy-and-hold" returns obtained on
the same stocks as controls. Secondly, the test can be designed such
that the magnitude of the returns on the stocks is not the critical
factor being tested (e.g. test for periodi tici ty). Thirdly, it is
possible to compare the performance of two portfolios of stocks with
comparable average beta using different stock selection methods.
However, there will still be occasions when CAPM/MM will have to be
used. In order to minimise the effect of non-stationarity, moving
regressions on moving blocks of data can be used instead of one
monolithic block. In addition, Dimson's (1979) AC method of correction
will be applied in order to improve the accuracy of beta computed for
stocks which are less frequently traded.
5.4.5 - IMPORTANT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATED CAPM
The unsatisfactory state of CAPM has led to a great deal of work in
the recent years to seek a replacement. Much of the work centres
around the Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing ( APT). It is
still too early to know whether CAPM will be replaced by APT or
something else. Nevertheless, it is important to take a look at this
development since it is directly related to the shortcomings of CAPM.
ROSS (1976) This is the paper which set out the theoretical
foundation of APT. It would be well beyond the scope of this thesis
to give it anything more than a brief examination. In essense, APT
states that the expected return on a risky asset is provided by the
following expression
E. = E + 3. (E -E ) + B (E 9"E ) + ... B (E -E )l o ll pi o iz pz o lk pk o
where: E. = Return on asset i
i
E = Return on asset with zero beta
o
Epi ... E k - Expected returns due to factors 1 to k
The problem about APT for practical usage is that the theory does not
specify what are the factors which are thought to have sin effect on
stock return. In the case of CAPM the common factor, that is, market
return, is directly observable. Researchers who are intent on testing
the validity of APT are left with two alternatives. First, they can
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personally choose those factors which they believe have an effect, on
stock return and then proceed to test out their belief by using
multiple regression. The second alternative is to use computerised
factor analyses and let the computer carry out the analyses of the
variance-covariance matrix which best fit the available body of data.
The first alternative is not very satisfactory since there are so
many possible combinations of factors involved. The second is
inherently even less satisfactory since it is largely a "blind
leading the blind" approach to the problem.
As Ross himself pointed out in his follow-up paper (1978), the
factors that had so far been tested for their effect on stock returns
ranged from inflation to international finance, taxation and even
human capital. Given the unsatisfactory state of CAPM, Ross had
expected that many researchers would attempt to provide something
better, but todate the amount of concrete result has been small.
Although Ross's paper was slightly outdated, his conclusion regarding
the validity of CAPM is probably just as true today :" but it
is ironic that after more than a decade of study, no robust test of a
supposedly testable theory exists." The next paper to be discussed
shows that three years later, the situation had remained much the
same.
FOGLER, JOHN & TIPTON (1981) The aim of the authors of this paper
was to uncover factors other than the market factor which may
provide aditional explanation of stock return.". They used both the
OLS method as well as computerised factor analyses to indent ify the
major factors involved. The data used were derived from CRSP tapes.
The sample was 100 stocks divided into eight industrial groupings for
the period 1959 to 1977. The multiple regression was based upon the
following expression:
_
r. = B + B x + B x„ + B„x„ + e.
it o lit 2 2t 3 3t it
where: = Excess return on stock i for period t
x = Excess return for CRSP weighted index for period t
X2t ~ Excess return on three months US T-Bills for period t
x^ - Excess return on Aa uti lity bond for period t
The result of the study showed that whilst the estimated coefficient
on market return was significant, all the other coefficients were
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not. The authors concluded thus, " This probably explains part of
the reason for the wide acceptance of CAPM.".
The computerised factor analyses using the same body of data provided
roughly similar results which is shown in part below:-







Apart from the first component, which is almost certainly due to
market effect, the effect of the other components appear to be small.
The authors believed that the second component was largely caused by
T-Bill rate while the third component could not be shown to be
ralated to the Aa utility bond rate except during parts of the study
period.
The authors did not come to any specific conclusion at the end of this
paper beyond saying that the economic factors studied appeared to
have some effect on stock return. They felt that more investigations
were required before attempting to answer several unanswered questions
posed at the end of the paper. In particular, they questioned whether
the relationship between ex post return and ex post economic factors
actually indicated ex ante relationship.
As things now stand, CAPM/MM is still the preferred model of stock
behavior, at. least until something better comes along. For this
thesis, it shall be assumed that the adjustment made to stock return
using the Market Model is the best way to obtain normalised return.
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CHAPTER SIX — PART I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DATABASE
S. 1 — Introduction
Chapter Six is divided into two parts: (1) A description of the
design features of the database and how it is developed and (2) A
description of how and why the more important initial outputs from
the raw database are derived.
Part I
6.2 - Selection of Data to be included in the Database
6.3 - Selection of the Sample Stocks
6.4 - Sources of Data and Methods of Data Gathering
Part II
6.5 - Computation of the different Capitalisation Multipliers
6.6 - Derivation of various categories of Stock Return
6.7 - Computation of different types of Beta and the selection of the
of Beta to be used
6.2 — Composition of the Database
6.2.1 - CRITERIA FOR SELECTING DATA FOR INCLUSION IN THE DATABASE
Universally, it is accepted that stockmarket research requires a
very large amount of data because of the size of the population, the
rapidity of change in the variables involved and Ike many fields of
information involved. It is commonly acknowledged that there was
little significant stockmarket research until the Sixties because of
the lack of high speed computers and large computerised databases.
The importance of databases such as the CRSP in the US and LSPD in
Britain is obvious given the very large proportion of stockmarket
research in the respective country which is based on these two
databases.
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Unlike researchers in the West, it is not possible for this
researcher to draw on information stored in existing databases.
Malaysia can be said to be a completely green field in so far as
stockmarket research is concerned. There has been no published
research of any standing from Malaysia. Even in Singapore, which is
more advanced, the amount of high level research conducted is very
limited. It was not until 1981 that the National University of
Singapore started to create a computerised stockmarket information
system. Even so, the timespan of the data being collected is short
(since 1973) and the work is as yet incomplete. In any case, owing to
the non-parity of Singaporean and Malaysian currencies and
increasingly different listed companies (about 70% of the pupulation
of the two market are the same), whatever data held in the
aforementioned database would be incomplete and in addition cannot be
directly used for this study. In addition there are doubts about the
accuracy of the data in this particular database.
For these reasons therefore, a completely new database has to be
created for the Malaysian situation. The size and range of data to be
held in this database are dependent on the following criteria:-
(1) The nature and direction of the intended research;
(2) Its comparability with existing databases;
(3) The relatively smaller size and shorter history of the Malaysian
stock market;
(4) The resources available and the ready accessibility of the
required information; and
(5) Differences in the nature of the listed stocks.
Each of these selection criteria will be discussed in detail next.
THE NATURE AND DIRECTION OF RESEARCH As explained in Chapter One
and as will be further amplified in Chapter Seven and Eight, the main
thrust of the research for this dissertation will be to replicate
wellknown Western efficiency tests under Malaysian conditions. Since
these tests are largely based on the aforementioned databases, the
proposed database ought to replicate the data structure of its
predecessor databases.
COMPARABILITY WITH EXISTING DATABASES There are two important
reasons for choosing to design a database which is comparable with
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the existing databases. The first reason is the one given in the
previous paragraph. The second reason is that it is only right that
one should reap the benefit of the greater experience of the Western
researchers. A lot of thinking and trial and errors had probably gone
into the design of these databases; it is only right that a new
database should be based on their design unless there are very
compelling reasons for not doing so.
As previously mentioned, the two best known stockmarket databases are
the CRSP and LSPD, the latter being developed from the former
(Smithers ( 1980)). Given the similarity between the British and
Malaysian accounting and stock trading systems, it s therefore
decided to closely follow the design of the LSPD database. There are
inevitably some differences owing to the different characteristics of
each market. The similarities and differences between the two
databases will be described in detail under Subsection 6.2.2.
THE RELATIVELY SMALL SIZE AND YOUTH OF THE MALAYSIAN MARKET The
Malaysian market had an official existence of only 25 years and
the number of shares listed is less than one twentieth of that listed
in the New York or London Stock Exchange. It would not be possible to
duplicate the CRSP or LSPD in terms of years of record or the number
of stocks included.
AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND ACESSIBILITY OF EXISTING INFORMATION
SOURCES Both the CRSP and LSPD were funded by members of the
securities industry. Their size and coverage is only possible given
this level of funding. The present database had to be built up within
the context of a doctoral programme without external funding apart
from the free use of computer facilities of the Science Univesity of
Malaysia. While it is not possible to know how much difficulty the
creators of the predecessor databases went through in gathering their
data, the present task requires a considerably greater amount of
effort than otherwise owing to the lack of proper archival
facilities. In the first 13 years of its life, the KLSE went through
three different incarnations and two removals, the archive stores are
therefore incomplete and disorganised. Apart from this, the record
keeping and organisation of the earlier years left much to be
desired. (This is only to be expected given the lack of experience of
the organisations involved.) Given the relative paucity of resources,
economy can be achieved by either limiting the amount of data
gathered per stock or by limiting the size of the sample. Given the
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requirements of (1) and (2) above, it is decided to have as complete
a record of each of the sampled stocks as possible while limiting
the number of stocks in the sample.
In term of information to be included, the available information
covers much the same range as that covered by LSPD with one major
difference—the non-availability of Alpha and Beta for each of the
stock.
THE DIFFERENCES IN THE NATURE OF THE LISTED COMPANIES In many
ways, the Malaysian listed companies are considerably simpler than
their British counterparts. This is partly due to history and partly
due to the laws and regulations in force. The amount of descriptive
information provided by LSPD is large to take into account the very
complex corporate structure that is possible in Britain. Given the
simpler corporate structure of Malaysian companies, the whole of the
descriptive data file under LSPD can be dropped as much of the data
included is not applicable and the few remaining classes of
information can be included in the other files.
6.2.2 - COMPARISON BETWEEN LSPD AND THE PRESENT DATABASE
(A) THE MAIN DESIGN FEATURES
The major design features of the LSPD are provided on the left hand
side of Table 6.1 below with the design features of the present
database provided on the right hand side.
As can be seen from Table 6.1, there are only three main differences
between the two databases in terms of major features —sampling
method, periodicity and inclusion of volume data.
The reason for choosing this particular sampling method will be
explained in Section 6.3. The reason for using weekly rather than
monthly sampling interval is that the modern trend seems to be towards
a shorter interval (witness the fact that the latest CRSP tape
provides daily sampling interval for prices). A shorter sampling
interval, however, introduces the problem of infrequent trading for
certain stocks. This problem will be examined in Section 6.6. The
reason for including the volume data being that in terms of resources,
it does not take much to include volume data as it is obtained from
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TABLE 6 . 1




(2) Basis for selecting Sample
Three Overlapping Samples
(a) Random sample covering 33% of
the population
(b) The 500 largest firms of 1955
(8.3% of the population)
(c) The 200 largest firms of 1974
(3.3% of the population)
1968-1983
Two Overlapping Samples
(a) The 50 largest companies at
the beginning of 1968
(b) The 60 largest companies at
the end of 1982
(Section 6.3 will provide explan¬
ation for the sampling method)
(3) Sample Size
2300 firms covering about 40% of
the listed firms and about 80% in
term of market value
55-77 firms covering 30% to 50% of
the listed firms and about 67% to.
89% in term of market value
(4) Periodicity
Monthly for price data and others
as per occurence
Weekly for transaction data and
others as per occurence
(5) Data Types Included
Seven classes of data Five classes of data
(a) Descriptive data (a) Price ) Transaction Data
(b) Capital changes (b) Volume )
(c) Dividend (c) Capitalisation Changes
(d) Par values (d) Dividend
(e) Price (e) Earnings
(f) Share capitals
(g) Earnings per share
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the same sources as price data. The main manpower requirement being
recording and keypunching which can be carried out by assistants.
Although the collected volume data is not being utilised in this
project, it is hoped that future researchers will be able to make use
of it.
(B) DATA INCLUDED
This section will examine in detail the types of data included in the
two respective databases. The contents of LSPD and the Malaysian
database are shown side by side in Table 6.2. For the sake of
brevity, in future text, the proposed database will be known as MSMD
(for Malaysian Stock Market Database). Explanatory notes on the
reasons for the differences between the contents included are
provided in Section 6.3»
6-3 — Sampling Method
6.3.1 -IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES IN SAMPLE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
PURPOSE BEHIND DEVELOPMENT OF DATABASE Before drawing up the
method of selecting the member stocks for the Malaysian Stock Market
Database (MSMD for short), it is important first to consider the main
intentions behind the development of this database. There are some
differences in the requirements of MSMD compared with LSPD. LSPD was
probably designed "purely" as a database. That is, Smithers, who
designed it, presumably did not have in mind what he himself wanted
to do with the data after the database was completed. The LSPD was
developed for use by other researchers. In contrast, the prime
purpose of the MSMD is to support the research undertaken for the
completion of this dissertation. The researchers who intend to make
use of LSPD would usually further select a sample of stocks from the
larger sample within the database. Each researcher presumably adopts a
sample selection method which best suits his purpose. It is quite
clear that, one would not expect many research projects to make full
use of all of the 2300 stocks within the LSPD. In contrast, the MSMD
is designed first and foremost to provide data for the tests to be
carried out in support of the hypothesis put forward in this
dissertation. Its prime purpose is therefore to provide an adequate
number (a minimum of 30) of representative subjects for each of the 7
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TABLE 6.2
CONTENTS OF LSPD AND MALAYSIAN DATABASE
LSPD :MALAYSIAN DATABASE
(I) Descriptive Data
-Code no., no. of capital changes, -Not included, data available from
no. of dividend, no. of par value other files and records
changes
-Dates of birth and death and of -Not included
first quotation
-Sample membership -Not included
-Cross reference with SEDOL and -Not applicable
Extel
-New and previous accounting dates -Available from Dividend File
-Name changes -Available from record
-Dates of major changes in nature -Not included
of business
-Estimate of Beta -Not available in raw form




-Capital Change type -Included
-Type of shares involved -Included
-Dividend Ranking Date -Included
-Announcement date -Included
-Six different markers to indicate -Different marking system






-Marker to indicate special status -Included
-Year of dividend -Included
-Type of dividend -Included
-Tax rate -Included
-Not included -Denominating currency
171
TABLE 6.2 (CONTD X)





-Included in Capital.Changes file
-Not applicable
-Included in Capital.Changes file
(5) Prices
-End of month date




-End of week date
-Not included
-Included, mid quotes price
provided if no transaction, last
transacted price provided if no






-Included in Capital Changes file
-Included in Capital Changes file
-No. of shares also provided




)Listed firms only recently started
)to provide EPS figures. Previously
)EPS had to be computed by users.
A separate Earnings file will be
constructed on similar line to
the Dividend file and contains
the following raw data
-Announcement date
-Financial Year
-Half year and full year Earnings
before Tax
-Full year after tax earnings
-Adjusted 12 month eps before tax
(8) Volume
-Not Included Included on the same basis as
Price
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efficiency tests to be carried out so that some generalised
statements can be made about the Malaysian market.
THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF THE LISTED FIRMS Judging by the
information provided in Smither (1980), the size distribution of
firms on the LSE is heavily skewed towards the top end. Out of a total
population of nearly 6000 firms, a sample that is based approximately
on the largest 10%(approximately) of the population plus another 33%
randomly selected make up 80% of the total market value of the listed
firms. In contrast, the largest 30% of the firms listed on the KLSE
make up only just over 60% of the total market value. A simulation of
Smithers' sample selection method was carried out on the Malayisan
stock population and the result of the simulation reveals that the
coverage in terms of market value would be much poorer. The largest
10% (25) of the population plus a further 33% of the population in
the form of a randomly selected sample produces a coverage of 63% at
the beginning of 1983. This contrasts with a coverage of 75% at the
same date using the sampling method selected. Furthermore, Smitherte
selection method applied locally produces a far greater concentration
in certain sectors of the market. Thus the 25 largest companies alone
make up 45% of the total market value of the population. Of the 45%,
25% is accounted by a mere 9 companies from the Finance and
Plantations sectors.
THE NECESSITY OF HAVING A MARKET PORTFOLIO AS A SUBSET OF THE MAIN
DATABASE As mentioned earlier, the Beta for individual stocks on
the KLSE is not available. One of the first tasks of the project is
therefore to compute the beta of each stock in the database by
regressing its return against the market return. As a surrogate for
the actual market, a "market portfolio" has to be created. The
requirements of the stocks which go into the market portfolio are not
the same as stocks selected for the database. The market portfolio
has to track the performance of the market as a whole as closely as
possible. While the database is to provide a sample which permits
generalisation on the market behavior over a fairly long period of
time. Given the continually changing nature of the stockmarket, the
database portfolio which is formed from samples selected at the
beginning and end of the research period is probably not capable of
tracking closely the return on the market throughout the whole of the
research period.
For this reason a separate market portfolio is created based on the
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largest 40 firms by market value, rebalanced on a yearly basis with
stratification by sectors. Several firms ( which may be termed
"shooting star" stocks given the meteoric rise and fall of their
market value.) selected on this basis are not part of the original
database portfolio and they have to be added in subsequently.
Compared with the typical market portfolio of the West, a portfolio
of 40 is very small. However, the work of Lorie and Hamilton (1971)
has shown that a sample as small as 8 can provide a reasonable
representation of the market. In fact, their work also shows that
there is little precision to be gained in increasing the sample much
beyond 30. As will be shown later, it is possible to select an annual
market portfolio of 40 stocks which give an excellent facsimile of
the market segmentation by market value. It is likely that such a
portfolio would provide a good surrogate of the market in terms of
return. A market portfolio of 40 would therefore appear to be
adequate.
TIMESPAN OF THE DATABASE There are several conflicting
requirements in choosing the timespan of the stockmarket; the three
more important ones are:-
(1) The stability of the characteris .tics being tested;
(2) The resources required for going further back in time; and
(3) The need to have as many data points as possible to improve the
power of the tests.
Given the fact that the market is so new, its characteristics are
probably changing quite rapidly. It is possible that over the 25 year
lifespan of the market, it may have changed a great deal such that
the same conclusion cannot be drawn over the whole timespan. The
cost of search of data increases disproportionately as one goes back
in time given the Malaysian conditions. In the earlier years of the
stock market's existence, record keeping and reporting was very poor.
Given these conflicting requirements, it is thought that a research
period of 16 years represents a reasonable compromise between them,
until more resources become available. To allow for the possibility
that the market may be evolving, some of the tests to be conducted
will be performed on subsets of the data divided in accordance with
time periods. As will be shown later in this thesis, market behavior
is not consistent even over this short span of time.
6.3.2 - SAMPLE SELECTION ISSUES AND METHOD
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(A) SAMPLE DESIGN ISSUES
The sample selected to go into the MSMD is based on the following
criteria, the reasons for adopting these particular criteria will be
discussed in the next section of the text:-
(1) Sample firms selected based on market value rather than on a
random basis;
(2) Sample firms are stratified by business sectors;
(3) Other things being equal, a more frequently traded stock is
selected over a less frequently traded one; and
(4) The population from which the samples are drawn is made up of all
stocks listed on the KLSE or its predecessors reg.ardless of
its official country of domicile or the number of other exchanges
on which it. is listed.
(1) SELECTION BASED ON NON-RANDOM SAMPLE The firms selected for
the database are based on two overlapping samples of the 50 largest
firms in 1967 and the 60 largest firms in 1982. The firms selected
for the annual market portfolio are based on the 40 largest firms at
the beginning of each year. All samples are stratified by sectors
according to market value weights. There are several reasons for
using a non-random selection method in building the market portfolio
and the database.
Firstly, there is the consideration of what is to be regarded as the
basic unit of the population to be sampled. There are three posssible
candidates — the firms themselves, the total number of outstanding
shares and the total dollar market value of the shares. If one is
studying the behavior of the management or some other sociological
behavior which is dependent on the firm as a complete entity, the
firms themselves wou]d be the obvious unit of survey. However, since
this dissertation is examining the behavior of the individual shares
(more especially the behavior of its return), it would be logical to
consider the last as being the basic unit of the population under
study. This conclusion is in line with the convention of stockmarket
research. Since the cost of data gathering is the same irrespective
of the size of the firm (in fact it is, on average, slightly cheaper
for the larger firms), from the practical viewpoint, it is better to
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use a non-random selection method based on size. The chosen sampling
method results in a 30% sample (at the end of the research period)
which covers over 70% of the total market value of the population.
To achieve the same coverage of the population, a random selection
method would require more than twice as many firms.
Secondly, it is normal for the smaller firms to be traded less
frequently than the larger firms. Infrequent trading would bring with
it the problems of inaccuracy in computed return and beta. Although
this problem can be overcome to a certain extent by using methods
such as Dimson's (1979), it is obviously preferable to use the more
frequently traded stocks in the first place. This is especially true
in Malaysia where the larger firms dominate the trading. As will be
shown later, the problem of non-trading is already quite acute for
some of the firms under the present selection method. A method based
on random selection would aggravate this problem. Judging from work
in the West, there are indications that the behavior of the smaller
firms' stocks is often at variant with that of the market as a whole
owing to the lack of interest on the part of the investors (e.g. the
small firm effect). A sample that is heavily weighted with the
smaller firms can produce biased results in the tests conducted.
It is therefore thought that a size based sample would produce
greater precision in the results than a randomly selected one. It is
possible that some biases may be introduced by this method of
selection. A likely bias is to favour some of the sectors which are
made up of large firms. This bias can be overcome by using stratified
sample. Other biases, if they exist, would probably be similar to
biases uncovered in the West. They are therefore known and can be
allowed for in drawing conclusions from the tests. In order to reduce
other possible biases, two overlapping samples are taken rather than
one.
STRATIFICATION BY MARKET SECTORS The listed firms are separated
into seven different sectors by the KLSE — Industrial and
Commercial, Finance, Hotels, Properties, Oil Palm, Rubber and Tin. Two
of these sectors, Hotels and Oil Palm, are very small and for the
purpose of this project can be respectively merged into the
Properties and Rubber sectors since they are broadly similar in
nature. Prior investigations reveal that firms in the various sectors
can differ considerably along various dimensions. In particular, they
can be very different in terms of age of firms, size, growth rate,
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return and trading frequency.
Firms are therefore selected for both the market portfolio and the
database sector by sector, the stratification factor being the market
value of each sector. That is, the market value of each sector is
computed and the largest firms from within each sector are included
so as to give the each sector within the sample the same weight as the
sector within the actual market. As a result of stratification, the
numerical representation of each sector can be very different from
the market value weights. For example, the finance sector is often
represented by only 2 or 3 firms (about 1% or 1.5% in terms of firms
in the number in the sample) but they often represent 20% or more
in terms of market value.
INFREQUENT TRADING As explained above, infrequent trading can
create problems of inaccuracy. Ideally, only the regularly traded
stocks should be included in the two samples, especially the market
portfolio. There are several problems is applying this criterion to
this project. Firstly, there is the problem of defining what is meant
by "infrequent trading" —there is no commonly accepted definition of
this term. This is perhaps not a serious problem because commonsense
can be applied to overcome it. For this project, a stock is said to
be "infrequently traded" if, during any one year, there is one or
more four week period during which there is no price change. A stock
is further said to be "very infrequently traded" if, in any one year,
there is one or more thirteen week period during which there is no
price change. Although the criteria are fairly arbitary apart from
being associated with the nodal periods of one month and one quarter,
there is some logic behind them. Using Dimsom's AC method (1979), it
is practically feasible to adjust the beta computation for the first
category of infrequent trading by including the return for 5 leading
and lagging weeks in the regression equation. It is therefore
acceptable to include stocks of the first but less so the second.
However, it is not possible to apply this criterion throughout during
the selection process. The problem is that two of the sectors, Hotels
and Properties and Tin suffer from the twin problems of infrequent
trading as well as being composed of firms of small and fairly
uniform size. This means that a relatively large number of firms have
to to be included, many of which suffer from infrequent trading.
These problems were particularly acute during the "non-boom" years
during the earlier part of the research period. (During the "boom"
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years, most shares are regularly traded). If the criterion of
frequent trading were to be applied rigidly, these two sectors would
become very under-represented during certain parts of the research
period. This criterion can therefore be applied only to the selection
of the other three sectors. ( Post 1977, the Tin sector became
dominated by a single giant firm which shares were and still are
regularly traded. Infrequent trading is therefore largely a problem
confined to the Hotels and Properties sector.)
DEFINING THE POPULATION UNIVERSE Owing to the close historical
ties between the UK, Singapore and Malaysia, a very large proportion
of the firms listed on the KLSE are actually non Malaysian resident
companies. There are three main types of companies which, although
not domiciled in Malaysia, are listed on its stock exchange:-
(1) British plantations and tin companies which business was located
in Malaysia. Although most of these companies were listed on the
London Exchange, they were also colisted on the KLSE. Their shares
were traded in Malaysia using the local currency unit as if they were
local companies. The domicile of most companies in this category
was gradually shifted during the Seventies such that at the end of
the research period, all but one of the sampled firms previously
domiciled in Britain have shifted their official residence to
Malaysia.
(2) Trading and Finance Companies with business throughout Malaysia
and Singapore but are resident in Singapore. This category has become
much smaller since the start of the research period. Many of these
companies have split their operation into two and relisted their
components separately on KLSE and SES. The relisting is usually
achieved by issuing two classes of shares to the original
shareholders. Whenever this took place, the previously joined company
was replaced by its Malaysian component in the sample. Those
companies which have not yet split, of which there are 10 in number
at the end of the research period, are all regularly traded on KLSE.
(3) Singapore based Hotels and Properties companies which have no
business interest in Malaysia. This is a problemic category because,
in addition, several of these are not frequently traded in the first
place. There are 9 companies in this category among the 13 companies
selected to represent this business sector. If these nine are
excluded, it will result in the whole sector being very much
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under-represented in the sample for there were very few Malaysian
domiciled companies in this sector for much of the research period.
This is an important sector since the sector weight varies from 5% to
14% during the research period. (The very high variability is caused
by the very high beta of companies in this sector.)
THE COMPANIES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE POPULATION UNIVERSE A
decision therefore has to be made to either exclude or include these
three categories of companies as part of the universe from which to
choose the sample. There are little difficulties in deciding that the
first of the above three categories should be included.
There are compelling reasons for including the second as well.
Firstly, for 6 out of the 16 years of the research period, the
Singapore and Malaysian exchanges were one and they are still very
closely linked with close arbitraging actions between the two.
Secondly there is an active market for these stocks in Malaysia
throughout the research period. Third, many of the companies have
split their operations into two following the separation of the two
exchanges; if the predecessor companies are not included, the
Malaysian components will have to be included after the split in any
case.
The third category is the most problemic. If those companies which
have no business interest in Malaysia were to be excluded from the
Hotels and Properties sector, this sector would become very
underrepresented during the time when the two exchanges were one. In
the end, it was decided to base the decision of whether to include
them or not upon the volume of transaction in these stocks at the
KLSE as a percentage of the total transaction volume of the two
exchanges. If the percentage of transaction undertaken at the KLSE is
reasonably high, these stocks are to be included as part of the
population universe. Table 6.3 below provides this piece of
information from post separation to the end of the research period.
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TABLE S - 3
KLSE TRANSACTION VOLUME AS PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL VOLUME IN KLSE/SES IN RESPECT OF
STOCKS IN THE HOTELS AND PROPERTIES SECTOR
HOTELS PROPERTIES TOTAL
VOL $'000 KLSE % VOL $'000 KLSE % VOL $'000 KLSE J
1974 123,460 39.5 158,439 44.9 281,899 42.5
1975 172,127 31.6 177,039 40.3 349,166 36.0
1976 67,296 22.3 130,244 18.0 197,540 19.5
1977 32,533 1.4 113,244 33.6 146,315 . 26.4
1978 215,546 24.0 346,483 37.6 562,029 32.3
1979 115,284 22.3 209,668 24.1 324,952 23.4
1980 346,632 20.5 1,322,472 22.1 1,669,104 21.8
1981 1,157,583 14.8 2,176,540 27.0 3,334,123 22.7
1982 290,439 16.6 822,960 25.1 1,113,395 22.9
1983 668,365 23.1 1,787,351 42.2 2,455,716 37.0
From this table, it can be seen that apart from 1976, the part played
by KLSE in the total picture is above 20% and in four of these years,
it played a greater than 30% part. It would thus appear that it is
preferable to include them as part of the population from which to
select the sample.
It is therefore decided that as long as a firm is listed on the KLSE,
and there is a market for it, it should be included in the population
from which the samples are to be drawn.
(B) SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE
The samples are selected based on the above stated principles on a
trial and error basis. The market value of each of the listed
commpanies (except for those with a market value of below M$5 million
which are not likely to be chosen) are fed into an IBM Micro Computer
year by year. A standard financial spreadsheet programme (Visicalc)
is used to work out the best combination of stocks for the beginning
and ending years for the database and for each of the years for the
market portfolio. The method is purely by trials and errors until a
combination of 40, 50 or 60 stocks could be found such that each
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sector of the sample is as closely matched as possible to the actual
sector weight for that particular year. Various combinations are
tried until the variances of the sample weights from the actual
weights are at a minimum. Certain simplifying steps are taken to
shorten the process of selection:-
(1) Balance between the various sectors take precedence over sticking
to the rule of inclusion of the largest firms;
(2) Infrequently traded stocks(as previously defined) are not
considered unless there are no other choices;
(3) Stocks listed for five years or less are not considered;
(4) The Industrial and Commmercial sector firms are used for "fine
tuning" the samples after the other sectors are largely fixed.
This is done because the large population and range of market
values available in this sector make the task of balancing
the portfolio very much simpler.
The numerical and percentage of market value representation by sector
for both the database sample and the market porfolio of each of the
years of the research period are provided in Tables 6.4 and 6.5.
shown below.
6.3.3 - POINTS OF NOTE FROM TABLES 6.4 AND 6.5
(A) DISCUSSION ON THE DATABASE SAMPLE - TABLE 6.4
A very obvious characteristic of the market is the slow down in the
growth of the listed companies, the reason for which has been
previously explained in Chapter Two. After 1975, there has been hardly
any growth at all. In particular, the years from 1975 to 1982 only
saw an increase of 4. As a result of this slow down in growth, the
database sample, though small in number, remains a very good
representation of the overall market throughout. Although the
percentage representation fluctuates, the sample still gives a 75%
representation in 1982.
A second important point to note is the large fluctuation in the
percentage representation of the database sample within the market.
Part of the explanation for this large fluctuation is the high beta
of the blue chips which are heavily represented in the database
sample. During the "bull runs", blue chips have a tendency to be
bid up to a very high level. Thus during the last three booms -
6.4(A)
ANNUAL NUMERICAL REPRESENTATION BY SECTOR
- DATABASE SAMPLE
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ANNUAL PERCENTAGE REPRESENTATION BY SECTOR
- DATABASE SAHPLE
TOTAL INDUSTRIAL FINANCE HOTELS & PROP. PLANATIONS TIN
AS I OF
MARKET ACTUAL SAMPLE ACTUAL SAMPLE ACTUAL SAHPLE ACTUAL SAMPLE ACTUAL SAMPLE
1968 89.2 73.2 69.1 9.3 12.3 6.7 8.1 5.6 6.0 5.2 4.5
1969 75.7 69.7 70.0 10.2 11.1 9.0 7.4 4.4 4.0 6.7 7.5
1970 70.4 68.3 68.7 11.2 12.5 7.4 5.8 6.4 6.1 6.6 7.9
1971 68.6 66.1 66.8 11.8 13.2 8.2 5.6 7.4 /.I 6.4 7.3
1972 73.1 66.9 68.0 14.5 16.0 6.0 4.1 6.9 6.5 5.7 5.4
1973 73.8 51.5 42.8 25.1 29.7 11.7 8.3 8.1 9.3 3.8 2.9
1974 69.7 48.8 50.6 16.9 20.6 11.2 8.4 18.4 17.3 4.7 3.1
1975 67.4 48.0 49.8 13.8 17.4 11.4 7.3 19.7 18.7 7.1 6.8
1976 72.9 49.1 51.2 19.7 24.5 9.0 5.9 17.0 14.7 5.0 3.8
1977 71.4 49.7 50.4 20.9 26.6 8.4 5.9 16.6 13.4 4.4 3.7
1978' 74.2 50.8 50.5 16.7 20.2 7.8 5.3 17.5 17.7 7.2 6.5
1979 74.4 52.1 50.6 16.4 19.6 7.4 5.9 18.5 19.0 5.7 4.9
1980 73.8 51.9 49.8 14.6 17.4 7.3 6.5 20.6 21.2 5.6 5.1
1983 79.7 49.4 50.1 19.0 20.4 9.4 9.1 15.2 14.2 7.0 6.2
1982 74.9 48.0 45.9 20.7 22.6 13.6 13.6 11.8 11.9 5.9 6.1
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TABLE 6.5(A)
ANNUAL NUMERICAL REPRESENTATION BY SECTOR
- MARKET PORTFOLIO
TOTAL INDUSTRIAL FINANCE . HOTELS & PROP PLANTATIONS TIN
ACTUAL SAMPLE ACTUAL SAMPLE ACTUAL SAMPLE ACTUAL SAMPLE ACTUAL SANFlE ACTUAL SAMPLE
1968 115 40 52 23 10 3 13 7 28 4 ]] 3
1969 141 40 65 20 10 2 22 11 30 4 14 3
1970 185 40 93 21 14 2 28 IT 32 4 18 3
1971 205 40 109 20 15 2 28 11 32 3 19 3
1972 215 40 116 19 15 3 30 11 32 4 22 3
1973 224 40 121 16 14 2 29 12 33 5 27 5
1974 229 40 129 17 12 2 30 11 29 5 29 5
1975 248 40 136. 17 11 3 28 12 44 6 29 2
1976 249 40 136 16 12 2 28 11 44 6 30 5
1977 254 40 141 17 13 2 25 10 44 6 31 5
1978 251 40 137 17 14 2 25 11 41 5 .34 5
1979 252 40 141 18 14 2 23 10 40 5 34 5
1980 252 40 142 20 14 3 22 7 41 5 15 5
1981 249 40 142 19 16 3 21 7 41 6 29 5
1982 252 40 143 22 16 3 23 7 41 ' 6 29 2
1983 26! 40 149 22 16 2 25 8 42 6 29 2
6.5(B)
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1968, 1972/3 and 1979/81 - the database sample assumes a much larger
part in the overall market value. But a year later, their
representation can drop by as much as 5%. It is interesting to note
this peculiar behavior of the local market compared with the West
where the blue chips are usually accorded lower beta.
The third point, to note is that in spite of the lack of sophistication
in the sample selection method, the database sample provides a
reasonably accurate representation of the market in terms of sector
weights. In spite of the large relative changes in importance of the
various sectors, the database sample has managed to keep track of
these changes. Apart from the fact that the Finance sector has a
tendency to be ovei—represented, the database provides a reasonable
facsimile of the overall market.
B) DISCUSSION ON THE ANNUAL MARKET PORTFOLIOS - TABLE 6.5
The first important point to note is that under the Malaysian
conditions, a 40 company portfolio can provide a very good
representation for the overall market. For all but two years of the
research period, the chosen market portfolio represented 50% or
greater of the market in terms of market value. Second, it is
noteworthy that using a yearly rebalancing, it is possible to track
the market very accurately in "termsof sector weights.
6 _ 4 — Sources o"P Data sund
Methods of Data Collection
6.4.1 - TYPES OF DATA REQUIRED FOR THE RESEARCH
As outlined in Section 6.2, the MSMD will be made up of five types of
data, viz.: Price, Volume, Capitalisation, Dividend and Earnings.
These five types of data can be grouped into two major categories
(1) Transaction Data - Price and Volume; and
(2) Accounting Data - Capitalisation, Dividend and Earnings.
These two categories of data are very different in their nature. They
come from very different sources and require different collection
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methods.
TRANSACTION DATA This type of data can be characterised by its
bulk and the simplicity of its collection. The required data can be
copied directly from their sources onto coding sheets and later be
keyed onto computer tape directly. The raw data as such is therefore
immediately usable without any further processing. This type of data
is also very voluminous as it is sampled on a weekly basis for the
whole of the research period or 832 data points for each of the
sampled companies (78).
ACCOUNTING DATA This category of data is very different from the
first. Firstly, the information as collected requires to be further
processed before they are usable for further computer processing. For
example, a collection of raw data on the history of bonus issues of a
company has to be converted into a list of capitalisation adjustment
factors before they can be used. Secondly, this type of data has very
complex structure. For example, a single capitalisation change of a
company involves as many as 10 pieces (sometimes more) of information
which have to be culled from different sources. Thirdly, the absolute
volume of data involved is small for each of the three subclasses of
data in this category. There are usually only 32 lines of data on
dividend or earnings and about half as many in respect of
capitalisation changes. From a data handling point of view, it is
more advantages to collect and process the information manually upto
the point where it is feasible to use computerised processing.
Given the very different nature of these two different categories of
data, discussion in the remainder of this section will be divided
accordingly.
6.4.2 - SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO EACH TYPE OF DATA
(A) NEWSPAPERS
Newspapers, being a daily publication, are the only sources of
transaction information until recently when the Singapore Stock
Exchange (SES) computerised their transactions handling operations.
As far as the research period is concerned, they are the sole
sources. Of the newspapers published locally, two could be used as
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sources of information for this project. They are the New Straits
Times (and its predecessor, the Straits Times) and the Business Times.
Unfortunately, the latter did not start publication until 1975 and
the range of information provided was very inadequate for a
supposedly business oriented paper. Though it has been improving
gradually over the years, it is only in the last few years that the
coverage can be regarded as adequate. For example, it is only in the
last three years of the research period that it had been providing a
complete weekly report on the dividend, earnings and capitalisation
announcements of the listed companies. As a result, this newspaper is
not used as a primary source of this category of information.
The most important part played by the New Straits Times as a source
of information is in its providing the socalled "Weekly Share Market
Report". This column has been a regular weekly feature of the New
Straits Times since 1969 and before that, there was a less complete
report. This report provides the last traded price, the highest and
lowest prices for the calender year todate, the trading volume, the
dividend yield and the price earnings ratio for every one of the
listed stocks (the last two pieces of information are neither up to
date nor accurate and are hence unusable). In addition, for the week
during which a stock "goes ex" a marker is placed next to the price
for both capital changes (reasonably accurate and complete) as
well as for dividend (incomplete and not reliable). The difference in
accuracy of data on "ex dates" for capital changes and dividend
payments is not surprising in view of the fact that the former are
likely to cause a big change in the quoted price and in addition the
"year high and low prices" have to be recomputed by the staff of the
newspaper.
The first task in the data collection work is to xerox a complete set
of the Weekly Share Market Reports covering the entire research
period. The backcopies of the newspaper are obtained from the Penang
Public Library (upto 1971) and from the collection at the Science
University (since 1971, the year the University came into existence).
(B) THE STOCK EXCHANGE GAZETTES
This publication has appeared in three different incarnations during
the research periods - first as the Stock Exchange of Malaya Gazette,
then as the Stock Exchange of Singapore and Malaysia Gazette and
finally as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Gazette. However, in all
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its incarnations, it is supposed to serve the same function; that is,
as the official monthly Stock Exchange news publication. It is
supposed to provide a complete report on what is happening in the
stockmarket. Its contents may seem extensive on paper but it is only
in recent years that its contents can be regarded as adequate. It now
provides a monthly summary of the accounting changes and transaction
data for all listed stocks, a complete record of all corporate
announcements, information on indices and market capitalisation and
even summaries of all annual reports. However, for much of its
existence, it was poorly organised and the information provided was
usually out-dated, often incomplete and patchy since it has always
been produced by inexperienced and non financially literate staff.
For example, such vital information as the ex-date for capital
changes and dividend payments was not included until after 1983.
However, it does provide an almost complete record of all
capitalisation changes, dividend announcements. Even if it does not
include all the data, much of the information therein is usable and
reasonably accurate. It is therefore the primary source for
accounting information in the pre 1973 years. Its other great
advantage is that it proved possible to assemble a complete set of
this publication from its first issue (June, 1960), either in its
original or xeroxed form. This means that the data gathering from
this source could be done in Penang, resulting in much time saved.
(C) THE RECORDS OF MESSRS. THONG & OH, STOCKBROKERS
As has been pointed out in Chapter Two, very few of the local
stockbrokers carry out research of any sort. However, they do keep
some sort of records on the important dates connected with
capitalisation changes and dividend payments in order to ensure
correct pricing in relation to dividend, bonus or rights ranking.
Some of the larger firms also keep other types of information on
listed companies. Messrs. Thong & Oh, the largest and second longest
established stockbroker firm in Penang, is kind enough to allow
access to its records and it has proved to be an invaluable source of
data. The records held only go back to the year 1973 although the
firm has been in existence for considerably longer. The information
is obtained from either the listed firms directly or from the Stock
Exchanges via daily telexes and recorded in hand written form.
Preliminary checking indicates that their records are the most
accurate. They are therefore used as the primary post 1973 source of
dividend dates and dividend amounts.
(D) THE LIBRARY OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF SINGAPORE
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The KLSE has proved to be extremely uncooperative in the way of
opening its facilities for the use of this researcher. As a result.,
the Library of the SES is used in its place. This has proved to be
an invaluable source for obtaining xeroxes of official publications
(i.e. Gazette and Yearbook), unobtainable from other sources, as well
as acting as the "last resort" source of other information. The SES
Library- contains a complete set of annual reports for all listed
companies going back to the mid Sixties in addition to complete sets
of all official publications since the beginning. It also holds in
hard copy form the "Report to Members" which is a daily record of all
corporate announcements received. Unfortunately, the complete
collection of this is available only since 1973; prior to that year,
copies of this record tend to be patchy and prior to the late
Sixties, all copies seem to have been destroyed. Although this record
is uS>able, it is extremely time consuming to gather the required
information in this way and it is therefore only used as a last
resort when the required information is not available elsewhere.
The disadvantage of the SES Library is that it is quite distant from
Penang. Its use requires travelling down to Singapore and spending
several days in the city and all that implies in terms of cost and
time.
(E) THE STOCK EXCHANGE YEARBOOKS
This publication provides a short history of each of the listed
company as well as five years' summary of financial information. The
range of information provided has become fuller with the years. In
the latest issues, it provides all important dates as well as
financial information. In addition to being used as a secondary
source of information on capital changes, dividend payments and
earnings, it proves invaluable in providing several small but vital
pieces of information such as name changes, first listing dates,
changes in financial year end, nature of corporate restructuring and
reorganisations, earnings and dividend ranking dates for new shares
created as well as information on subsidiaries and major
shareholders.
Again, it proved feasible to assemble a reasonably complete set of
this publication going back to 1968.
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(F) CORPORATE ANNUAL REPORTS
This is only a minor source of information, although important
nevertheless. Firstly, it is used for discovering how corporate
restructuring and reorganisations (very common for local listed
companies) have been carried out. Secondly, it is used for gathering
information of "external" capitalisation changes. (An explanation of
the difference between "internal" and "external" capitalisation
changes will be provided in Section 6.5.)
6.4.3 - COLLECTION OF TRANSACTION DATA
As outlined in Section 6.4.1, the collection of these data is
straightforward. The one point which needs further elaboration is the
fact that these data were keyed in and used without being
counterchecked against a second source (although the recording and
keying-in are double-checked). There are two reasons for this.
Firstly, the frequency of sampling means that the error rate is
likely to be lower and whatever errors there may be would not have
such profound effect on the subsequent computation and analysis.
Secondly, there is no likelihood of the errors exerting a cumulative
effect as in the case of capitalisation information where an error in
the computation of the adjustment factor at the beginning would lead
to all subsequent figures being in error. Thirdly, it would be of
doubtful benefit to check the data against a second source which is
no more accurate since the most obvious second source is the data
published in another newspaper. It would be extremely time consuming
to check the data against the only known and available third source,
that is, the hardcopy of wire information service (e.g. Reuter).
Furthermore, this source of information is not tabulated and it is
doubtful if it is possible to accumulate a complete set covering 16
years. For these reasons therefore, the information obtained from the
New Strait Times' Weekly Sharemarket Reports is assumed to be
accurate.
6.4.4 - COLLECTION OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING DATA
The three types of data in this category are "events driven", so to
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speak. That is, a clutch of information would come into being every
time there is an announcement of a new corporate event of one of
these types. At each announcement, the data which become available
can be further subdivided into: (1) Information on dates and (2)
Other types of information on the nature of the announcements. There
are therefore altogether six major classes of information
(1) Information on dates connected with capitalisation changes (CD);
(2) Information on various characteristics of capitalisation changes
(CC);
(3) Information on dates connected with dividend announcements (DD);
(4) Information on various characteristics of dividends (DC);
(5) Information on dates connected with earnings announcements (ED);
(6) Information on various characteristics of earnings (EC).
Note:Letters inside brackets show the short form of each class of
information to be used in Table 6.6.
The six sources of information used to obtain the above classes of
information for the database may be divided as follows;-
MAJOR SOURCES
(1) The Stock Exchange (MSE/SEMS/KLSE) Monthly Gazette;
(2) The data files of Messrs Thong & Oh, Stock Brokers;
MINOR SOURCES
(3) The weekly newspaper Share Market Reports; (4) The Library of the
Stock Exchange of Singapore;
(5) The Stock Exchange Yearbooks; and
(6) The Annual Reports of the selected companies.
The relationship between the various types of information and the
various sources of data is summarised in Table 6.6 appended below.
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TABLE 6.6
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPES OF INFORMATION AND THEIR SOURCES
PRE 1973 POST 1973
DATA TYPE CD CC DD DC ED EC CD CC DD DC ED EC
GAZETTE + * + * + + + * + * + *
STOCKBROKER * * * * - -
NEWSPAPER + - + - - - + + + + + +
SES LIBRARY + + -f + + + * * * * * +
YEARBOOK - * - * - + - * - * - +
AN. REPORT + * • + * + + * + * + +
* = This information is almost completely obtainable from this source
+ = This information is partially obtainable from this source
- = This information unobtainable from this source
The information on capitalisation changes and dividends can be
regarded as the most important pieces of information to be collected
as they provide the means of computing the return on investment
required for the computation of beta in the -first place and the for
carrying out various efficiency tests in the second place. As it
turns out, it proves to be possible to assemble a most accurate
collection on the CC and DC types of data. The CC and CD types of
data prove to be slightly more difficult but in the event, a very
great percentage of the data collected appears to be very accurate as
well. The collection of earnings data, primarily for deriving the
Earnings Per Share information required for Earnings Forecast Error
(EFE) tests to be described in Chapter Eight, proves to be less
tractable. There are several serious problems which make the
collection of data incomplete. These problems will be elaborated in
Section 6.4.5. The rest of this section will describe in some detail
how the accounting data in general are collected.
As is usual with this type of data gathering, both the transcription
and keypunching of data are double checked for accuracy. In addition,
data gathering from the above sources follows the general principles
stated below. The reasons for adopting these principles will be
briefly explained later.
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(1) The same piece of information is obtained from two sources where
possible.
(2) Prior investigations are carried out to determine which of the
alternative sources for a piece of information is the most accurate
and that particular source is established as the primary source while
another source(s) is designated as the second source.
(3) Where it proves impossible to obtain a particular piece of
information, an estimate is usually applied.
TWO SOURCES ARE USED For the sake of accuracy, all capitalisation,
dividend and earnings data are obtained from one primary source and
cross checked against a secondary source. Accuracy is especially vital
in information on capitalisation changes where a single error would
affect all subsequent computations. (This class of information is in
fact triple checked for accuracy.)
DETERMINING THE PRIMARY SOURCE FOR EACH TYPE OF INFORMATION
Preliminary investigations are carried out using a small sample of
stocks to determine which of the alternative sources of information
for each type is the most accurate and complete. That source is then
defined as the primary source and where possible all data of that
type is collected from this source. Any missing data would be
gathered from one of the other secondary sources. The data from the
primary source is then cross checked against one or more of the
secondary sources. Where there is disagreement, the data from the
primary source is taken as the correct one unless experience shows
that that particular piece of information may be wrong. Table 6.7
below gives the primary and secondary sources of information for each
of the six types of information as defined previously.
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TAB LE 6. T
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
PRE 1973 POST 1973
PRIMARY SECOND. PRIMARY SECOND.
DATES OF CAPITAL CHANGES GAZETTE N'PAPER BROKERS GAZETTE
LIBRARY LIBRARY
OTHER DATA ON CAPT. CHANGES YEARBOOK ANN. REP. YEARBOOK ANN. REP.
GAZETTE BROKERS
DATES OF DIVIDEND PAYMENTS GAZETTE N'PAPER BROKERS GAZETTE
LIBRARY LIBRARY
OTHER DATA ON DIV. PAYMENTS YEARBOOK ANN. REP. YEARBOOK ANN. REP.
GAZETTE GAZETTE
DATES OF EARNINGS ANNOUN'T
(INTERIM) NONE AS DIV (LIBRARY
(FINAL) AS DIV. GAZETTE (N'PAPER
LIBRARY
OTHER EARNINGS DATA (INTERIM) NONE GAZETTE LIBRARY
(FINAL) YEARBOOK GAZETTE YEARBOOK G>fYZ.ET\E.
ANN. REP. ANN. REP.
MISSING DATA REPLACED BY ESTIMATES Certain pieces of data (apart
from those connected with earnings announcements to be discussed
later), particularly for the earlier years of the research period,
prove to be very elusive. Most of these are in connection with
dividend announcement dates and dates connected with internal
capitalisation changes. In these cases, estimates have to be
applied. In the former cases, however, as most companies do attempt to
make their dividend announcements close to the same date every year,
the use of estimates in these instances would not lead to gross
errors. In all cases where the missing data have been replaced by an
estimate, a marker is applied to indicate the method of estimating
the missing data.
Exhibit 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 at the end of this chapter show respectively
the information file in respect of Capitalisation Changes, Dividends
and Earnings for one of the sample firms (Boustead Holdings Berhad).
(This particular company is chosen because it gives a reasonably
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complete set of examples of events met by the listed companies).
Explanatory notes are appended beneath the printout of each file in
respect of each piece of data.
6.4.5 - PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN COLLECTING EARNINGS DATA
The earnings information on each of the sample firms is required for
the conducting of the Earnings Forecast Tests. In order to conduct
this test, the Earnings Per Share (EPS)of each of the sample firms is
required for every earnings announcement. To compute the the EPS
figure, one would need the Profit After Tax and the Number of Shares
figures for each announcement. There is little difficulty getting the
latter data as it is already part of the Capitalisation Changes
files. The former figures prove to be very difficult to obtain,
particularly for the earlier years of the research period. The
problem is two fold. Firstly, EPS figures are normally given scant
regard by local investors and hence such information is treated with
little importance by the local publications. Secondly, in respect of
the interim earnings figures, even when they are obtainable, only the
pretax figures are provided.
The first problem leads to the situation whereby it proves almost
impossible to obtain the interim earnings figures for the 1968-1973
period. The Stock Exchange Gazette does not provide these figures
until after 1973. Neither the companies themselves (in their annual
reports), nor the Stock Exchange Yearbook provided this vital
information for the earlier years of the research period. Newspaper
announcements also prove to be extremely patchy. Finally, it had to
be accepted that it would not be possible to have a complete record.
As a result, the interim figures are only recorded in respect of the
post-1973 years. This omission is not as great a handicap as it may
first appear. In carrying out the EFE tests, a certain forecasting
model has to be developed to provide EPS forecast to compare with the
actual EPS and the effect of the forecasting error is studied. The
first six years of data (i.e. those with only the final EPS) are
acceptable for developing the forecasting model since a stable long
term relationship is desired. Once the forecasting model is put into
use however, it is important that a more timely earnings figure is
studied. Of course, at which point (1974), the interim figures are by
then available.
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The second problem leads to the situation whereby it proves impossible
to obtain a complete set of the post-tax interim earnings figures
throughout the research period. There are several reasons for the
existence of this peculiar situation. Firstly, local taxation laws are
such that taxes are paid on an "after the event" basis rather than on
a P.A.Y.E. basis. Thus the tax on the earnings for the company fiscal
year 1984 will only be paid in 1985 even if the financial year end is
in the first half of the 1984 calender year. Thus there is no legal
necessity for corporations to prepare the interim after tax earnings
figures. Secondly, for some unknown reason, local newspapers and stock
exchange publications always quote earnings on a before tax basis.
Until about ten years ago, even the published EPS figures in the
Weekly Sharemarket Report were on a pretax basis in defiance of the
Western convention. Until today, dividend yield is still quoted on a
gross basis. All headlines connected with corporate earnings
announcements deal with the pretax profit. Thirdly, the concept of EPS
is still alien to a very large segment of the investing public and
as a result, corporations do not published the EPS figures
automatically as part of the earnings announcement as they do in the
West.
Given the near impossibility of obtaining the post-tax interim
figures, the EPS figures derived for use in the EFE tests are the
pretax EPS figures. While this may seem peculiar at first glance,
this unconventional move is not illogical in view of the local
situation. If the EPS information is at all used by the investors to
price stocks, the figure they use would be that which is
conventionally available. Since the figures available are the pretax
figures, it is these figures which are likely to be used.
CHAPTER SIX — PART II
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THE INITIAL OUTPUTS OF THE RESEARCH
6.5 — The Capitalisation CHeunge
Adjustment Factors
Since the time of Fisher and Lorie (1964, 1968 and 1970), the
algorithm of adjusting for the change in the number of shares held
owing to alterations in the capitalisation of the company appears to
have become reasonably standardised. However, when working on this
project, this researcher came across several problems in this area
which do not appear to have been adequately addressed in earlier
works. In trying to carry out some of the first tasks of this
project, this researcher has to formulate some answers to these
questions himself.
6.5.1 - THE PROBLEM OF "INTERNAL" AND "EXTERNAL" CAPITALISATION
The number of shares outstanding of a company can change in one of
two possible ways. First, the number of shares can be changed by what
may be termed "internally generated events" such as bonus, rights or
reverse split. In such events, the percentage ownership of the
company in the hand of the existing shareholders does not change
although the number of shares owned by each would alter. These
capitalisation change events are termed throughout this dissertation
as "internal capitalisation change events". The second way by which
the number of shares in a company can change is through what may be
termed "externally generated events" such as share swaps, conversion
of debt instruments and issual of new shares to a third party. In
this case, the number of shares held by the existing shareholders
remains the same although their percentage ownership of the company
would have changed. There is also a possible third way which can be
viewed as a combination of the first two. There are the occasional
instances when a company split itself into two components by
issuing to the pre-existing shareholders two classes of new shares in
exchange for their old holdings. In this case, depending on how the
individual shareholders deal with the new situation, the event can be
looked upon as "internal" or "external" or both. If the shareholders
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hold on to both classes of shares, the event may be thought of as an
internal one. If they sell out one class of shares and either buy the
other class of shares or use the money for some other purpose, it can
be thought of as both an internal as well as external event. The
computations required to adjust for these two different events are
quite different.
In the computing of the return a shareholder gets from investing in a
company's shares, the events of importance are the internal events.
As far as the pre-existing shareholders are concerned, the external
events have no immediate direct effect on their holdings. (There would
be other longer term indirect effects such as earnings dilution but
these do not concern us in the study of the ex-post return on
investment.) Therefore, in the computation of return on investment,
the internal capitalisation change adjustment factor (known as '.M'
throughout this dissertation) is used. The computation of M for bonus
issues, stock splits or reverse splits is clearcut enough and it
should not give rise to any controversy. The computation of M to
account for rights issues will be discussed in greater detail in
Section 6.5.2
The differentiation between internal and external capitalisation
changes adopted by this study also has a part to play in the
computation of the market return required for the estimation of
betas. The normal convention to compute market return is to weight
the return on the sampled firms by the number of shares outstanding
multiplied by the market price. In adopting this approach, a
modification to the commonly accepted method of computing market,
return is necessary. In a market where there has been a great deal of
external capitalisation changes (e.g. Malaysia), the use of the total
number of outstanding shares as a weighting factor would bias the
market return upwards. In this study therefore, the market return is
computed by assuming that the number of shares of a company
outstanding at any one time is the product of the initial number of
shares and the internal capitalisation adjustment factor (as far as
computations for obtaining market portfolio return are concerned). If
there had been no external capitalisation changes since the beginning
of the research period, this number would be the same as the actual
number of shares outstanding. Otherwise, it would be less under most
circumstances.
For checking purposes, the external capitalisation adjustment factor
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(known throughout this thesis as "N") is also computed. The
relationship between M, N and the number of shares of a company
outstanding at a given time is given by the equation:-
S = I X M X N
Where : S = Actual Number of Shares Outstanding
I = Number of shares outstanding at start of research period
or at first listing
M = Internal Capitalisation Adjustment Factor
N = External Capitalisation Adjustment factor
If M and N have been computed correctly, the calculated S at anyone
time should be the same as the actual S and this provides an
important countercheck of the accuracy of the work carried out.
This is perhaps the right place to explain the algorithm employed in
this project to adjust for the cases where the sample firm chose to
split itself into its Malaysian component and its Singaporean
component by issuing two classes of shares to its pre-existing
shareholders. The method employed here is slightly different from
that employed by Fisher and Lorie because of the non-existence of
capital gains tax in Malaysia. In these cases, it is assumed that
the Malaysian shareholders (who are the investors being studied)
would sell out their allocation of Singaporean class of shares and
use the proceeds to buy Malaysian class shares to the same value. The
valuation date is the first day on which both classes of shares are
listed. In these instances, the N for the stocks involved would drop
below 1.00. This is only to be expected since there is a reduction in
the number of shares in the hand of "outsiders".
6.5.2 - THE PROBLEM OF ADJUSTING FOR RIGHTS
Malaysian companies have a very strong tendency to make rights issues.
One third of the sample companies have made one or more rights issues
during the research period. Among those which have made rights issues,
most of them have made more than one. This tendency to make rights
issues can be partly explained by the fact that many of the listed
companies are extremely fast growing and partly by the fact that
local investors do not regard rights issues as being potentially
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dilutive. This has been remarked upon by the Far Eastern Economic
Review (Section 2.8). In addition, unlike rights issues of the
West, local rights issues are usually made at a considerable
discount to the market price which makes rights issues similar to
bonus issues to some extent. As a result of these two factors, almost
all rights issues are fully taken up. It is rare for the underwriters
to have to take up any remainder.
Given such a situation, the method of adjusting for rights described
by Fisher and Lorie (op cit) may not be the best choice. Briefly,
Fisher and Lorie's algorithm assumes that the shareholders do not
incur extra investment in the taking up of a rights issue. Their
method assumes that a portion of the rights is sold off such that the
sales of the rights balances exactly the payment for the rest of the
rights. Fisher and Lorie's method assumes in effect an "open" system
whereby there exists other investors who will "bail out" the existing
shareholders in the event of a rights issue.
In consideration of the investment environment, it is felt that it is
better to assume a "closed" system whereby the existing shareholders
have to pay for the additional cost incurred in taking up rights. The
cost of rights is therefore included as a "negative dividend" in the
computation of the stock return. This negative return has to be
"paid for" out of ftiture capital gain or dividend return. This method
of adjusting for rights meshes in well with the adopted method of
computing stock return which will be discussed in the next section.
The adoption of this method of adjusting for rights, however, gives
rise to a problem when conducting two of the efficiency tests - the
Dividend Growth Test and the Earnings Forecast Error Test. The
problem arises because these tests require the computation of the
Dividend Per Share and Earnings Per Share over a long period of time
in order to fit a model to describe the growth of each. Over such a
long period, the DPS and EPS have to adjusted for capitalisation
changes undergone by the companies. The use of M to adjust for the
DPS or EPS to reflect the increase in the number of shares held by
the shareholders would result in an upward bias of the "true" DPS
and EPS figures in the case of companies which have made rights
issues. The upward bias is caused by the fact that the M in themselves
do not reflect the cost of rights, unlike the case of computation of
stock return whereby the cost of rights is taken into account by the
negative dividend. In the former cases, a different adjustment factor
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which does take into account the cost of rights has to be used. A
different capitalisation adjustment factor which is termed "RM" (based
on the Fisher and Lorie method) is therefore computed for those
companies which had made rights issues. This is why in Exhibit 6.1
(the example of Capitalisation file), there are three different
capitalisation adjustment factors - M, N and RM. RM is the
capitalisation adjustment factor which is used for computing the
adjusted DPS and EPS required for the efficiency tests.
6.6 — Computation Of
Return on In-vestment
(A) INDIVIDUAL STOCK RETURN
Once the M and the dividend payment stream in respect of each company
in the database have b^en computed, it is then possible to move on to
the computation of stock returns. This research follows the normal
convention for the great majority of stockmarket research whereby
the return on investment is computed in terms of total wealth at
the end of the holding period compared with the beginning of the
holding period. As has been previously explained, the use of return
relative instead of percentage return enables one to derive the
logarithm of the return relative which is symmetrical about wealth
ratio of 1.00 while percentage return would result in a skewed
distribution.
There are some differences in the way capital gains and income taxes
are computed in Malaysia. As a result, there are several differences
in the computation of return on investment. There is no capital gains
tax in Malaysia, hence in the current study no allowance for capital
gains tax is necessary. A 40% withholding tax is applied to dividend
payments (except for tax exempt dividends). Individual taxpayers may
then apply to have the withholding tax use a tax credit to offset
total income tax due. Dividend is therefore in effect taxed at the
individual's marginal rate of taxation (ll%-55% for private
individuals). Corporations, pension funds and other institutions are
taxed at 40%. For this study, dividend is assumed to be taxed at 40%.
Certain dividends are tax exempted for various reasons and where this
takes place, no tax is assumed.
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Where : P - Adjusted Price of the ith stock
D = Adjusted Dividend of the ith stock received during holding
period
In turn the Adjusted Price and the Adjusted Dividend are obtained
respectively from the following equations:-
P. = p. x M.
it *it it
D. = d. x M.
it it it
Where : M - Internal Capitlisation Adjustment Factor
p = Unadjusted Price of the ith stock
d = Unadjusted Dividend of the ith stock received during
holding period
For this study, the holding period is assumed to be the same as the
sampling interval - one week. The assumption of such a short holding
period has the advantage of not having to impute dividend
re-investment return. The returns for longer holding periods are
computed from the weekly return relative assuming continuous
compounding with dividend re-investment in the same stock. This is
all in line with the time-tested technique and should not give rise
to any controversy.
From the simple return relative, the natural logarithm of the return
relative, LN(Rl, can be computed. The residual return, RR, can then be
computed from the l.N(R) by making use of the Alfa and Beta which are
estimated from the regressi pn performed on the individual LN(R) on
the natural logarithm of the market return relative. This process
will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.
(B) MARKET RETURN
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The algorithm for computing the market return follows closely from
the algorithm for computing individual stock return. The following




E s. x (p. + d. )
•
j 10 it it
n
£ s. x p. ,
i=] 10
Where : P Adjusted Price of the ith stock in the sample
D = Adjusted Dividend received of the ith stock during holding
period
S - No. of Shares outstanding as previously defined
There is one point of note in the computation of the Market Return.
Owing to the fact that the market portfolio is rebalanced every year,
the market return for the weeks of one year is based on a different
portfolio than the previous and the subsequent year. As a result,
there is a discontinuity in the computation of the market return if a
52-week "year" is assumed for each of the market portfolios. Instead
a 53-week year (with one week's overlap between 'years') is invoked
so as to obtain returns for 52 weeks. Arising from this decision, it
is .also decided that a "standard" 52-week year is used rather than
the Gregorian 52.125-week year. As a result, the research period is
two weeks shorter than the actual calender period.
05 . 7 — Computation o -f Different Betas
Araci Selection of Beta to TJ«3o
6.7.1 - THE PROBLEMS OF CHOICE IN THE METHODOLOGY
OF ADJUSTING FOR MARKET EFFECT IN STOCK RETURN
The use of CAPM to adjust securities return for market effect will
require the researcher to make three major choices as to the methods
to employ before arriving at the computed return residual, viz:-
(1) Which model of CAPM to use;
(2) Which method of computing beta; and
(3) Which method of adjusting for market effect.
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The question of which model of CAPM to use has been discussed at
length in Chapter Five and hence will not be repeated here. It
suffices to say that this study decides to employ Sharp's Market
Model as the model of CAPM.
The question of which of the three commonly used methods of computing
return residual, CAR, API and PPI to use is perhaps not very important
as it has been shown by Brown (1978) that all three methods produce
very similar result. This project will use the CAR method, partly
because it seems to the most widely used method and partly because
its algorithm is said by Brown to be the most conservative.
The second of the three choices above is the one which mainly
concerns us at this point. Traditionally, beta is computed simply by
regressing individual stock returns on market returns over a long
period of time. However, as the holding period gets shorter, the
problem of infrequent trading becomes more severe. Infrequent trading
gives rise to the problem of low apparant beta and low coefficient of
determination (Dimson (1979)). As a result, an additional step has to
be employed in order to overcome the the problem of infrequent
trading. Since this project employs weekly sampling interval, it is
expected that infrequent trading is likely to be a problem. As a
result, a decision has to be made as to how best to tackle the
problem of low trading.
Several methods for overcoming this problem has been proposed. Of
these the better known methods are as suggested by Dimson (1979),
Scholes and Willaims (1977) and several others discussed in Dimson.
The merit of Dimnson's AC method is discussed at length in Dimson. It
appears to this researcher that the superiority of Dimson's method is
real and it has been accepted by other workers in this field as well
(e.g. Reinganum(1982)). This project therefore will use Dimson's AC
method to provide an alternative method to simple regression for
computing individual stock betas. The next subsection will discuss
the differences in the regression results between simple regression
and Dimson's AC regression.
The alfa and beta for each stock are estimated from three years'
moving regressions of individual stock returns on market returns
although this writer is aware that traditionally much longer period
is typically used. (Ball (1972) uses 100 months, Mandelker (1974)
uses 60 months). A three year moving regression is chosen as a
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compromise between long term regression as is commonly used in the
West and the realisation that the stability of betas under local
market conditions (as with the Western markets) is very poor. An
excessively long period for regression will not give a good estimate
of the "real" beta as pointed out by Bar-Yosef and Brown (1977). A
short period for regression will lead to excessive fluctuation in the
computed results. It is thought that three years provide a
reasonable mid point between the two conflicting requirements.
6.7.2 - COMPARISON BETWEEN SIMPLE REGRESSION AND DIMSON'S
AC REGRESSION FOR COMPUTING STOCK BETAS
In this section, two important characteristics of the regressions
will be examined - the frequency distributions of the computed betas
and of the coefficient of determination for the regression. Table
6.8 provides the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentiles and the
median of the beta frequency distributions for each of the blocks of
regression carried out (14 regressions are carried out using blocks
of three years starting in 1970) in respect of the simple
regression and the AC regression. Table 6.9 provides the 20th, 40th,
60th, and 80th percentiles and the median of the frequency
distribution of the coefficients of determination for the same
computations.
(A)THE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE BETAS
There are several points of note from this distribution. Firstly, it
is clear that the simple regression gives a beta distribution that is
far too low. The grand mean of the distributions is only 0.79 while
it should theoretically be 1.00. It is therefore likely that
infrequent trading has some influence in producing this result.
Secondly, it is clear that Dimson's AC method produces a much higher
distribution for the betas than simple regression. But the grand mean
of the beta distribution is still apparently low at 0.89. An
explanation will be provided later as to why it is not 1.00.
Thirdly, it is fairly obvious that even using three year moving
regressions, there is still considerable instability in the computed
betas. The value of the median beta can change by 10-12% from one year
to the next. However, it is noticeable that the mean beta seldom
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rises above 1.00 (only 1 out of 14 sets of regressions).
Considering that the betas for two adjacent regressions are computed
with two common years of data, this instability is doubly surprising.
It is not possible to offer a formal explanation as to why this
should be so. From available evidence it seems that the less
knowledgeable and speculative investors are far more likely to enter
the market during the "bull market" phases and that their choice of
investment may be more eclectic compared with the knowledgeable
investors who seems to stay with the large companies. As a result,
during the bull markets, the smaller capitalisation stocks' whose
betas are greater tend to move up more in value, thus taking mean
beta closer to 1.00.
Fourthly, it. is also discernible that over the 14 blocks of regression
carried out, there is a tendency for the two distributions to become
closer, especially at the lower end of the distribution. This is
probably a sign that infrequent trading becomes less of a problem as
the market matures.
(B)THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE COEFFICIENTS OF DETERMINATION
Similar comments can be made about the comparison between the
frequency distribution of the coefficient of determination for
simple versus AC regression. It is obvious that AC regressions
produce higher coefficients of determination than the simple
regressions. The grand mean is 0.3498 as against 0.2800, or 7%
higher. Also, for both kind of regressions, the variability of the
coefficients is very high reflecting the highly unstable nature of
the stockmarket. For AC regression, the median coefficient can be as
high as 0.4550 (1975) to as low as 0.2376 (1971). Lastly, there is
some indications that the coefficients of determination are becoming
greater over the years. Again, this reflects the increasing maturity
of the Malaysian market.
(C) EXPLANATION FOR THE LOW COMPUTED MEAN BETA
The beta for the individual stock is obtained by regressing the
individual stock returns on the overall market returns. The market
returns are computed from a representative market portfolio with
market value weighting. If the distribution of the beta is
independent of market capitalisation, the resultant beta distribution
should have a mean value of about 1.00. But as previously mentioned,
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there is reason to believe that in Malaysia, the stocks of large
companies have higher betas than small companies even after adjusting
for infrequent trading. If the mean beta is computed using market
value weighting instead of equal weighting, there is reason to
believe that the resultant mean would have a value close to 1.00.
As proof of this conjecture, this exercise is carried out for the AC
beta frequency distribution for the year 1977. The resultant mean
market value weighted beta has a value of 1.006 while the equal
weighted mean - is 0.79. The same computation is carried on the
frequency distribution of the simple beta for the same year and this
produces a figure of 0.97 as against the equal weighted mean of 0.75.
It is therefore clear that there is a sound reason for this unusual
result. A further peice of evidence can be seen by computing the
mean market value for the five quintiles of the frequency
distribution of the AC betas for the same year. The result can be
seen below:-
Quintile Mean Market Value of
Of AC Betas Companies Within Each
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the betas computed
using Dimson's AC method are far superior to the betas computed using
simple regression. It is therefore decided that this method should be












DISTRIBUTION OF COMPUTED BETAS
PERCENTILE
20 40 50 60 80 MEAN
1970 SIMPLE 0.36 0.84 0.95 1.05 1.29 0.87
AC 0.65 0.84 1.06 1.15 1.43 1.04
1971 SIMPLE 0.51 0.75 0.88 1.00 CD 0.85
AC 0.68 0.89 0.95 1.03 1.28 0.98
1972 SIMPLE 0.35 0.55 0.60 0.67 0.87 0.63
AC 0.38 0.65 0.82 0.88 1.13 0.81
1973 SIMPLE 0.50 0.66 0.78 0.86 1.00 0.74
AC 0.63 0.84 0.89 0.99 1.12 0.87
1974 SIMPLE 0.37 0.67 0.75 0.80 1.02 0.72
AC 0.63 0.82 0.90 0.92 1.13 0.87
1975 SIMPLE 0.42 0.68 0.72 0.91 1.12 0.78
AC 0.48 0.78 0.90 0.99 1.20 0.85
1976 SIMPLE 0.25 0.55 0.67 0.84 1.26 0.75
AC 0.24 0.71 0.78 0.86 1.18 0.76
1977 SIMPLE 0.30 0.56 0.69 0.80 1.26 0.75
AC 0.30 0.69 0.78 0.97 1.24 0.79
1978 " SIMPLE 0.45 0.65 0.73 0.86 1.15 0.78
AC 0.51 0.72 0.79 0.90 1.18 0.82
1979 SIMPLE 0.55 0.71 0.85 0.92 1.13 0.81
AC 0.61 0.80 0.84 0.90 1.07 0.80
1980 SIMPLE 0.48 0.80 0.91 1.00 1.13 0.85
AC 0.61 0.82 0.95 1.08 1.25 0.92
1981 SIMPLE 0.44 0.73 0.83 1.00 1.19 0.85
AC 0.55 0.80 0.91 1.02 1.34 0.97
1982 SIMPLE 0.49 0.71 0.90 0.95 1.26 0.86
AC 0.62 0.84 1.00 1.06 1.31 1.00
1983 SIMPLE 0.48 0.69 0.84 0.96 1.27 0.83
AC 0.56 0.86 0.93 1.00 1.31 0.94
MEAN SIMPLE 0.43 0.68 0.76 0.90 1.15 0.79
AC 0.56 0.79 0.89 0.98 1.23 0.89
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AN EXTRACT FROM CAPITALISATION FILES - BOUSTEAD HOLDINGS BHD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (toV AU.
AHN'T ANN'T EX EX M N RM CAPT'N CHANGE COST OF NO. OF MARK!
PERIOD DATE PERIOD DATE AMOUNT TYPE RIGHTS SHARES
810 070568 812 240568 1.4 1.0 1.4 2/5 B - 7000 -
966 040571 968 190571 2.0 1.0 1.8438 3/7 R 0.2142 10000 -
1016 190472 1020 190572 2.4 1.0 2.2213 1/5 B - 12000 -
1070 040573 1072 180573 3.0 1.0 2.7657 1/4 B - 15000 -
- - 1133 150774 3.0 1.0061 2.7657 - SI - 15091 -
- - 1200" 311075 4.569 0.6606 4.2122 - SO - 15091 3 1
- - 1259 161276 4.569 0.666 4.2122 - SI - 15230 1 1
- - 1259 161276 4.569 0.9192 4.2122 - SI - 21000 1 1
1265 260177 1266 310177 9.138 0.9192 8.4243 1/1 B - 42000 -
1332 080578 1333 160578 10.052 0.9192 9.2667 1/10 B - 46100 -
1430 270380 1439 290580 13.402 0.9192 12.3556 1/3 B - 61600 -
1493 120631 1500 310781 17.869 0.9192 15.4441 1/3 R 0.6667 82133 -
1493 120681 1507 140981 26.803 0.9192 23.1662 1/2 B - 123200 -
- - 1568 151182 26.803 1.0642 23.1662 - SI - 142625 3
1621
'
191183 - 080384 26.803 1.1067 23.1622 - A - 148315 -
totes On the Variable in each Column:
(1) Announcement Period : Each week during the research period is given a code number and the date of the event,
given the corresponding period code.
(2) Announcement. Date : Self explanatory
(3) Ex Period : Self explanatory
(4) Ex Date : Self Explanatory
(5) H : The internal capitalisation change adjustment- factor
(6) N : The external capitalisation change adjustment factor
(7) R!i : The internal capitalisation change adjustment factor which takes into account, the cost of rights
(8) Capitalisation Amount. : The quantum of the capitalisation change. "1/X" stands for "One for X"
(9) Capitalisation Type : The type of capitalisation change undergone. E.g. B = Bonus and R ^ Rights
(10) Cost of Rights : The cost of rights per share held in term of Malaysian currency
(11) to. Of Shares : to of shares outstanding in millions
(12) Markers .- Markers to indicate source and accuracy of data or type of estimate
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EXHIBIT e. . 2
AN EXTRACT FROM THE DIVIDEND FILES -BOUSTEAD HOLDINGS BHD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
ANN'T ANN'T EX EX PAY'T PAY'T DIV'D DIV'D DENOH FISCAL 12-MONTH
PERIOD DATE PERIOD DATE PERIOD DATE PER SH TYPE YEAR DIVIDEND
814 070668 816 160668 818 290668 0.15 F/T M 1267 0.12 ■
846 160169 848 300169 850 080269 0.05 I/I M 1268 0.09
865 290569 868 140669 870 300669 0.10 F/T M 1268 0.09
897 070170 899 230170 901 020270 0.05 I/T M 1269 0.09
916 210570 920 170670 922 290670 0.10 F/T M 1269 0.09
949 070171 951 220171 953 010271 0.05 I/T M 1270 0.09
966, 040571 968 180571 970 010671 0.10 F/T M 1270 0.09
1002 100172 1003 200172 1005 310172 0.05 I/T M 1271 0.09
1016 190472 1020 170572 1022 010672 0.10 F/T H 1271 0.09
1053 050173 1054 080173 1057 010273 0.05 I/T M 1272 0.09
1070 020573 1076 140673 1080 090773 0.10 F/T M 1272 0.09
1101 051273 1103 211273 1106 110174 0.075 I/T H 1273 0.105
1121 220474 1122 030574 1127 010674 0.125 F/T M 1273 0.12
1154 _ 101274 1155 191274 1159 110175 0.075 I/T M 1274 0.12
1173 240475 1177 190575 1180 090675 0.125 F/T M 1274 0.12
1208 221275 1209 291275 1211 160176 0.075 I/T M 1275 0.12
1226 280476 1228 100576 1231 030676 0.125 F/'T M 1275 0.12
1259 161276 1261 271276 1263 140177 0.075 I/T M 1276 0.12
1279 050577 1281 160577 1284 040677 0.0625 F/T M 1276 0.0825
1309 011277 1310 0-91277 1314 060178 0.0375 I/T M 1277 0.06
1332 080578 1333 160578 1337 100678 0.0625 F/T H 1277 0.06
1361 301178 1363 131278 1367 120179 0.05 I/T M 1278 0.0675
1383 040579 1385 180579 1389 150679 0.075 F/T M 1278 0.075
1413 301179 1415 141279 1419 110180 0.05 I/T M 1279 0.075
1430 270380 1437 160580 1442 160680 0.075 F/T M 1279 0.075
1464 211180 1467 081280 1472 150181 0.05 I/T M 1280 0.075
1486 240481 1491 2-90581 1495 25068,1 0.075 F/T M 1280 0.075
1505 160981 1507 140-981 1524 150182 0.05 I/T M 1281 0.06
1535 310382 1542 210582 1547 250682 0.075 F/T M 1281 0.06
1570 021282 1572 131282 1577 170183 0.025 I/T H 1282 0.06
1591 280483 1595 230583 1600 280683 0.05 F/T M 1282 0.045
1623 071283 - 1233 - 270184 0.0375 I/T M 0684 0.075
Notes on the variable in each column
(1) Announcement Period : Self explanatory
(2) Announcement. Date : Self explanatory
(3) Ex Period : Self explanatory
(4) Ex Date : Self explanatory
(5) Payment. Period : Self explanatory
(6) Payment. Date : Self explanatory
(7) Dividend Per share : The dividend per share in term of currency unit
(8) Dividend Type : Markers to indicate dividend type and tax status
(9) Denomination : The currency which is used for dividend payments
(10) Fiscal Year : The financial period for which trie dividend is made
(11) 12-Month Dividend : This is the dividend in Malaysian currency paid out per share after adjusting for exchange
rate for the previous 12 fiscal months
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EXHIBIT 6.3
AN EXTRACT FROM THE EARNINGS FILES ~ BOUSTEAD HOLDINGS BHD
(1) (2) 1 3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ANN'T ANN'T DIV'D EARN'S DEN0M. FISCAL HALF YR YEAR .ADJ.124
PERIOD DATE STATUS TYPE YEAR PBT PBT PBT
814 070668 1 21 M 1267 - 1800 1800
846 160169 1 11 M 1268 - - -
865 290569 1 21 M 1268 - 1416 1416
897 070170 1 11 M 1269 - - -
916 210570 1 21 M 1269 - 1614 1614
949 070171 1 11 M 1270 - - -
966 040571 1 21, M 1270 - 1777 1777
1002 100172 1 11 M 1271 - - -
1016 190472 1 21 M 1271 - 3105 3105
1053 050173 1 11 M 1272 - - -
1070 020573 1 21 M ' 1272 - 6079 6079
1101 051273 1 11 M 1273 - - -
1121 220474 1 21 M 1273 - 8139 8139
1154 101274 1 11 M 1274 4702 - -
1173 240475 1 21 M 1274 6754 11456 11456,
1208 221275 1 11 M 1275 3655 - 10409
1226 280476 1 21 M 1275 2081 5736 5736
1259 161276 1 11 H 1276 2759 - 4840
1279 050577 1 21 M 1276 5897 8656 8656
1309 011277 1 11 M 1277 6513 - 12410
1332 280578 1 21 • M 1277 8613 15126 15126
1361 301178 1 11 M 1278 6546 - 15159
1383 040579 1 21 M 1278 12106 18652 18652
1413 301179 1 11 M 1279 8704 - 20810
1430 270330 1 21 M 1279 14716 23420 23420
1456 260980 1 11 M 1280 11804 - 26520
1486 220431 1 21 M 1280 12303 24107 24107
1507 160981 1 11 M 1281 8020 - 20323
1535 310382 1 21 M 1281 8125 16145 16145
1570 290982 1 11 M 1282 4018 - 12143
1591 270483 1 21 M 1282 16332 20350 20350
Notes On The Variable In Each Column:
(1) Announcement Period : Self explanatory
(2) Announcement Date : Self explanantory
(3) Dividend Status : Paying concurrent dividend or not
(4) Earnings Type : Markers to indicate earnings type and tax. status
(5) Denomination : currency in which earnings are stated
(6) Fiscal Year : Self explanatory
(7) Half Year Profit. Before Tax : Self explanatory
(8) Year Profit Before Tax : Slef explanatory •




ANALYSTS OF DATA PART I —
EFFICXENCY TESTS XN RESPECT
OF WEAK FORM INFORMATION
T.I. — Introduction to Chapters
Sevon and Eight
As explained in Chapter One, two of the four objectives of this
dissertation are: (1) To carry out tests on the informational
efficiency of the Malaysian market; and (2) To compare the results of
such tests with similar tests on the Western markets (mainly the US
and the British). In order to make such comparisons more meaningful,
a wide range of information will be tested. In the first instance,
the range of information to be tested can be divided along the
traditional weak form and semi-strong types or as they ought to be
known more appropriately as respectively transaction information and
accounting information. Chapter Seven will discuss the methods and
results of the tests conducted on the transaction information and
Chapter Eight will discuss tests conducted on accounting information.
In line with what is stated in the foregoing paragraph, tests will be
conducted on various types of information which have been found to
be reasonably efficiently treated by the Western market using the
schema developed in Chapter One (that is, stage II and III types of
efficiency). Apart from this, the range of information chosen is also
determined by firstly, the necessity to replicate only the better
known and well tested methods of the West, and secondly, by the
availability of information in the database. Based on this, it has
been decided to select the following three types of transaction
information for testing under Malaysian conditions:-
(1) Stock Price Periodicity (Short, Medium and Long Term);
(2) Stock Price Moving Averages; and
(3) Relative Strength.
From past work on the Western markets, we can make certain statements
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about how efficiently these types of information are treated by the
Western stock markets. (The papers on these tests have been previously
discussed in Chapters Three and Four and will be mentioned briefly
later in this chapter.) It is now generally accepted that information
on short term periodicity of the stock prices is very efficiently
treated (stage III) in that it is not possible to uncover any short
term periodicity in stock prices. There is, however, less unanimity
over the medium and long term periodicity although it is generally
accepted that there is not much gain to be exploited there (stage
II). Moving average information appears to be efficiently treated as
well (stage III) as it is not possible to obtain abnormal gain from
trading methods based on moving averages. Finally relative strength
type of information appears to be also efficiently treated (stage
III) for the same reason.
This chapter will describe three sets of tests based on these types of
information performed on the Malaysian stock prices and they will be
discussed in the following sections of this chapter:—
7.2 - Method and results of tests for the periodicity in Malaysian
stock prices;
7.3 - Method and results of moving average tests;
7.4 - Method and results of relative strength tests.
Each of the above sections will be further divided into the following
four subsections for discussion:-
-Background to the tests;
-Test method and sample used;
-Results;
-Conclusion.
However, each of the section may not follow rigidly the above format.
V . 2 — Tests To i~ Periodicity in
Ma 1 ays i em Stocl-c F'c i ccs
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7.2.1 - BACKGROUND TO THE TESTS
The existence of periodicity in economic time series is a subject of
controversy. Stock price series, like other economic time series are
subjected to much argument among researchers in this field and have
been subjected to many tests conducted over the last thirty odd
years. However, much of the testing (until recently) were for the
uncovering of short and medium term cycles in that most of the
tests were serial correlation tests on data lagged by period of six
months or less. This academic emphasis on testing for short term
cycles is in contrast to the belief of the practitioners in the field
of investment. Apart from floor specialists who are in a position to
take advantage of the short term swings as well as not having to pay
commission on their trades, most investors are more interested in
long term cycles. Their interest is based on the very practical
consideration that short term cycles do not allow for adequate
margin to cover transaction costs. If an American trader can make a
consistent 10% per year abnormal gain on his deals (which may be
thought of as a very good margin), he is not likely to be interested
in cycles which are less than six months in length since his
turnaround transaction cost would be about 4X.
There have been many papers on short term auto-correlation tests; the
most wellknown of which is probably Fama (1970). The general
conclusion is that for periods up to one month, there is little
testable autocorrelation. There were, for a time far fewer tests
specifically conducted to examine the longer term periodicity of
stock prices. Of the better known earlier papers are Granger and
Morgernstern (1963) and Allvine and O'neill (1980). While the former
examined the whole of the power spectrum, the latter was more
interested in the four-year cycle. Both papers agreed that there was
a four year cycle but they could not agree on its significance.
Rozeff and Kinney (1976) looked at the cycles up to one year in length
using autocorrelation and both parametric and non-parametric tests and
concluded that there was a significant one year cycle which is in
line with the general belief on Wall Street. A very large number of
tests have been carried out during the early Eighties to test for the
socalled "turn-of-the-year" anomaly. In general, almost all of these
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tests show this effect. However, all attempts so far to provide an
explanation for this anomaly have failed.
Information on the existence of periodicity can be said to be one of
the simplest to uncover and to be applied to stockmarket trading. If
a market shows periodicity of a large amplitude in its stock price
series, it can be said to be a very inefficient one indeed. For it
requires only simple statistical tools to uncover periodicity and the
application of this knowledge to trading cannot be simpler.
7.2.2 - TEST METHOD AND SAMPLE
The test method is relatively straightforward and follows closely the
methodology of the past tests. The past auto-correlation and spectral
analysis tests had generally used the first difference in the price
series while Allvine and O'neill employed a periodic trading strategy
as well. The use of the first difference in the price series has two
defects. Firstly, the use of the price alone does not take into
account dividend return. The ex-dividend effect alone could
conceivably introduce a cycle in line with the frequency of dividend
payments (typically twice a year in Malaysia). Secondly, with the
tests being carried out on a body of data covering a long period of
time, the first difference itself is non-stationary. For these
reasons therefore, the current series of auto-correlation tests will
be conducted on the logarithm of the return relatives which is a
stationary series.
A serial correlation programme developed by the Department of
Business Studies of the University of Edinburgh is used for examining
the return series. The individual return series are examined for
auto-correlation for short, medium and long terms. Two series of
tests are run, one using the weekly return relatives and the other
the monthly return relatives. In addition, the market return series
is also tested. The reason for testing the monthly return relatives
as well as weekly return relatives is that it is thought that for
longer differencing periods (one year or more), the weekly return may
be too fine a measure of human behavior (Rozeff and Kinney used one
month return relatives in their study of longer term cycles). The
following lags are tested:-








200-216 Weeks 204-216 Weeks
The choice of lags to be tested reflects the past work carried out
and the "obvious" nodes in terms of time ( such as 13 and 26 weeks)
which are commonly mentioned in technical publications. The monthly
auto-correlation tests are carried out using overlapping periods.
The sample is based on all the stocks in the database irrespective of
listing history since equal emphasis is being given to short as well
as long term cycles. In addition, the same tests are carried out
using the aggregated market return relative series. At first glance
the large number of stocks in the sample may be thought of as
providing a robust test for serial dependence but stocks in the same
market are seldom completely mutually independent in their
movements. However, given the fact that the stocks of different
market sectors tend to conform to different cycles (this can be
partly seen by examining the sector indices) and the fact that the
market factor only has low power of determination on individual
Malaysian stock prices ( the median coefficient of determination of
the stock return against the market return being only 0.35), the
individual stock price series have greater independence than stocks
of the Western markets. A sample of nearly 80 stocks over such a
long timespan should provide a reasonably powerful test of the
periodicity if it exists.
7.2.3 - RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
(A) THE WEEKLY RETURN SERIES
In all, 49 runs of the auto-correlation test are carried out on each
of the 79 (78 stock series and one market series) return relative
series available. The results are obviously far too voluminous to be
reported fully here. They are summarised in the form of the
frequency distribution of the correlation coefficients for each of
the lags tested for those differencing periods which have the
greatest degree of dependence. In addition, the standard errors in
respect of these lags are also shown and the number of sample stocks
whose correlation coefficients exceed twice the standard error is
indicated. This summary is shown below as Table 7.2.1.
As these tests do not duplicate exactly past tests in terms of
differencing intervals, the results of these tests can only be
compared in parts to the results of previous tests. There are two
important parts to the results;the behavior of the individual stock
return series and the behavior of the market in aggregate. These two
parts will be discussed separately.
INDIVIDUAL STOCK RETURN SERIES As Levy remarked in his paper
(1967), auto-correlation tests suffer from the defect that it is very
difficult to determine what is the size of correlation coefficient
which can be deemed to show a significant degree of dependence in the
price series. The classical test of the degree of dependence hinges
on the assumption of normality which may not be tenable in this
instant. In addition therefore, the preponderance of correlation
coefficient in the same direction for each lag is also considered. A
situation in which the correlation coefficients are evenly spread
with a few stocks demonstrating a high correlation coefficient is
probably less indicative of non-random behavior than a situation in
which a large majority of stocks tested demonstrating tightly packed
correlation coefficients. For this reason, both the number of cases
which has a correlation coefficient which is greater than twice its
standard errors, the frequency distribution of the correlation
coefficient and the number of stocks which have a positive
correlation coefficient are provided in Table 7.2.1A.
On an absolute basis, we can say that the weekly return relatives
show little serial correlation over the whole spectrum of time lags
tested. Even among the lags which demonstrate the greatest degree of
dependence (i.e. those selected for Table 7.1), the average number of
cases per lag which has a correlation coefficient which is greater
than twice their respective standard error is only 5.5 and the
maximum is only 8. In terms of the actual value of coefficients, in
only three cases do more than 10% of the stocks show a correlation
coefficient of greater than 0.10. There are only weak indications of
dependence surrounding the traditional technicians' nodes of
4,8,13,26, 52 ( actually strongest at around 50 weeks) and 208 weeks.
Compared with Fama (1970) who tested the autocorrelation over 1, 4, 9
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TABLE 7.2.1
SUMMARY OF THE AUTO-CORRELATION TESTS ON WEEKLY RETURN
RELATIVES DISTRIBUTION OF THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
(A) FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
LAG FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
IN OF THE CORR. COEFFICIENTS
WEEKS <-0.10 -0.099/ -0.049- 0/ 0.05/ >0.1(
-0.05 -0.001 0.049 0.099
1 10 11 17 24 11 4
2 2 8 17 28 15 7
3 1 2 17 26 22 9
4 0 2 19 36 19 1
7 2 14 28 18 8 1
8 0 2 22 34 14 5
9 2 7 35 23 7 3
10 2 18 30 22 5 0
11 0 14 30 31 2 0
12 2 16 42 16 1 0
13 4 16 39 16 2 0
14 0 6 41 25 4 0
26 3
'
9 38 23 4 0
50 1 3 22 28 16 4
TABLE 7.2.1(contd)
(B) OTHER RESULTS OF AUTOCORRELATION TESTS
LAG STANDARD NO OF NO OF C.COEFF
IN ERROR CASES > + VE FOR MKT
WEEKS 2 X SE r RETURN
I .0950 4 39 0.1796*
2 .0569 4 50 0.1058*
3 .0589 8 57 0.1284*
4 .0400 7 56 0.0926*
7 .0459 4 27 -0.0269
b .0432 8 53 0.0962*
9 .0452 6 33 -0.0106
10 .0424 3 27 -0.0598
11 .0390 6 33 -0.0419
12 .0359 6 17 -0.0484
13 .0397 7 18 -0.0776
14 .0306 4 29 -0.0476
26 .0392 5 27 -0.0827*
50 .0559 3 48 0.0970*
*Corr. coefficient of market. return exceeds 2X its Standard Error
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and 16 days, the current series of test show very similar result.
Taking the 9 and 16 day auto-correlation as the closest to 1 and 2
week auto-correlations performed here, the percentages of cases which
demonstrate a correlation coefficient of greater than two times
standard error are respectively 5.1% and 5.1% as against 6.7% and
3.3% in Fama's case.
When all the stock returns are considered together, there is slightly
stronger evidence in support of the belief that stocks show periodic
movements. There is some evidence of non-randomness at lags of
4 weeks, 8 weeks, 27 weeks and 50 weeks. The positive cycle of 8
weeks is particularly interesting since it is bracketed by weeks with
minimal appearance of non-randomness. While there is no logical
economic explanation on why stock return series should demonstrate
such non-random behavior, to a weak extent, the evidence lends
support to the "random walk with reflecting barrier" type of stock
behavior proposed by Cootner.
OVERALL BEHAVIOR OF THE MARKET The results on the overall market
behavior provide more interesting reading. They show fairly clearly
at what are the lags are at which a great majority of the stock
return series to show some tendency to move together. Based on the
market return, it would appear that there is some tendency for
stocks to move together over 1 to 4 weeks (correlation coefficienct
respectively 0.1796, 0.1058, 0.1284 and 0.0926 all of which exceed
two times the standard error). Over the longer term, there appears
some tendency for stock returns to move together at 8, 26 and 50
weeks lag (correlation coefficient respectively 0.0926, -.0827 and
0.0970 all of which again exceed two times thesfa^dard error).
(B) THE MONTHLY RETURN SERIES
The auto-correlation tests performed on the weekly return relatives
do not produce strong evidence in support of non-randomness. A
possible reason is that the weekly returns may be too fine a measure
to examine human activities. It is doubtful that cycles in the
stockmarket occur at very precise intervals. This statement would
seem to be even more applicable when the very long cycles are
considered. Thus when Rozeff and Kinney (1976) tested for the yearly
cycle, they used monthly return instead of weekly return. It is
therefore decided to replicate the tests using monthly return
relatives.
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In all 42 runs of the autocorrelation tests are performed on each of
the 79 return series. Again, the results are too voluminous to be
reproduced fully here and they are summarised as Table 7.2.2 which is
shown below.
The second series of tests produce more interesting results. Using
monthly returns, it appears that the stockmarket does have a more
significant tendency to cyclical movements surrounding the nodal
points of one month, one quarter and one year. The significance of
such cyclicalities will be discussed separately under each of these
lags. The degree of non-independence obtained will be compared with
those obtained by Rozeff and Kinney.
MONTHLY CYCLE There appears to be some evidence in support of the
contention that there exists a cycle of between four and six weeks
in length for some of the Malaysian stocks. Between 52 to 58 out
of 78 stocks have positive auto-correlation coefficient and between 6
to 13 of these stocks exhibits a correlation coefficient which is
twice greater their standard errors. However, this tendency rapidly
dissipates as the differencing interval increases further such that
with an lag interval of 8 weeks, there are only 3 stocks out of 78
which exhibit a correlation coefficient which is greater than two
times standard error. This appears to imply that that there is some
tendency for the return of two consecutive months to be correlated.
Rozeff and Kinney found a similar tendency for market returns in
their test. Of the six sub-samples tested, four show a correlation
coefficient which is greater than two times their standard errors and
the other two show correlations which are just on the verge of being
significant. The current test shows an even greater tendency to a
monthly cycle in market return (correlation coefficient being 0.233)
than the sample tested by Rozeff and Kinney ( average of about 0.19).
QUARTERLY CYCLE At the differencing interval of 12 weeks, there
again exists some tendency for auto-correlation, although such
correlation is largely negative. For the lag intervals of 11, 12 and
13 weeks, the respective number of stocks which exhibits positive
correlation coefficient is only 14, 9 and 11. The number of stocks
which exhibit correlation coefficient which is twice larger than its
standard error are respectively 6, 10 and 6. Thus there appears to
be some tendency for stocks to show a degree of price reversal at
TABLE 7.2.2 223
SUMMARY OF THE AUTO-CORRELATION TESTS ON MONTHLY RETURN
RELATIVES DISTRIBUTION OF THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
(A) FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENCTS
LAG FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
IN OF THE CORR. COEFFICIENTS
WEEKS <-0.10 -0.099/ -0.049/ 0/ 0.05/ >0.1C
-0.05 •—1<OOO1 0.049 0. 099
4 6 5 y 14 11 33
5 1 3 14 16 17 26
6 O<1 4 19 28 10 14
7 3 9 17 31 11 6
y 3 12 21 24 12 5
9 5 19 30 11 8 4
10 12 28 14 14 6 3
11 19 23 21 7 6 1
12 23 23 20 7 3 1
13 21 21 22 9 2 2
14 11 19 24 16 6 1
15 11 9 25 19 10 3
24 2 14 20 21 16 4
25 7 22 20 14 13 1
26 9 23 19 16 9 1
27 6 27 23 13 6 0t-
50 2 2 13 25 13 22
51 OA 8 8 21 18 20
52 4 8 12 23 18 12
53 5 9 22 23 13 4
54 6 13 25 22 7 3
55 8 21 24 5 15 3
56 13 27 24 7 3 3
204 7 18 28 17 5 2
205 11 17 24 17 7 1
206 9 19 21 24 3 1
207 5 15 20 32 5 0
210 0 8 20 26 16 7
211 1 6 20 24 20 6
212 3 5 17 29 16 7
213 5 4 22 27 13 6
214 3 10 27 23 9 5
215 6 19 19 23 7 3
216 5 15 30 0 nA L 3 9
TABLE 7-2.2(contd)
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210 .0621 1 49
211 .0637 4 50
212 .0618 4 52
213 .0610 4 46
214 .0638 5 37
215 .0604 6 33
216 .0543 6 27







































three monthly interval. This lends a small amount of support for the
technicians' belief that stocks tend to show a "secondary cycle" of
between 6 weeks and 6 months.
On an aggregative basis, Rozeff and Kinney's test show similar
tendency to negative auto-correlation at 12 week lag. The value of
the correlation coefficient of the current test is again larger than
that of Rozeff and Kinney's ( -0.1357 against about -0.11).
ONE—YEAR CYCLE There appears to be two different cycles
surrounding the one year node. There is a positive cycle of 50-511
weeks in length and a negative cycle of about 56 weeks in length. The
50/51 week cycle appears to be the stronger one. The number of stocks
showing positive correlation for the lag intervals of 50, 51 and 52
weeks is respectively 60, 59 and 53 with the number of stocks
exhibiting correlation coefficient which is greater than twice its
standard error is respectively 7, 6 and 3. This evidence of
cyclicality seems to lend some support to the traditional Malaysian
stockmarket "folklore" that the stockmarket tends to rise around
the time of the Chinese New Year. The Chinese New Year is based on
the lunar year of about 50.5 weeks with a "leap year" of 55 weeks
every three years to keep the calendar in step with the Gregorian
year. The existence of such a cycle would be in line with the
"turn-of-the-year effect" of the Western markets which is now well
tested.
There is unlikely to be any economic reason for the existence of such
a cycle and it would be entirely possible that this is the end result
of the "self-fufilling" effect of such a folklore. While it would be
risky to read too much into such tenous evidence, it would be logical
to conjecture that since the cycle is not based on anything rational,
the knowledgeable investors may take advantage of such a cycle and
sell part of their investments. If this conjecture is correct, one
would expect that the positive correlation at a lag interval of about
51 weeks would quickly turn negative. The result of the tests shows
that this is indeed so. At 56 week lag interval, the highly positive
preponderance of the correlation coefficients has turned highly
negative (only 13 out of 78 stocks exhibit positive correlation
coefficients).
On an aggregative basis, the market shows some tendency to
non-randomness at 50/51 weeks interval although such non-randomness
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is not significant (correlation coefficient being respectively 0.1120
and 0.0838; standard error being about 0.08).
FOUR-YEARLY CYCLE There is only weak evidence of any cyclicality
surrounding the four year node. There is some indication of a
negative cycle of slightly less than 208 weeks in length and a
positive cycle which is slightly longer than 208 weeks in length.
7 - 2 . 4 — CONCLUSION
Based on these very comprehensive tests carried out on a large sample
of Malaysian stocks covering 16 years, it is possible to state that
there appears to be somewhat more serial dependence in Malaysian
stock prices than in the Western cases. The amount of dependence in
the individual weekly return relative series is low and is in line
with what was obtained by Fama in a similar series of tests although
the two are not strictly comparable because Fama used daily prices
and different lags.
The monthly return relative series however demonstrate a greater
degree of dependence than the weekly return series. It is notable
that Rozeff and Kinney were able to show conclusive signs of serial
dependence of one year's lag using non-parametric tests although the
standard auto-correlation tests did not show significant amount of
dependence.
At this stage, it is not possible to state whether such dependence
can lead to a situation wherein traders can make actual abnormal
profit. Some degree of dependence appears to exist in a number
stocks, dependence which is consistent and statistically
significant. It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude that the
Malaysian stockmarket does not exhibit perfect efficiency in terms of
stock price periodicity information. It is conceivable that
knowledgeable investors can possibly make abnormal profit although
there is little evidence to support this at this stage. As will be
shown later in the Relative Strength tests, there appears to be a
small potential for making abnormal profit in the Malaysian
stockmarket because of the existence of some degree of regular
cyclicality.
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7.3 — Uncovearxng Lonjg Term Trend
Using Moving: Average Tests;
7.3.1 - BACKGROUND TO THE TESTS
The previous test is designed to uncover the existence of cyclicality
over a wide range of timespans. These series of tests are designed to
isolate the effect of medium term or "secondary" cycles in order to
reveal the long term or "primary" cycles. There is another material
difference between the first series of tests and the present one. A
serial correlation test can only uncover any periodicity if such
periodicity is reasonably regular. The moving average test is
designed to uncover irregular cycles, provided that such cycles are
lon^evthan the length of the moving average and that the amplitude of
the cycle is adequately large.
These series of tests are based on the well known technicians' belief
(as described in Edwards and Magee (1966)) that stock prices exhibit
socalled secondary movements of between six weeks and six months when
its price would move between a pair of trend lines. Such secondary
movements can continue for a period of between one to three years
which in turn form the primary movement. By using price charts and
other manifestations of price movements, technicians hope to be able
to identify the beginning of such primary movements. By buying
shortly after the start of the primary bull trend and selling shortly
after the start of the primary bear trend, the technicians hope to
gain abnormally large profit.
Owing to the fact that the number of cycles per primary movement is
not definite, nor is the size of the upward movement or the length of
the primary movement known, it is therefore difficult to design a
test to replicate exactly the practitioners' method. Filter tests,
originally designed by Alexander (1961) are now thought to be
unsuitable for this purpose because of non-stationalities of stock
prices.
The methodology of the moving average tests was first suggested and
tested by Cootner (1962) and later extensively tested by Van Horne
and Parker (1967). The idea behind the use of moving averages is that
a moving average of adequate length would smooth out even the longest
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known secondary cycles and thus reveal the primary cycle. The use of
a high enough hurdle rate would separate a "real" upward trend from
minor movements. However, both the hurdle rate and the moving average
length have to be chosen with care to ensure that the test conforms
to the nature of the market. The very extensive series of tests
conducted by Van Horne and Parker ( with 20, 30 and 40 week moving
averages and 0, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10, 15% hurdle rates) led the authors to
conclude that in so far as it was possible to design workable tests,
the American market showed no exploitable primary cycles.
7.3.2 - METHOD AND SAMPLE
The moving average test has been previously described in detail in
Chapter Three and there is hence no need to go into a detailed
description here. While it is desirable to replicate Van Horne and
Parker's methodology as closely as possible, it is felt that certain
improvements can be made in the choice of combination of moving
average lengths and hurdle rates. In selecting the lengths of moving
average and hurdle rates to use, we can be guided by both
practitioners' method and previously conducted tests. In terms of
lengths of moving average to use, previous tests seem to be at slight
odds with the practitioners' method (as stated by Edwards and Magee).
If, as technicians suggest, the secondary movements are thought to be
between 6-26 weeks in length, a 26 week moving average would seem to
be about the longest that ought to be used. This is further confirmed
by the fact that the most frequently quoted moving averages in
charting publications (as in the S & P Trendline) is the 200-day
(28.5-week) and the 30-week moving averages. Whilst Van Horne and
Parker did not discuss the reasons for the chosen lengths, it is
possible their choice is partly determined by this knowledge and they
decided to bracket 30 weeks by 10 weeks on both sides. Cootner chose
to use a single 40 week moving average. This study chooses to use 10,
15, 20, 25 and 30 weeks or lengths which are somewhat shorter than
those previously tested. In terms of hurdle rates, we cannot be so
clearly guided by practitioners' method as the margin by which the
price should move above the previous trend is always stated in
qualitative terms. In this case, we can be guided by previous tests.
Previous tests seem to indicate that a hurdle rate of 7.5% produced
the highest abnormal return. This series of tests will therefore use
this hurdle rate bracketed by 5% and 10%.
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The test consists of comparing the after tax return obtainable from
$1.00 invested in each of the sampled stock under both the
"buy-and-hold" strategy and under the trading strategy using the
moving average concept for the whole length of the research period.
The return under the buy-and-hold strategy is computed from the
logarithm of the total weekly return relative assuming continuous
compounding. Under each test of the trading strategy, the weekly
closing price of each stock is continuously compared with its own
moving average and if the weekly closing price is above or below the
moving average by greater than the hurdle rate for two consecutive
weeks, the stock is then assumed to be bought or sold at the
following week's closing price. During the time when the money is held
as stock, the total return for the holding period is computed in the
same way as under the buy-and-hold strategy. When the money is out of
the stock, it is assumed to be held in a 7-day call money account at
an after tax interest rate of 3.5% per annum (it will be explained
later why this avenue of investment is chosen). A brokerage charge of
1% is assumed to be incurred each time the money is switched between
stock and call-money and vice versa. It is realised that a 1%
brokerage charge seems low by Western standard; however, the
official broker's commission rate (set by the Exchange) in Malaysia
is 1% and frequent traders can usually get a discount from this rate.
Furthermore, the delivery time for share certificates is usually very
long by Western standard because paperwork is as yet uncomputerised
(a period of one month or more is quite normal, especially during
market rises). No cost is assumed at this stage for price spread as
it is an unknown quantity. If it turns out that the moving average
strategy is superior than "buy-and-hold" method, sensitivity tests
can be carried out at the time of examining this superiority.
The paired returns from each stock over the research period from the
buy-and-hold and the trading strategy are then compared. If any of
the trading methods is obviously superior to the buy-and-hold
strategy overall, Wilcoxon signed rank tests will be used to examine
the significance of such superiority. The null hypothesis is that the
trading strategy should not yield higher overall return than the
buy-and-hold strategy after transaction cost has been taken into
account.
Minor modifications to the accepted methodology are necessary in
order to take into account the different characteristics of the
Malaysian market. Firstly, it would have been noticed that short
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selling is not undertaken because it is currently against the
Exchange rules. During the time when the moving average indicates a
"no stock" situation, the money freed from selling the stock is
assumed to be placed in a 7-day call money account to receive short
term interest. The reason for using 7-day call money account instead
of placing the money in Treasury Bills is that there is no secondary
market for Treasury Bills in Malaysia. The after tax return of 3.5%
seems very low by current Western market standards. However it must
be noted that in Malaysia interest rate is under government control
(both by the the fact that the government owns the two largest banks
in operation and the fact that the Central Bank offers virtually
unlimited rediscount facilities for commercial papers to the clearing
banks). During the research period the pretax 7-day call money rate
only rose from 5% to 8% inspite of the global financial situation.
(During the same period, the interest rate on personal saving
accounts was comparable to the 7-day call money rate.) For this test,
it is assumed to be 3.5% after tax throughout ( Malaysian corporate
tax rate is 40 + 5%, the extra 5% being a "temporary" surtax). Third,
the Malaysian stockmarket is considerably more volatile than
Western markets as has been shown in Chapter Two. A movement of 10%
in the price of a stock in a single week is regularly met. For this
reason, it is decided to use two consecutive weeks of movement
greater than the hurdle rate to determine a "buy" or "sell"
situation, the second breaching of the hurdle rate being taken as a
confirmation of the previous week's movement. This modification has
the effect of lengthening the lag by a week.
The sample selected for the performing of this test also reflects the
nature of the companies in the database and the nature of the market.
Owing to the fact that one of the requirements of sample selection is
stratification by market sectors, some of the companies included in
the database are infrequently traded. Infrequent trading results in
spurious computed moving averages as well as very large jumps in
prices. The moving average test is probably not usefully testable
under such circumstances. It is therefore thought that it would be
better to exclude those companies which are deemed to be
infrequently traded (as defined in Chapter Six). Since almost all the
infrequently traded companies are found within the Tin and the Hotel
sectors, a perhaps arbitary decision is taken to exclude all stocks
within these two sectors. It is also thought that companies with a
trading history of less than six years should be excluded because of
inadequate data. This leaves a total sample of 58 which is an
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adequate sample in a market with only 260 stocks at the very most.
7.3.3 - RESULTS OF THE MOVING AVERAGE TESTS
The results of the moving average tests are summariesd in Table 7.3.1
and Table 7.3.2 below.
TABLE 7 . 3 . 1
SUMMARY OF THE MOVING AVERAGE TESTS - LONG ONLY
NO OF CASES IN WHICH AT LEAST ONE MA
METHOD PRODUCES SUPERIOR RETURN
LENGTH OF HURDLE FIRST HALF SECOND HALF OVERALL
MOVING AVG WK. RATE 1968-1975 1976-1983 1968-1983
10 0.05 28 9 11
10 0.075 30 8 10
10 0.10 25 6 8
15 0.05 29 9 9
15 0.075 27 9 12
15 0.10 28 7 15
20 0.05 33 9 13
20 0.075 27 7 17
20 0.10 20 6 14
25 0.05 25 10 16
25 0.075 28 9 16
25 0.10 24 8 12
30 0.05 19 8 10
30 0.075 20 7 12
30 0.10 19 12 10
NO. OF STOCKS IN WHICH
BUY-AND-HOLD IS SUPERIOR
TO ALL MA METHODS 14 34 29
TOTAL NUMBER OF STOCKS 58 58 58
TABLE 7.3.2
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COMPARATIVE RETURN FROM TRADING METHODS AND BUY-AND HOLD -
CLOSING BALANCE FROM A STARTING SUM OF $100 INVESTED IN EACH STOCK

































The major findings of the tests as evidenced from the above tables
may be summarised as follows:-
(1) During the first half of the research period, the MA method
performs slightly less well than the buy-and-hold method in the
majority of methods tried. None of the trading methods is
significantly superior to buy-and-hold. The buy-and-hold strategy is
only significantly better (using Wilcoxon signed rank test) than the
trading method with a moving average of 30 weeks.
(2) The buy-and-hold strategy is very much more superior during the
second half of the research period than the first. During the second
half of the research period, the buy-and-hold strategy is superior to
all the MA methods at better than 0.025 level of significance. The
difference in the relative performance of buy-and-hold during the
separate halves of the research period is so great that it probably
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cannot be attributable to chance. There are perhaps some
environmental reasons for this superiority.
(3) The consistency of performance of the various moving average
methods is very surprising. During the first half, for nine of the
fifteen methods tested, the strategy produces superior results within
the range of 25 to 30 cases. In terms of closing balance, all but
three of the trading methods produce an ending balance that is within
10% of the others (and within 10% of the buy-and-hold closing balance
as well).
During the second half, all but one of the trading methods produce a
closing balance that is within 15% of each others with the last
within 25%. The number of superior cases for all methods falls
within 6 and 12.
(4) There are indications that as the length of the moving average
gets longer, its efficacy declines. There are also indications that
both 0.05 and 0.075 are superior hurdle rates to 0.10.
7.3.3.1 - DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
(A) COMPARISONS WITH VAN HORNE AND PARKER (1967)
There are several differences between the sample design and
methodology between Van Horne and Parker (1967) (VP) and the current
series of tests. VP used a sample of 30 stocks over a period of six
and half years and tested moving average lengths of between 20 and 40
weeks. These tests employ a sample that is twice as large and cover a
period that is two and half times longer and test moving average
lengths of between 10 to 30 weeks. The differences in findings may or
may not be a result of these differences.
Firstly, VP found an overwhelming advantage with the buy-and-hold
strategy. Two indications of the superiority of buy-and-hold can be
seen from the following findings:-
(a) For the 450 possible combinations of trading rules and stocks (
15 X 30), the trading strategy is superior in only 69 cases;
(b) None of the trading rules produces a closing balance that is
within 20% of the buy-and-hold closing balance before transaction
costs are taken into consideration (25% if transaction costs are
included).
The current series of tests produce very interesting results in that
for the second half of the research period, buy-and-hold is as
overwhelmingly superior as in VP. Of the 870 possible combinations of
trading rules and stocks (15 X 58 ), the moving average strategy
produces only 123 superior closing balances. However, for the first
half of the research period, the superiority is not so obvious. The
trading strategy produces 382(out of 870) cases of higher closing
balances. Furthermore, while VP found that in only three cases (10%
of sample), did half or more (i.e. 8 or more out of 15) of the
trading methods exceed the buy-and-hold method in profitability; in
the current series of test, 23 do (40% of sample). Although the
buy-and-hold strategy is also superior during the first half of the
research period, the advantage is much less clear cut.
Secondly, VP found a slight superiority for the 40 week moving
average out of the 20, 30 and 40 week moving averages tested. This
series of tests however find that the 10 or 15 week moving average is
slightly superior to the others (out of the 10,15,20,25 and 30 week
moving averages tested) and that there are indications that as the
length of the moving average increases, its efficacy declines during
the first half. For the second half, both 15 and 30 week moving
averages are relatively superior. The superiority of the latter is
probably due to the fact that the longer moving averages used result
in lesser trading and during this period, the less trading there is,
the better would be the return.
(B) A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE RELATIVELY BETTER PERFORMANCE OF
THE TRADING STRATEGY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE RESEARCH PERIOD
The advantage in employing a trading strategy as against simply buying
and holding lies in the supposed ability to be able to make a bigger
gain by cycling between buying at a low point and selling at a high
point such that the total return would be greater than merely buying
and holding. However, there is an opportunity cost involved in not
being able to sell at the top or buying at the bottom owing to the
lag introduced by using moving averages and traders also have to pay
for the transaction costs involved in trading. The longer the moving
average, the greater is the lag, hence the larger the opportunity
cost. But the longer the moving average, the lesser is the turnover
rate hence resulting in lower transaction costs. Insofar as it is
possible to have an optimum length of moving average, one can
envisage the type of market in which this trading strategy would
excel. Such a market would be one with zero or low long term gain
(assuming that there is no stockmarket which experiences a long
term loss) with cycles of regular length which is the same as the
length of the moving average being tested and large amplitude of
movements.
On the other hand, there are several conditions which would reduce
or negate the advantage of the trading strategy. If the market has a
strong rising trend, the "sell" point would not be well above the
"buy" point (that is the "up" legs of the stock price movement are
much longer and/or steeper than the "down" legs) such that
transaction costs and opportunity costs more than wipe out the gain
obtained from trading. If the cycles are very short, the trading
strategy would suffer from both excessive lags which results from
high opportunity costs as well as missing out some of the cycles
altogether. If the amplitude of movements is small (caused by either
small market movements or low beta), the costs of transaction
(together with the opportunity costs) would be greater than the
possible gain from trading.
It is therefore conceivable that during certain periods of a market's
existence, a trading strategy based on moving average could perform
much better than at other times. It so happens that market conditions
during the period chosen by VP for their tests are precisely
opposite to those cited earlier as necessary conditions for superior
performance of trading strategy. For five and a half years out of six
and a half years' duration of the test, the market was rising
rapidly with minor downturns. Between January 1960 and June 1966
(duration of the test), the Dow Jones Industrial Averages rose from
about 650 to to 900. It would be useful if the same tests can be
carried out for the period 1967-1980. For during this period, the
overall market rose very little and there were several cycles of very
large amplitude.
The very different performance of the same trading strategy uncovered
by the present research during the two halves of the research period
can perhaps be explained by the fact that the market was very
different during the two separate halves of the research period.
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During the first half of the research period, the market experienced
two large downturns (respectively caused by race riots in 1969 and
the OPEC induced recession of 1973/4) while during the second half,
it only experienced a downturn of medium severity. The average annual
gain for the market portfolio (computed using geometric mean) for the
first half of the period is 15.5% as against 22.9% during the second
half. These two factors probably contribute a large extent to the
very poor performance of the trading strategy.
Further evidence in support of the above conjecture can also be
gleaned from a study of the return characteristics of stocks which
perform relatively well or badly under the trading strategy during
the first half. Table 7.3.3 and Table 7.3.4 appended to the end of
this section provide information on the return and beta of stocks
which respectively perform well and badly under the trading strategy.
Here the term "perform well" is defined as stocks which provide
superior return to buy-and-hold in 8 or more (out of 15) of the MA
methods while "perform badly" is defined as stocks which provide
superior return in 3 or less of the MA method tested. (Owing the
consistency of performance under MA method, very often the trading
strategy would prove to be superior in all 15 methods).
As can be seen from Table 7.3.3, a majority ( 18 out of 23) of the
stocks which provide superior performance under the trading strategy
have relatively high beta or low return or both. And contrarily, a
majority (20 out of 23) of the stocks which perform badly under the
trading strategy have relatively low beta or high return or both.
There are of course some exceptions to the rule but they form a
small minority. The summary information from Tables 7.3.3 and 7.3.4
is provided below:-
AVG BETA AVG LOG RETURN
MEDIAN OF MA SUPERIOR STOCKS 1.006 0.1164
MEDIAN OF MA INFERIOR STOCKS 0.810 0.1813
MARKET MEAN DURING 1968-1975 0.903 0.1441
7.3.4 - CONCLUSION
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Based on this series of tests together with the tests carried out by
Van Horne and Parker, it is possible to draw the following tentative
conclusions regarding Moving Average trading methods.
(1) It does not appear possible to obtain consistent superior return
over a long period of time in the Malaysian market by using moving
average trading methods compared with a simple buy-and-hold
strategy;
(2) There are indications that the returns obtainable under moving
average methods are very sensitive to the market conditions and/or
stock characteristics. If the conditions are right, the moving
average method can produce superior result. While it is not possible
to predict the future market conditions, stock characteris tics are
predictable to a certain extent. Thus the beta of a stock is
reasonably predictable as is the growth rate of of an industrial
sector.
(3) While it is not possible to show in a scientifically rigorous way
that the moving method is in any way superior, at the same time, it
would be premature also to conclude that the MA method is totally
worthless as an investment strategy for all stocks and at all times.
This series of tests have shown that there can be considerable
deviations from the picture of perfect efficiency to cast doubt on
the strong conclusion reached by VP.
TABLE 7.3.3
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CHARACTERISTICS OF STOCKS WHICH PERFORMED WELL UNDER THE MA METHODS
1968-1975
STOCK SUPERIORITY
- OUT OF 15
AVG.BETA AVG.LOG.RETURN
BDR 15 1.169 0.0021
CBL 15 1.007 0.0501
CCM* 10 0.802 0.1489
CNC 15 1.247 0.1366
CSB 13 0.979 -0.1209
CSC* 14 0.805 0.2094
DBS 14 1.402 0.1164
DMI* 8 0.755 0.2025
ESS 11 0.752 0.0250
FNN 12 0.980 0.0743
GTH 9 1.047 0.0901
HWP 15 1.186 0.1380
KEM 14 1.009 0.1694
KLK 9 1.047 0.0901
MAG* 11 0.810 0.1969
MUI 15 1.337 -0.0350
NBT* 10 0.496 0.1651
RTH 11 0.899 0.0754
SCN 15 0.268 0.0471
TAN 15 1.184 -0.2599
UOB 9 1.409 0.3979
UOL 8 1.135 0.1601
WEA 12 1.006 0.1441
MEAN 12.17 0.966 0.0927
MEDIAN 12 1.006 0.1164
MARKET MEAN 0.903 0.1441
* = EXCEPTIONAL STOCKS. THAT IS, STOCKS WHICH HAVE BOTH BETA <0.903
AND RETURN >0.1441.
TABLE V . 3 . 4
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CHARACTERISTICS OF STOCKS WHICH PERFORM BADLY UNDER THE MA METHODS
1968-1975
STOCKS SUPERIORITY AVG.BETA AVG.LOG.RETURN
- OUT OF 15
BTD 0 0.5786 0.3211
CON 3 0.7476 -0.0193
CPL 3 1.1982 0.0630
CTD* 0 1.1388 0.1377
MB 0 0.7856 0.3526
GEN 3 1.2269 0.3526
GNS 0 0.7806 0.1178
HLO 1 0.3176 0.0499
HUF 0 0.6475 0.1990
HUM 1 0.7496 0.1578
IRN 1 0.9800 0.1583
KWN 0 0.4728 0.2480
MBB 0 0.8104 0.2550
MBS 3 0.6887 0.1234
MTC 0 0.8083 0.1247
OCB 0 1.1287 0.3931
ORL 0 0.8353 0.1963
SPR* 2 1.0200 0.0348
SSS 0 1.0765 0.2103
TAS 1 0.7967 0.2170
TMB 0 0.9607 0.1866
TNC* 0 1.0381 -0.0327
UPL 0 0.6149 0.1813
MEAN 0.78 0.8436 0.1740
MEDIAN 0 0.8104 0.1813
MARKET MEAN 0.903 0.1441
* = EXCEPTIONAL STOCKS. THAT IS, STOCKS WHICH HAVE BETA >0.903
AND RETURN <0.1441
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7.4 — Testing jFoir "the Validity of
the Rela-fc ive Strength concept
7.4.1 - BACKGROUND TO THE TESTS
These series of tests are based on the well known technicians' belief
(as stated by books such as Edwards and Magee (op cit)) that a stock
that is moving up relatively faster than the market will tend to
continue to do well and one which is moving down faster than the
market will continue to do badly until such trends are somehow
broken. The concept of "relative strength" is to be distinguished
from the concept of market effect. A stock with low beta could show
high relative strength at certain times and vice versa. The basis for
such a belief is the idea that the market participants consist of
investors with different degrees of knowledgeability. The price of a
stock would start to move up relative to the market when the
insiders and other highly knowledgeable investors begin to take
interest in that stock because they know something which the general
market does not as yet know. As the price moves up, it would attract
the next most knowledgeable level of investors who in turn would push
the price further up. One may term this the "jumping on the bandwagon
effect". The mechanism involved is very much the same as that
described in Chapter Four in connection with the paper by Akerlof
(1970). The reverse takes place when the most knowledgeable investors
receive a piece of bad news ahead of the market. It is also possible
that the actions of the knowledgeable investors can have a cyclical
effect on the price. The price movement triggered off by the buying
of the superior investors could lead the price to move far out of
line from its perceived "intrinsic value". If it were to go too far
out of line, the knowledgeable investors would sell which can have
an "avalanche" effect leading to the price falling well below its
"intrinsic value" once again (as described by Cootner (1962).
Technicians believe that it is possible to discern the actions and
intentions of these knowledgeable investors by the use of the relative
strength technique. To make use of this technique, the technician
needs to define two criteria:-
(1) The optimum length of time over which to measure the relative
movement of the stock prices; and
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(2) The exact meaning of the term "relatively strong" or "relatively
weak" when comparing the price movements of different stocks in the
market.
As is usual with literature on technical methods, these crucial
criteria are not defined in the common books on technical analysis.
In addition, the exact way by which the relative strength concept can
be employed in actual practice is not described either. This led Levy
(1967) to invent his own methodology for performing the test. The
validity of Levy's methodology (to be replicated later by Jensen and
Bennington (1970) (JB)) will be examined in the next section.
7.4.2 - METHOD AND SAMPLE
Levy's methodology requires the purchasing of stocks into a
portfolio, stocks which have performed relatively well. The portfolio
is rebalanced periodically by adding new stocks which have performed
relatively well since the previous selection and casting out stocks
from the portfolio which have performed badly. The total return for
the portfolio is computed for the duration of the study before and
after transaction cost has been taken into account. The computation
of the return is straightforward and is based on the assumption of an
equal dollar investment in each of the stocks in the portfolio at the
start and equal distribution of available funds (from the disposal
of cast out stocks) among the new stocks at each rebalancing.
He defined stocks which "have performed relatively well" as stocks
within a portfolio which possess the highest ratios of the current
price to the 27-week price moving average. This method requires the
setting of three parameters: the percentage of the ranked stocks to
be selected (which he called "X"), the "cast out rank" (i.e. the
ranking of the relative strength below which a stock is deemed to
have lost its high relative strength status which he called "K") and
the frequency of rebalancing. In the design of the methodology and
the definition of the various parameters, Levy appeared to have
introduced changes to the original concept of relative strength
method as practised by the technicians. It is possible that these
changes would have resulted in the tests conducted by Levy and JB
being less powerful. These and other drawbacks of Levy's methodology
will be discussed in the next section.
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7.4.2.1 - MAJOR DRAWBACKS OF THE LEVY METHODOLOGY
AND THE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS FOR THE CURRENT TESTS
(1) Market Effect Not Explicitly Taken Into Account Literature on
technical methods usually left unstated whether the relative
volatility (i.e. beta) of the stocks ought to be taken into account
when computing the relative strength of stocks. As a group,
technicians are notoriously unscientific and it is perhaps worth
noting that the relative strength concept predated the discovery of
the market effect. Although both Levy and JB were aware of the market
effect, they did not apply the tool for adjusting the market effect
at the time of their tests.
JB overcame this problem by grouping the stocks into classes having
similar betas ( into 29 classes of 200 stocks each). This is not
practicable for the present project since there are too few stocks
involved. In order to overcome the market effect, the "relative"
performance of the stocks will be computed by taking into account
the beta of the stocks.
A necessary follow-up modification to Levy's methodology would ensue
from the decision to use beta for adjusting the market effect when
computing the relative strength. The beta of the stocks selected for
the current project is calculated from the total return of the stocks
rather than from price changes alone as the beta is obtained by
regressing the logarithm of the weekly total return relative of a
stock upon the logarithm of the weekly return relative of the market
portfolio. As a result, the relative strength of the stocks in the
test sample has to be computed from the beta adjusted logarithm of
the return relatives (i.e. the return relative residuals) rather
than the price movements.
This means that Levy's method for computing the relative strength is
not applicable. The current series of tests therefore compute
relative strength by comparing the cumulative return residual of all
the stocks in the sample over a period of time X ( where X = 4, 7,
10, 13 and 26 weeks). Those stocks having the highest cumulative
return residuals are deemed to have the highest relative strength and
vice versa.
It is perhaps fortuitous that this modification is required because,
as will be shown in the next two subsections, Levy's method may not be
a good approximation of the practitioners' method.
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(2) Levy's Method Is Not Good Approximation Of The "Trading" Nature
of the Practitioners' Method Apart from the previous defect, Levy's
method also does not appear to take into account the fact that
technicians' methods are usually thought of as short term trading
methods. By buying the high relative strength stocks and holding them
in a portfolio for long duration, the methods probably lessens the
benefits to be gained (if there is any). As far as can be gathered
from the literature, the typical technician operates with a high
turnover of stocks under most of the methods employed. He would
normally dispose of his stocks after a few months whether they
provide a profit or not. Levy's method of holding on to the stocks
unless they fall below the cast out rank would tend to produce a more
"fuzzy" result.
Instead of tracking the performance of a portfolio which is
continuously being built up with high relative strength stocks, it
is therefore proposed to compare the performance of a high relative
strength portfolio with that of a low relative strength portfolio
for a period of 12 weeks after they have been selected. Thereafter a
new pair of portfolios a-re selected. The period of 12 weeks is chosen
because it is decided to test this method once every 13 weeks so as
to obtain a large enough sample.
(3) Levy's "Relative Strength" Method Is Too Close to the Moving
Average Method Levy's definition of high relative strength stocks
results in a method of selecting stock which is almost identical to
the method of stock selection under the "Moving Average" method
previously discussed in Section 7.3 in terms of both the stock
selection method and the time period over which the stocks are
selected. The one difference is that under the Moving Average
Method, the stocks are selected if the current price exceeds the
medium term moving average by a certain percentage while Levy's
Relative Strength method selects those stocks which have the highest
ratios of current price to its medium term moving average. The
previously proposed modification would differentiate this test from
the Moving Average Test.
The last problem with Levy's method is that a 27-week moving average
may cover too long a time frame. A review of literature on technical
analysis shows that technicians usually speak of relative strength as
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a short term method rather than long term. Indeed, a commercial
charting publication, "The S&P Trendline" defines its selection of
high relative strength stocks as those stocks which have shown the
highest relative price movements in "recent weeks" (the term "recent
weeks" is not defined). It is therefore proposed that the relative
strength method is tested over a range of time period adopted from
the technicians' belief of secondary cycles of between 6 weeks and 6
months. Test periods of 4, 7, 10, 13 and 26 weeks are selected for
the current series of tests.
7.4.2.2 - THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY DESCRIBED
The proposed methodology stays close to the original concept of Levy
apart from the three modifications proposed above. A single sample
consisting of all the stocks in the database is used throughout the
research period. The cumulative return residuals for the prior 4, 7,
10, 13 and 26 weeks for all the stocks in the sample are computed and
ranked once every 13 weeks throughout the research period (which is
64 quarters long) except the last, making a total of 314 {(63 X 4) +
62} rankings. The high and low relative strength stocks are
respectively defined as the top ranked and bottom ranked stocks in
terms of their cumulative return residuals. Four portfolios are formed
from each quarterly ranking; two from the highest and lowest ranked
15 stocks and two from the highest and lowest ranked 10 stocks (these
are equivalent to a "X" of 15% and 20% in Levy's terminology). The
low strength portfolios are called the "Class A" portfolios and the
high strength portfolios, the "Class B" portfolios.
The total return residual of each portfolio is then tracked for a
further 12 weeks after portfolio formation. The post portfolio
formation collective return residuals from the two pairs of Class A
and Class B portfolios for each quarter are compared using Wilcoxon
Signed Rank Tests based on the Null Hypothesis that the two different
portfolios should not produce a distinguishable difference in return
residual. The transaction costs are not taken into account in the
first place.
7.4.3 - RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The results of the various relative strength tests are provided in
Tables 7.4.3 and 7.4.4 appended at the end of this section and the
results are also summarised in Tables 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 below in a
slightly different presentation. The main findings of the tests may
be summarised as follows.
(1) It Appears Possible To Detect Some Non-Randomness In Malaysian
Stock Prices Using The Relative Strength Method
The detectable non-randomness, however, is not as clearcut as it is
traditionally held by technicians. That is, it does not appear
possible to take advantage of the "jumping on the bandwagon" effect
as described earlier in Section 7.4.1 and make abnormal gain by buying
stocks which had performed relatively better. As cam be seen from
Table 7.4.3, in the cases of the 10-stock portfolios, of the five
different time period relative strength methods tested, none of the
Class B portfolios (high strength) outperform the Class A portfolios
(low strength) throughout the 12 week period after portfolio
formation on an overall basis.
In fact the opposite is true. In the case of portfolios of 10 stocks
each, the "low strength" portfolios outperform the "high strength"
portfolios in every instance. Out of the 20 instances of comparison
(5 different relative strengths at 4, intervals after portfolios
formation), only two of the Class A portfolios (low strength) do not
significantly outperform the Class B portfolio. (The significance
probability of each of the Wilcoxon signed rank tests is given In
Tables 7.4.3 and 7.4.4 )
TABLE 7.4.1
AVERAGE PER STOCK ABNORMAL RETURN OF CLASS B (HIGH STRENGTH)
PORTFOLIOS AFTER VARIOUS HOLDING PERIODS POST PORTFOLIO FORMATION
WK. AFTER PORT. LENGTH OF RELATIVE STRENGTH
FORMATION SIZE 4 WEEK 7 WEEK 10 WEEK 13 WEEK 26 WEEK MEAN
10 -.0068 -.0030 +.0159





10 -.0101 -.0080 -.0066





10 -.0192 -.0224 -.0189





12 10 -.0230 -.0308 -.0254 -.0202 -.0205 -.0240
15 -.0155 -.0230 -.0187 -.0163 -.0179 -.0183
TABLE 7 . -4 . 2
AVERAGE PER STOCK ABNORMAL RETURN OF CLASS A (LOW STRENGTH)
PROTFOLIO AFTER VARIOUS HOLDING PERIODS POST PORTFOLIO FORMATION
WK. AFTER PORT. LENGTH OF RELATIVE STRENGTH

























































(2) Different Stocks Appear To Be Subjected To Different Cycles
An interesting result of these tests is that in almost all the
relative strength methods tested, abnormal return in the opposite
direction to what is logically expected is obtained. An attempt will
be made here to provide an explanation for this behavior.
An examination of a small sample of the portfolios selected reveals
that there is a surprisingly fast turnover of stocks from portfolio
of one length to the next. Typically, two adjacent portfolios (e.g.
of 4-week and 7-week relative strengths) would have only about one
third of their stocks in common. It is also noticeable that much of
the abnormal return is contributed by the non-common stocks.
This result seems to imply that stocks are not subjected to cycles of
similar lengths. It also appears that there is a strong tendency to
auto-reverse at the top or bottom of their price cycles and that the
downside of the price cycles are steeper than the upside. It would
seem that the relative strength method used in this series of tests is
adept at picking out stocks which have arrived at or are near to
their turning points. The price reversals experienced by these stocks
are strong enough to produce the observed result although in each
ranking of the high and low length stocks only a smallish number of
stocks are undergoing such reversals. The conjecture that only a
smallish number of stocks are significantly involved in each test is
given added strength by the next finding.
(3) The 10 Stock Portfolios Outperform the 15 stock Portfolios
The tests carried out are replicated using two different sizes of
portfolios - 10 and 15. The results of the two series of tests seem
to indicate that a portfolio size of 10 has greater power to produce
abnormal return. Table 7.4.1 above gives the average per stock
abnormal return in respect of the Class B portfolios in the various
weeks after portfolio formation. The abnormal returns in respect of
the Class A portfolios (Table 7.4.2) show similar relative difference
although in absolute terms, they are smaller.
As can be seen from the above tables, the 10-stock portfolios
consistently produce higher per stock abnormal returns throughout the
12 week holding period. This supports the earlier conjecture that a
smallish number of stocks account for much of the total amount of
abnormal gain detected.
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(4) Maximum Abnormal Return Is Obtained After About 12 Weeks
It can be seen that generally, the abnormal return increases
monotonically as the holding period is lengthened. Twelve weeks
(which is the maximum period observed) provides the largest abnormal
returns except in one instance (4-week relative strength method).
However, there is some indication that the abnormal returns may be
flatenning by the 12th week.
(5) The Absolute Magnitude Of the Abnormal Price Movements Is Not
Large
(In the ensuing discussion, only the case in respect of the abnormal
return for the 10-stock portfolio at the end of 12 week holding
period is considered as this is the case where the maximum abnormal
returns (positive and negative) are obtained)
Although the abnormal returns obtained when the relative strength
method is applied to Malaysian stocks appears to be highly
significant in statistical term, the quanta of abnormal gain obtained
are not large. As can be seen from Tables 7.4.1 and 7.4.2, the
pattern of the abnormal movements is roughly the same across both
Class A and Class B portfolios although the movements are in the
opposite direction.
In respect of the Class A portfolios, the abnormal movements are
positive and the return residuals increase to a maximum at the 12th
week after portfolio formation. The maximum abnormal return obtained
is from the use of the 10-week relative strength method which
provides a gain of 2% after 12 weeks. The average magnitude of gain
is 1.5% after 12 weeks which translates to an annualised gain of 6%.
In respect of the Class B portfolios, the abnormal movements are
negative and similarly the return residuals increase in magnitude up
to the 12th week after portfolio formation. The maximum abnormal
returns are provided by the 7-week relative strength method which
results in a loss of 3% after 12 weeks. The average magnitude of the
loss experienced by all the portfolios is 2.4% after 12 weeks or an
annualised loss of 10%.
Although the direction of the abnormal movements is the opposite to
that detected by Jensen and Bennington (1970)(JB), it is interesting
to compare the size of these abnormal movements with those obtained
by JB. Using the [X = 10%, K = 160] and the [X = 5%, K = 140]
methods, JB respectively obtained an average abnormal return of 1.3%
and 0.8% on an annualised and before transaction cost basis. It
would appear that the current test method can provide, at best, an
average abnormal movement that is 4.6 times (going long on the Class
A stocks) or 7.6 times (going short on the Class B stocks) than the
best obtained by JB.
Based on the methodology used in these tests, it would appear that it
is possible to make abnormal profit by trading stocks using the
relative strength methods tested here. However, the absolute amount
of gain which can be obtained by a trader is only about 4% on an
annualised basis after taking into account his transaction cost (of
about 2% per turnaround) even in the best case. This gain is
obtainable only by shortselling which is not allowed under the
existing KLSE rules. Therefore, while the statistical evidence of
dependence is very strong,such statistical dependence may be less
important from the real world trader's point of view. The problem
here is that the method as tested is not refined enough to pick out
only those stocks which have peaked or bottomed. And since different
stocks conform to different cycles, the subsequent abnormal movement
of the stocks which have peaked (or bottomed) is diluted by the
stocks which are still on the their way up (or down). Under the real
world conditions, a technical trader probably does not employ such
a purely mechanical method. It may be feasible to design further
modifications to bring the method closer to the real world. A
possible refinement would be to combine this method with the
information on stock periodicity obtained from the auto-correlation
tests described in Section 7.2.. Thus, it may be possible to select
stocks using the 10-week relative strength method in conjunction with
the knowledge that certain stocks have a pronounced 20 week cycle.
(6) The Greatest Amount Of Abnormal Movements Appears To Be Related
To A Price Cycle of About 20 Weeks
Although abnormal returns are obtained with almost all relative
strength methods tested, such abnormal returns are not uniform for all
combinations of relative strength lengths and holding periods. In the
case of the Class B portfolios (high strength), the greatest abnormal
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return is obtained using 7-week relative strength and the portfolio
being held for 12 weeks. The second biggest abnormal return is
obtained using 10-week relative strength and the portfolio held for
10 weeks. In the case of the Class A portfolios, the greatest
abnormal return is obtained using 10-week relative strength portfolio
held for 12 weeks with the second greatest abnormal return obtained
using 10-week relative strength portfolio held for 10 weeks. This
seems to imply that as far as could be deduced from the available
data, the greatest amount of abnormal return is obtained from a cycle
of around 20 weeks or longer. This conjecture ties in well with the
results of the auto-correlation tests discussed in Section 7.2
wherein it was found that the 11 to 13 weeks auto-correlation showed
the greatest degree of negative correlation.
7.4.4 - CONCLUSION
The results of this series of tests together with the results from
the auto-correlation tests seem to show that there is a certain
degree of serial dependence in the prices of stocks in Malaysia.
Certainly, there is a much greater degree of dependence than that of
the US market as demonstrated by Fama (1970) or Jensen and Bennington
(1970). Although the best relative strength method is capable of
providing an after transaction cost abnormal gain of only about 1%
every 12 weeks, the abnormal gain obtainable is very persistent and
statistically very strong. As most academic workers are willing to
admit, it is very difficult to duplicate exactly practitioner's
methods. It is possible that with a greater degree of refinement, it
is may be feasible to obtain a higher level of abnormal gain. From
these series of tests, it would seem that the level of non-randomness
in Malaysian stocks is higher than that of the larger of the
Western markets. It would seem premature therefore to say that it is
impossible for knowledgeable investors to make abnormal gain by
using technical methods.
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TABLE 7. A. 3






WEEKS AFTER PORT. AVE.CUM. NO. RANK SIGNIFICANCE
PORT FORMTN TYPE RESIDUAL# SUPR'R SUM + PROBABILITY"
2 A .1389 42 -1420 <0.01
B -.0679 21 596
4 A .1090 40 -1425 <0.01
B -.1005 23 591
8 A .0924 39 -1413 <0.01
B -.1924 24 603
12 A .1297 41 -1399 <0.01
B -.2295 22 617
O
A A .0787 38 -1194 0.102
B -,0298 25 822
4 A .0677 36 -1265 <0.04
B -.0821 27 751
8 A . 1023 43 -1472 <0.01
B -.2241 20 544
12 A .1290 44 -1498 <0.01
B -.3082 19 578
9
■ L. A .1209 33 -1214 <0.08
B .1586 30 802
4 A .1517 43 -1448 <0.01
B -.0655 20 568
8 A .1783 44 -1559 <0.01
B -.1886 19 457
12 A .2073 37 -1450 <0.01
B -2527 26 566
2 A . 1031 37 -1276 <0.04
B -.0146 26 740
4 A .0974 41 -1349 <0.01
B -.0610 22 667
o A .1203 44 -1407 <0.01
B -.1295 19 609
12 A . 1307 41 -1409 <0.01
B -.2022 22 607
2 A .0519 32 -991
B .0220 31 1025
4 A .0593 39 -1254
B -.0433 24 762
y A . 1229 41 -1465
B -.1502 22 551
12 A .1564 43 -14 6 9













WEEKS AFTER PORT. AVE.CUM. NO. RANK :SIGNIFICANCE
PORT FORMTN TYPE RESIDUAL* SLIP SUM* PROBABILITY"
o A .1642 41 -1346 <0.02
E -.0370 22 670
4 A .1144 43 -1316 <0.02
B -.1054 20 700
8 A .1086 40 -1357 <0.01
B -.2003 23 659
12 A .1603 39 -1380 <0.01
B -.2320 24 636
O
c A .0898 38 -1195 0. 1003
B -.0370 25 821
4 A .0672 32 -1214 <0.08
B -.0790 31 802
8 A .1188 43 -1467 <0.01
B -.2589 20 549
12 A .1461 42 -1503 <0.01
B -3457 21 513
2 A .1278 38 -1285 <0.04
B -.0119 25 731
4 A .1520 44 -1397 <0.01
B -.0832 19 619
ft A .1989 42 -1505 <0.01
B -.2542 21 511
12 A .2439 39 -1431 <0.01
B -.2806 24 585
2 A .1044 38 -1240 <0.06
B -.0052 25 776
4 A .1314 44 -1449 <0.01
B -.0911 19 567
8 A .1294 39 -1399 <0.01
B -.2098 24 674
12 A .1211 37 -1342 <0.02
B -.2446 26 674
0
C. A .0488 32 -1030 NOT SIG.
B .0364 31 986
4 A .0460 33 -1257 <0.03
B -.0513 30 759
3 A . 1047 40 -1439 <0.01
B -.1864 23 577
12 A .1425 40 -1442 <0.01
B - n / o o. LUU U 23 574
Cumulative Residual is the simple ari thnfa}ic mean
of the 63 (62 in respect of the 26-week R.S.) total portfolio return
residuals for each of the 63 (62).quarters for which the R.S. Tests
are carried out for the given holding period.
+ The expected Rank Sum is +/-1008 (977 for 62 tests) and the Expected
Standard Deviation is 146 (143 for 62 quarters).
"The Significance Probabilities are computed using the normal
approximation for the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test..
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CHAPTER EIGHT
ANALYSIS OF DATA — FART II
EFFICIENCY TESTS IN RESFECT
OF SEMI—STRONG INFORMATION
8-1 — Introduction
8.1.1 - ORGANISATION OF CHAPTER EIGHT
In addition to Section 8.1, this chapter is divided into the
following sections
8.2 - The Method and Results of the Dividend Yield Test
8.3 - The Method and Results of the Dividend Growth Test
8.4 - The Method and Results of the Bonus Issues (stock splits) Test
8.5 - The Method and Results of the Earnings Forecast Error Test
8.1.2 - INTRODUCTION TO SECTIONS 8.2 AND 8.3
- SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW ON DIVIDEND INFORMATION
As is noticeable from the above contents listing, two types of
dividend information will be tested in this study. There are several
reasons for putting this emphasis on dividend information and they
are discussed below.
(a) Dividend and earnings information are the two most intensely,
researched information types. Insofar as dividends are unambiguous
pieces of data and their meaning well understood, they form a most
important type of information to be tested for market efficiency.
(b) As has been explained in Chapter Six, it has been feasible to
gather the complete dividend record for all sample firms for the
whole of the research period (the record in respect of earnings
information is far less complete).
(c) From this writer's understanding of the market, it is apparent
that the Malaysian investors, companies and financial writers pay
much greater attention to dividends than earnings.
While there is little doubt of the importance of dividends as
information processed by the Malaysian market, there is little
knowledge of how efficiently this information is used, unlike the
Western markets. As discussed in Chapter Four, the picture concerning
the degree of efficiency with which the Western markets handle past
dividend information is at present a little unclear. While there are
many researchers who believe that dividends have very little
informational value, many others hold the opposite view. This
dissertation takes the view that this difference in opinion could be
partially explained by the type of dividend announcements on which
the conclusion regarding the informational value of dividends is based
and that some of the differences may be more one of degree rather
than substance. Certain types of dividend announcements could have
far greater informational value and hence market effect than others.
Dividend announcements which contain information already known and
discounted by the market or information which the market believes to
have little useful content would be treated casually by the market.
There are several reasons why many of the dividend announcements in
the US or the British market have little market effect. Firstly, the
sheer sophistication of the market means that much of the information
contained in a "normal" dividend announcement may already be known.
Such could well be the case why Watts (1973) failed to find any
correlation between dividend announcements and future returns as he
used the annual dividend figures. The three interim announcements
could have "given the clue away", as suggested by Laub (1976).
Secondly the market probably understands that past dividends do not
have much predictive value for future dividends or earnings ( as
shown by the work of Little and Rayner (1966) and Fama and Babiak
(1968)). Thirdly, the market probably also understands that dividends
are largely artificial quantities which are determined more at the
whim of corporate managers who are usually most unwilling to reduce
dividends (at least over the short run).
The foregoing comments does not mean that all dividend announcements
has no informational value. It seems to this writer that unusual or
unexpected dividend announcements can have a powerful effect on the
price of stocks. The case of DEC in 1983 or ITT in 1984 could be
cited in partial support of this. Both these stocks lost over one
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third of their market value within a week of their announcing highly
unexpected dividend reductions. The recent work of Asquit and Mullins
(1983) on the strong impact of initiating or resuming dividends after
a long break seems to lend support to this conclusion. It would seem
that the work of Aharony and Swary (1980) on effects of non-concurrent
dividend and earnings announcements supports the same contention. It
seems reasonable to conclude that even in a market where the
informational value of dividends is generally low, the market still
pays some attention to all dividend announcements and that
unexpected or unusual dividend announcements will lead to some market
reactions. Thus the US market can be said to deal very efficienctly
with dividend announcements as a whole. In the schema of market
efficiency proposed in Chapter One, the US market can be said to
almost conform to the Stage III Efficiency. That is, the market
generates a lot of information on dividend payments, the information
so generated is correctly interpreted and in the majority of
instances, the market acts speedily in accordance with its
interpretation of the information on dividends.
Given the efficiency with which the US market deals with most
dividend information, the various types of dividend information are
therefore a good one with which to compare the efficiency of the
Malaysian market. Two types of dividend information are selected for
testing — a relatively simple type and a more complex type. With our
understanding of the market, we can have some prior expectation that
the Malaysian market is likely to deal more efficiently with the
simple information than the complex information. Section 8.2 will
examine the efficiency with which the Malaysian market deals with
dividend yield information. While superficially, dividend yield
information may seem simple to understand and to use for investment
decision making, in reality, it is an extremely complex piece of
information to make proper use of. Section 8.3 will test the
efficiency with which the market makes use of past dividend
information. This is a straightforward type of information to
understand. There has not been a test (as far as this writer knows)
on exactly the same type of information in the West. An explanation
will be provided later as to why this particular type of information
is chosen.
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8- 2 — Test "to Uncover Relationship
of Dividend Yield and Retnr-n
8.2.1 - BACKGROUND TO THE TEST
The gulf between the thinking of lay investors and corporate officers
on the usefulness and importance of dividend on one hand and that of
most academics on the other is probably wider than in any other area
of investment. Until today, most lay investors and corporate officers
pay a lot of attention to the amount of dividend a company pays (as
indicated by the work of Blume and Friend (1978)) and yet a large
number of academics appear to agree with Miller and Modigliani's
position that "dividend is irrelevant". The total amount of return an
investor gets is a combination of dividend and capital gain. If the
investor is rational, it should not make any difference to him in
which form he gets his return after due adjustments have been made
for taxation and transaction costs. Thus, contrary to the thinking of
many fundamentalist writers, buying high dividend yield stocks
should not provide an investor with higher return than buying low or
zero yield stocks.
Tests for the effect on dividend yield on total return on investment
are therefore among some of the commoner tests of efficiency carried
out. However, it is not easy to test the dividend yield effect as
there are many other factors which can affect the return on a stock
other than dividend yield. It is possible that a direct cross
sectional test of dividend yield against returns may produce a result
which is biassland the significance of which would be difficult to
estimate. An example of this type of problem can be seen from the
work of Robinson (1951) as quoted by Brealey (1971). At first glance,
Robinson's work appeared to reveal a strong relationship between
dividend payout ratio and price earnings ratio. This work seemed to
imply a prima facie case for the belief that the market seems to
value high payout stocks. Deeper analysis revealed that this
relationship had been erroneously drawn because several conditions
(temporary low earnings, high leverage or higher expected future
earnings) could all lead to a stock manifesting both high payout and
and high PER although in no sense can it be regarded as "highly
valued".
This realisation led Black and Scholes (1974) to pioneer the use of a
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different technique to study the relationship between dividend yield
and return. They applied an adaptation of the two parameter CAPM
equation given bedewi¬
ng. ) = y + B[E(R ) - Y ] + T C<5. ~ 6 )/6
i o m o oimm
/v
_ t
Where R. = Expected return on stock a
Rm = Expected return on the market
6. = Dividend yield on stock i
6 = Dividend yield on market
m
To avoid bias in the regressions, Black and Scholes grouped the
securities into 25 separate portfolios divided first by beta and then
by yield. The multiple regressions were carried out based on the
monthly data of dividend yield, price and return for every stock
listed on the NYSE for the period 1947-1966. According to Black and
Scholes, there was no significant dividend yield effect.
Blume (1980), later modified the methodology of Black and Scholes in
several ways and replicated the tests on a bigger body of data and
over a longer period of time (1936-1976). Blume similarly used the
grouping technique developed by Black and Scholes. The first
modification was the use of the following regression equation:-
r. = a + b 6. ■+ c 6. ■+ e.
it t t it t it xt
Where r. = Total realised return on stock i
11
Y^t - Anticipated dividend yield on stock i
8. = Beta of stock i
it
The second involved conducting the test on quarterly rather than
monthly data, his reasoning being that since corporations paid
dividend once a quarter, a quarterly regression would lessen the
ex-dividend effect of taxes. The third involved the use of
"anticipated dividend yield" (the ratio of of dividends paid over a
12-month period to the beginning-of-period price adjusted for
general market movements) instead of the measure for dividend yield
adopted by Black and Scholes ( which is the ratio of the dividends
paid over the previous 12 months to the price at the end of these 12
months). The third of these modifications appears to be the crucial
one. It would seem that using end of the period price to compute
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dividend yield (a la Black and Scholes) would weaken the power of this
test since this measure of future dividend yield is only accurate if
dividend payment is very sticky. Blume's concept of "Anticipated
Dividend Yield" may be clearer if the computation steps are




D1 + D2 fflt
ANTDY = x
P(t-1) M (t-1)
Where ANTDY = Anticipated Dividend Yield
P = Stock Price
D = Dividend payments
MI = Market Index
From the regressions carried out, Blume came to the conclusion that
for certain decades of the research period, there was a significant
dividend yield effect. Blume did not conclude that the market was
irrational from this finding. Instead, he suggested that the most
plausible explanation is that the market failed to anticipate the
greater relative return for high yielding stocks. In the model of
market information system developed in Chapter One, this would be
Stage I efficiency. That is, the market has the information but it
does not correctly interprete the meaning of its content.
8.2.2 - METHOD AND SAMPLE
Given the very much smaller number of securities in the present
database, there is no possibility of replicating the methodology of
Black and Scholes or Blume. However, as the required data are all
ready in the database and since the dividend yield test is a
fundamental test for market efficiency,. it would be interesting to
uncover the Malaysian market's reaction to this information.
It is therefore decided to carry out this test using direct cross
sectional regression without grouping. This test is carried out with
the realisation that it will not be a powerful test. In a sense, this
test is a "negative" test to be considered in conjunction with the
results of all the other tests to be carried out. If the test reveals
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an association which is contrary to a majority of all the tests then
we have to be very careful in interpreting the result. On the other
hand, if the test reveals result which is inline with the other
tests, we can perhaps more confidently accept the result as an
accurate one.
As Blume's methodology is a development of Black and Scholes' and
there had been no adverse critisms of his work, it would seem to be
more logical to adopt his method to the extent possible. There are two
minor modifications to Blume's method. Firstly, in his tests, he
adjusted the "anticipated dividend yield" by using the ratio of the
year beginning market price index to the year end market price index.
As there is no reliable market index available in Malaysia and such
information is not readily obtainable from the database, it was
decided to use the market return to adjust the "anticipated dividend
yield". Secondly, in his test, the regressions were carried out once a
quarter to minimise the tax effect of the quarterly dividend payment.
As the vast majority of Malaysian companies pay dividends twice rather
than four times a year, the current test is carried out with
semi-annual regressions. It was also decided to extend the test to
include also the regressions of the total return at the end of one
year in addition to six months. The reason for doing so is that it is
thought that if dividend yield has any effect, its effect may not
show up over such a short run under the Malaysian conditions.
The tests are straightforward. The data on the beta, dividend yield
and total return for each stock as well as return on the market are
all in the database. The sample is made up of all the stocks in the
database. The regressions are performed twice (i.e for the six month
return and the annual return) once every six months. This results in
30 regressions for the six monthly return and 29 regressions for the
yearly return. The multiple regressions are carried out using SPSS.
The summary results of the regressions carried out are shown below as
Tables 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 respectively for the six monthly return and
the annual return.
TABLE 8.2.1
RESULTS OF CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS OF 26-WEEK RETURN ON
ANTICIPATED DIVIDEND YIELD AND BETA
r. = a + b6. + cB. + £
it t t it t it
































































































RESULTS OF CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSION OF 52 WEEK RETURN ON
ANTICIPATED DIVIDEND YIELD AND BETA FOR PERIOD
r. = a + b6. + c 6 • _ + £
it t t it t it



























































































*:Every week of the research period is given a number starting with
792 as the first week of 1968.
8.2.3 - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ON THE DIVIDEND YIELD TESTS
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(A) The 26 Week Realised Return
As can be seen from Table 8.2.1, anticipated dividend yield has very
poor predictive power for total returns obtainable on a stock. The
overall regression coefficient for dividend yield is very small; the
average being only -0.007. Of the coefficients, 13 are negative. The
negative average value is caused by the fact that the negative values
are generally larger than the positive values. It is interesting to
note that the negative coefficients coincide with periods of high
market activities and rapidly increasing prices. During such periods,
the shares of both high growth and speculative companies (both of
which share the common characteristics of low dividend yield) has a
tendency to be bid up by a greater extent than the "average"
stock.
Of the 30 cross sectional regressions carried out, in only one case
does the F value of the regression coefficient for dividend yield
exceed 4.00 (for a significance probability of about 0.025). The
average of the F values is only 1.08.
(B) The 52 Week Realised Return
The anticipated dividend yield has slightly better predictive power
for returns over a period of one year. The average coefficient being
-0.028 and in four cases, the F value exceeds 4.00. The average F
value is 1.96. Such level of significance can still be termed very
low.
(C) Discussion of the Result
We have seen that over both 6 months and one year, the predictive
power of anticipated dividend yield for adjusted realised returns is
very poor. There are several possible alternative explanations for
this result. Firstly, the market is very rational and fully
comprehends the ramifications surrounding dividend yield as outlined
at the beginning of this section. Secondly, the market may be less
efficient than what was demonstrated by Blume such that its
investors do not possess or make full use of the information on
dividend yield. Thirdly, the regression result is in some way biasedand
does not provide a true picture of the situation. At this point, it
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is very difficult to ascertain which of the explanations is the
correct one.
Taken on its own, the result of the dividend yield test is probably
not very material. It is perhaps better to consider this result in
the light of the results from the other tests. As will be shown in
the sections on the Dividend Growth (DG) and the Earnings Forecast
Error (EFE) tests, the Malaysian market apparently does make use of
past dividend and earnings information although it does not seem to
use it correctly or quickly. It seems to this researcher that it is
more difficult to make use of dividend yield information than the
past dividend and earnings information. In the DG and EFE tests,
certain assumptions are made about the market's use of past
information on which to base stock investment decisions. In both
cases, the information processing is quite straightforward. In the
DG's cases, the market is assumed to base its investment decisions on
the rate and stability of the past dividend payment stream. In the
EFE's case, the market is assumed to base its investment decisions on
the amount by which the current EPS deviates from its past pattern.
But in order to make investment decisions based on dividend yield
information, the market is required to perform an additional step of
information processing. That is, the riskiness as well as the future
growth rate of each of the stock has to be taken into account in
conjunction with the past dividend payment and current price. Only
then will it be able to decide whether, at the current dividend
yield, the stock makes a good investment. It would seem that this is
rather more difficult than the other two types of information
processing. If Blume's conclusion is correct in that the US investors
are not fully efficient on the use of dividend yield information, it
is possible that the Malasyian investors may be even less efficient.
In view of the results from the other three tests on accounting
information, it seems to this researcher that it would be more
logical to conclude that the possiblity exists that Malaysian market
does not make much use of dividend yield information in making its
investment decision. This is because information on the future
growth rate of stocks is not generally available and investors are
therefore not able to relate this information to the correct pricing
of stocks in term of their dividend yield. It is interesting to note
that over a period of one year, dividend yield appears to have
slightly more predictive power for return. Tenuous as this evidence
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is, it would seem to suggest that there may be a small number of long
term investors who could be in posession of more in-depth dividend
yield information.
8.2.4 - CONCLUSION
Taken by itself, the dividend yield test as described is not a
particularly useful test. The importance of this test is to round out
the range of informational efficiency being tested in this
dissertation. It is also important in that it provides a comparison
with the situation in the US.It is therefore better not to make a
statement regarding the efficiency of the Malaysian market with
respect to dividend yield information at this stage. Another study of
the result will be made in Chapter Nine.
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8-3 — Test "to Uncov <s i~ -fche D <sg it e e?
o:F Efficiency in -fctie Use cf
F'as-fc Dividend Infomna-t ion
8.3.1 - BACKGROUND TO THE TEST
This test is rooted in the belief (the basis for this belief has been
discussed in Section 8.1.2) that given the complexity of the process
of stock evaluation, it is unlikely that in a well developed market,
a simple rule of thumb based on historical accounting information is
of any use in pricing stocks. That is, it is very unlikely that a
simple rule of thumb like "buy only blue chips" or "buy stocks with
high dividend growth" will yield abnormal profit. In an efficient
market, competitive bidding will ensure that the prices of stocks
chosen using such rules would rise to a level whereby its future
return would be in line with that of the market.
However, in a less than perfectly efficient market, there may exist
some investors who would attempt to follow such rules. By following
such rules, they would bid the price of the chosen stocks to a level
where their future return would be less than what one would expect
(Stage II efficiency). In an even less efficient market, such rules
may be made to yield abnormal profit (Stage I efficiency). We know
that the US market is of the first type as far as most types of
accounting information are concerned. The purpose of this test is to
explore how inefficient the Malaysian market is.
The accounting information to be tested here is dividend information,
more specifically, the information contained in the dividend series
of each firm in terms of its consistency and growth rate. The reasons
for choosing dividend as against earnings information have been
provided in Section 8.1.2. It is to be noted that no Western
researcher has performed a test on exactly the same type of
information. Although this test can be regarded as "new" in this
sense, it. is actually well founded on previous tests which have been
performed in the West. Its concept and methodology are almost
entirely based on the test conducted by Jones, Tweedy and
Whittington (1976). In addition, Watts (1973) has carried out a very
similar test on the information content of dividend changes.
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The idea behind Jones, Tweedie and Whittington (JTW) is that a less
than perfectly efficient market may pay "too much" attention to the
past good performance of the listed companies. That is, companies
which have undergone a period of good performance may be bid up
excessively such that the purchasing of these stocks would provide
lower than expected return. The corollary of that would be that the
purchasing of stocks of "bad performing" companies would yield
abonormal high return.
JTW defined "good performing companies" as those which have: (a)
above-average past profitability (defined as a high Return on Equity);
and (b) high Price/Earnings ratio. The result of the test showed
that it was not possible to achieve abnormal returns by buying stocks
with poor past performance.
Assuming that the British market is as efficient as the American one,
it is not surprising that JTW were not able to uncover evidence in
support of their conjecture that the market could possibly pay too
much attention to past performance.
Given the preference for using dividend information for this study,
it was therefore decided to modify JTW's test slightly in terms of its
definition of "good performing companies". Instead of basing the
definition of good performance on high ROE and high PER, this test is
base.d on high past dividend growth rate and high consistency for
such growth rate. There is also one practical reason for choosing
these particular criteria. In an economy that is largely based on
commodities, listed firms do not demonstrate stable earnings. In
contrast, there are a number of large listed companies which
demonstrate high and regular dividend growth rate.
8.3.2 - METHOD AND SAMPLE
The test is based on the conjecture that the Malaysian market either
fails to make use of past dividend information or uses it incorrectly
in the process of pricing stocks. Assuming that good performance is
consistent (unlike the Western companies), if it does not make use of
past dividend information, it would be possible to obtain abnormal
gain by purchasing companies with past good performance. This would
be a case of gross inefficiency. It is likely that the market would
be more efficient that this. It is possible that the Malaysian
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market, being less developed than the British one, would behave in
the manner postulated by JTW.That being so, the purchase of companies
with good past performance will provide subnormal returns while the
purchase of poor performing companies will provide supranormal
returns.
The first step in running the test is to carry out five-year moving
linear regressions on the dividend record for every one of the stocks
in the database. The regressions are performed annually starting with
1971 (using data from 1967-1971). Each of the regressions is based on
five years' dividend record computed with "six monthly rest". That
is, the total dividend paid in the previous 12 months is computed
once every six months ( dividend is usually paid twice a year in
Malaysia). Thus there are ten data points for each regression. While
it would be more logical to perform semi-logarithmic regressions on
the data, linear regressions are used owing to the problem of breaks
in the stream of dividends. It is felt that over five years, the bias
introduced by using linear regression on a series with probably
multiplicative rate of increase would not be too excessive.
After the yearly regressions have been performed, the stocks are then
ranked according to their annual dividend growth rates. From this
annual ranking of dividend growth rate and the information on
consistency of dividend growth in terms of its coefficient of
determination, it is possible to choose two categories (portfolios)
of stocks respectively known as Class A and Class B stocks. The Class
A stocks are defined as the 14 stocks which are top ranked in
dividend growth rates with a regression coefficient for dividend
growth of greater than 0.88 (giving a coefficient of determination of
0.77). Class B stocks are defined as the 14 stocks which are bottom
ranked in terms of dividend growth rates without taking into account
the coefficient of regression of the computed growth rate. The number
of stocks within each category and the hurdle regression coefficient
are chosen in order to provide an adequate degree of separation
between the two categories of stocks in all the years.
The logarithm of the return residual for each stock within each
portfolio is recorded both on an annual as well as cumulative basis
for each of the years subsequent to portfolio formation till the end
of the research period. The total and mean return relative of each
portfolio for all the years are also computed. A sample of the work
sheet (that of the 1980 portfolio) from this step is reproduced as
Exhibit 8.3.1 appended to the end of this section.
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The mean return relative for each portfolio is then compared with the
mean return relative of all the stocks within the database for the
respective year both on an annual as well as cumulative basis. The
comparisons are given at the end of this section as Table 8.3.4
(annual) and Table 8.3.5 (cumulative).
It is to be noted that the mean risk adjusted cumulative return
relative of all the stocks in the database gradually increases with
the years such that at the end of twelve years, it is considerably
different from 1.0. There are two probable causes for this
non-stationa"*"i'ty. Firstly, the regressions carried out for the
computation of beta are based on weekly returns and as a result the
long term growth trend is probably masked to a certain extent.
Secondly, the portfolios are equal weighted which gives greater
relative weight to the smaller companies which probably grew faster
during this period.
8.3.3 - DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION
(A) ANNUAL RETURNS FROM PORTFOLIOS - FROM YEAR OF SELECTION TO 1983
Individual Portfolios As can be seen from the last column of Table
8.3.4, the mean return relatives of the individual Class A and Class
B portfolios for each of the years following their formation to the
end of the research period do not appear to be significantly
different from the mean return relative of the stocks in the
database for the given year. For the Class A Portfolios, the fraction
of the years in which the chosen stocks produce a superior mean
return compared with the database stocks varies from 3/11 (0.18) to
2/3 (0.67) with a mean 0.48. For the Class B Portfolios, the fraction
varies from 7/10 (0.70) to 1/3 (0.33) with a mean of 0.52.
It would appear that over the longer term, the portfolio selection
method cannot produce a portfolio which can provide a return which is
significantly different from the average on a year-to-year basis. The
cross sectional comparisons however produce very different conclusion
as we can see in the next paragraph.
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SUMMARY OF CROSS SECTIONAL PERFORMANCE
OF CLASS A AND CLASS B STOCKS
- ANNUAL COMPARISON WITH ALL OTHER STOCKS IN DATABASE
YEAR NO OF NO CASES SIGNIF. NO CASES SIGNIF
AFTER CASES IN WHICH PROB. IN WHICH PROB.*
PORT. PORT. A PORT. B
FORM'N IS BETTER IS BETTER
+ 1 12 4 0.1331 11 0.0012
+ 2 11 4 NS 4 NS
+ 3 10 6 NS 6 NS
+ 4 9 5 NS 4 NS
+ 5 8 5 NS 5 NS
+ 6 7 2 NS 2 NS
+ 7 6 3 NS 2 NS
+ 8 5 3 NS 4 NS
+ 9 4 3 NS 1 NS
+10 3 3 0.0 1 NS
+ 11 2 0 0.0 0 0.0
+ 12 1 0 0.0 1 0.0
*: Significance Probability obtained by Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests.
NS : Significance Probability Is Greater Than 0.15
Cross Section of Portfolios Table 8.3.1 above provides a summary
of the cross sectional performance of the Class A and Class B
portfolios compared with the database stocks. The detailed
information can be seen in Table8.3.4 which is appended to the end of
this section. The cross sectional comparison uncovers an interesting
difference in the relative performance of the Class A Portfolio and
the Class B Portfolio.
In the first year after portfolios formation, the Class B portfolios
appear to perform very much better than the database stocks. Of the
12 portfolios available for comparison, 11 outperform the database
stocks in terms of mean risk adjusted return relative. When Wilcoxon
Signed Rank test is applied to the ranking of the differences in the
mean performance of the Class B stocks versus the database stocks,
the null hypothesis that the two should not produce distinguishable
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return is rejected at the significance level of 0.0012. There is
therefore little doubt that stocks chosen for the Class B portfolio
perform significantly better than the database stocks on an overall
basis in the first year after selection into the Class B portfolio.
As can be seen from the same table, in the first year after portfolio
formation, the Class A portfolios appear to perform slightly worse
than the database stocks. Of the 12 portfolios compared, only 4
outperform the mean database performance. When similar Wilcoxon
Signed Rank test as above is applied to the differences in the return
relatives, the test indicates that the inferior performance of the
Class A stocks is not quite significant ( significance probability of
0.1331).
In the second and subsequent years after portfolios formation, neither
the Class A nor the Class B portfolios perform significantly better or
worse than the database stocks until the tenth year and after (Table
8.3.1). By this time, there are only three or less instances for
comparison and the results cannot be usefully considered.
Performance of Individual Portfolios One Year After Formation
Given the interesting overall cross sectional performance of the
Class A and Class B portfolios in the first year after portfolios
formation, it is decided to examine more closely the performance of
the individual portfolios one year after formation.
On an indivdual basis, the performance of the Class B stocks after
one year is less conclusive. When Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests are applied
to the yearly ranking of the individual Class B stock return
relatives versus all the other return relatives in the database, 8
out of the 12 portfolios produce a result which can be said to be
significantly different from that of the database. The detail of
the results of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests are provided in Table
8.3.2 below.
When the same tests are applied to the yearly ranking of return
relatives of the Class A stocks versus the rest of the database, in
only five instances can the performance of the Class A stocks be




RESULTS OF WILCOXON RANK SUM TESTS APPLIED TO COMPARISONS OF RETURN
RELATIVES BETWEEN PORTFOLIO STOCKS AND ALL OTHER STOCKS IN THE
DATABASE FOR THE GIVEN YEAR ONE YEAR AFTER PORTFOLIO FORMATION













NS : Significance Probability Is Greater than 0.15
(B) CUMULATIVE RETURNS FROM PORTFOLIOS
Class B Portfolios On a cumulative basis, the superior return
achieved by the Class B portfolios in the first year appears to
dissipate rapidly in the next two or three years. As can be seen from
Table 8.3.3 below, the fraction of the Class B portfolios which has
superior mean return relative declines from 11/12, to 8/11, 7/10 and
6/9 from the first to the fourth year after portfolios formation.
From the sixth year onward, there are indications that the Class B
portfolios perform less well than the database stocks but the sample
is too small to make a stronger assertion. When Wilcoxon Signed Rank
tests are performed on the the ranking of the cross sectional return
relatives, it is only during the first three years that the Class B
portfolio cumulative returns show significantly better performance
than the database. The null hypothesis that there should be no
difference between the performances of the two can be rejected at
levels of significance of respectively 0.0012, 0.0337 and 0.0967 for
the first three years. Taking into consideration the findings on the
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annual portfolio return relatives discussed above, it is probably
correct to say that the abnormal return obtainable from the Class B
portfolios is available for a short duration only; much of the
benefit is lost by the second year.
Class A Portfolios The cumulative return obtainable on the Class
A portfolios is very different from that of the Class B portfolios.
The marginally inferior return of the first year after portfolios
formation appears to get steadily worse over the years. As can be
seen from Table 8.3.3, the fraction of the Class A portfolios having
a superior mean return compared to the database stocks has fallen to
1/10 and 1/9 by third and fourth years respectively. Although the
return appears to improve a little in the fifth and subsequent
years, the improvement is small. In all years from the third onward,
the cumulative return relative obtainable from Class A portfolio is
significantly inferior to that of the database as a whole. Evidence
therefore indicates that the inferior return obtained from Class A
stocks can be very persistent; its effect seems to linger for many
years.
TABLE 8.3.3 274
SUMMARY OF CUMULATIVE CROSS SECTIONAL
PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE OF CLASS A AND CLASS B STOCKS
YEARS NO OF NO CASES SIGNIF. NO CASES SIGNIF.
AFTER CASES IN WHICH PROB.* IN WHICH PROB.*
PORT. PORT. A PORT. B
FORM'N IS BETTER IS BETTER
+ 1 12 4 0.1331 11 0.0012
+ 2 11 5 0.1030 8 0.0337
+ 3 10 1 0.0737 7 0.0967
+ 4 9 1 0.0098 6 NS
+ 5 8 2 0.0273 4 NS
+ 6 7 2 0.0391 1 NS
+ 7 6 1 0.0781 2 NS
+ 8 5 1 0.0675 1 NS
+ 9 4 0 0.0 0 0.0
+10 3 0 0.0 0 0.0
+ 11 2 0 0.0 0 0.0
+12 1 0 0.0 0 0.0
*Significance Probability computed using Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test
8.3.4 - CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion of the result from the JTW type
tests on a stock selection method based on historical dividend data,
it is possible to make the following conclusions regarding the
Malaysian stockmarket:-
(1) It appears that the Malaysian stockmarket is not inefficient to
the extreme with regard to historical dividend data in that it does
not appear possible to make abnormal gains by simply buying "good"
stocks or selling "bad" stocks;
(2) It appears that the market does make use of past dividend
information for stock selection. Evidence uncovered seems to indicate
that the market places a premium on stocks with rapid and consistent
dividend growth and a discount on stocks with slow dividend growth.
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Such marking ups and discountings appear to be carried out to q.t\
extent which is not fully justifiable. The return in the years
subsequent to their selection based on past dividend criteria is
inconsistent with their past performance. There is strong evidence to
suggest that stocks with a history of poor dividend performance may
be excessively undervalued by the market such that in the immediate
years after their selection, their mean perfomance is superior to
that of the other stocks in the database. There is also some
evidence, though less strong, to suggest that stocks with good
dividend performance may be overvalued by the market such that the
return obtainable from the latter stocks is inferior to the market as
a whole in the years subsequent to their selection.
(3) It appears that the period during which Class B stocks are
selling at a discount is relatively short - about one year. From the
second year onward, the stocks appear to be selling at the same level
as other stocks such that their returns in subsequent years are
indistinguishable from the average return. It is possible that the
five year period used as the basis of selecting Class A and Class B
stocks may be too long such that similar benefit can be obtained even
if the selection is based on four years of dividend information. If
this is the case then the undervaluation of Class B stocks may be
longer than it appears here.
The poor returns obtainable from Class A stocks appear* to persist
for a very long period. The persistence of the low return from Class
A stocks is mystifying. It could perhaps be due to the lack of
persistence of good dividend performance of Malaysian/Singaporean
companies. A period of strong dividend growth could be a "flash in
the pan" event not to be repeated for some years. The market may not
be aware of this and persist in overvaluing the "good" stocks for
many more years after their period of good performance is over. At
this juncture, it is not possible to offer any evidence to support
this conjecture.
TABLE 0.3.4
MEAN ANNUAL PORTFOLIOS' RISK ADJUSTED RETURN RELATIVES
(A) LONGITUDINAL STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL PORTFOLIOS
NUMBER OF YEARS AFTER PORTFOLIO FORMATION






A 1.1484 1.0578 0.9955 1.1034 1.0727 1.1100 1.0540 0.9950 1.0282 1.0667 0.9356 0.9805 7/12
B 1.2741 0.9497 0.9464 1.0455 0.9541 1.0457 1.0242 1.1209 1.1648 0.9864 0.9265 1.0368 4/12
DB 1.1282 1.1212 0.9853 0.9923 1.0597 1.0786. 1.0258 1.0785 1.1493 1.0276 0.9628 1.0368 -
1972
A 1.0134 0.9638 1.0922 0.9970 1.0250 1.01613 0.9581 1.0149 1.1022 0.9965 0.9524 3/13
B 1.0-907 0.9124 0.9985 0.9242 1.0913 1.0495 1.0509 1.4000 1.03-83 0.8402 0.7761 5/11
DB 1.1212 0.9853 0.9923 1.0597 1.0786. 1.0258 1.0785 1.1493 1.0276 0.9628 O.S
1973
A 0.8915 1.1023 0.9908 1.0565 1.1412 1.0346 0.9912 1.0591 0.9779 0.9892 5/10
B 1.0593 0.9-914 1.06® 1.1766 1.0379 1.0172 1.3706. 1.0958 0.8067 1.0186 7/10
DB 0.9353 0.9923 1.0597 1.0786 1.0258 1.0785 1.1493 1.0276 0.9628 O.S
1974
A 1.0821 1.0052 0.9989 1.0891 1.1169 1.1164 0.9500 0.9864 1.0588 5/9
B 1.0062 1.22-92 1.2105 1.0190 1.0326 0.9648 1.0799 1.0240 0.9637 5/9
DB 0.9923 1.0597 1.0786 1.0258 1.0785 1.1493 1.0276 0.9628 0.9808
1975
A 0.9299 1.0274 1.0708 1.004 1.0374 0.9989 0.9839 1.0964 3/8
B 1.1950 1.2343 0.9752 1.0040 1.3895 1.1911 0.8947 0.9093 4/8
DB 1.0597 1.0786 1.0258 1.0785 1.1493 1.0276 0.9628 O.S
1976
A 1.0525 1.0642 1.1094 1.0252 1.0356 0.9217 1.0782 4/7
B 1.12-94 1.0205 1.1192 1.1701 1.1375 0.9135 0.8615 4/7
DB 1.0786 1.0258 1.0785 1.1493 1.0276 0.9628 O.S
1977
A 1.0437 1.0731 1.1178 1.0211 0.9216 1.0606 2/6
B 1.1053 1.1818 1.2238' 1.0161 1.0092 0.8809 4/6




A 1.0733 1.0889 0.9936 0.9926 1.0239
B 1.1385 1.1391 1.0748 1.0441 0.8819




A 1.0282 0.9759 0.9783 1.0406
B 1.3608 1.1046 0.9495 0.8907




A 0.9191 0.9730 1.1234
B 1.1547 0.9092 0.8856















(B) CROSS SECTIONAL STUDIES OF PORTFOLIOS OF SAME AGE -
MEAN RISK ADJUSTED RETURN RELATIVES OF PORTFOLIOS OF SAME AGE
NUMBER OF YEARS AFTER PORTFOLIOS FORMATION
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10 +11 +12
A 1.0118 1.0403 1.0471 1.0473 1.0468 1.0369 1.0026 1.0304 1.0418 1.0175 0.9440 0.9805
B 1.1286 1.0542 1.0452 1.0323 1.0686 1.1118 1.0364 1.1100 0.9809 0.9484 0.9513 1.0368
DB 1.0492 1.0420 1.0295 1.0341 1.0914 1.0433 1.0375 1.0398 1.0301 0.9904 0.9718 0.9808
NO OF CASES IN WHICH CLASS A AND B PORTFOLIOS ARE SUPERIOR TO DATABASE STOCKS
A 4 4 6 5 5 2 3 3 3 3 0 0
B 11 4 6 4 5 2 2 4 1 1 0 1
NUMBER OF CASES IN EACH AGE GROUP
12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
TABLE S.3.5
ANNUAL PORTFOLIOS' ADJUSTED RETURN RELATIVES - CUMULATIVE
NUMBER OF TEARS AFTER PORTFOLIO FORMATION
PORTFOLIO +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10 +11
YEAR TYPE
A 1.2004 1.2171 1.3367 1.4723 1.7375 1.6089 1.6135 1.7173 1.7664 1,5485
1971 B 1.186.7 1.0819 1.0842 1.0185 1.0536. 1.074 1.2054 1.40-98 1.3474 1.1877
DB 1.2650 1.2464 1.236.8 1.3107 1.4137 1.4503 1.56.41 1.7976 1.8472 1.7784
A 0.9929 1.06.12 1.0717 1.0787 1.0-949 1.0242 1.0337 1.1328 1.1315 1.0818
1972 B 1.0116 0.9703 0.8995 0.9468 0.9757 1.0351 1.3471 1.2628 1.0374 0.9689
DB 1.0476 1.0-963 1.1617 1.2530 1.2854 1.3863 1.5932 1.6372 1.5763 1.5458
A 0.9908 0.9477 0.9995 1.1254 1.1452 1.1606 1.1446 1.0945 1.0755
1973 B 1.0688 1.1874 1.3967 1.3248 1.36.42 1.69® 1.8163 1.3687 1.28-95
DB 0.9777 1.0361 1.1175 1.4641 1.2364 1.4270 1.4602 1.4058 1.3786
A 1.0727 1.0844 1.1584 1.2934 1.4761 1.3234 1.2701 1.3065
1974 B 1.2163 1.4919 1.3878 1.4106 1.3897 1.4228 1.4228 1.2830
DB 1.0516 1.1342 1.1635 1.2549 1.4422 1.4820 1.4268 1.3992
A 0.9685 1.0032 1.1294 1.2251 1.1361 1.0599 1.1602
1975 B 1.5120 1.3413 1.3329 1.8164 2.2206. 1.6874 1.4080
DB 1.1430 1.1725 1.2646 1.4534 1.4935 1.4379 1.4101
A 1.1139 1.2443 1.2910 1.2522 101271 1.20-94
1976 B 1.1091 1.2130 1.5018 1.4762 1.2634 1.0443
DB 1.0645 1.1933 1.3715 1.4093 1.3368 1.3306
+12
A 1.1201 1.2540 1.1855 1.0753 1.1446
1977 B 1.2941 1.6399 1.4725 1.4223 1.2303
DB 1.1064 1.2716 1.3066 1.2850 1.2337
A 1.1723 1.0889 1.0885 1.1218
1978 B 1.3018 1.3465 1.3688 1.1606
DB 1.2395 1.2737 1.2263 1.2026
A 0.9817 0.9549 0.9482
1979 B 1.5264 1.2652 1.1071
DB 1.1810 1.1370 1.1150
A 0.9083 0.9649






MEAN A 1.1472 1.0825 1.1342 1.2055 1.2659 1.2329 1.2444 1.3128 1.3245 1.3152 1.4568
RETURN B 1.1939 1.2409 1.2835 1.3220 1.3568 1.3271 1.4399 1.3325 1.2248 1.0787 1.1540
REL. DB 1.0918 1.1531 1.2182 1.3254 1.3517 1.4180 1.4909 1.5600 4.6007 1.6621 1.7440
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EXHIBIT 8.3.1
WORKSHEET FOR THE COMPUTATION OF INDIVIDUAL STOCK AND PORTFOLIO
RETURN RELATIVES AND MEAN PORTFOLIO RETURN RELATIVES
1981 1982 1983
RETURN ANTI LOG RETURN ANTI LOG CUM RET ANTI LOG RETURN ANTI LOG CUM RETUR ANTILOG
CLASS B STOCKS
BJT -0.3288 0.7198 -0.1240 0.8834 -0.4528 0.6358 0.0584 1.0602 -0.3944 0.6741
PRC 0.2424 1.2743 -0.0066 0.9934 0.2359 1.2660 0.0507 1.0520 0.2865 1.3318
NBT 0.2325 1.2618 0.4736 1.6057 0.7061 2.0261 -0.4638 0.6289 0.2423 1.2742
PMC -0.1911 0.8261 0.0264 0.0267 -0.1647 0.8481 0.1484 1.1600 -0.0163 0.9838
UOL 0.4344 1.5440 -0.1723 0.8417 0.2621 1.2996 -0.3139 0.7306 -0.0519 0.9495
AKM -0.1058 0.8996 0.1400 1.1503 0.0342 1.0348 -0.0004 0.9996 0.0338 1.0344
MYS 0.4222 1.5253 -0.5563 0.5733 -0.1341 0.8745 0.1157 1.1227 -0.0184 0.9817
PRT 0.6195 1.8580 -0.6979 0.4976 -0.0784 0.9246 -0.0308 0.9696 -0.1092 0.8965
SLP 0.0765 1.0795 -0.3394 0.7122 -0.262-9 0.7688 -0.2682 0.7648 -0.5311 0.5880
CEH -0.2415 0.7854 0.2011 1.2228: -0.0404 0.9604 -0.1183 0.8884 -0.1587 0.8532
SPP -0.2015 0.8175 -0.4420 0.6427 -0.6435 0.5255 -0.1018 0.9032 -0.7453 0.4746
CTD -0.0215 0.9787 -0.2727 0.7613 -0.2-942 0.7451 -0.3906 0.6766. -0.6849 0.5042
CPP 0.0893 1.0934 -0.2370 0.7890 -0.1477 0.8627 -0.1875 0.8290 -0.3352 0.7152
MER 0.4071 1.5025 0.0275 1.0279 0.4346 1.5444 -0.4908 0.6121 -0.056.2 0.9454
AV'G 0.1024 -0.1414 -0.0390 -0.1424 -0.1814
TOTAL 16.1659 12.7281 14.3163 12.3977 12.2065
MEAN 1.1547 0.9092 1.0226 0.8855 0.8719
CUSS A STOCKS
BTD -0.4809 0.6182 -0.3855 0.6801 -0.8664 0.4205 0.36.03 1.4337 -0.5062 0.6028
HLO 0.0322 1.0327 0.1530 1.1653 0.1852 1.2034 -0.0597 0.9421 0.1255 1.1337
CSB 0.0979 1.1028 -0.2562 0.7740 -0.1583 0.8536 -0.0179 0.9822 -0.1762 0.8385
CMC -0.1815 0.8340 0.1002 1.1054 -0.0313 0.9219 0.3173 1.3734 0.2360 1.2662
TAN -0.4727 0.6233 0.1318 1.1409 -0.3409 0.7111 0.1924 1.2122 -0.1485 0.8620
GNS 0.0697 1.0722 -0.1276 0.8802 -0.0579 0.9437 0.0998 1.1050 0.0419 1.042-8
TAS 0.2105 1.2343 0.1327 1.1419 0.3432 1.4095 -0.3871 0.6791 -0.0439 0.9571
UAC 0.0858 1.0895 -0.1346 0.8740 -0.048"? 0.9523 0.1868 1.2054 0.1380 1.1479
KLK -0.2221 0.8008 0.1244 1.1324 -0.0978 0.9069 0.1836 1.2016 0.0859 1.0897
DMI 0.0896 1.0937 0.0429 1.0439 0.1325 1.1417 -0.2067 0.8133 -0.0742 0.9285
ESS -0.0187 0.9815 0.1198 1.1273 0.1012 1.1065 0.2091 1.2325 0.3102 1.3638
MTC 0.1253 1.1335 0.0742 1.0770 0.1995 1.2208 -0.1732 0.8410 0.0263 1.0266
PTL -0.5100 0.6005 -0.2778 0.7574 -0.7878 0.4549 0.4222 1.5254 -0.3655 0.6938.
RHM -0.4302 0.6504 -0.3247 0.7228 -0.7549 0.4701 0.1668 1.1815 -0.5881 0.5554
AVG -0.1146 -0.0448 -0.1595 0.0924 -0.0671
TOTAL 12.8677 13.6226 12.7168 15.7282 13.5087
MEAN 0.9191 0.9730 0.9083 1.1234 0.9649
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8.4 — A. Test to Unco-ver- the Market ' s
Reaction to Bonus Xssn.es
8.4.1 - BACKGROUND TO THE TEST
This test is based on the wellknown work of Fama, Fisher, Jensen and
Roll (1969) (FFJR) which does not require introduction here. FFJR
found that the US market appeared to respond efficiently to the
announcement of stock splits. That is, the market seems to
understands that stock splits per se do not add value to the stocks
concerned. Thus, after the announcement of a split, stocks do not on
an average provide higher than normal return. More specifically, they
found that stock splits seemed to be the result of a period of rising
stock price rather than the other way round. Stock splits could
therefore be regarded as confirmation of the market's expectation
that a particular stock is going to do well. If this expectation is
fulfilled ( by the occurence of a stock split with an increased
dividend later), the stock's price would not show any further
response. If this expectation is not fulfilled, as in the case of
stocks which have had to reduce dividend subsequent to the split, the
price of the stocks involved would decline. The market can therefore
be said to be very efficient in terms of information on stock splits.
However, the situation in Malaysia gives the impression that the
investors do not seem to understand fully the meaning of a bonus
issue. A student of finance schooled in the Western tradition who
moves to Malaysia, would be amazed by the amount of press coverage
and general interest generated by rumours or news of an impending
bonus. This is very much in contrast to the way American investors
treat the news of an impending stock split. This leads this
researcher to postulate that it is conceivable that the Malaysian
market may not treat the news of bonus issues as efficiently as the
US market treats news of a stock split. It is therefore proposed
that the FFJR test is replicated as closely as possible in Malaysia.
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8.4.2 - METHOD AND SAMPLE
(A) METHOD
Malaysia, much like the rest of the British Commonwealth, uses the
British accounting procedures (with a few exceptions). As a result,
stock splits are not normally practised by the listed companies.
Instead, like British firms, they issue bonus shares. Although bonus
issues are procedurally different from stock splits, they are
identical from the financial point of view. FFJR's method will
therefore be replicated using bonus issue announcements rather than
stock splits. FFJR's methodology will be replicated with four
modifications.
Firstly weekly data is used instead of monthly data. It is expected
that weekly data would provide a finer picture of the market's
reaction. Secondly, the CAR is computed for 50 weeks before and after
the bonus announcement rather than 30 months before and after the
announcement. The reason for doing so is that it is obvious from
looking at the results of FFJR's tests that much of the important
"action" takes place in the 24 month period surrounding the split
announcement. Third, the status of "increased" or "decreased"
dividend paymeht of a stock is defined on an absolute basis rather
than relative to the average of all' the stocks listed on the
Exchange. Defined on this basis, one would often obtain the situation
of a static dividend payment which is not obtained in FFJR's
methodology since it is extremely unlikely that the rate of change in
the dividend payment of a stock is identical to that of the average
of all stocks. As a result, stocks which maintain the same absolute
dividend after the announcement are regarded as being in the same
category as those having reduced dividend on the reasonable
assumption that in Malaysia, the average change in the dividend
payment of all listed companies is positive.
The last and probably the only major modification to FFJR's method is
in the way by which the alphas and betas (required for the
computation of the residuals) are computed. FFJR realised that the
alphas and betas would not be stable around the time of the split
announcements. In order to compute the "normal" alphas and betas,
they use the data from the whole of the research period (1927-1959)
in a single block for carrying out the regressions and they also
exclude the data for the 15 months before and after the split. Owing
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to the lack of stationafity of local alphas arid betas ( as shown in
Chapter 6) and the far shorter duration of the test, FFJR's method
for computing the "normalised" alphas and betas has to be modified
for the current test.
As explained in Chapter 6, the alphas and betas of the sample stocks
have been computed using moving blocks of data of three calender years
in size. Rather than recomputing the alphas and betas using an
approximation of FFJR's method, it was decided to make use of the
pre-existing values of alphas and betas by taking the average of the
alphas and betas computed from blocks of data which are some distance
away from the bonus announcement. A preliminary investigation is
carried out to examine the behavior of the alphas and betas
surrounding bonus announcements and the result is shown as Table
8.4.1. This table shows the mean value of the alphas and betas of the
stocks undergoing a bonus issue in a given year for the 6 calender
years surrounding the bonus announcement. As can be seen from the
table, the alphas show a pronounced "blip" surrounding the bonus
announcement. However, this "blip" is of short duration; alphas
computed from three year block of data ending two calender years
before the announcements and three calender years after the
announcements axe. much smaller than the alphas computed from the three
year block of data ending the calender year of the announcement.
The computed betas do not show a clear pattern of abnormal behavior
as with the alphas. As can be seen from Table 8.4.1, there only seems
to be a tendency for the betas to rise throughout the 6 years
surrounding the bonus announcements. It is not possible to provide a
complete explanation for this pattern of behavior. This tendency can
probably be explained in part by the fact that the average value of
the computed betas have been rising over the research period (this
pattern has been examined in Chapter 6). It is also possible that
stocks which issue bonus could have attracted greater market
attention subsequent to making the bonus issue, hence resulting in
their having higher betas.
Given the abnormal behavior of the alphas, both parameters have to be
normalised for the computation of the residuals. An examination of
the effect of this normalisation will be undertaken later.
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TAB LE S . 4 . 2
AVERAGE VALUE OF ALPHA AND BETA OF STOCKS UNDERGOING BONUS ISSUE
FOR YEARS SURROUNDING THE YEAR OF ANNOUNCEMENT
(A) AVERAGE VALUE OF ALPHA COMPUTED USING THREE YEARS OF DATA ENDING:
YEAR YEAR -2 YEAR -1 YEAR 0 YEAR +1 YEAR +2 YEAR +3
1970 NA NA 0.0008 0.0002 0.0024 -0.0014
1971 NA -0.0002 0.0018 0.0052 0.0024 0.0009
1972 0.0005 0.0014 0.0036 0.0031 0.0011 -0.0001
1973 -0.0005 0.0023 0.0033 0.0027 0.0018 -0.0001
1974 0.0013 0.0021 0.0017 0.0022 0.0007 -0.0004
1975 0.0024 0.0017 0.0012 0.0004 0.0018 0.0011
1976 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0011 0.0011 0.0002 0.0003
1977 -0.0016 0.0005 0.0036 0.0012 -0.0007 0.0028
1978 0.0005 0.0021 0.0021 0.0019 0.0007 0.0013
1979 0.0016 0.0025 0.0046 0.0046 0.0042 0.0023
1980 0.0012 0.0026 0.0041 0.0026 0.0011 -0.0021
1981 0.0018 0.0027 0.0034 0.0021 -0.0003 NA
1982 0.0020 0.0026 0.0031 0.0016 NA NA
1983 0.0024 0.0027 0.0017 NA NA NA
W'TD AVG 0.0010 0.0019 0.0027 0.0022 0.0011 0.0003
(B) AVERAGE VALUE OF BETA COMPUTED USING THREE YEARS OF DATA ENDING:
YEAR YEAR -2 YEAR -1 YEAR 0 YEAR +1 YEAR +2 YEAR +3
1970 NA NA 1.1702 1.1144 0.8014 1.0264
1971 NA 0.7377 1.0691 0.4844 0.8108 0.8202
1972 0.7059 1.1000 0.8877 0.9113 0.9139 0.8943
1973 0.9423 0.7669 0.7602 0.8375 0.8726 0.7988
1974 0.7442 0.7158 0.8058 0.8702 0.8705 0.9382
1975 0.5444 0.7016 0.6941 0.6909 0.6207 0.7802
1976 0.7960 0.6881 0.7834 0.7803 1.0091 0.9948
1977 0.8296 0.7856 0.6292 1.0898 0.9636 1.1211
1978 0.9023 0.8547 0.9299 0.9280 1.0555 1.0095
1979 0.6842 0.7817 0.7948 0.8382 0.8688 0.9141
1980 0.8736 0.8717 1.0250 1.2470 1.3039 1.1369
1981 0.9419 1.0871 1.0815 1.1284 0.9820 NA
1982 0.8955 1.0254 1.0405 0.9688 NA NA
1983 0.9149 0.8919 0.8401 NA NA NA
W'TD AVG 0.8197 0.8529 0.8816 0.9242 0.9495 0.9484
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The method for computing the "normalised" alphas and betas is
designed after taking into consideration the very much shorter
research period and the fact that the available alphas and betas are
computed based on calendar years of data. A fixed 30 months
"exclusion period" as used by FFJR is not practicable. The method
used instead uses a variable length excluding period which excludes
data for a minimum of 12 months (minimum of 6 before and after)
surrounding the bonus announcements. The figure below shows
diagrammatically how the normalised alpha and beta in respect of a
share which announced a bonus issue on 31.3.78 are computed.
FIGURE 8.4.1
METHOD FOR COMPUTING NORMALISED ALPHAS AND BETAS
CALENDER YEAR









Computed using these three
years of data
BONUS ANNOUNCED
Normalised Alpha and Beta are respectively the average of:-
(Alphal + Alpha2) and (Betal + Beta2)
In the case of those bonus announcements which occured at the two
extremities of the research period, the above method is obviously not
applicable. In these cases, the "normalised" alphas and betas are
merely taken from the alphas and betas computed from the next or the
previous "clean" block of data (again maintaining a separation of at
least 6 months from the bonus announcement).
As a check on the efficacy of this method of normalising the alphas
and betas, the mean value of the alphas and betas computed in the
following three ways are compared:-
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ALPHA BETA
(1) GRAND MEAN OF ALL STOCKS FOR ALL YEARS
(2) MEAN OF ALL BONUS ISSUING STOCKS WITHOUT
0.0005 0.8873
EXCLUSION
(3) MEAN OF ALL BONUS ISSUING STOCKS USING
0.0027 0.8816
METHOD DESCRIBED ABOVE 0.0015 0.9285
It is not possible to say what the mean "true" alpha of stocks
undergoing bonus issue is. It is possible that these stocks would
have a higher alphas than the average of all stocks. Even in the
unlikely case that this is the same as the grand mean of the alphas,
we can say that this method of normalisation reduces the abnormality
of alphas by more than half while at the same time it raises the
value of the betas by a small extent (about 5%). (It is not possible
to explain exactly why the process of normalisation raises the value
of the betas. It appears this is due to the fact that the rate of
increase in value of beta is less steep before the bonus announcement
than after (please refer to Table 8.4.1). As a result, the averaging
process introduces an upward bias.)
In the event that the true alphas and bertas are lower than those used
for the computation of the residuals, the true value of the residuals
would be greater than those which are shown in Table 8.4.3. In this
case, the picture of inefficiency uncovered would be further
strengthened.
(B) SAMPLE
The sample of stocks is composed of all the stocks in the database.
They are divided into five subsamples to permit a more indepth
examination of the behavior of the market. The Average Residual (AR)
and Cumulative Average Residual (CAR) for five separate subsamples of
stocks under going bonus issues of "1 for 5" (a 1 for 5 bonus is
equivalent to a 25% stock split) or greater (stocks which issued
rights concurrently with bonus are excluded) are computed. The five
subsamples are as follows:-
(A) All bonus issues made during the years 1968-1976;
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(B) All bonus issues made during the years 1977-1983;
(C) All bonus issues with reduced or same dividend subsequent to the
bonus issue announcements; and
(D) All bonus issues with increased dividend subsequent to the bonus
issue announcements; and
(E) All bonus issues made during the research period.
The reason for not splitting the research period into two equal
halves is that this way of splitting provides for a roughly similar
number of bonus issues during the two halves (83 and 87).
8.4.3 - RESULTS OF THE BONUS ISSUE TESTS
There were in all 170 "stand alone" (that is, those without a
concurrent rights issue) bonus issues of greater than "1 for 5"
during the research period. This is equivalent to about 2.62 bonus
issues per company (the average number of companies in the database
being 65) for 16 years or an average frequency of 0.163 bonus issue
per company per year. This appears to be much more frequent than for
companies listed on the NYSE. FFJR recorded 940 splits for all
companies listed on the NYSE for 33 years. Assuming that the average
number of listed companies was about 2,000 during this period; this
would represent an average frequency of' stock split of about 0.014
per company per year.
It would seem that Malaysian/Singaporean companies have a far greater
propensity to undergo bonus issues than US companies making stock
splits. Part of the reason for this could be due to the greater profit
growth rate of the local companies over the last 10-15 years. Another
possible reason for the greater number of bonus issues is that
American companies have a greater tendency to make "large" stock
splits - thus "two for one" splits are very common in the US.
Malaysian companies tend to make a greater number of "small" splits.
The number of bonus issues for each of the five sub-samples which
were separately examined are given below:-
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(A) All bonus issues for years 1968-1976
(B) All bonus issues for years 1977-1983
(C) All bonuses with static or decreased dividend
83
87
after bonus issue 56
(D) All bonus issues with increased dividend after bonus issue 114
The ratio of bonuses with increased dividend to total bonus differs
in the two halves of the research period ( respectively 59% and 75%).
This difference probably reflects the more bouyant business
conditions of the second half of the research period. It is perhaps
important to note this difference because it could provide part of
the explanation for the different behavior of the stock return
between the two halves of the research period.
The respective AR and CAR for each of the above sub-samples are
computed and are given in Table 8.4.3 which is appended at the end of
this section. In addition the CAR's are plotted using a commercial
plotting programme and are appended to the end of this section as
Figures 8.4.1 - A "to E. (The various graphs are drawn to different
scales.) Comparing these values with those obtained out by FFJR, It
can be seen that the behavior of the CAR's appears very different
from that uncovered by FFJR. The important findings of FFJR and the
current test are summarised in Table 8.4.2 on the next page.
(E) All bonus issues for years 1968-1983 170
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TABLE 8.4.2
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE RESULTS OF FFJR AND CURRENT TEST
CHANGE IN VALUE OF CAR FFJR
(A) STOCKS WITH BONUS 1968-1976 (SUBSAMPLE A)
CURRENT
TEST
a) BETWEEN MONTH -12 TO MONTH -2 NA
b) BETWEEN MONTH -2 TO MONTH 0 NA
c) BETWEEN MONTH -12 TO MONTH 0 NA
d) BETWEEN MONTH 0 AND MONTH +12 NA
B) STOCKS WITH BONUS 1977-1983 (SUBSAMPLE B)
a) BETWEEN MONTH -12 TO MONTH -2 NA
b) BETWEEN MONTH -2 AND MONTH 0 NA
C) BETWEEN MONTH OF -12 TO MONTH 0 NA
d) BETWEEN MONTH 0 AND MONTH +12 NA
C) STOCKS WITH DIVIDEND "DECREASES" (SUBSAMPLE C)
a) BETWEEN MONTH -12 TO MONTH -2
b) BETWEEN MONTH -2 TO MONTH 0
C) BETWEEN MONTH -12 TO MONTH 0





D) STOCKS WITH DIVIDEND "INCREASES" (SUBSAMPLE D)
a) BETWEEN MONTH -12 TO MONTH -2
b) BETWEEN MONTH -2 TO MONTH 0
C) BETWEEN MONTH -12 TO MONTH 0
d) BETWEEN MONTH 0 AND MONTH +12
E) ALL BONUSES (SUBSAMPLE E)
a) BETWEEN MONTH -12 TO MONTH -2
b) BETWEEN MONTH -2 TO MONTH 0
C) BETWEEN MONTH -12 TO MONTH 0






























The results of the test reveals considerable departure from the
findings of FFJR. The major differences between the findings are
discussed below.
Firstly, the present test finds very little increase in the value of
stocks upto Week -7 compared with the findings of FFJR. This is
particularly so for bonuses issued during 1968-1976 (Subsample A) -
increase in CAR of 0.0038 - and bonuses which are followed by
dividend decreases (Subsample C) - increase in CAR of 0.0120 -
between Week -50 and Week -7. Bonuses followed by dividend increase
(Subsample D) and bonuses made during 1977-1983 (Subsample B)
experience a much greater rise in CAR over the same period
(respectively 0.1185 and 0.0844). In sharp contrast FFJR found that
all their samples experienced sharp improvement in their CAR ( of
between 0.14 to 0.21) for the same period (i.e. Month -12 to Month
-2).
Secondly, the CAR's of the current samples tend to spurt up steeply
between about Week -6 to Week +2. The amount of movement experienced
appears to be considerably larger than that uncovered by FFJR. The
increase in the CAR is 0.0833 as against 0.026 (FFJR) for the "all
stocks" case (Subsample E) for the two month period upto and
including the announcement month. The consistency of the size of the
advance of the CAR's during this period' for all five subsamples is
surprising ( all of them having a value between 0.0810 to 0.0853)
Thirdly, in all cases, the CAR's trend downward soon after the
announcements as against FFJR's finding whereby only stocks with
decreased dividend suffered a declining CAR after announcement. The
margin of decline is large in all cases. It is particularly large in
the case of bonuses made during 1977-1983 (Subsample B) (-0.1205
between Week 5 Week 50) and in the case of stocks with decreased
dividend payment after the bonus issues (Subsample C) (-0.1442
between Week 1 and Week 50). Even Subsample D (dividend increases)
suffers a decline in the CAR of -0.0425 as against an increase of
0.0286 in FFJR's sample). In the case of Subsample E (all stocks),
the decline is -0.07712 as against a small increase of 0.0009.
It is also notable that there appears to be some difference in the
behavior of stock prices between the two halves of the survey period.
During the second half, the stock price behavior is a bit closer to
the FFJR model in that there is a greater improvement in CAR (+0.1999
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against +0.2119) in the twelve months preceding the announcements. The
gain appears to be reasonably evenly spread out except for the last
month. During the first half of the period, the total rise
experienced is smaller (+0.0891) and much of that gain is obtained
during the Week of -6 to Week +2.
8.4.4 - DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
It would appear that the stock price behavior surrounding a bonus
issue in Malaysia differs considerably from that of a US stock split.
In this section, an attempt will be made to provide some explanations
for this difference. A reiteration of the major conclusions reached
by FFJR at this point would be useful. The following is a summary of
their major conclusions
(1) Stock splits appear to be more the result of a period of
abnormally good price performance rather than vice versa. That is, it
appears that the management of a company tends to decide on a split
after a period of abnormally good price performance;
(2) The market appears to have prior knowledge (from about Month -5)
that a stock split is coming such that the price tends to move up
more sharply than previously during Months -5 to Month -1. In other
words, there appears to be some degree of speculative buying based
on the prior knowledge of the impending stock split. As a result, at
the time of the actual announcement, there is very little or zero
price reaction; and
(3) The value of a stock split does not lie with the stock split per
se but with the expectation that a stock undergoing a split will in
future pay higher dividend. The market therefore expects a dividend
increase to follow from a stock split. If there is no such increase,
a decline in stock price can be expected. The amount of decline
appears to be the same as what has been gained in the five months
prior to the announcement (that is, gain based on speculation that a
split is forthcoming).
THE APPLICABILITY OF FFJR'S CONCLUSIONS TO THE MALAYSIAN SITUATION
(A) GOOD PAST PERFORMANCE THE CAUSE OF STOCK SPLIT
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A study of the movements of CAR after the announcement for the
various subsamples in the current test is very revealing of the
nature of the Malaysian market. All subsamples suffer a decline in the
value of CAR from Week 0 tc Week +50. For Subsample C, the decline
in CAR relative to the gain made prior to announcement is especially
sharp. By Week +50, its CAR stands at -0.05 (as against +0.06 just
before the announcement). This performance stands in very marked
contrast to the very good performance in the few weeks before and
after the bonus announcements. Together with the fact that CAR
experiences only small changes until about Week -7, this seems to
imply a market behavior that is the completely different from the one
postulated by FFJR.
The fact that the "benefit" of bonus announcement is so transient
seems to strongly imply that a bonus announcement IN ITSELF has a
certain amount of positive value. It is possible that a segment of
the market has done some buying after receiving rumours or news of
the impending bonus such as to produce the price increase noted. But
the fact that the CAR should decline so sharply soon after the
announcement must also imply that there is some selling pressure from
some quarter. These two statements seem to be in contradiction unless
the first group of investors (the "buyers") and the second group (the
"sellers") are from mutually exclusive segments of the market.
While it is not possible to provide stronger evidence than this, this
performance pattern strongly suggests the existence of a group of
knowledgeable investors taking advantage of their superior
information and the less knowledgeable investors' fascination with
bonus issues. As mentioned in the introductory paragraph to this
Section, the general belief that bonus issue is a "good thing" is
very prevalent in Malaysia although such belief is hard to
comprehend. Given such a scenario, it is possible that the
knowledgeable investors could be the sellers after the bonus
announcements for they are well aware that the bonus announcements
per se should not have led to an increase in stock prices.
The behavior of Subsample C (that is, very sharp relative decline
after the bonus announcement) further suggests that there indeed
exists some knowlegeable investors who do take advantage of this
mistaken belief and who take further advantage in wake of bonus
announcement to "unload" heavily in respect of those stocks which in
addition have poor future prospects.
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(B) MARKET HAS PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE IMPENDING SPLIT
There is probably a qualitative difference between the gain made in
the final weeks before an announcement and the period before that.
From about Week -7 and after, the gain made in CAR is probably due to
leakages (through corporate insiders or employees of the
organisations connected with the bonus issues) of the definite news
of an impending bonus announcement because by that time, the board of
directors must have made the decision to issue a bonus and the
announcement itself would be in preparation (printing of
shareholders' circular, booking newspaper space etc). In term of
discussion on market efficiency, the good performance that concerns
us more is the improvement in the CAR made in the year or so before
this final stage.
FFJR attributed the run-up in price in the several months prior to
announcement to good market information. Such knowledge can be taken
as a sign of efficiency since there is no gain to be made after the
official announcement. Price behavior of Malaysian stocks surrounding
bonus announcement also demonstrates a certain degree of prior
knowledge in the market. However, such information appears to become
general knowledge only much nearer to the time of the announcement.
In all the subsamples, the greatest gain' in the AR is attained during
the week of the announcement or the week after ( Week 0 or +1) with a
certain amount of abnormal gain in the three weeks before and two
weeks after the announcement. While in FFJR's sample, the greatest
gain was attained in Month -2 (or at the average time of 7 weeks
prior to announcement) with strong movements upward from about Month
-4. This seems to imply that general knowledge of the news of the
impending split/bonus perhaps occurs at different stages of the event
horizon leading upto the announcement. It would appear that in the
US, news of an impending stock split becomes general knowledge
probably soon after the decision has been taken by the board of
directors to split the stocks. In Malaysia it would appear that the
news only become general knowledge very much later, probably only
after the official announcement although there is some amount of
leakage in the three to four weeks before the official announcement.
(C) THE PERCEIVED VALUE OF A STOCK SPLIT IS IN THE EXPECTATION OF
INCREASING FUTURE DIVIDEND
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It does not appear feasible to uphold this conclusion of FFJR in
respect of the Malaysian market. The strongest piece of evidence
against it would be the fact that the CAR of all stocks,
irrespectively of whether it pays a higher post bonus dividend or not,
declines by roughly the same abosolute margin. This fact appears to
lend further support to the conjecture made earlier that the market
is composed of two types of investors.
The less knowledgeable investors would only enter the market close to
announcement time and buy on the rumour or news of the impending
bonus. Their collective action would drive up the price from the
level reached. However, the final part of the gain is not sustained
by any real increase in the underlying value of the stock, and there
are knowledgeable investors who are aware of this. As a result they
would take the decision to sell after the announcement has been made.
(This action would appear to follow the wellknown Wall Street adage
to "buy on the rumour and sell on the news".) Since the final part of
the price advance is irrational, all stocks making bonus issues would
decline irrespective of the type of changes in dividend payment
after the bonus issues. Thus even stocks with dividend increase would
suffer a decline in CAR. However, the decline of CAR relative to the
gain previously made in respect of this class of stocks is smaller
and the value of the CAR never becomes negative. This is in sharp
contrast to the behavior of stocks with dividend decrease, the
decline is twice the size of the gain made upto the point of
announcement and the value of the CAR eventually drops well below
zero.
This last point seems to imply a certain amount of efficiency even
though the general picture is one of considerable inefficiency.
CONCLUSION
On the balance of evidence, it is possible to make certain
conclusions regarding the degree of efficiency with which the
Malaysian market deals with information on bonus issues.
(1) There is strong prima facie evidence that the market as a whole
does not treat information on bonus issues efficiently. The mere fact
the CAR for all stocks decline after bonus announcement implies that
there are possibilities for making abnormal gain. In addition, there
is a sharp advance in the CAR for all subsamples just before and
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after the bonus announcement apparently based purely on the news of
the bonus itself. It is possible that this inefficiency arises in
part because of last minute speculative buying based on the mistaken
belief that bonuses per se will lead to enhanced share value.
(2) There is strong evidence that there may be two different types of
investors involved in the trading of stocks surrounding bonus issues
- the knowledgeable and the less knowledgeable. The former would base
their investment decision making on the perceived value of the stocks
while the latter base their investment decision not specifically on
the earnings/dividend prospect of the company but rather on the
belief that bonus issue would enhance the value of the underlying
stocks. It would seem that the knowledgeable investors have been
exploiting their superior position to make abnormal profit off the
less knowledgeable investors.
(3) There is some evidence that the market has become slightly more
efficient over the research period in that the market appears to have
greater prior knowledge of impending bonus issues, and that the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 - 5 — Xest "to Uncco-vei" "the Market * s
Use oX Earnings Information
8.5.1 - BACKGROUND TO THE TEST
This test is based on the original conceptual framework first
developed by Ball and Brown (1968) (BB), although the actual method
will be largely based on more modern developments of BB's work. The
basis of the test was the idea that the Western securities markets
appear to posess an expectation of the level of earnings per share a
stock ought to have. If the actual earnings were to deviate
considerably from this level, the market price is likely to react in
the direction of the deviation. The difference between the expected
EPS and the actual EPS is known as the Earnings Forecast Error and
as a result these tests are also known as the Earnings Forecast Error
(EFE) tests.
In BB's test, the earnings forecasts were developed by regressing
past earnings upon the GNP on an annual basis. The stocks in the
sample are divided into two groups according to whether they have
undergone a positive or negative earnings forecast error. The average
performance of each group for 12 months before and after the
announcement was recorded. BB developed the API technique for
examining the abnormal performance of the stocks involved. Their API
technique is conceptually very similar to the CAR technique developed
by Fama Jensen Fisher and Roll (1969) (FFJR). From the Abnormal
Performance Index so developed, Ball and Brown concluded that the
market was highly efficient because the informational content of the
earnings forecast errors appeared to be already known to the market
well before the announcement and the prices of the stocks had
already moved as much as they were ever going to by the time of the
announcement.
Later workers, in particular, Brown and Kennelly (1972), Joy,
Litzenberger and McEnally (1977) (JLM) and Be aver Clarke and Wright
(1979) (BCW) carried on this line of work with several major
modifications to the method of BB. An extensive discussion of the
more recent works on earnings information has been provided under
Section 4.3.1 and there is little need to repeat the discussion here.
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It suffices to reproduce below the conclusions reached at the end of
that discussion
(1) The market seems to have a prior expectation of what the
forthcoming EPS figure for each listed firm ought to be;
(2) In addition to having a prior expectation of what a firm's EPS
ought to be, the market seems to "know" in advance (the exact extent
of this "knowledge" is in dispute) if the firm is going to
experience an increase or decrease in earnings from the "ought to be"
level and the price of the stock would have moved considerably in
the direction of the eventual earnings change well before the
announcement ;
(3) A good facsimile of the market's earnings expectations can be
developed from fairly simple method/s;
(4) If the actual EPS figure differs considerably from what had been
expected, there is a further price reaction in the direction of the
forecast error in addition to the previous movement; and
(5) The reaction is not instantaneous, taking up to 26 weeks to take
full effect (again this point is in dispute).
Among the work cited earlier, BCW is the most recent and is the most
extensive. It is therefore decided to adopt the methodology of this
work for the present test. BCW's main purpose does not appear to be
so much to prove or disprove the EMII. Rather, the authors' main
purpose appears to show that " a positive ordinal association
exists between unsystematic returns and the magnitude of earnings
forecast errors". BCW tested two different earnings forecast models
and two different methods of measuring forecast errors resulting in
four replications of the test. BCW found a highly significant
correlation between the magnitude of EFE and the size of unsystematic
return in the year leading upto to the earnings announcement.
Interestingly, all four replications of the test produced very
similar results. This seems to imply that the test method is not very
sensitive to changes in methodology.
8.5.2 - METHOD AND SAMPLE
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(A) Modifications to BCW's Methodology
Owing to the differences in emphasis, environment and available
resources, several major and minor modifications to BCW's methodology
are made. These are:-
(1) The unsystematic returns are tracked after the forecasts have
been made rather than before;
(2) Only one forcasting model is used and one method of computing
forecast errors;
(3) A modified version of forecasting model is used; and
(4) The securities are studies individually rather than grouped into
portfolios.
Period For Recording Unsystematic Return (Inline with the rest of
this thesis, the term "return residual" is used in preference to
"unsystematic return".) As the emphasis of this dissertation is to
uncover possible inefficiencies which exist in the Malaysian market,
instead of recording the return residuals for the 12 months upto the
point of the earnings announcement, this test will record the
cumulated return residual (CRR) for each stock at six months and one
year after the the earnings forecast has been made (As will be shown
later, this is not the same point in time as the earnings
announcement). In this sense, this test is closer in spirit to the
one performed by JLM.
One Forecasting Model and One Method of Computing EFE Is Used As
BCW could show very little difference between the four replications
of the tests performed and given the finite resources available, it
is therefore decided to use a single model and a single method of
computing the EFE. The model of forecasting used is very similar to
BCW's Model B and the method of computing EFE is what BCW called the
Percentage Forecast Error.
Modified Version of BCW's Forecasting Model Used BCW's earnings
forecast model is based on the following equations:-
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f(EPS.t> - EPS.(t_0 ♦ 9, >tj(t.,) -
f (AEPS. t> +;f2,i,(t-I)SEPS»t
Where EPS^ ^ = Earnings Per Share for the ith stock for the year t
EPS = Average EPS for the year t
mt
v v are Estimates obtained by OLS regression of AEPS. on
'1' Y2 x
AEPS^ for all years of data through year (t—1)
From the above equation, it can be seen that BCW forecasting model is
based on the relationship between changes in individual EPS( AEPS^ )
and changes in average EPS ( AEPS ). Given that the Malaysian
mt
economy is largely commodities based, the EPS of firms tend to
fluctuate a great deal. Owing to differences in the earnings cycles
of different firms, there appears to be little relationship between
the changes in individual EPS and the changes in the average EPS. A
random sample of 30 firms was chosen and a comparison made between
the relationship of the individual EPS(EPS ) and average EPS(EPS )
it mt
as well as the relationship between changes in individual EPS and
changes in the average EPS (using all the available data for each
firm). This investigation reveals that under the Malaysian
conditions, the regression of AEPS£t on ^EPSmt produces an average
coefficient of determination of only 0.1690. In sharp contrast the
regression of EPS. on EPS produces an average coefficient of
it mt
determination of 0.6026. It is therefore decided to adopt the
following model for forecasting purposes:-
f (EPS. ) = a. . •+ b. .EPS .
it i,(t-l) i,(t-l) mt





This is a slight modification of what BCW called Percentage Forecast
Error which is given by the equation:-
AEPS. - f(AEPS. )
it it
6pit f(AEPSi )
In RCW's test, smal] earnings forecast errors were omitted in order to
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avoid the problem of having very large forecast errors as earnings
forecast tends to zero. In the current test, these data are included
owing to the smaller size of sample. As a result outliers with
extreme value exists. As the significance test will use rank rather
than actual value, the existence of outliers should not be a problem.
(B) THE ACTUAL METHOD DESCRIBED
An example of the actual worksheet for performing the test is
included as Exhibit 8.4.1 attached to the end of this section. The
first step consists of computing the 12-month Adjusted Earnings Per
Share Before Tax thereafter known as EPS for short) stream for each
stock in the database (except those with less than 6 years of
earnings record) once every six months for the whole of the research
period. The calender year is used rather than the fiscal year unlike
BCW because of the lack of uniformity in the earnings announcement
dates (the length of time between fiscal year end and earnings
announcement can vary from 2 months to nine or even longer). The
Average EPS is computed once every six months based on the all the
announced results made during the previous six months.
The second step is to carry out OLS regression for every EPS stream
on the Average EPS. The regression is first carried out for the year
ending December 31, 1973 for all stocks with a minimum of 6 earnings
announcements. Thereafter, it is done once at the end of every
calender year with all the available data for each stock included.
Estimates for a and b for each stock for each of the years of 1973 to
1982 are therefore derived.
The third step is to produced an earnings "forecast" for each stock in
respect of the earnings announcement which is being made during the
first six calendar months of a given year. This "forecast" is
computed from the estimated individual a and b in respect of the
last regression made at the end of the previous calendar year and the
Average EPS computed from the earnings announcements made in the
first 6 months of the current calendar year. That is, the EPS
forecast for June 1974 is made using the a and b derived from
regression on data upto December 1973 and the Average EPS for June
1974. This computational step is inline with BCW's methodology. In
so far as most of the stocks have their fiscal year-end in June or
December, a majority of the stocks would make either their interim or
final earnings announcement between Febuary and June, the "median"
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being about the end of April. As a result, by the time the "forecast"
is made, it is on average two months after the new earnings figures
become generally available.
The fourth step is to compute the Earning Forecast Ratio (EFR) which
is derived by dividing the actual EPS by the forecasted EPS. Hence a
low figure would denote a negative EFE under the schema of BCW. For a
stock with an unbroken earnings stream throughout the research
period, it would be possible to produce in all 10 EFR for the period
June 1974 to June 1983. As not all stocks have such complete record,
the number of EFR per year for this test varies from 39 to 72.
The last step is to record the Cumulated Return Residual (CRR) for
each stock for the 6-month and one-year periods after every earnings
forecast has been made. That is, for an earnings forecast made at the
end of June 1974, the CRR for that stock would be recorded for the
period July 1974 to December 1974 and July 1974 to June 1975. The
return residual is computed using the technique pioneered by FFJR as
previously described in Chapter Three. As previously mentioned in
Chapter Six, throughout this dissertation this is the method used
whenever unsystematic returns have to be computed.
(C) Statistical Properties Of Earnings Forecast Ratios and
Cumulative Return Residuals
The frequency distributions in respect of the Earnings forecast
Ratios and the Six-month and One-year Cumulative Return Residuals are
provided in Tables 8.5.1 and 8.5.2 appended below to afford a
comparison with BCW's findings. The means and standard deviations for
these distributions are left out as it is felt that they do not
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FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESIDUAL RETURN
(A) SIX MONTHS AFTER FORECAST
PERCENTILE
20 40 50 60 80
1974 -0.2222 -0.0707 0.0011 0.0290 0.0767
1975 -0.1683 -0.0614 -0.0134 -0.0052 0.0959
1976 -0.0694 -0.0138 0.0108 0.0613 0.1510
1977 -0.0869 -0.0255 -0.0053 0.0075 0.1074
1978 -0.1377 -0.0551 -0.0168 0.0149 0.0787
1979 -0.1041 -0.0128 0.0083 0.0391 0.1362
1980 -0.1441 -0.0588 -0.0080 0.0240 0.1626
1981 -0.1485 -0.0458 -0.0175 0.0086 0.0852
1982 -0.1778 -0.0613 -0.0399 -0.0251 0.0975
1983 -0.1668 -0.0714 -0.0446 -0.0204 0.0602
MEAN -0.1426 -0.0478 -0.0127 0.0130 0.1051
307
TABLE 8.5.2 (contd)
(B) ONE YEAR AFTER FORECAST
PERCENTILE
20 40 50 60 80
1974 -0.2498 -0.1187 -0.0910 -0.0353 0.1271
1975 -0.2453 -0.1148 -0.0792 -0.0300 0.0996
1976 -0.1315 -0.0229 0.0109 0.0840 0.2099
1977 -0.1806 -0.0422 0.0279 0.0710 0.2126
1978 -0.1494 -0.0220 -0.0007 0.0329 0.1244
1979 -0.1421 -0.0187 0.0092 0.0839 0.2004
1980 -0.2247 -0.1025 -0.0257 0.0672 0.2327
1981 -0.3568 -0.0735 -0.0347 0.0453 0.1353
1982 -0.2453 -0.0809 0.0140 0.0500 0.1851
MEAN -0.2139 -0.0662 -0.0188 0.0410 0.1697
The forecast errors appear to be considerably larger than those
recorded by BCW. It is interesting to note that the EFR are
distributed almost symmetrically about their medians. It is not
possible to compare the distribution of the cumulative return
residual as BCW only provides the grouped distribution. In so far as
it is possible to judge; the cumulative return residuals appear to be
considerably larger too after adjusting the data to the same units.
8.5.3 - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The EFR and the CRR in respect of all the stocks for each of the
forecast period are tested for significance using Spearman Rank-Order
Correlation. Given that the sample is large, the approximation to the
t-distribution is used to compute the significance probabilities.
Table 8.5.3 below provides the Spearman correlation coefficients, the
t-values and the significance probabilities for the period 1974 to
1983 (1982 for the one-year CRR).
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SPEARMAN CORRELATION BETWEEN EFR AND RETURN RESIDUALS
(A) SIX MONTHS AFTER FORECAST
YEAR rs n t VALUE SIG. PR(
1974 0.2166 39 1.350 NS
1975 0.4451 57 3.686 <0.01
1976 0.1652 63 1.308 <0.10
1977 0.5032 68 4.731 <0.01
1978 0.4668 69 4.321 <0.01
1979 0.3716 71 3.325 <0.01
1980 0.5919 71 6.100 <0.01
1981 0.5005 68 4.697 <0.01
1982 0.3617 72 3.240 <0.01
1983 0.3377 70 2.960 <0.01
(B) ONE YEAR AFTER FORECAST
YEAR rs n t VALUE SIG. PROB.
1974 0.2049 39 1.273 NS
1975 0.2728 57 2.103 <0.025
1976 -0.1830 63 -1.454 <0.10
1977 0.2366 68 1.978 <0.05
1978 0.2472 69 2.119 <0.025
1979 0.1860 70 1.561 <0.10
1980 0.3661 71 3.268 <0.01
1981 0.1915 68 1.609 <0.05
1982 0.1017 72 0.8553 NS
NS = NOT SIGNIFICANT: SIG. PROBABILITY GREATER THAN 0.10.
From the above table, two points of note stand out:-
(1) Upto six months after earnings forecast is made, there is a highly
significant correlation between high ratios of actual earnings to
forecast earnings (i.e. high EFR) and high cumulated return
residuals. Out of the 10 years examined, 8 provide highly significant
Spearman rank-order correlations.
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(2) At one year after forecast, the correlation has become much less
significant. In only 5 years out of 9 was the corrrelation
significant at above 0.05 level. Two of the years have significance
probabilities above 0.10 and 2 more are close to the borderline of
0.10. In only one case is the correlation as significant as that of
the cumulated return residual at six months.
8.5.4 - CONCLUSION
Based on the results of the EFE test, it is possible to make some
conclusions regarding the efficiency of the Malaysian market regarding
earnings per share information.
Firstly, the market does not appear to differ by a marked degree from
the US market in the of processing of earnings information. In the US
market, the level of efficiency appears to be somewhere between
Stage II and Stage III. That is, it appears to process EPS
information very accurately and reacts reasonably rapidly to forecast
errors. In the Malaysian market, the investors appear also to have
some prior expectations of the "right" EPS for a share. If the actual
EPS deviates far from this expectation, the price of the share would
drop. Owing to the small size of the sample, it is not possible to be
more definitive as to the actual connection between EFE and return
residuals. The reaction of the Malaysian investors appears to be
slower than that of the US (comparing the result of the current test
with that of the JLM) in that there are still considerable abnormal
movements upto 14 months after the earnings announcement month.
Secondly the Malaysian market appears to be faster changing. Instead
of the CRR going flat after a certain time, there seems to be some
movement in the opposite direction after the first six months. This
reversal is strong enough to cause four of the nine Spearman
correlation coefficients to become insignificant between six and
twelve months after the forecast.
In conclusion it would seem that the Malaysian market in spite of the
previously quoted anecdotal evidence is reasonably efficient with
regard to EPS information. It seems as if a certain segment of the
market does carry out information processing of the type tested and
3io
it does respond to unusual changes in EPS. However, it also seem
from the available evidence that such response is not very rapid and
could provide opportunity for abnormal gain. It can therefore be said
to be only Stage II efficient.
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EXHIBIT S . 5 . 1
AN EXAMPLE OF WORKSHEET EMPLOYED FOR CONDUCTING THE EFE TEST
BOUSTEAD HOLDINGS BHD
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
EARNINGS 6-MONTH 1-YEAR
CY/PER EPER YPBT ISH PBTPS RM ADJ PBTPS a b FOECAST EFR CRR CRR
68/843 814 1800 5000 36.0 1.0000 36.0
69/895 865 1416 7000 20.2 1.4000 26.3
70/947 916 1614 7000 23.1 1.4000 32.3
71/1000 966 1777 10000 25.4 1.4000 35.6
72/1052 1016 3105 12000 31.1 1.8438 57.3
73/1104 1070 6079 15000 50.7 2.2213 112.6 - 6.7 3.33 178.1
74/1156 1121 8139 15091 54.3 2.7657 150.2 -46.6 2.72 172.4 1.22 -0.2819 -0.1506
1173 11456. 15091 75.9 2.7657 209.9
75/1208 1208 10409 15091 69.0 2.7657 190.8 -51.2 21® 137.7 0.91 -0.0238 -0.0965
1226 5736 15091 24.2 2.7657 125.1
15091 13.8 4.2122
76/1261 3259 4840 15091 32.1 4.2122 135.2 -47.2 2.85 174.8 0.99 0.01716 0.02554
1279 8656 21000 41.2 4.2122 173.5
77/1313 1309 12410 42000 28.1 4.2122 248.9 -54.0 3.01 251.2 1.21 -0.1274 0.0428
15.5 8.4243
1332 15126 42000 36.0 8.4243 303.3
78/1365 1361 15159 46000 20.5 8.4243 304.3 "69.6 3.35 348.2 1.08 -0.1367 0.13452
14.2 9.2667
1383 18652 46000 40.5 9.2667 375.3
79/1417 1413 20810 46000 45.1 9.2667 417.9 -76.3 3.48 496,9 0.95 0.2475 0.02706.
1430 23420- 46000 50.8 9.2667 470.7
80/1469 1456 26520 61600 31.9 9.266.7 532.8 -68.2 3.35 534.5 0.90 -0.2466 -0.4780
19.2 12.3556.
1486 24107 61600 39.1 12.3556 483.1
81/1521 1507 20323 61600 33.0 12.3556. 407.7 -56,0 3.15 461.2 0.68 -0.1371 -0.0048
1535 16145 61600 13.0 12.3556 313.5
9.9 15.441
82/1574 1570 12143 82133 14.8 15.441 226.5 -35.8 2.78 434.6 0.76 0.2241
83/1600 - 20350 142625 14.3 23.1662
il) CY/PER CALENDER YEAR/PERIOD
(2) EPER = EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD
(3) YPBT : 12-HONTH PROFIT BEFORE TAX
(4) ISH : NUMBER OF SHARES OUTSTANDING AT Tiff OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT
(5) PBTPS = PROFIT BEFORE TAX PER SHARE
(6) RM : CAPITALISATION CHANGE ADJUSTMENT FACTOR WITH ALLOWANCE FOR COST OF RIGHTS
(7) ADJ. PRTPS = ADJUSTED PROFIT BEFORE TAX PER SHARE
(8) a : THE y-INTERCEPT IN THE REGRESSION OF EPS ON AVERAGE EPS
(9) b - THE SLOPE OF THE EGRESSION
(10) EARNINGS FOECAST : SELF EXPLANATORY
(11) EFR - EARNINGS FORECAST RATIO
(12) 6-MONTH CRR : SIX-MONTH CUM11ATED RETURN RESIDUAL




9-1 — Resla1ement of Research
Ob ject, ±ves and Hypothesis
The research described in this dissertation has four main objectives,
the last of which is also in the form of a hypothesis to be tested.
These four objectives, which have been previously examined in detail
in Section 1.4 are
(1) To carry out an analysis of the characteristics of the Malaysian
stockmarket (in short : An Analysis of Malaysian Stockmarket);
(2) To carry out an analysis of the efficiency of the Malaysian
stockmarket in respect of a wide range of information (in short:
An Analysis of Malaysian Stockmarket Efficiency);
(3) To compare the efficiency of the Malaysian stockmarket vis a vis
the Western Markets more particularly the US market (in short :
A Comparative Study of Malaysian Stockmarket Efficiency); and
(4) To examine the applicability of the traditional model of market
efficiency in the light of the above findings and to suggest
possible modifications/extensions to the traditional model of
informational efficiency (in short: A Proposal for a New Model
for Stockmarket Efficiency).
These four objectives will be briefly summarised below.
9.1.1 - AN ANALYSIS OF THE MALAYSIAN STOCKMARKET
Unlike the traditional model of stockmarket efficiency, the model
which is hypothesised in this dissertation does not assume the
existence of an ideal set of conditions for market efficiency.
Instead, this thesis hypothesised that stockmarket efficiency is
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dependent on its environment and that not all stockmarkets are in
possession of the ideal conditions.
It is is therefore proposed that the attainment of the ideal
conditions for efficiency is dependent on certain characteris tics of
the market. Some of these characteristics are thought to be
(1) The mix between institutional and small investors;
(2) The quality and quantity of financial publications available;
(3) The level of disclosure and the the quality of corporate reports;
(4) The financial literacy of the investing public; and
(5) The inclination and objectives of the investors.
The first objective of this study is to carry out an analysis of the
Malaysian market along each of these dimensions so as to develop some
prior expectations of the degree of efficiency of the market. The
write-up of this analysis is presented as Chapter Two of this
dissertation. In addition, there is further analysis of the market in
Part II of Chapter Six.
9.1.2 - AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MALAYSIAN STOCKMARKET
The second objective is to conduct efficiency tests on a wide range
of Malaysian information. By applying Beaver's concept of "signal
efficiency" rather than Fama's concept of "form efficiency", the
signals chosen for testing are not limited by any artificial
classification. They are instead chosen because they are signals
which are efficiently processed in the US and because they make full
use of the information within the database. Seven types of signals,
oraganised into two categories are chosen:-
(1) Transaction Information
(a) Price Periodicity;





(c) Stock Split; and
(d) Earnings Forecast Errors.
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9.1.3 - COMPARING THE EFFICIENCY OF MALAYSIAN STOCK MARKET
There are two problems in attempting to compare the efficiency of the
Malaysian market against the Western markets. The first problem is
that there is no pre-existing and acceptable framework for doing so.
As has been shown earlier, Famar's "three-form" concept of
efficiency is not workable because of the ambiguity in the
definition of the "strength" of a particular type of information. It
is therefore not possible to say that one market is more efficient
than another merely because it treats one artificially demarcated
group of information efficiently while the other does not. This
dissertation takes the view that all types of information are
"equal" from an efficiency viewpoint and that efficiency in terms of
a particular type of information cannot be extrapolated to mean
efficiency in respect of another type of information whether the
latter is of the same group or not, however the "group" may be
defined.
The rejection of Fama's concept of efficiency would give rise to two
problems in a comparative study. Firstly, if one type of
informational efficiency cannot be defined as being "stronger" than
the others, how would one compare the efficiency of two different
markets? If stockmarket efficiency is a black or white issue, there
would be no problem. It is accepted that few markets are either
totally efficient or totally inefficient with respect to a particular
piece of information. If so, how does one make a qualitative statement
about the relative efficiency of two markets in respect of a
particular signal which is not treated with perfect efficiency by
both? This dissertation therefore "invents" a framework for making
such a comparison. That is the "Three Stage" system which has been
described in detail in Section 1.4.3. It is accepted that this system
is far from perfect and to a very large extent the division is
arbitrary. However, it is thought that a finer method of comparison
is required when making overall statements regarding the relative
efficiency of two markets.
The second problem of comparison is that it is not possible to do a
direct "one-on-one" comparison for all the seven types of information
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tested. Owing to the differences in the nature of the markets, the
desire to make full use of a smaller body of data and differences in
the translation of practitioners' methods into workable tests, only
five of the seven tests carried out afford a direct comparison of how
Malaysian and Western markets behave. This problem may not be that
serious because of the great number of tests which have been
performed on the Western markets. Although a particular piece of
information may not have been tested in the West (e.g. "relative
strength" as defined by this dissertation), very closely related
information has been tested (i.e. in this case "moving average" and
"filter rule") and it should be feasible to draw seme conclusions
from the results of these comparable tests.
9.1.4 - FROPOSAL FOR A NEW MODEL OF MARKET EFFICIENCY
The model of market efficiency proposed rests on the following four
ideas regarding the information/market system (- erences to the
particular section of the dissertation where the idea has been
previously expounded are annotated)
(1) The existence of the ideal conditions for efficiency is not
automatically assumed (Section 1.3.2);
(2) The cost of information is not zero and different types of
information have different cost of search ( Sections 1.4.4 and 4.2);
(3) The efficiency with which a market treats a particular signal
would be dependent on its cost of search and the market' s correct
comprehension of it (as in (2) above); and
(4) Ihe efficiency with which a stockmarket treats a type of
information is not uniform over time nor over market sectors (Section
1.3.2).
From these four ideas, a new model for describing the informational
efficiency is developed (the Mosaic Model). This model has been
described in some detail under Section 1.4.4.3. For this part of the
dissertation, it suffices to describe its more important features:-
(1) Two securities markets are unlikely to be identical as to the
efficiency with which they deal with all types of information;
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(2) Markets differ in their efficiency because of the differences
which exist in the number and literacy of the participants and
differences in other environmental factors;
(3) Within each securities market, it is difficult to state a uniform
rule regarding its behavior in respect of all information available
in that particular market;
(4) Information efficiency can be unique in terms of time, place and
market sector. Individual examination with regard to a particular
type of information is required before any statement in respect of
its efficiency can be made. Even then such a statement can only be in
terms of degree rather than in absolute.
0
9 - 2 — Co rac j us ions in Resp>eci of Stated
Ob jecfc i"vos and Hypothesis
9.2.1 - CONCLUSIONS IN RESPECT OF FIRST OBJECTIVE-
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MALAYSIAN STOCKMARKET
The work in pursuant of this objective is carried out in Chapter Two
and to a lesser extent in Chapter Six of this dissertation. An
academically sound and detailed descriptive analysis of the
Malaysian securities market would be too resource consuming within the
context of this dissertation. As a result the work which is carried
out is less rigorous than the rest of this dissertation. In order to
ameliorate this problem, an attempt is made to gather information
from many wide ranging sources.lt is hoped that such a wide based
view of the market provided by Chapters Two and Six can provide a
fairly clear and reliable picture of the nature of the market.
The Malaysian market can be said to be in possession of the following
important features which make it different from the major markets of
the West.
(1) It is a market with a short "public" history although some of the
firms listed on it have been in existence for many decades. Many of
the current shareholders have been in possession of their investment
for some considerable period as they are the first or second
generation controlling owners of such companies. At the same time
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there has been a general movement towards shifting the ownership of a
percentage of shares to the wider public, in particular, the Malays.
(2) It is a market which has undergone explosive growth in the last
20 years within an economy which has undergone a similar rate of
growth.
(3) It is a market that is still more dominated by individual
investors and the controlling shareholders rather than large
institutional investors or the general public;
(4) It is likely that the mix of participants has changed to a certain
extent over the last twenty years. It is probable that there is now a
greater proportion of middle class investors because of the transfer
mentioned in (1) above as well as the enormous growth in personal
savings experienced by the country over the last 20 years.
(5) The lack of strict disclosure regulations, institutional
investors, investment publications and full service brokers results
in a dearth of investment information in the hands of the general
investing public.
(6) It is a market which experiences very great variations in the
trading volume as well as very large variations in stock prices.
(7) As can be seen by the large variations in trading volume, there is
probably a large group of "floating" investors who move in and out of
the market with some rapidity in contrast to what one may call the
"basal investors" who have more long term objectives and who provide
the basal volume of the market. It is possible that the floating
investors and the basal investors form largely mutually exclusive
groupings.
From the above, it is possible to make some conjectures regarding the
existence of several special features which make it less similar to
the Western markets. It is probable that such special features would
have some bearing upon the efficiency of the market and the effect
they may have will also be discussed below. These special features
are: -
(1) The market may be made up of two very distinct groups of
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investors. For the lack of more suitable terms, they may be
identified as the "long term investors" and the "floating investors".
The former probably have been in existence for some time while the
latter are more likely to be the newer investors.
(2) It is likely that the long term investors are far more
knowledgeable than the floating investors. Such a difference in
knowledge is probably partly the result of experience and partly the
result of differences in inclinations.
(3) It is possible that the time horizon as well as the investment
objectives of the two groups of investors are very different. The
floating investors are more interested in the short term and tend to
adopt more of a "quick-in quick-out" investment method.
If the above conjectures are correct, we would expect the existence
of a "two-tier" market in terms of investors and efficiency. At the
investors level, it is possible that there exists investors who may
be as knowledgeable as their counterparts in the West. At the same
time, there possibly also exist investors with much less knowledge
with a less rational approach to their investment.
It is probable that the former are less likely to give rise to any
sign of inefficiency. If there are to be any inefficiencies, such
inefficiencies are more likely to be of the shorter term variety.
Over the long run, such short term inefficiencies are likely to leave
minimal trace.
9.2.2 - CONCLUSIONS IN RESPECT OF SECOND AND THIRD OBJECTIVES -
ANALYSIS OF MALAYSIAN STOCKMARKET EFFICIENCY AND
COMPARING THE EFFICIENCY OF MALAYSIAN STOCKMARKET
It is felt that it is probably more effective to discuss these two
objectives together rather than separately since they are so closely
related. The work in pursuant to these objectives has been described
in Chapters Seven and Eight. This section will be divided into two
parts in respect of the types of information tested. Section 9.2.1.1
will discuss Transaction Information as tested in Chapter Seven while
Section 9.2.2.2 will discuss Accounting Information which are tested
in Chapter Eight.
9.2.2.1 - THE MARKET EFFICIENCY OF TRANSACTION INFORMATION
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(A) General Comments on the Efficiency of the US Market
Three types of transaction information are tested viz:-
(a) Price Periodicity;
(b) Moving Average; and
(c) Relative Strength.
Apart from some minor exceptions which will be mentioned later, the
US market can be said to treat the first two types of information
very efficiently. It is not possible to make any direct statement
regarding relative strength information as the tests previously
carried out appear not to be a correct translation of the
practitioner's method.
In terms of price periodicity, inefficiencies seem to exist at the
longer terms only. While there is still some controversy surrounding
these inefficiencies, the general opinion is that the US market
demonstrates some non-randomness surrounding the periods of one year
and four years. At the shorter term, there appears to be very little
inefficiency to be exploited.
In terms of moving average information, the evidence is that there is
no inefficiency to be exploited. In addition, we can note that tests
on other transaction information such as filter rule and "relative
strength" as defined by Levy reveal no inefficiency in connection
with other types of transaction information. Given that such types
of information are simple and obvious, it would indeed be surprising
that the US market can be made to yield any inefficient results. Had
a test been carried out using the relative strength methodology of
this dissertation, the probability is high that such a test would
yield few signs of inefficiency.
It thus appears that in the US, it is highly probable that most types
of transaction information are treated most efficiently (Stage III).
The exceptions lie only with the longer terms. It is possible that
such inefficienci es exist because technicians are usually short term
traders and hence do not attempt to exploit such inefficiencies.
(B) Efficiency of Malaysian market in Respect of Price
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Periodicity
For periods of less than a year, there appears to be some
non-randomness in Malaysian stock prices. It is perhaps important to
point out there appears to be no economic reason why there should be
any cycle over the short term. The technicians' belief is apparently
based on something that is akin to the lunar or seasonal cycle. While
there could be behavioral and psychological reasons why there should
be short term cycles, over the long run such cyclicalities are
unimportant. Such cycles, if they ever exist, are likely to be self
cancelling owing to their probable non-synchronous nature, (there is
some evidence of this showing up in the relative strength test).
For period of one year, there appears to be some non-randomness
surrounding the Chinese Lunar Year. As shown by Rozeff and Kinney,
autocorrelation may not be the best way to test for cyclicality. By
using non-parametric tests, the US prices have been made to show
strong signs of non-randomness although autocorrelation tests reveal
no sign of such. It is very possible that a replication of Rozeff and
Kinney's method on the Malaysian prices will reveal similar one year
periodicity since Malaysian prices show up more non-randomness under
auto-correlation tests. While the US market demonstrates a one year
cycle which is probably tied to the year-end tax selling, such a
cycle in the Malaysian market is probably less rational. It is
possible that the general "cheeriness" surrounding the Chinese New
Year may result in some of the investors willing to "take a
flutter". There is no evidence to support this presently. This would
be an interesting area for future research.
At the four year level, there is again only minor sign of
non-i~andomness. This is perhaps not surprising as the US cycle is
believed to be tied to the presidential election cycle (Allvine and
O'Neill) which does not exist in a similar form in Malaysia.
(C) Efficiency of the Malaysian Market In Respect of Moving Average
Information
Overall, it is not possible to demonstrate that the use of moving
average trading methods over the long run (8 and 16 years) can yield a
greater return than the buy-and-hold method although the return
obtained is relatively better than that obtained in a similar test
performed in the US (Van Horne and Parker). However, this superficial
reading of the result masks several important findings.
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Firstly, it has been shown that the individual stock return achievable
is very sensitive to the beta of the stock as well as the return on
the stock during the period tested. Secondly, the overall return
achievable is also very sensitive- to the price behavior of the
market during the duration of the test. Thirdly, the test result is
sensitive to the price level at the starting and ending points. If
the test is started at a time of low general price level and ends at
a time of high price level (as with the current test), the result is
likely to be bias in favour of the buy-and-hold method. Ideally, this
test should endeavour to start and end in years which are more or
less at the "mid-point" of the price trend (if there can be any
agreement on what constitutes the mid-point of a price trend). Lastly,-
it can also be seen that some stocks have more pronounced cycles than
others which make them more suited for this trading method.
Therefore, until more research is done in this area, it. would be
premature to conclude that in less sophisticated markets than the US,
the moving average method cannot be made to yield superior return
than buy-and-hold for all stocks and for all times.
(D) Efficiency of The Malaysian Market In Respect Of Relative
Strength Information
This test is designed to uncover short term price cycles (of less than
26 weeks) if such cycles exist. The test reveals that it is possible
to uncover statistically significant departures from pure randomness
in Malaysian stock prices by the use of this trading method. However,
in quantitative terms, the amount of abnormal gain to be exploited is
small, barely covering the transaction cost in the best cases. There
appears to be several reasons why this is so. The first reason
appears to be that the method is not capable of "catching" a price
rise early enough to yield maximum gain. The second reason is that
different stocks conform to different short term cycles and by its
nature, the relative strength test, of one length is only efficient in
showing up cycles of that length. The third reason is that such
cyclicalities appear to be random in their occurence.
It is interesting to note that this test is able to uncover some sign
of inefficiency which the moving average test cannot. The important
difference between the two is the different time frame of the test.
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The moving average test is designed for uncovering long term cycles
(socalled primary cycles of about 3—4 years). As stated earlier, the
type of investors who are more likely to display irrationality of this
type are likely to be the floating investors. Since by definition
they are more interested in the short term, it is perhaps not so
surprising that the moving average test cannot reveal any
inefficiency on an overall basis while the relative strength test
does.
(E) Summary Comments on the Efficiency of the Malaysian Market In
Respect of Transaction Information
In conclusion it is possible to say that the Malaysian market appears
to be less efficient than the US market overall. While signs of
inefficiency exist, they generally exist for short durations and for
individual stocks only. In order to show up such inefficiencies more
clearly, the test methods probably have be refined and
individualised. When applied to all stocks over the long term, the
test methods do not yield much inefficiency. To the extent that it is
possible to make an overall comment, the inefficiencies which exist
seem to be one of time. That is, non-randomness does exist but there
is little time for exploiting them. In that sense therefore the
Malaysian market seems to attain Stage II rather than Stage III
effciency compared with the US. In terms of moving average
information it appears to be close to Stage III.
9.2.2.2 - THE MARKET EFFICIENCY OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
(A) General Comments on the Efficiency of the US Market




(d) Earnings Forecast Error.
It is more difficult to make an overall comment regarding the
efficiency of the US market with respect to these four types of
information. They will hence be considered individually.
Dividend Yield - The uncertainty surrounding the efficiency of
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this type of information has been discussed fully in Section 4.3.2.
Overall this writer leans toward the belief that the US market is
highly efficient with regard to dividend information in general and
probably very efficient with regard to dividend yield information in
specific.
Dividend Growth - There is no previous work on precisely this
type of information. However, very similar work has been carried out
by Watts on dividend change, EPS change and return and by Jones,
Tweedie and Wh\tlington on EPS growth, PER and return. Both these
tests reveal close to Stage III efficiency for respectively the US
and British markets. In addition, other work in this area by Pettit
and Aharony and Swary (speed of adjustment to dividend change) again
show that the US market is close to Stage III efficient with respect
to dividend change information. This writer therefore feels that had
similar test been carried out in the US market, dividend growth
information is likely to be treated very efficiently (probably close
to Stage III).
Stock Split - The US market has been shown to be highly efficient
with regard to stock split information.
Earnings Forecast Error - This type of information is not treated
with as great an efficiency as the three previous types. On the whole
recent tests seem to indicate that even the US market takes about six
months for stock prices to adjust fully to earnings forecast errors.
The market is therefore only Stage II efficient.
To the extent that is possible, we can therefore conclude that the US
market appears to treat these four types of information very
efficiently with the exception of earnings forecast error which is
treated quite efficiently.
(B) Efficiency of the Malaysian Market in respect of the Dividend
Yield Information
The work carried out shows that for most of the periods tested there
is almost no significant relationship between dividend yield and
return after six months (the mean coefficient being -0.007 and the
mean F-value being 1.079). Over one year, there is slightly more
significant relationship with the mean coefficient at -0.023 and the
mean F-value at 1.96. The negative mean coefficient implies that if
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there is any relationship, the relationship is in the opposite
direction to that discovered by Blume.
It is very difficult to make any statement regarding the efficiency
of the Malaysian market with respect to dividend yield information.
As explained in Section 4.3.2.1, the true informational value of
dividend yield is extremely complex and cannot be readily analysed.
The fact that there is a lack of correlation between dividend yield
data and realised return cannot be taken to mean automatically that
the market understands fully the relationship between dividend yield
and return and is therefore highly efficient, it is possible for the
dividend yield information to be not used at all which would give
rise to the same lack of correlation between dividend yield and
return. Any conclusion based purely on this one test would therefore
be extremely risky.
To the very small extent that we can make any sort of judgement,
there are indications that dividend yield information is used to a
small degree. The evidence lies in the fact that over one year, there
is a more significant negative relationship between dividend yield
and return compared with six month. This could be taken as indication
that there is a slight investors' preference for high yield stocks
which proves to be not justifiable. This conjecture is given some
support by the Dividend Growth test which will be discussed later in
this section. Both tests seem to indicate that Malaysian investors
have some tendency to use historical dividend data to guide their
investment decisions. It would be necessary to do further tests in
this area before any stronger conclusion can be made. However, if this
conjecture stands up, it would mean that in respect of dividend yield
information, the Malaysian market is only Stage I efficient. That is,
it appears to make use of dividend yield information but uses it
incorrectly.
(C) Efficiency of the Malaysian Market in respect of Dividend
Growth Information
The work of Pettit and others has shown that the US market possesses a
remarkable degree of prescience regarding future direction of
dividend changes. One can probably attribute this ability to the
existence of a large number of publications providing dividend
forecast for the listed firms (for example, a US broker firm this
writer is familiar with provides a monthly update of 5-year dividend
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growth rate forecast for over 500 firms). Given that firms like
Valueline are known to provide reasonably accurate forecasts, it is
not surprising that the market has a high degree of prescience. In
Malaysia, there is no such service available to the investors at
large. Under such a situation, it would not be surprising for
investors to rely on past data to guide their investment decision
making if they make any sort of investigation at all.
The basis of the dividend growth test is the belief that Malaysian
investors do rely to some extent on past dividend record for their
investment decision making. The test result shows that the socalled
Class A firms (those with high and consistent DPS growth rate)
provide a much lower return than the market average (statistically
highly significant for one year after selection). This would seem to
imply that there is a degree of "bidding up" in the price of stocks
which have performed well in the immediate past. Such bidding up
leads to poorer return on these stocks. It would seem that the
Malaysian investors' inability to get information early enough
(unlike the US investors) leads to this type of inefficiency. In this
sense the Malaysian market is only Stage II efficient. (It may be
even arguable that it can classed as Stage I efficient because it
makes decision using the wrong information (as against outdated
information)). It is therefore evident that it is less efficient than
the US market pertaining to this type of information.
(D) Efficiency of the Malaysian Market in respect of Stock Split
Information
The result of the test on stock splits appears to give very clear
indication of inefficiency among the Malaysian investors. The test
result confirms the superficial impression a student of that market
may have from press comments and investors' reaction on stock splits
that the market has an erroneous understanding of the value of a
stock split (that is, Stage I efficiency). It is interesting to note
the very strong evidence of Stage I efficiency in this case compared
with the less strong evidence of Stage II efficiency in respect of
dividend growth and earnings forecast error information to be
discussed next.
This writer believes that this is probably a manifestation of the
two-tier market discussed earlier. The sharp rise in prices of stocks
undergoing split around the time of announcement can only mean that a
.325
sufficiently large number of investors buy the shares on speculation
that stock splits are events of advantage. It is less likely that
experienced investors be numbered among the buyers. In fact it is
more likely that they would be the sellers since they probably
understand the real meaning of stock splits. It is therefore the
floating investors who give rise to this sign of inefficiency. Such
speculations around the time of stock splits are not likely to have
any long term effect. This is indeed so, as shown by the fact that
one year after the split announcement, the Cumulated Average Residual
is back to nearly 0.0.
(E) Efficiency of the Malaysian Market in respect of Earning
Forecast Error (EFE) Information.
This test is based on the belief that the market has a prior
expectation of the EPS of listed firms and if the actual EPS is
different from its expectation, there will be price adjustment in the
same direction as the forecast error. The test conducted permits one
to make two important statements about the Malaysian market
(a) The market seems to have a prior expectation of the amount of EPS
that the listed firms will announce (at least insofar as the sample
firms are concerned): and
(b) The market does react in the same direction and magnitude to
earnings forecast errors albeit quite slowly.
The test shows that the relationship between EFE and abnormal return
is highly significant nine months (on average) after the earnings
announcements. After a lapse of 14 months, there is still some degree
of correlation. We can conclude therefore that in respect of EFE
information, the Malaysian market is quite efficient, almost as
efficient as the US market. It differs only in the speed of reaction.
In the US, the correlation appears to be nearly over after 6 months
while the response here takes more than twice as long. It therefore
demonstrate Stage II efficiency in respect of EFE information.
(F) Summary Comments on the Efficiency of the Malaysian Market in
respect of Accounting Information
In conclusion we can say that in respect of three of the four types
of accounting information tested, the Malaysian market shows greater
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degree of inefficiency. In repect of stock split and dividend growth
information, the inefficiency is much greater. In repect of EFE
information, the inefficiency is only a little greater. The evidence
in support of inefficiency pertaining to dividend yield information
is too weak for making any strong assertion. It thus appears that
overall, the Malaysian market is much less efficient with regard to
accounting information.
9.2.3 - CONCLUSIONS IN RESPECT OF THE FINAL OBJECTIVE -
PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MODEL FOR STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY
The proposed model (the Mosaic Model) of stockmarket efficiency has
been previously described in Section 1.4.4.3 and has been summarised
at the beginning of this chapter. There will therefore be no further
restatement of its salient points in this section. The Mosaic Model
of stockmarket efficiency was developed in the first place based on
the literature review previously described under Chapters Three, Four
and Five. Since the literature review was conducted using research
publications from the West, more particularly the publications from
the US and Britain, the universal validity of the model would be in
doubt if not further tested. Especially since the US and British
markets are probably among the most developed there are. If the model
is to have wider application, it must be tested in different
environment, an environment which is very different that that of
West. The Malaysian market has been chosen for testing the model
precisely because it is so different. In this section, we shall
examine the how well does the model perform in respect of its four
important features when applied to the Malaysian stockmarket.
(A) Stocks Markets are Not Identical in terms of Informational
Efficiency
This feature of the model appears to hold up well when applied to the
Malaysian market. The summary table below shows how differently the
Malaysian market treat different types of information using the
schema developed in Section 1.4.3.
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DEGREE OF EFFICIENCY IN RESPECT OF EACH MARKET
INFORMATION TYPE US MARKET MALAYSIAN MARKET
PRICE PERIODICITY STAGE II/III
MOVING AVERAGE STAGE III
STAGE II/III
STAGE II/III







DIVIDEND GROWTH PROBABLY STAGE III STAGE I/II
EARNINGS FORECAST
ERROR STAGE II/III STAGE II
As has been shown in Section 9.2.3, when examined in detail, the
differences are even larger. There is therefore little doubt that
statement regarding the efficiency of a particular market cannot be
automatically applied to another market. Market can and do behave
very differently in respect of individual pieces of information.
(B) Environmental Differences Lead to Differences in Efficiency
In Section 9.2.1 it has been shown that the Malaysian market
environment is very different from that of the US, especially in terms
of the wide variations in the literacy and objectives of the
participants and the amount of public information available. From
these special features of the environment, it is possible to develop
some prior expectations regarding the likely behavior of the market.
From this we can predict that if there were to be any inefficiencies,
they are more likely to be in the following areas
(a) Short term rather than long term because the less knowledgeable
investors appear to operate on a "floating" basis;
(b) Information of a more complex rather than simple straightforward
nature; and
(c) Information which requires a great deal of research and
comprehensive record rather than commonly available information.
As the results from the seven tests show; the actual behavior of the
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market appears to fit in well with our prior expectations. In term of
similar type of transaction information, the short term method
(relative strength) yields more inefficiency than the long term
method (moving average). The same comments may be made with regard
to price cycles.
In term of information of different complexity, we see that moving
average information is reasonably efficiently treated while dividend
growth information is less efficiently treated. At first glance, it
may seem that the inefficiency with which the market deals with stock
split information is contrary to our expectation. However, from this
writer's experience, it is very difficult to convince investors with
no background in finance that a stock split is not "something for
nothing".
In term of information which requires a great deal of research, it is
obvious that information like dividend growth and EFE are likely to
be treated with less than perfect efficiency.
As has been shown in the tests, the above expectations are indeed
proved to be correct. It thus appears that environment has a great
deal of influence on the efficiency of a particular market. The fact
that EMH emerged from the US is perhaps not at all surprising
considering the advanced state of the securities market there.
Similarly, it is perhaps also not surprising that the Mosaic Model
should be proposed by a person from a much less developed market.
(C) There is No Uniform Rule Regarding the Behavior of a Particular
Market in respect of a Particular Group of Information
The proposed model takes issue with the Fama's model with regard to
the concept that different types of information of a grouping such as
"weak" or "semi-strong" are supposed to be treated in similar manner
by the market. While it is t e that superficially, the socalled weak
form information requires less effort to unearth than the semi-strong
information, there are many possible exceptions to this rule (which
have beend discussed in Section 1.3.1). Thus we have seen that there
is some evidence of inefficiency in terms of annual and four-year price
cycles which seems to be the simplest data there are to unearth.
Similarly, we have seen that one of the simpler information of the
semi-strong' type - stock split - is treated with the greatest amount
of inefficiency. It is thus very risky to extrapolate a market's
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behavior over the whole range of information from its behavior
regarding one particular type.
(D) A Stock Market Is Not Uniform in terms of Time and Market
Sector
While it is fairly obvious that different stock markets are likely to
be different in terms of efficiency, it is further hypothesised that
even the same market can behave differently across time and within
its different sectors. This feature of the hypothesis is less
supported by the results of tests carried out than the others. While
it is clear from the work done in the West that different market
sectors can behave very differently (e.g. the "small firm effect"),
there has been less work specifically addressed to the comparative
study of informational efficiency of a single type of information
across time. However, there are some indications from the current
series of test that this part of the hypothesis is likely to be
correct as well. As shown in the stock split and the moving average
tests, the second half of the research period seems to be more
efficient than the first half. And as shown by the stock split and
EFE tests, the "short term" market is much less efficient than the
"long term".
(E) Summary of Section 9.2.3
In the final analysis, the Mosaic Model appears to have good
explanatory and predictive power with regard to market efficiency. As
hypothesised, the US market looks very different from the Malaysian
market on an overall basis. Using the lithographic analogy first
introduced in Chapter One, we can say that the US market is one which
is largely covered with white dots with a sprinkling of medium and
dark grey dots. The Malaysian market by contrast appears to be made
up of a large proportion of light grey dots and perhaps smaller,
roughly equal proportions of medium and dark grey dots. Overall
therefore the Malaysian market has much greyer appearance than the




— Suggestions For Future Reseajrco
Given the limited resources available for a Ph. D. dissertation, the
research work that was begun for this project has to be ended at a
more or less arbitrary point. Given less limiting circumstances,
there are many possibilities for continuing work in this area. This
is especially so given the very "green field" nature of the Malaysian
market. This dissertation has identified three general areas where it
is thought that useful further research may be carried out:-
(1) Extending the tests as carried out over larger samples and longer
periods of time;
(2) Modifying current tests and carrying out new tests in the light
of the results shown up by the first series of tests; and
(3) Conducting some of the tests designed for this project using
different set of data from some other countries.
9.3.1 - EXTENDING THE CURRENT TESTS
There are many constraints placed on a project of this nature and as
a result, the tests as carried out are not ideal. Among the
limitations imposed are:-
(a) Artificial starting and ending points;
(b) Limited sample size; and
(c) The need to limit the dissertation to a manageable length.
If such limitations do not exist, it is possible to do more even
within the bounds of the tests conducted. Some of the ways by which
the current tests may be extended are described below.
(A) Extend the Period of the Research
Given that the start of the research period is determined by
available resources and the end determined by the completion of the
dissertation itself, the period of the research is not necessarily
ideal. There are several improvements which can be made.
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Firstly, given the short history of the market, there is much to be
said for extending the research to the beginning of its official
existence (1961). This is only a further seven years back and
although it would require considerably more resources and not all
data would be complete, it would give a unique view of the
development of a stockmarket from its birth. It would be interesting
to observe how the market may have changed with its development.
Secondly, the Moving Average test is sensitive to the market level at
the beginning and end of the test period. A longer test period would
make it possible to start and end the test at more unbias points.
(B) Enlarging the Size of the Sample
The sample used covers from 28% to 48% of the population numerically
although the coverage in terms of market value is very much bigger.
There are several advantages to be gained by enlarging the sample
size.
Firstly, it is possible that given the market environment, the
efficiency of information pertaining to large companies may be very
different from that of the small. It would be very interesting if
such tests as the Dividend Growth and the EFE tests could be
extended to cover the smaller companies.
Secondly, some of the tests are not rigorous enough given the small
size of the sample. There is much to be gained if the Dividend Yield
test could be based on a larger sample so that it can replicate more
closely Blume's original test method.
(C) Extending the Tests Carried out
Owing to the necessity of limiting this dissertation to a reasonable
length, the EFE test is terminated although the available data are
sufficient for carrying out a more extensive test.
A useful extension would be to turn the EFE test into a "two sided"
test rather than one in which only the post announcement reaction to
EPS is examined. It would provide more conclusive evidence of the
existence of differences between markets if the pre-announcement
reaction could be examined.
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9.3.2 - MODIFYING CURRENT TESTS AND CARRYING OUT NEW TESTS
(A) Modifying the Current Tests
There are several improvements/extensions which may be made to the
current tests.
Firstly, it would seem that non-parametric tests can be applied to
examine price periodicity more closely. If the US experience is any
guide, there is likely to be more signs of inefficiency there.
Secondly, the Moving Average test can be possibly be refined to enable
it to pick out stocks with higher mobility. Beta coefficients and
possibly "market leadership" can be used as screening factors in the
first instance.
Thirdly, the Relative Strength test can also be improved if it is
used in combination with the result from the periodicity tests. That
is, the Relative Strength test can be applied to stocks with known
cyclicality.
(B) Applying New Tests
An interesting additional test would be to carry out some sort of
volume test. Owing to the shortage of time, it is not possible to
design and complete a test for the efficiency in respect of volume
information. This type of information is rarely tested although
technicians are supposed to use it extensively.
Another test of interest would bean "Intrinsic Value" test to
validate the fundamentalists' investment method. This test would be
difficult to design as the concept of intrinsic value is not a simple
one to define. However, Oppenheimer and Schlarbaum have shown that
even using a simplified form of intrinsic value, the US market can be
made to yield abnormal returns. It is possible that the same method
may be applicable to the Malaysian market.
As mentioned earlier in this section, this dissertation has
concentrated on efficiency tests although a lot of the data gathered
into the database can be further analysed. A very large amount of
data relating to individual stock return and behavior of beta is now
., , 333available which has not yet been analysed. There is certainly much
which can be done in the way of comparing these information and
behavior patterns with those of the Western markets.
9.3.3 - SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCH IN OTHER COUNTRIES
So far, the suggestions for further research are meant to be applied
to the Malaysian market. However, the findings of this research and
the support they provide for the Mosaic Model would suggest that
further useful research can be counducted in other countries/markets.
On a larger scale, there are several securities markets in the East to
which little in-depth research has been carried out; for example,
Hong Kong, Bangkok and Taiwan. Judging by press comments from these
markets, it would seem that these markets share some common features
with the Malaysian market and they would be interesting grounds for
research. Within a large and complex market like the US, there are
also market sectors which require further examination. One's
impression is that the OTC market in the US or the USM in the UK
shares some common characteris tics with the Malaysian market and
they would be an interesting areas to test, the Mosaic Model.
In a similar fashion, the time dimension of market efficiency has
been little examined even in the well researched US market. It would
seem that there are useful areas for research there. For example, it
would be interesting to go back to the earlier years of the US market
and examine its efficiency with regard to Stock Split information.
Similarly tests on transaction information can probably be usefully
performed on data going back to the beginning of this century.
On a smaller scale, it would be interesting to examine a local
feature like the Chinese New Year effect (if it exists) in markets
which use the Lunar calender and New Year and contrast this with the
behavior over the period in countries using the Gregorian calender.
Moving away from pure efficiency tests, other features of the
hypothesised model would require more examination. The relationship
between information availability and efficiency would be an area
which can be usefully researched. Another possible area for research,
although it is difficult at this point to give any concrete
suggestion, would be the effect of investors' belief and literacy on
stockmarket efficiency.
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9-4 — Implications Of* The Study
This study has given rise to some implications for various groupings
of people connected with the securities market, specifically the
Researchers, the Investors and the Policy Makers. The implications in
respect of each grouping will be discussed separately below.
9.4.1 - IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCHERS
(A) This study has shown that it is not possible to make generalised
comments across different stockmarkets or even within the same market
in respect of informational efficiency. Researchers have to be more
specific when making assertions about market efficiency.
(B) This study has shown that market efficiency cannot be
automatically assumed. Certain factors can have important influence
on market efficiency. When researchers are examining a new market for
its efficiency, they have to be aware of the environmental factors in
the first place.
(C) Given the validity of the hypothesis proposed, there are
interesting areas for further research in stockmarket efficiency.
(D) In conclusion it would appear that the efficiency debate is still
not over, further research in new directions would be required.
9.4.2 - IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTORS
(A) Investors ought to be aware that investment techniques which are
successful in one particular market may not be useful in another
market. This is particularly so in respect of the less developed
markets like Malaysia's where there are considerable signs of short
term inefficiency,
(B) Although this fact is not given emphasis in the concluding
section of this dissertation, it would seem that less developed
335
markets are much more risky in terms of variability of stock return.
The higher return which has been obtainable may not be adequate
compensation for the higher riskiness.
9.4.3 - IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS
This section is written based on the assumption that the relevent
policy makers believe that it is desirable for the government to
interfere in the securities market. This may not be true in all
countries.
(A) In so far as it is desirable to have an efficient securities
market so as to achieve efficient capital allocation, this study
appears to show that it may be possible to improve the efficiency of
a particular stockmarket. One possible step would be for the
government to require much higher level of disclosure at the listed
company level. Another possible step to take would be to require the
listed firms to state clearly the true financial implications of all
public announcements.
(B) As it has been shown that greater degree of inefficiency is
associated with the short term rather than the long term, it is
perhaps also desirable for the government to encourage long term
investment. This can be done, as in Australia, by applying




"ADAM SMITH" (Pseud) (1967)
The Money Game.
New York, Random House.
"ADAM SMITH" (Pseud) (1972)
Super Money.
New York, Random House.
AHARONY J. AND I. SWARY (1980)
Quarterly Dividend and Earning Announcements and Stockholders Return
Journal of Finance, Vol. 35, No. 1 pp 1-12
AKERLOF G.A. (1970)
The Market for "Lemons" : Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism.
Quaterly Journal of Economics, Vol 89 pp 488-500.
ALEXANDER S. S. (1961)
Price Movements in Speculative Markets : Trend or Random Walks.
Unplublished, can be found in Cootner (1964) pp 338-372
ALLVINE F.C. AND D.E. O'NEILL (1980)
Stock Market Return and Presidential Election Cycles.
Finanical Analysts Journal, Sept-Oct 1980 pp 49-56
ASQUIT P. AND D.W. MULLINS (1983)
The Impact of Initial Dividend Payments on Shareholders' Wealth.
Journal of Business. Vol. 56, No. 1 pp 77-96
BALL R. AND P. BROWN (1968)
An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Numbers.
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol 6, No 2 pp 159-178
BALL R. AND R. WATTS (1972)
Some Time Series Properties of Accounting Incomes.
Journal of Finance, Vol 27, No 3 pp 663-682
BANZ R.W. (1981)
The Relationship between Returns and Market Values of Common Stocks.
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 9, No 1 pp 3-18
BARRY C.B. AND S.J. BROWN (1983)
Differential Information and the Small Firm Effect.
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 12, pp 283-294
BAR-YOSEF S. AND L.D. BROWN
A Re-examination of Stock Splits using Moving Betas.
Journal of Finance, Vol 32, No 4 pp 1069-1080
BASU S. (1977)
Investment Performance of Common Stocks Relative to their Price
Earnings Ratios : A Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.
Journal of Finance, Vol 32, No 3 pp663-682
BAUMOL W.J. (1965)
The Stock Market and Economic Efficiency.
New York, Fordham University Press
BEAVER W.H. (1968)
The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements.
Suppl. on Empirical Research in Accounting,
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol 6, pp 67-92
BEAVER W.H. (1970)
The Time Series Behavior of Earnings.
Journal of Accounting Research, Suppl. to Vol 8 pp 62-99
BEAVER W.H. (1981a)
Financial Reporting : An Accounting Revolution.
Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall 1981
BEAVER W.H. (1981b)
Market Efficiency.
Accounting Research, Vol 56, No 1 pp 24-38
BEAVER W.H. AND D. MORSE (1978)
What Determines Price-Earnings Ratios.
Financial Analysts Journal, Jul-Aug 1978 pp 65-76
BEAVER W.H., A.A. CHRISTIES AND P.A. GRIFFIN (1980)
The Information Content of SEC Accounting Series Release 190.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol 2, No 2 pp 127-157
BEAVER W.H., R. CLARKE AND W. WRIGHT (1979)
The Association between Unsystematic Security Returns and Magnitude of
Earnings Forecast Errors.
Journal of Accounting research, Vol 17, No 31 pp 316-340
BEAVER W.H., R. LAMBERT AND D. MORSE (1980)
The Information Content of Securities Prices.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol 2, No 1 pp 3-28
BLACK F. (1971)
Implications of the Random Walk Hypothesis for Portfolio Management
Financial Analysts Journal, March-April 1971, pp 16-22
BLACK F. (1972)
Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing.
Journal of Business, Vol 45, No 3 pp 444-455
BLACK F. (1973)
"Yes, Virginia there is hope" : Tests of the Value Line Ranking
System.
Financial Analysts Journal, Sept-Oct 1973, Letter to Editor ppl0-14
BLACK F. AND M. SCHOLES (1974)
The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock
Prices and Returns.
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 1, No 1 ppl-22
BLACK F., M.C. JENSEN AND M. SCHOLES (1972)
The Capital Assets Pricing Model : Some Empirical Tests.
Unpu blished, reprinted in Jensen (1972)
BLUME M.E. (1975)
Betas and their Regressive Tendency.
Journal of Finance, Vol 30, No 3 pp 785-796
BLUME M.E. (1980)
Stock Returns and Dividend Yield Some More Evidence.
Review of Economics and Statistical, Vol 62, No 4 pp 567-577
BLUME M.E. AND I. FRIEND (1973)
A New Look at the Capital Assets Pricing Model.
Journal of Finance, Vol 28, No 1 pp 19-33
BLUME M.E. AND I. FRIEND (1978)
The Changing Role of the Individual Investors
John Wiley, New York
BREALEY R.A. (1971)
Security Prices irx a Competitive Market : More about Risk and Return
from Common Stocks
Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press 1971
BREEN W. (1968)
Low PER and Industry Relatives.
Financial Analysts Journal, Jul-Aug 1968 pp 125-127
BROWN S.L. (1978)
Earnings Changes, Stock Prices and Market Efficiency.
Journal of Finance, Vol 33, No 1 pp 17-28
BROWN P., D.B. KEIM, A.W. KLEIDON AND T.A. MARSH (1983)
Stock Return Seasonalities and the Tax-Loss Selling Hypothesis.
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 12 pp 105-127
BROWN P. AND J. KENNELLY (1972)
The Information Content of Quarterly Earnings.
Journal of Business, Vol 45, No 3 pp 403-421
BROWN P., A.W. KLEIDON AND T.A. MARSH (1983)
New Evidence on the Nature of Size-Related Annually in Stock Price.
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 12 pp 33-56
BROWN P. AND V. NIEDERHOFFER (1968)
The Predictive Content of Quarterly Earnings.
Journal of Business, Vol 41, No 4 pp 488-497
340
BROWN L.D. AND M.S. ROZEFF (1978)
The Superiority of Analysts' Forecasts as Measures of Expectation :
Evidence for Earnings.
Journal of Finance, Vol 33, No 1 pp 1-16
CHANT P.D. (1980)
On the Predictability of Corporate Earnings Per Share Behavior.
Journal of Finance, Vol 35, No 1 pp 13-21
CHEYARA K., J. BOATSMAN AND R0 (1980)
Market Reaction to the 1976 Replacement Cost Disclosure
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol 2, No 2 pp 107-125
CONRAD K. AND D.J. JUTTNER (1973)
Recent Behavior of Stock Market Prices in Germany and R.W.H..
Kyklos, Vol 26, pp 576-599
C00TNER P.H. (1962)
Stock Prices : Random versus Systematice Changes.
Industrial Management Review, Vol 3, No 2 pp 24-45
COOTNER P.H. (1964) (ED)
The Random Character of Stock Market Prices.
Cambridge, MIT Press
CRAGG J.G. AND B.G. ALKIEL (1968)
The Consensus and Accuracy of Some Predictions of Growth of Corporate
Earnings.
Journal of Finance, Vol 23, No 1 pp 67-84
DAWSON S.M. (1982)
Journal of Portfolio Management 1982, Spring pp 17-20
DAWSON S.M. (1984)
The Trend Towards Efficiency for Less Developed Stock Exchanges: Hong
Kong.
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol 11, No 2 pp 151-161
DIMSON E. (1979)
Risk Measurement when Shares are Subject to Infrequent Trading.
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 7, No 2 pp 197-226
DREMAN D.N. (1977)
Psychology and the Stock Market
New York, AMACOM
FAMA E.F. (1963)
Mandelbrot and the Stable Paretian Distribution.
Journal of Business, Vol 36, No 4 pp 420-429
FAMA E.F. (1965)
The Behavior of Stock Market Prices
Journal of Business, Vol 38, No 1 pp 34-105
FAMA E.F. (1970)
Efficient Capital Markets : A Review of Theories and Empirical Work.
Journal of Finance, Vol 25, No 2 pp 383-417
FAMA E.F. AND BABIAK (1968)
Dividend Policy : An Empirical Analysis.
Journal of American Statistical Association 1968 Dec. pp 1132-1162
FAMA E.F. AND M.E. BLUME (1966)
Filter Rule and Stock Market Trading.
Journal of Business, Vol 39, No 1, Jan 1966
FAMA E.F., L. FISHER, M.C. JENSEN AND R. ROLL (1969)
The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information.
International Economic Review, Vol 10, No 2 pp 1-21
FISHER L. (1966)
Some New Stock Market Indices
Journal of Business, Suppl. to Vol 39, No 1 pp 191-225
FISHER L. AND J.H. LORIE (1964)
Rates of Return on Investment in Common Stocks
Journal of Business, Vol 37, No 1 pp 1-21
FISHER L. AND J.H. LORIE (1968)
Rates of Return on Investment in Common Stocks : The Year-by-Year
Record (1926-1965).
Journal of Business, Vol 41, No 3, pp 291-316
FISHER L. AND J.H. LORIE (1970)
Some Studies of the Variability of Return on Investment in Common
Stocks.
Journal of Business, Vol 43, No 2 pp 99-134
FOGLER H.R., K. JOHN AND J. TIPTON (1981)
Three Factors, Interest Rate Differential and Stock Groups.
Journal of Finance, Vol 36, No 2, pp 323-335
FOSTER G. (1975)
Accounting Earnings and Stock Prices of Insurance Companies.
Accounting Research, vol 50, No 4 PP 686-698
FRANCIS J.C. (1972)







New York, Harper and Row
GRAHAM B. AND D. DODD (1934)
Security Analysis.
New York, McGraw-Hill
GRAHAM B., D. DODD AND S. COTTLE (1962)
Security Analysis.
New York, McGraw-Hill
GRANGER C.W.J. AND 0. MORGENSTERN (1963)
Spectral Analysis of New York Stock prices.
Kyklos, Vol 16 pp 1-27
GRANGER C.W.J. AND 0. MORGENSTERN (1970)
The Predictability of Stock Market Prices.
Lexington, Heath-Lexington
343
GREEN D. AND J. SEGALL (1967)
The Predictive Power of First Quarter Earnings Reports.
Journal of Business, Vol 40, No 1 pp 44-55
GREEN D. AND J. SEGALL (1968)
Brickbats and Straw Men : A Reply to Brown and Niederhoffer.
Journal of Business, Vol 41, No 4 pp 498-502
GREEN D. AND J. SEGALL (1970)
Return of the Straw Men.
Journal of Business, Vol 43, No 1, pp 63-65
GROSSMAN S.J. (1976)
On the Efficiency of Competitive market where Traders have Diverse
Information.
Journal of Finance, Vol 31, No 2 pp 573-585
GROSSMAN S.J. AND R.J. SHILLER (1981)
The Determinants of the Variability of Stock Prices.
American Economic Review, Vol 71, No 2 pp 222-227
GROSSMAN S.J. AND J.E. STIGLITZ (1980)
On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Market.
American Economic Review, Vol 70, No 3 pp 393-408
GULTEKIN M.N AND N.B. GULTEKIN (1983)
Stock Market Seasonality : International Evidence.
Journal of Finance, Vol 12 pp 469-482
HAJIM E.A. (1982)
Something Old, Something New, Something Blue.
Published for private circulations among clients of Lehman Management
Co. Inc., New York
IBBOTSON R.G. AND R.A. SINQUEFELD (1977)
Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation : The Past (1926-1976) and the
Future (1977-2000).
New York, Financial Analysts Research Foundation
JAFFE J.F. (1974)
Special Information and Insider Trading.
Journal of Business, Vol 47, No 3 pp 410-429
JAMES C. AND R.O. EDMINSTER (1983)
The Relationship Between Common Stock Returns, Trading Activity and
Market Value.
Journal of Finance, Vol 38, No 4 pp 1075-1086
JENSEN M.C. (1967)
Random Walks : Reality or Myth - Comments.
Financial Analysts Journal, Nov-Dec 1967 pp 77-85
JENSEN M.C. (1968)
The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964.
Journal of Finance, Vol 25, No 2 pp 389-416
JENSEN M.C. (1972) (ED)
Studies in the Theories of Capital Market.
New York, Praeger
JENSEN M.C. AND G.A. BENNINGTON (1970)
Random Walks and Technical Theories : Some Additional Evidence.
Journal of Finance, Vol 25, No 2 pp 469-481
JONES C.J., D.P. TWEEDIE AND G. WHITTINGTON (1976)
The Regression Portfolio: Statistical Investigation of a Relative
Decline Model.
Journal of Business and Accounting, Vol 3, No 2 pp 71-92
JOY O.M., R.H. LITZENBERGER AND R.W. McENALLY (1972)
The Adjustment of Stock Prices to Announcements of Unanticipated
Changes in Quarterly Earnings.
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol 15, No 2 pp 207-225
KAPLAN R.S. AND R. ROLL (1972)
Investors Evaluation of Accounting Information : Some Empirical
Evidence.
Journal of Business, Vol 45, No 2 pp 225-257
KEIM D.B. (1983)
The Size of Firms and the Year End Effect.
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 12, pp 13-32
KEIM D.B. AND R.F. STAMBAUGH (1984)
A Further Investigation of the Week End Effect.
Journal of Finance, Vol 39, No 3 pp 819-834
KENDALL M.G. (1953)
The Anal ysis of Economic Time Series Part I.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol 116, Pt. 1 pp 11-25
KING B.F. (1966)
Market and Industry Factor in Stock Price Behavior.
Journal of Business, Vol 39, No 1 pp 139-190
KUEHNER C.D. AND RENWICK (1980)
The Efficient Market - Random Walk Debate.
Unpublished, Reprinted in Levine (1980) pp 70-159
LEVINE (1980) (ED)
The Investment Manager's Handbook.
Homewood, Dow-Jones Irwin
LEVY R.A. (1967)
Random Walks : Reality or Myth?
Financial Analysts Journal, Nov-Dec 1967 pp 69-77
LEVY R.A. (1968)
Random Walks : Reality or Myth - Reply
Financial Analysts Journal, Jan-Feb 1968, pp 129-132
LEVY R.A. (1974)
Beta Coefficient as Predictor of Return
Financial Analysts Journal, Jan-Feb 1974 pp 61-69
LINDVALL J.R. (1977)
New Issue Corporate Bonds, Seasoned Market Efficiency and Yield
Spread.
Journal of Finance, Vol 32, No 4 pp 1057-1067
346
LINTNER J. (1975)
Inflation and Security Return.
Journal of Finance, Vol 30, No 2 pp 259-280
LINTNER J. AND R. GLAUBER (1967)
Higgledy Piggledy Growth in America.
Unpublished, reprinted in Lorie and Brealey (1978)
LITTLE I.M.D. (1962)
Higgledy Piggledy Growth.
Bull, of the Oxford Univ. Institute of Economics and Statistics, Vol
24, No 4 pp 389-412
LITTLE I.M.D. AND A.C.C RAYNER (1966)
Higgledy Piggledy Growth Again.
Oxford, Basil Blackwell
LORIE J. AND R. BREALEY (1972) (ED)
Modern Developments in Investment Management : A Book of Readings.
New York, Praeger
LORIE J. AND M.T. HAMILTON (1971)
Stock Market Indices.
Unpublished, reprinted in Lorie and Brehley (1972), pp 68-83
MALKIEL B.G. (1975)
A Random Walk Down Wall Street.
New York, W.W. Norton
MALKIEL B.G. (1977)
The Valuation of Closed-End Investment Company Shares.
Journal of Finance, Vol 32, No 3 pp 847-859
MANDELBROT B. (1963)
The Variations of Certain Speculative Prices.
Journal of Business, Vol 36, No 4 pp 394-419
MARKOWITZ H.M. (1952)
Portfolio Selection.
Journal of Finance, Vol 7, No 1 pp 77-91
MARSH P. (1978)
Equity Rights Issues and the Efficiency of the UK Stock Market.
Journal of Finance, Vol 34, No 4 pp 839-862
MILLER M.H. AND F. MODIGLIANI (1961)
Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares.
Journal of Business, Vol 34, No 4 pp 411-433
MODIGLIANI F. AND R.A. COHN (1979)
Inflation, Rational Valuation and the Market.
Financial Analysts Journal, Mar-Apr 1979 pp 24-44
MOORE A.B. (1962)
Some Characteristics of Changes in Stock Prices.
Extract from unpublished Ph.D. thesis, reprinted in Cootner (1964)
MURPHY J.E. AND H.W. STEVENSON (1967)
PER and Future Growth of Earnings.
Financial Analysts Journal, Nov-Dec 1967 pp 111-114
NIEDERHOFFER V. AND P.J. REGAN (1972)
Earnings Changes, Analysts' Forecasts and Stock Prices.
Financial Analysts Journal, May-Jun 1972, pp 65-71
OFFICER R.R. (1975)
Seasonality in Australian Capital Markets : Market Efficiency and
Empirical Issues.
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 2 pp 29-51
OPPENHEIMER H.R. AND G.G. SCHLARBAUM (1981)
Investing with Ben Graham : An Ex-ante Test of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol 16, No 3 pp
341-359
OSBORNE M.F.M. (1959)
Brownian Motion in the Stock Market.
Operational Research Vol 7, No 2 pp 145-173
THE UNIVERSITY ofEDINBURGH
£> INr





The Adjustment of Security Prices to the Disclosure of Replacement
Cost Accounting Information.
Journal of Finance. Vol 2, No 2 pp 159-189
ROLL R. (1981)
A Possible Explanation of the Small Firm Effect.
Journal of Finance, Vol 36, No 4 pp 879-888
ROSS R. (1983)
Vas 1st Das? The Turn-of-the-year Effect and the Return Premium of
Small Firms.
Journal of Portfolio Management 1983 Winter, pp 18-28
ROBERTS H.V. (1959)
Stock Market "Patterns" and Financial Analysis.
Journal of Finance, Vol 14, No 1 pp 1-10
ROSENBERG B.• AND A. RUDD (1982)
Factor Related and Specific Return of Cohimon Stocks, Serial
Correlation and Inefficiency.
Journal of Finance, Vol 37, No 2, pp 543-554
ROSS S.A. (1976)
The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Assets Pricing.
Journal of Economic Theories, Vol 13, No 3 pp 341-360
ROSS S.A. (1978)
The Current State of the Capital Assets Pricing Model.
Journal of Finance, Vol 33, No 3 pp 885-901
SAMUELSON P.A. (1965)
Proof the Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly.
Industrial Management Review, Vol 6, No 2 pp 41-49
SCHOLES M. AND J. WILLIAMS (1977)
Estimating Betas from Non Synchronous Data.
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 5, pp 309-327
350
SCHWERT G.W. (1983)
Size and Stock Return and Other Empirical Regularities.
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 12, pp3-12
SELIGMAN D. (1983)
Can You Beat the Stock Market?
Fortune, December 26, 1983
SHARPE W.F. (1963)
A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis.
Management Science, Vol 9, No 2 pp 271-293
SHARPE W.F. (1964)
Capital Asset Prices : A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions
of Risk.
Journal of Finance, Vol 19, No 3 pp 425-442
SHARPE W.F. (1966)
Mutual Funds Performance.
Journal of Business, Vol 39, No 1 pp 119-138
SHARPE W.F. AND G.M. COOPER (1972)
Risk-Return Classes of New York Stock Exchange Common Stocks.
Financial Analysts Journal, Mar-Apr 1972' pp 46-56
SHILLER R.J. (1981a)
Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes
in Dividend?
American Economic Review, Vol 71, No 3 pp 421-436
SHILLER R.J. (1981b)
The Use of Volatility Measures in Assessing Market Inefficiency.
Journal of Finance, Vol 36, No 2 pp 291-204
SHISKIN J. (1968)
Systematic Aspect of Stock Price Fluctuation.
Univ. of Chicago Seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices
Qouted by Kuehner and Renwick (1980)
SMITHERS J. (1980)
London Share Price Database.
London, London Graduate School of Business Studies
SOLNICK B.H. (1973)
Note on the Validity of the R.W.H. for European Stock Prices.
Journal of Finance, Vol 21, No 5 pp 1151-1159
SOLOMON E. (1955)
Economic Growth and Common Stock Value.
Journal of Business, Vol 28, No 3 pp 213-221
THEIL H. AND C.T. LEENDERS (1965)
Tomorrow on the Amsterdam S.E.
Journal of Businnes, Vol 38, No 3 pp 277-284
VAN HORNE J.C. AND C.G.C. PARKER (1967)
The Random Walk Theory : An Empirical Test.
Financial Analysts Journal, Nov-Dec 1967 pp 87-92
VERRECHIA R.E. (1979)
On the Theory of Informational Efficiency.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol 1, No 1 pp 77-90
WATTS R.L. (1973)
The Information Content of Dividend.
Journal of Business, Vol 46, No 2 pp 191-211
WATTS R.L. AND J.L. ZIMMERMAN (1980)
On the Irrelevence of Replacement Cost Disclosure for Security
Prices.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol 2, No 2 pp 95-106
WHITBECK V.S. AND M. KISOR (1963)
A New Tool in Investment Decision Making.
Financial Analysts Journal, May-Jun 1963 pp 55-62
WILLIAMS J.B. (1938)
The Theory of Investment Value.
Amsterdam, North-Holland
